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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This PhD aimed to understand the construct of psychopathy from an expert perspective 
and gain consensus on the fundamental components of the disorder. To assist with this, 
the research aimed to develop, refine and evaluate a new self-report measure of 
psychopathy that was in agreement with experts and captured the core aspects of the 
disorder relating to cognitive and affective functioning. The research also aimed to 
explore the role of implicit and explicit cognitive and affective processing in 
psychopathy, investigating how these processes present in the consensus definition and 
psychopathy defined through clinical measures. In doing so, the research aimed to 
further the understanding of implicit processing in psychopathy and current, more 
explicit, approaches to measurement.  
 
Study one comprised a review of the relevant literature and an expert Delphi survey. 
Thirty-two experts participated in the Delphi survey and this was completed over three 
rounds. Experts agreed that psychopathy could be understood through interpersonal 
factors, behavioural characteristics, deficits in cognition and affect, and developmental 
factors. As predicted, experts gravitated towards the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(PCL-R) definition of psychopathy and rated items relating to this as most important. It 
was also predicted that experts would capture the affective components of psychopathy 
in their understanding of the construct, but not cognition. Partial support was found for 
this. Nine items examining cognition and affect were included in a new self-report 
measure, the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment (PAPA). This 
allowed for a theoretical understanding of the construct that extended to assessment. 
 
Study two recruited 431 participants [310 university students (154 men and 156 
women) and 121 male prisoners] to evaluate the new self-report measure of 
psychopathy and to determine its value when assessing psychopathic cognition and 
affect. It was predicted that the PAPA would be positively associated with an existing 
self-report measure of psychopathy (i.e. the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale; 
LSRP), negative cognitive schema, positive cognitive schema, and negative affect. This 
was supported. The LSRP also positively correlated with positive and negative 
cognitive schema, and negative affect, thus providing further support for predictions 
stating that psychopathy would correlate with these variables. Exploratory factor 
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analysis extracted a two-component solution from the PAPA, which was underpinned 
by ‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’.  
 
Study three involved an in-depth interview with 50 students and 41 psychiatric patients 
to allow for further exploration of cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy. 
All participants were men. As expected, analyses indicated that psychopathy defined by 
experts and clinical measures were predicted by explicit and implicit cognition and 
affect assessed via the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL). Implicit 
processing was also found to be influenced by levels of psychopathy, with those scoring 
high on the disorder demonstrating more deficits. Contrary to expectation, implicit and 
explicit affect appeared to perform differently across samples. Nevertheless, results 
suggest that psychopathy assessment would benefit from the inclusion of implicit 
measures to assess for psychopathic processing. Self-report, observation, collateral 
review and items that explore lifestyle were also deemed important when assessing for 
the disorder. An evaluation of the PAPA found it to have acceptable levels of reliability 
and validity. 
 
The current research indicates that explicit and implicit cognitive and affective 
processing are integral aspects of psychopathy and need to be considered when 
assessing for the disorder. The research also points towards a change in the assessment 
of psychopathy, with the inclusion of different methods, such as implicit testing, 
interview, collateral review, self-report and observation to capture cognition and affect, 
and reduce the possibility of response bias.   
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Chapter 1. 
SETTING THE SCENE 
 
 
Understanding the construct of psychopathy has been one of the issues at the forefront 
of psychiatric research since the early 19
th
 century. Over the years, both researchers and 
clinicians (e.g. Pinel, Rush & Prichard) have attempted to delineate the core features of 
psychopathy. Many early conceptualisations of psychopathy were based solely on 
clinical observation and proposed that the disorder manifested from maladaptive 
personality traits (e.g. Cleckley, 1976). However, the development of the Psychopathy 
Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1991) and its revision (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) moved 
understandings of the construct away from abnormal personality, placing more 
emphasis on psychopathy as criminal behaviour (Cooke & Michie, 2001) and thus 
‘criminal’ as opposed to ‘abnormal’ personality. 
 
The focus on psychopathy as criminal behaviour raised questions over the measurement 
of psychopathy, in that the PCL-R was criticised for not being a true assessment of 
personality. This has extended to queries concerning the components underpinning the 
disorder (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001). Indeed, the emphasis on psychopathy as 
‘criminal behaviour’ explains in part the over-focus on forensic populations [primarily 
men] in the literature (Blackburn, 2007a).  
 
Regarding other samples, there is growing interest in psychopathy within community 
samples (Neumann & Hare, 2008) and in women (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). 
The rationale behind the former is that some psychopaths are able to function within 
‘normal’ society without entering the Criminal Justice System (Williams, Paulhus & 
Hare, 2007). The notion that psychopaths are well-represented in everyday society 
places an increased emphasis on personality, which has influenced some researchers 
(e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001; Skeem & Cooke, 2010a,b; Blackburn, 2007a) to revert 
back to the original conceptualisation of psychopathy as ‘abnormal personality’ as 
opposed to ‘criminal personality’. Thus, from what has been identified so far, it 
becomes clear that there is little consensus on the underlying features of the disorder 
and this uncertainty extends to the assessment of psychopathy. 
 
 2 
Furthermore, Cleckley (1976) argued that criminality is not a central feature of 
psychopathy. Instead, he proposed that those with the disorder have deficits in cognition 
and affect that predispose them to engage in behaviour that is harmful to themselves and 
others. Cognition and affect are therefore integral aspects of psychopathy and form the 
main focus of this thesis.  
 
The concept of processing (both cognitive and affective) is crucial when understanding 
psychopathy. For example, Newman (1998) suggested that certain psychopathic traits, 
such as impulsivity, may be explained through a cognitive deficit in the psychopath’s 
ability to fully understand the environment when engaging in goal directed activity.  
The Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998) accounts for this deficit and 
states that individuals with psychopathy are unable to attend to secondary information 
when a dominant response set has been established. Other researchers have argued that 
biases in cognitive schemas, which act as a guide for behaviour, influence the 
psychopath’s ability to process information effectively (e.g. Serin, 1991; Vitale, 
Newman, Serin & Bolt, 2005) and to form moral judgments (e.g. Young, Koenigs, 
Kruepke & Newman, 2012).  
 
In addition to their cognitive impairments, psychopaths also have deficits in affective 
processing, which influences their ability to identify (e.g. Blair et al. 2004) and evaluate 
(e.g. Williamson, Harpur & Hare, 1991) emotional stimuli. This ultimately impacts on 
their ability to effectively understand and react appropriately to other’s feelings and 
circumstances. A number of theories have been proposed to explain this. This includes 
the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957), the Violence Inhibition Mechanism 
Model (VIM; Blair, 1995) and Beck’s (1987) Theory of Emotional Disorders.  
 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis assumes that individuals with psychopathy are 
unable to recognise fear due to deficient emotional reactivity. VIM expands on this and 
states that psychopaths experience difficulty when identifying and reacting 
appropriately to unpleasant emotional content, i.e. another person’s upset. Beck’s 
Theory offers an alternative explanation of emotional processing in psychopathy and 
places emphasis on the role of cognitive schemas. More recent explanations of affective 
processing in psychopathy have started to consider the interactive effects of cognition, 
specifically the role of attention (e.g. Glass & Newman, 2009). This will be expanded 
upon in the main body of the thesis (specifically Chapter five). 
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It is important to note that cognitive and affective processing is not wholly explicit 
(conscious) and can occur at an implicit (unconscious) level (Back, Schmukle & Egloff, 
2009). Examining psychopathy at an implicit level is important when attempting to 
understand the automatic, unconscious mechanisms that underpin the disorder. 
Psychopathy measures, including the PCL-R, have failed to account for cognition and 
affect, and have also ignored the importance of implicit processing.  It is beneficial to 
incorporate implicit measures into the assessment of psychopathy, not only due to such 
processing occurring at an implicit level but also since psychopathy can be highly 
correlated with increased levels of deception and lying (Snowden, Gray, Smith, Morris 
& MacCulloch, 2004). Thus, in order to fully understand the construct and to provide an 
accurate assessment, psychopathic processing needs to be examined at both an explicit 
and implicit level.  A new measure of psychopathy that incorporates these elements is 
therefore required. 
 
The remainder of this introduction will expand on the issues outlined here. The next 
four Chapters will provide a detailed literature review on the defining features of 
psychopathy; the assessment and measurement of psychopathy; cognitive processing; 
and affective processing. Throughout this review, a number of theories will be 
introduced to allow for a theoretical understanding of the construct. The sixth Chapter 
presents the research aims and predictions.  
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Chapter 2. 
PSYCHOPATHY: DEFINING THE CONSTRUCT 
 
 
2.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides an overview on how psychopathy has been defined over the 
years. It first looks at the conceptions offered in the 19
th
 century by physicians, such as 
Pinel, Rush and Prichard. It then proceeds to discuss the definitions that arose from 
German psychiatry and how these influenced later conceptions made in the early 20
th
 
century. A review of the work of Cleckley is provided, along with an overview on how 
the construct has been defined in the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). As part of this, the difference between 
psychopathy and DSM-defined antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) will be made 
explicit. The Chapter concludes by examining the conceptualisation of psychopathy 
proposed by Hare (1991). 
 
Psychopathy has various legal definitions that should not be confused with the clinical 
definition. Whilst the clinical definition relates to psychopathy as outlined by the 
Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991; See p. 26), the legal definition, 
published in the first edition of the Mental Health Act (MHA; 1983) refers to 
psychopathy as ‘psychopathic disorder’. That is, it views psychopathy as; 
 
“a persistent disorder or disability of the mind (whether or not including 
significant impairment or intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive 
or seriously irresponsible conduct on part of the person concerned” (p. 3).  
 
The more recent version of the MHA (i.e. MHA, 2007) does not view psychopathy as a 
distinct disorder and instead categorised it under the all-inclusive term, ‘mental 
disorder’. ‘Mental disorder’ refers to “any disorder or disability of the mind” (p. 1).  It 
is important to note that this Chapter and the ensuing Chapters are interested in the 
clinical rather than the legal definition of psychopathy.  
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According to Millon, Simonsen and Birket-Smith (2003), descriptions of the construct 
of psychopathy can be traced as far back as Ancient Greece. However, for the purpose 
of this Chapter the main focus will remain on the descriptions provided in the early 19
th
 
century, until the present day. 
 
2.2 Historical conceptualisations of the construct 
 
Over the past two centuries the construct of psychopathy has been defined in a number 
of different ways. As Millon et al. (2003) note, clinical psychopathy has been 
characterised by an array of different behaviours that appear to have had little in 
common. There remains considerable debate around the definition of psychopathy, even 
today, with many professionals still failing to “get the picture” (Millon et al. 2003, p. 3) 
regarding what components underpin the disorder. 
 
2.3 Conceptualisations formed in the 19
th
 century 
 
In 1801, Philippe Pinel, a French physician, recognised that several patients were 
engaging in behaviours characterised as impulsive, risky and self-damaging (Millon et 
al. 2003). Despite the nature of these acts, Pinel noted that the reasoning ability of his 
patients remained largely intact. Given that his patients’ had no noticeable deficits in 
their intellect, Pinel labelled these cases as ‘manie sans délire’.  This translates to 
‘insanity without delirium’ (Millon et al. 2003). According to Millon et al. (2003), Pinel 
was one of the first to state that insanity could exist without any significant deficits in 
intellectual functioning or reasoning ability.   
 
Benjamin Rush, an American psychiatrist, also attempted to conceptualise psychopathy. 
Unlike Pinel, Rush suggested that disturbances in the moral faculty were caused by 
physical phenomena (Werlinder, 1978). Rush believed that psychopathy originated from 
some form of birth defect or biological disease (Andrade, 2008).  In his work, ‘Diseases 
of the mind’, Rush suggested that psychopathic individuals were not responsible for 
their behaviour as their moral faculty could be influenced by physical conditions that 
injured their “judgement, ability to remember, and to imagine, etc” (Werlinder, 1978, p. 
25). Given the nature and direction of Rush’s work, it is unsurprising that he felt 
individuals with psychopathy should be managed within medical facilities rather than in 
prisons (Toch, 1998).  
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Towards the mid 19
th
 century there was increasing acknowledgement of a role for 
emotion in psychopathy. Werlinder (1978) states that researchers and physicians began 
to agree that ‘diseases’ resulted from emotions being disordered rather than from 
deficits in understanding and reasoning. 
 
Despite agreeing with Pinel’s notion of ‘manie sans délire’, James Prichard, a British 
physician, expanded the concept to include a number of different mental and emotional 
conditions (Millon et al. 2003). According to Millon et al. (2003), Prichard included 
these conditions under the heading of ‘moral insanity’. He placed increased emphasis 
on affect in his conceptualisation. Prichard suggested that those individuals described as 
‘morally insane’ (‘or born criminal’; Werlinder, 1978), had a decreased sense of 
autonomy. They were unable to let their natural feelings and tendencies direct their 
behaviour (Millon et al. 2003). Prichard stated that such individuals were: 
 
 “swayed, despite their intellectual ability to understand the choices before them, 
by over-powering ‘affections’ that compelled them to engage in socially 
repugnant behaviours” (located in Millon et al. 2003, p. 5).  
 
He was suggesting that psychopathic individuals were driven by disturbances in their 
‘natural emotions’ rather than deficits in their ability to reason and learn, and that their 
poor self-governance prevented them from behaving appropriately. However, Prichard 
argued these affective disturbances were so discrete they often went unnoticed 
(Werlinder, 1978). 
 
Prichard’s ‘moral insanity’ was criticised for being too diverse and for having very little 
in common with the more recent definitions of clinical psychopathy (Millon et al. 
2003). Prichard became over focussed on the antisocial tendencies of some individuals, 
and began to include all disorders that were characterised by an inability to govern 
one’s own behaviour in line with social norms (Hervé, 2007). More specifically, Hervé 
(2007) stated that the term ‘moral insanity’ became a collection of clinical disorders, 
such as schizophrenia, personality disorder and organic brain dysfunction.   
 
Towards the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, Prichard’s label of ‘moral insanity’ was 
replaced by the term ‘psychopathic inferiority’ (Andrade, 2008). Andrade (2008) 
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recognised that this term was first introduced by Koch, a German psychiatrist, to 
describe individuals who displayed pervasive patterns of abnormal behaviour, rather 
than symptoms of mental illness. Under the heading of ‘psychopathic inferiority’, the 
German construct of psychopathy became an all-encompassing term to describe the 
different forms of abnormal personality, more commonly known today as personality 
disorder (Sass & Felthous, 2007). Furthermore, Sass and Felthous (2007) state that the 
label of ‘psychopathic inferiority’, as described by Koch, included few conditions that 
matched the present day description of psychopathy. However, like Prichard, Koch’s 
label of ‘psychopathic inferiority’ became over inclusive and the majority of conditions 
included did not resemble current descriptions of psychopathy (Millon et al. 2003). 
Nonetheless, despite such criticism, Koch was one of the first physicians to provide a 
brief description of psychopathy that, to an extent, is still used in clinical practice today.  
 
Koch constrained his view of psychopathy to that of personality pathology, stating that 
this was largely determined by biological factors (Hervé, 2007). He argued that 
‘psychopathic inferiority’ resulted from a “weakness in the brain”, whereby the brain 
was unable to effectively deal and cope with normal levels of strain (Werlinder, 1978). 
Koch went on to divide ‘psychopathic inferiority’ into two distinct states: congenital 
and acquired (Sass & Felthous, 2007).  
 
Sass and Felthous (2007) also suggested that these two states were further divided into 
three subgroups: psychopathic predisposition; psychopathic defect; and psychopathic 
degeneration. Although Koch never empirically tested these three subgroups (Millon et 
al. 2003), he proposed that the fragility of the brain was at its weakest in those placed in 
the psychopathic degeneration group (Werlinder, 1978). Koch believed that 
psychopathy was at its most severe in this group and was therefore one of the first to 
recognise that the disorder could occur along a continuum. That is, the severity of 
psychopathic traits could differ depending on the individual.    
 
According to Werlinder (1978), ‘psychopathic inferiority’ was criticised for not having 
any clear distinct boundaries, with psychiatrists often finding it difficult to differentiate 
between ‘normal’ and psychopathic tendencies. It was only when an individual’s whole 
life history was examined that these differences became apparent (Werlinder, 1978). 
The shift in focus away from ‘moral insanity’ to abnormal personality also meant many 
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of the traits associated with the recent descriptions of clinical psychopathy were 
engulfed by the overly broad label of personality disorder (Andrade, 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, this transition set the scene for other researchers to examine psychopathy 
as a personality disorder rather than an unknown clinical disorder (Hervé, 2007). 
However this did not begin to take form until the early 20
th
 century, as the work of 
Koch only became known worldwide when many German psychiatrists travelled to 
other countries (Sass & Felthouse, 2007). 
 
Summary 
 
Thus, at the beginning of the 19
th
 century psychopathy was viewed as a disorder of the 
mind, i.e. as a mental health problem. However, towards the end of this century 
descriptions of psychopathy moved away from this and focussed more on abnormal 
personality. There was also a view that antisocial behaviour, along with psychopathy, 
originated from a birth defect or biological disease. It was proposed that this disease or 
defect resulted in impairments in judgement and moral reasoning. Others held the 
viewpoint that psychopathy was associated with deficits in affect only, suggesting that 
the disorder was driven by disturbances in emotion rather than problems in cognition. It 
therefore becomes evident that whilst experts recognised the importance of including 
cognition and affect in their descriptions of the disorder, they were unable to understand 
that deficits could occur concurrently in both of these systems.  
 
Clinical descriptions of the construct continued to develop in the early 20
th
 century, with 
a particular emphasis placed on the role of affect in psychopathy. 
 
2.4 Early and mid 20
th
 century conceptualisations 
 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, American psychiatry was arguably under-
developed in comparison to European psychiatry (Werlinder, 1978). It is argued by 
some that it was not until Meyer, a German psychiatrist, travelled to America that 
American psychiatry became familiar with the German concept of psychopathy 
(Werlinder, 1978). According to Stover (2007), Meyer was greatly influenced by the 
work of Koch, but unlike Koch and other physicians at that time, he made a distinction 
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between psychopathic and neurotic cases. In contrast to neurotic cases, psychopathic 
individuals were argued to present with a lack of deep emotional reaction. 
 
The German concept of psychopathy also continued to develop in the early 20
th
 century. 
Kraepelin (1905, cited in Castillo, 2003) replaced Koch’s term ‘psychopathic 
inferiority’ with ‘psychopathic personality’. This referred to an abnormal form of 
personality development considered degenerative in nature and resulting from a morbid 
reaction to life stressors. Kraepelin further proposed that the construct of psychopathy 
could be inherited (Taylor, 1997). Cleckley (1982) noted that it was not uncommon for 
psychiatrists to believe that individuals with psychopathy originated from families, 
“loaded with [the] stigmata of degeneration [and] signs of neuropathic taint” (p. 252). 
Psychiatrists, such as Kraepelin, were of the opinion that psychopathic individuals came 
exclusively from families that had some form of hereditary physiological weakness or 
defect. 
 
Kraepelin (1904, cited in Millon et al. 2003) incorporated this weakness into four 
categories that somewhat resemble today’s description of antisocial personality: 
professional criminals; criminals by impulse; the morbid liars and swindlers; and the 
morbid vagabonds
1
. According to Werlinder (1978), Kraepelin argued that the majority 
of habitual offenders belonged to the ‘unstable’ psychopathic category, which was also 
referred to as ‘criminals by impulse’. Thus, it appears that experts were beginning to 
suggest that a psychopathic individual’s propensity to engage in criminality was 
governed by a deficit in their ability to regulate their behaviour. 
 
Kraepelin (1904, cited in Millon et al. 2003) was also of the opinion that all 
psychopathic individuals had deficits in affect. This was arguably becoming a defining 
feature of the disorder consistent among experts. By the eighth edition of his work, 
Kraepelin (1915, cited in Millon et al. 2003) had expanded his description of the 
construct and separated psychopathic individuals into two categories: those of ‘morbid 
disposition’ and those displaying abnormal personality styles. Kraepelin divided those 
individuals displaying abnormal personality styles into seven subgroups: excitable; 
unstable; eccentric; liars; swindlers; antisocial; and quarrelsome (Castillo, 2003). 
These overlapped with the four antisocial personality categories that he outlined in his 
                                                        
1
 i.e. an individual who wanders through life without establishing a purpose, has low self-confidence, and 
lacks the ability to undertake adult responsibility 
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earlier work. Whilst the last three subgroups were arguably representative of antisocial 
traits, Millon et al. (2003) recognised that the subgroups as a whole were similar to the 
diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder as outlined by the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Such descriptions therefore implied that psychopathic individuals 
were irresponsible, deceitful, aggressive, and regularly violated social norms and the 
rights of others. 
 
Schneider, another German psychiatrist, discarded Kraepelin’s more socially orientated 
labels and instead suggested that psychopathy was best understood through more 
scientific terms, “from the psychology of ‘normal’ personality” (Werlinder, 1978, p. 
105). He argued that personalities that deviated away from what he coined as ‘normal’ 
could be classified as abnormal. Schneider (1923, cited in Werlinder, 1978) divided 
abnormal personality into two groups: a group that consisted of more general abnormal 
personalities and a distinct group that contained ‘psychopathic personalities’. More 
specifically, Schneider defined ‘psychopathic personality’ as that containing a set of 
abnormal personality traits, which inflicted either suffering to the individual or to 
society in general. It is important to note that Schneider was one of the first to suggest 
that not all psychopathic individuals were involved in criminality and could indeed be 
found residing in the community (Stover, 2007).  
 
In addition, Schneider also argued that there were ten different subtypes of psychopath: 
hyperthymic [excessive positive disposition]; depressive; lacking self-confidence; 
fanatic [obsessive enthusiasm]; self-assertive; emotionally unstable; explosive; 
emotionally cold; weak-willed; and asthenic [chronic weakness and a lack of strength] 
(Hurwitz & Christiansen, 1983). It was his description of the emotionally cold 
psychopath that best represents the more recent descriptions of clinical psychopathy 
(Lynam et al. 2011a). That is, the psychopath as affectionless, displaying little emotion, 
remorse or empathy. 
 
Karpman, like Schneider, proposed that psychopathy could be divided into two clinical 
subtypes (Poythress & Skeem, 2006). However, unlike Schneider, Karpman suggested 
that psychopathic individuals could be categorised as either primary or secondary 
(Poythress & Skeem, 2006). Karpman (1955, cited in Skeem, Poythress, Edens, 
Lilienfeld & Cale, 2003) suggested that primary psychopaths were characterised by an 
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affective deficit and often behaved in a direct yet deliberate manner to increase their 
gain. Secondary psychopaths however, displayed symptoms that reflected an affective 
disturbance and were often impulsive, driven by emotional hatred or revenge (Karpman, 
1955, cited in Skeem et al. 2003). Secondary psychopaths were also described as 
neurotic, displaying high levels of anxiety and/or depression. According to Poythress 
and Skeem (2006), the affective disturbance found within secondary psychopaths was 
an adaptation to maladaptive parenting styles. Despite the differences between primary 
and secondary psychopaths, Karpman (1948, cited in Poythress & Skeem, 2006) stated 
that both subtypes were characterised by criminality and a lack of regard or empathy for 
others.  
 
Arieti (1963, cited in Hare, 1970) also separated the construct of psychopathy into 
different categories. He suggested that simple psychopaths were unable to delay their 
gratification regardless of the consequences, whilst complex psychopaths were unable to 
delay their gratification, but were also able to plan and avoid getting into trouble (Hare, 
1970). Arguably, these plans rarely considered the rights and feelings of others. Hare 
(1970) suggested that many untrustworthy politicians and businessmen could be 
categorised as complex psychopaths. 
 
McCord and McCord (1964, cited in Forrest, 1996) offered a description of 
psychopathy that, to an extent, summarised many of the definitions outlined here. They 
suggested that in general, psychopathic individuals are asocial, driven by uncontrolled 
desires for excitement, are aggressive and impulsive, have poor coping strategies, 
experience very little guilt, display little remorse, are detached from others, and have a 
distorted understanding of love and affection. Furthermore, McCord and McCord 
argued that the two most important features of psychopathy were ‘guiltlessness’ and 
‘lovelessness’, and without these two characteristics an individual could not be 
classified as a psychopath. It becomes increasingly apparent that during the 20
th
 century 
experts viewed deficits in affect to be an integral aspect of the disorder. 
 
There are many different definitions and terms used to describe psychopathy, with 31 
identified in this Chapter alone. This illustrates the difficulties when defining a 
heterogeneous disorder, such as psychopathy. It may also reflect cultural differences 
within the construct, as German definitions were being used to define American 
psychopaths and vice versa. In support of this, Husain (1995) noted that psychopathy 
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cases in America appeared more clinically severe than those cases studied in Europe. 
Thus, clinical descriptions of psychopathy may not apply across cultures. Nonetheless, a 
consensus on the defining core features of psychopathy would arguably prove 
beneficial, specifically when assessing for the construct.   
 
Summary 
 
From what the literature has indicated so far, psychopathy was viewed as abnormal 
personality in the 20
th
 century, which was either inherited or developed due to life 
stressors. Psychopathic individuals were described as having deficits in affect and 
presenting with numerous traits that were conducive to an antisocial personality type, 
e.g. impulsivity, irresponsibility, egocentricity, and a lack of empathy and remorse.  
Individuals diagnosed with psychopathy were also described as displaying low or high 
levels of anxiety depending on whether their personality traits were congenital or 
acquired.  
 
Whilst a significant emphasis was placed on the role of affect in psychopathy, cognition 
appeared to be missing from clinical descriptions of the disorder outlined during the 20
th
 
century. However, it was not until Harvey Cleckley, an American Psychiatrist, that the 
specific individual personality traits and mechanisms underpinning the disorder were 
acknowledged (Andrade, 2008). 
 
2.5 Cleckley’s conceptualisation of psychopathy 
 
Whilst writing the first edition of his book, ‘The Mask of Sanity’ (1941), Cleckley 
(1982) recognised that the construct of psychopathy was undefined in the psychiatric 
literature in comparison to other psychiatric disorders. He felt that material being 
published did not bear any resemblance to what he had experienced in his clinical work. 
In an attempt to understand the nature of psychopathy, Cleckley (1982) proposed that it 
would be valuable to review some of the historical concepts of the construct. 
 
Cleckley (1982) believed that individuals suffering from psychopathy should be 
distinguished from ‘normal’ offenders. Unlike Pinel, Rush, and Prichard, he did not 
agree that ‘intellect’ and ‘moral faculty’ could be studied as two separate entities. In the 
revised edition of his book, Cleckley (1982) stated the following:  
 13 
 
“We reject the demand to deal separately with an ‘intellect’, a ‘moral faculty’, a 
‘will’, as if they were, apart from the words, things that could be isolated for 
study or treatment” (p. 122). 
 
Alternatively, he suggested that the construct could be better understood by observing 
specifically how psychopathic individuals presented in various aspects of their 
functioning (Cleckley, 1982), thus recognising the importance of cognitive and affective 
processing in psychopathy. 
 
Cleckley (1982) also criticised psychiatrists, such as Koch, Kraepelin and Schneider, for 
including the construct under the same heading as other mental defects. He argued that 
psychopathy was distinct from other disorders and should be seen as separate. To 
illustrate this point, Cleckley (1982) stated how psychopathy was over-used as a means 
of classifying a range of difficulties, noting:  
 
“As the psychoses were recognized and the psychoneuroses were distinguished 
from them, it became increasingly popular to put virtually anything that failed to 
fit into these categories with the psychopath in a veritable diagnostic salad of 
incompatibles. The term ‘psychopathic personality’, of course, invites such 
practice with its literal applicability to all psychiatric disorders” (p. 124).  
 
To overcome these issues, Cleckley (1982) provided a detailed account of the 
psychopath in his book. He titled the book ‘The Mask of Sanity’ as he felt psychopathic 
individuals were able to conceal their true identity and appear outwardly ‘normal’; 
imitating the feelings and behaviours of others. Cleckley (1982) recognised that despite 
having the intellectual ability to interact on a superficial level, those with psychopathy 
did not have access to the corresponding emotions to understand the experience in any 
depth. It was this affective deficit that Cleckley (1982) felt was central to the 
psychopath’s presentation. Interestingly, Cleckley (1982) noted that it was only when an 
individual with psychopathy spoke or was involved in goal directed behaviour that their 
true self became apparent. This suggests that deficits in psychopathy occur at a subtle 
level, but become more pronounced when individuals engage in behaviour to achieve a 
specific goal. Nevertheless, these deficits arguably allowed Cleckley to distinguish 
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psychopathic individuals from those without the disorder and therefore appear to have 
some utility when assessing for the construct.  
 
Cleckley (1982) also felt psychopathy could manifest itself in varying degrees of 
severity. For example, he proposed the following:  
 
“The characteristic disorder of the psychopath is usually not difficult to 
distinguish from other disorders, but like all of them, it, too, is seen in the widest 
variations of degree, in manifestations ranging from isolated character traits in 
a successful person, or brief episodes of delinquency in adolescence, to 
disability far greater than that shown by many of the psychotic patients 
committed to institutions” (p. 145).  
 
In essence, psychopathy can occur on a continuum, with severe levels of the disorder 
being associated with more difficulties, including problematic behaviours such as 
offending. However, Cleckley (1982) did not believe that the typical psychopath 
committed any serious offences. He did nonetheless suggest that there were exceptions 
to this. Cleckley (1982) described those psychopathic individuals who were involved in 
crimes, such as murder, as being callous and as having no remorse. More specifically, 
he stated that it was a psychopath’s deficits in affect that prevented them from 
understanding their actions, which in turn left them uninhibited from participating in 
serious offending behaviour. He also suggested that psychopathic individuals were not 
afraid of punishment and that they fully understood the consequences of their actions 
(Cleckley, 1982). It therefore appears that Cleckley was suggesting that deficits in 
functioning predisposed individuals with psychopathy to engage in antisocial behaviour, 
with the severity of these deficits influencing the nature and extent of this behaviour. 
 
From his detailed clinical accounts, Cleckley (1982) speculated that psychopathy 
resulted from some form of inborn defect that was not genetically related. Thus 
disagreeing with several previous descriptions of the disorder (e.g. Koch and 
Kraepelin). Cleckley firmly believed that the maladaptive features of the disorder were 
caused by abnormal personality development, rejecting the idea that psychopathy 
originated from organic brain dysfunction or from some type of genetic defect. For 
example, he stated that individuals with psychopathy have “lesions in their personality” 
(Cleckley, 1982, p. 143). He was reluctant to accept previous clinical descriptions and 
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instead outlined 16 personality traits that he felt best described the construct (Cleckley, 
1982). These were described as: 
 
“Superficial charm and good ‘intelligence’; absence of delusions or other signs 
of irrational thinking; absence of ‘nervousness’ or psychoneurotic 
manifestations; unreliability; untruthfulness and insincerity; lack of remorse 
and shame; inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour; poor judgement and 
failure to learn by experience; pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love; 
general poverty in major affective reactions; specific loss of insight; 
unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations; fantastic and uninviting 
behaviour with drink and sometimes without; suicide rarely carried out; sex life 
impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated; and a failure to follow any life plan” 
(p. 204).  
 
Cleckley’s clinical profile of the prototypical psychopath contains items that account for 
deficits in both cognitive (e.g. poor judgment) and affective processing (e.g. general 
poverty in major affective reactions). Whilst Cleckley’s explanations of these deficits 
were based solely on observation, his clinical profile encouraged further empirical 
investigation into the area and was also said to provide the foundations for the current 
assessment of psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 
2003).  
 
Summary 
 
Cleckley’s (1982) outline of the psychopath was viewed as the most accurate 
description of the construct for some time. His profile depicted psychopathy as a 
disorder of abnormal personality underpinned specifically by 16 personality traits. 
Cleckley’s description explicitly made reference to cognition and affect and proposed 
that deficits in these two areas predisposed those with the disorder to engage in 
antisocial behaviour. Thus, antisocial behaviour was not seen as a defining feature of 
psychopathy and instead focus was placed on personality pathology. More specifically, 
he suggested that it was the severity of the deficits in cognition and affect which 
determined the extent and nature of the behaviours enacted by psychopathic individuals. 
Whilst Cleckley recognised that both cognition and affect were core features of the 
disorder, he placed more emphasis on the role of affect. It is important to note that 
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Cleckley’s description of the psychopath was based on observation.  Empirical 
investigation into the disorder, specifically the associated deficits in functioning, was 
yet to be conducted. 
 
Before reviewing the current descriptions of psychopathy, it is important to conclude 
the history of the construct by examining how the DSM defined the disorder over the 
years. Within this section particular emphasis will be placed on the distinction between 
psychopathy and DSM-defined ASPD. 
 
2.6 DSM definitions of psychopathy: Distinguishing psychopathy from ASPD 
 
In the early 20
th
 century, the American Psychiatric Association (APA; 1952) recognised 
that soldiers returning from the war were displaying unusual symptoms not commonly 
seen in community psychiatric hospitals. Only about 10% of these cases could be 
successfully diagnosed (APA, 1952). Given that the classification system at that time 
was limited to disorders normally found within the general public, all personality 
disturbances identified within military personnel, regardless of severity, were classified 
under the term of ‘psychopathic personality’ (APA, 1952). As a result, the Armed 
Forces began to alter the classification system to meet their needs, which added further 
confusion. It soon became apparent that the standard psychiatric description was no 
longer suitable for everyday clinical practice (APA, 1952). 
 
According to the APA (1952), many psychiatrists at that time felt the description of 
psychopathy needed updating and a new proposal was developed to resolve this. With 
the aim of gaining a consensus on the content of the proposal, the committee distributed 
copies to approximately 10% of APA members (APA, 1952). The proposal was 
published in 1952 and became known as the first edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I; APA, 1952). 
 
The new manual referred to psychopathy as a personality disturbance. However, to 
avoid confusion with similar sounding terms, such as ‘psychotic’, the committee 
changed the name of the construct to ‘sociopathic personality disturbance: antisocial 
reaction’ (Gurley, 2009).  DSM-I defined psychopathy similar to the clinical description 
outlined by Cleckley. To be classified as presenting with sociopathic personality 
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disturbance – antisocial reaction, the manual stated that an individual had to meet the 
following: 
 
“This term refers to chronically antisocial individuals who are always in 
trouble, profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no 
real loyalties to any person, group, or code. They are frequently callous and 
hedonistic, showing marked emotional immaturity, with a lack of sense of 
responsibility, lack of judgement, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so 
that it appears warranted, reasonable, and justified. The term includes cases 
previously classified as ‘constitutional psychopathic states’ and ‘psychopathic 
personality’. As defined here the term is more limited, as well as more specific 
in its application” (APA, 1952, p. 38). 
   
The second edition of the DSM (DSM-II; APA, 1968) was published 16 years later. 
Bodholdt, Richards and Gacono (2000) identified that this edition aimed to reduce 
ambiguity by providing clearer diagnoses for each of the different types of personality 
disorder. DSM-II placed a greater emphasis on the personality traits associated with 
each disturbance (Bodholdt et al. 2000).  
 
The committee expanded the diagnostic criteria of psychopathy to include the following 
personality traits: callousness; impulsivity; selfishness; and guiltlessness (Gurley, 
2009). Gurley (2009) also recognised that to further distinguish psychopathy from other 
personality disturbances, DSM-II highlighted that an individual had to present with the 
personality traits noted here and not just have an extensive criminal record. 
 
In the second edition of the DSM, psychopathy encountered another name change. It 
was changed from ‘sociopathic personality disturbance - antisocial reaction’ to 
‘antisocial personality’ (Gurley, 2009). This was made to “facilitate maximum 
communication within the profession” (APA, 1968, p. viii). 
 
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association published the third edition of the DSM 
(DSM-III; APA, 1980). This edition was created using a very different approach to that 
adopted when developing DSM-I and DSM-II. Gurley (2009) noted that the APA aimed 
to increase the accessibility, reliability and applicability of DSM-III. 
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Psychopathy experienced another name change. It was now referred to as ‘antisocial 
personality disorder’ (ASPD) (Gurley, 2009). The diagnostic criteria also underwent 
significant alterations, focusing more on criminal behaviour than personality (Gurley, 
2009). To be diagnosed with ASPD (which is in fact a different disorder to 
psychopathy
2
), the APA (1980) stated that an individual had to have a history of at least 
three antisocial behaviours prior to the age of 15, display a pervasive pattern of 
criminality, and present with at least four manifestations of the disorder since the age of 
18, i.e. an inability to maintain work; an inability to respect and follow social norms; 
and an inability to honour financial obligations, etc. (APA, 1980).  
 
This change was made as the committee felt that behaviour was easier to define and 
assess, which in turn would hopefully increase the reliability of ratings (Bodholdt et al. 
2000). The only two personality traits that remained in the diagnostic criteria were 
impulsivity and irresponsibility (Gurley, 2009). According to Blackburn (2007a), DSM-
III saw the return of ‘moral insanity’, in that the diagnostic criteria of psychopathy 
focussed more on a list of socially undesirable acts with virtually no reference to any 
personality traits. Thus, the conceptualisation of psychopathy moved away from 
abnormal personality to criminal behaviour and further omitting the core affective and 
interpersonal features, as well as placing less emphasis on the role of cognition. 
 
Many researchers felt that the diagnostic criteria of ASPD had deviated away from the 
original conceptualisation of psychopathy made by Cleckley (Gurley, 2009). They also 
stated that the new diagnostic criteria was too broad as research had found that 
approximately 80% of prisoners now met the criteria for ASPD, with only one-third of 
these being classified as psychopathic under the original criteria adopted by DSM-I and 
II (Gurley, 2009). Despite efforts made by the APA to make psychopathy more 
measurable, it appears that they may have instead introduced a new disorder. Hare and 
Neumann (2006) also agree with this suggestion stating that: 
 
“the DSM strategy for operationalizing the construct of psychopathy may in fact 
have introduced a related, but not identical construct to the field, one that 
continues in DSM-IV” (p. 61). 
 
                                                        
2
 The diagnostic criteria for ASPD includes rule breaking, impulsivity and lying. Psychopathy is similar 
to ASPD but places less emphasis on criminal behaviour. Unlike ASPD, psychopathy is also associated 
with interpersonal and affective difficulties. 
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During the development of DSM-IV, a number of field trials were conducted to pilot the 
proposed changes (Gurley, 2009). Twelve field trials were completed, one of which 
examined the recommended changes to the diagnosis of ASPD. Hare, Hart and Hempur 
(1991) noted that the trials aimed to consider whether the diagnosis of ASPD should: 1). 
Include some of the traditional personality traits often associated with psychopathy; and 
2). Whether the diagnostic criteria of ASPD could be shortened and simplified. The 
field trials sampled populations from four different sites, involving prisoners, 
psychiatric patients (not psychotic), individuals with substance use disorders, and 
homeless people (Widiger et al. 1996). The results indicated that various items 
belonging to the diagnostic criteria of ASPD could either be collapsed or deleted, and 
that the rank order of the criteria needed changing (Widiger et al. 1996). The trials also 
highlighted that it was particularly important to incorporate several items associated 
with the PCL-R into the diagnostic criteria of ASPD (Widiger et al. 1996).  
 
Following the trials, a number of relatively minor changes were made to the diagnostic 
criteria of ASPD (Gurley, 2009). The criteria now included several personality traits 
that also appear in the current assessment of psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003):  
 
“Individuals with antisocial personality disorder frequently lack empathy and 
tend to be callous, cynical, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and 
sufferings of others. They may have an inflated and arrogant self-appraisal 
(e.g., feel that ordinary work is beneath them or lack a realistic concern about 
their current problems or their future) and may be excessively opinionated, self-
assured, or cocky. They may display a glib, superficial charm and be quite 
voluble and verbally facile (e.g. using technical terms or jargon that might 
impress someone who is unfamiliar with the topic)” (APA, 2000, p. 703). 
 
The personality traits outlined here were also very similar to the ones first proposed by 
Cleckley in his clinical profile of the psychopath (Gurley, 2009). It could be suggested 
that the APA viewed ASPD to be almost identical to the construct of psychopathy. This 
view was not positively considered by a number of researchers (e.g. Ogloff, 2006; 
Hildebrand & de Ruiter, 2004) as they felt ASPD should be seen as separate to 
psychopathy. Equating ASPD with psychopathy also led to confusion amongst 
clinicians as they began to extend research findings from studies on psychopathy to 
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those individuals with ASPD (Ogloff, 2006). Moreover, the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
of ASPD was criticised for being over inclusive, for having low diagnostic validity and 
low predictive power (Gurley, 2009).  
 
Indeed, when examining the link between ASPD and psychopathy, Hildebrand and de 
Ruiter (2004) identified that the two disorders were asymmetrically related. They found 
that almost all of the patients diagnosed with psychopathy also met the criteria for 
ASPD. However, only a very small number of the patients diagnosed primarily with 
ASPD met the diagnosis for psychopathy (Hildebrand & de Ruiter, 2004). This finding 
supported the conclusions made by Huchzermeier and his colleagues. Huchzermeier et 
al. (2007) suggested that psychopathy did not belong to the broader construct of ASPD. 
Instead they proposed that psychopathy, as defined by the PCL-R, partially overlaps 
with ASPD sharing some of the same characteristics.  
 
In an attempt to further distinguish psychopathy from ASPD, Cunningham and Reidy 
published an article in 1998 that compared the two constructs. They identified that in 
general, research has found psychopathy to be a better predictor of institutional 
violence, parole outcome, treatment failure, and violent recidivism than ASPD. 
Research has also identified that individuals with psychopathy have different 
neuropsychological and processing deficits to other offenders (e.g. Pham, 
Vanderstukken, Philippot & Vanderlinden, 2003; Howard & McCullagh, 2007), 
including those with ASPD (e.g. Kosson, Lorenz & Newman, 2004; Rogstad & Rogers, 
2008). The differences between ASPD and psychopathy, identified here, emphasise the 
need for DSM-V to make the diagnostic criteria of ASPD more distinguished from 
clinical psychopathy. 
 
DSM-V (APA, 2013) does not recognise psychopathy as a distinct entity and instead, 
like DSM-IV, continues to include many behavioural features of the disorder under the 
heading of ASPD. Whilst the categorical diagnostic framework for ASPD remained the 
same, an alternative dimensional approach was introduced to allow for a trait-based 
model. The committee was of the viewpoint that personality disorders are characterised 
by maladaptive variants of personality traits that merge into ‘normality’ and into one 
another (APA, 2013). This explanation may account for the inclusion of some 
psychopathy features within the ASPD diagnostic criteria. Nonetheless, when 
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considering the dimensional trait-based model of ASPD, the broad personality domains 
of antagonism, disinhibition and negative affect were proposed.  
 
The criteria for reckless disregard and irresponsibility were represented by traits of 
impulsivity, risk taking and irresponsibility (disinhibition domain). A lack of remorse, 
irritability and aggressiveness, and deceitfulness were captured by traits of 
deceitfulness, manipulativeness, hostility and callousness (APA, 2013). The APA 
committee related these personality traits to the domain of antagonism, with the 
exception of ‘hostility’, which they associated with negative affect.  
 
According to Strickland, Drislane, Lucy, Krueger and Patrick (2013), the dimensional 
approach to ASPD does not include many of the core features considered to underpin 
psychopathy. That is, the trait-based model of ASPD does not capture interpersonal 
efficacy, emotional resiliency and fearless temperament; all of which have been argued 
to form the prototypical elements of ‘boldness’ found within psychopathy (Strickland et 
al. 2013). An important question therefore remains as to whether psychopathy can be 
fully represented by the personality traits included in the ASPD trait model.  
 
Strickland et al. (2013) investigated this and found that psychopathy, as defined by the 
Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM; Patrick, 2010)
3
, can be effectively indexed 
using the personality inventory for DSM-V (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, 
Watson & Skodel, 2012). The trait-based model for ASPD adequately captured the 
disinhibition and meanness facets of psychopathy (Strickland et al. 2013). However, 
additional traits are required to provide improved coverage of the boldness facet to the 
same level as disinhibition and meanness. Strickland et al. (2013) identified two traits to 
predict the boldness facet of psychopathy: Risk taking (disinhibition domain) and 
manipulativeness (antagonism domain). Whilst this finding suggests that the 
dimensional approach adopted in DSM-V for diagnosing ASPD may better capture 
psychopathy, additional traits are still required to capture the boldness facet (Strickland 
et al. 2013). More specifically, Strickland et al. (2013) suggested that inclusion of 
anxiousness (reversed), submissiveness (reversed), and attention seeking to the ASPD 
trait-based model in DSM-V would provide better coverage of the boldness facet of 
psychopathy, and thus the construct of psychopathy as a whole. 
                                                        
3
 The TriPM is a 58 item self-report measure developed to assess three components of psychopathy 
delineated in the Triarchic model (Patrick, Fowles & Krueger, 2009; Patrick, 2010): Boldness; Meanness; 
and Disinhibition. 
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One limitation of the Strickland et al. (2013) study is that psychopathy was assessed 
solely via self-report. Questions therefore arise as to whether the findings can be 
generalised to psychopathy measured using different approaches, specifically via the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 2003), which utilises interview 
and collateral assessment. Notwithstanding this limitation however, the findings of 
Strickland et al (2013) highlight that the dimensional approach used in DSM-V offers a 
basis for distinguishing a “classically psychopathic variant of ASPD”; a variant that is 
similar to the ‘primary’ psychopath described by both Cleckley and Karpman 
(Strickland et al. 2013, p. 336). Though this is a progressive step, the DSM would 
arguably benefit from providing diagnostic criteria for psychopathy separate to ASPD; 
one that makes explicit reference to the core personality features of the disorder, as well 
as taking into account the role of cognition and affect. 
 
Summary 
 
Despite its significance, psychopathy has had an unclear history in DSM. The construct 
appears to have been merged with ASPD, as they share similar behavioural 
symptomology. Equating psychopathy with ASPD has resulted in many core features of 
the disorder being ignored, specifically those relating to interpersonal, cognitive and 
affective functioning. Although the introduction of DSM-V and its dimensional 
approach offers a more promising framework for defining psychopathy, the disorder is 
yet to be viewed as a distinct syndrome in line with more favourable conceptualisations, 
such as that of Hare (1980, 1991).  
 
2.7 Hare’s conceptualisation of psychopathy 
 
Based on the work of Cleckley, Robert Hare, a researcher in the area of Forensic 
Psychology, developed an instrument to assess psychopathy (Harpur, Hakstian & Hare, 
1988). This became known as the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980). Eleven 
years later, Hare released a revised version of the instrument, the PCL-R. Although the 
PCL was originally developed to assess a unitary construct, i.e. psychopathy as a whole, 
a number of factorial analyses identified that two highly correlated factors could be 
extracted (Harpur et al. 1988). Factor I (F1) was found to relate to a number of 
interpersonal and affective personality traits, whilst factor II (F2) was associated with a 
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chronically unstable and antisocial lifestyle (Harpur, Hare & Hakstian, 1989)
4
. These 
two factors arguably underpin, or have influenced, current descriptions of the disorder. 
  
The two-factor model of psychopathy was also found to extend to the revised version of 
the PCL-R (e.g. Hare, 1991; Moltó, Poy & Torrubia, 2000). Hare (1970) was of the 
opinion that psychopathy was a “distinct clinical and behavioural entity” (p. 11). 
However, he did state that some of the characteristics associated with the construct 
could be found in other psychiatric disorders, such as ASPD and narcissistic personality 
disorder (Hare, 1970).  
 
In terms of ASPD, Hare and Neumann (2009) recognised that it was similar to 
psychopathy, but not identical. Hare and Neumann (2009) suggested that psychopathy 
places more emphasis on interpersonal and affective features, whilst ASPD focuses 
more on antisocial behaviour. In support of this suggestion, Harpur et al. (1988) found 
ASPD to correlate more strongly with F2 than with F1 of the PCL
5
. 
 
Summary 
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that Hare’s conception of psychopathy is based on his 
assessment tool, the PCL-R. He viewed psychopathy as a distinct disorder, separate to 
ASPD, underpinned by two factors representing personality and behavioural features. 
Although the PCL-R has been held as the ‘gold standard’ for assessing psychopathy, 
several researchers (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001; Skeem & Cooke, 2010a,b) have 
expressed their concerns surrounding the PCL-R and its current conceptualisation of the 
construct
6
. Their concerns extend to the PCL-R’s assessment of cognition and affect and 
the components underpinning the disorder. 
 
2.8 Concluding comments 
 
Psychopathy was arguably the first disorder to be classified as a disorder of personality. 
It has a rich clinical history that not only outlines the construct itself, but also takes into 
                                                        
4
 See Chapter three for the items underpinning each PCL-R factor. 
5
 A number of researchers (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001; Skeem & Cooke, 2010a,b) have expressed their 
concerns stating that Hare’s two factor model is not a true representation of psychopathy, and instead 
have proposed a three factor model that places more emphasis on personality features and affect. 
6
 This will be addressed in Chapter three along with a more detailed discussion on the different measures 
used to assess for psychopathy. 
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consideration the impact psychopathy has upon society in general. As Hervé (2007) 
recognises, the clinical experiences and observations made by past physicians, such as 
Cleckley, provide an insight into the inner world and functioning of the psychopath that 
could not be achieved by research alone. Furthermore, these qualitative accounts led to 
the development of the PCL-R, thus providing a structured clinical tool to assess and 
further study the construct.  Hare’s (1991) criteria used to assess for psychopathy has 
provided clinicians with a current, common understanding of the disorder; an 
understanding that distinguishes psychopathy from ASPD. Whilst the APA are still yet 
to make this distinction, it appears that they are moving in the right direction; proposing 
use of a dimensional approach to assess for personality pathology which captures 
further facets of personality.  
 
Nevertheless, despite its contribution to the academic literature and popularity among 
clinicians, the PCL-R is not without its limitations. This has resulted in a number of 
questions surrounding the measurement and consequently the clinical definition of 
psychopathy. Moreover, Hare’s (1991) conceptualisation of psychopathy may not be 
applicable to all populations and warrants further investigation. This moves the thesis 
onto the specific area of assessment and measurement of psychopathy. 
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Chapter 3. 
PSYCHOPATHY: ASSESSING AND MEASURING THE 
CONSTRUCT 
 
 
3.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides an overview on the measurement of psychopathy. This includes a 
discussion on the different measures used and the limitations associated with each. It is 
important to initially focus on the measurement of psychopathy via the Psychopathy 
Checklist - Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 2003), as this has played a key role in defining 
the construct as well as guiding theory and research in the area (Skeem & Cooke, 
2010b).  
 
Throughout this Chapter, the nature and extent of psychopathy across different 
populations, including forensic, clinical and community, is explored in accordance with 
the measure applied. A discussion on sex differences in psychopathy is also provided. 
 
3.2 Measuring the construct of psychopathy 
 
Whilst researchers have been concerned with the predictive utility of the construct (e.g. 
Walters, 2012), clinicians use the concept to determine treatment suitability and to 
guide treatment and management plans (Harris & Rice, 2006). Offenders arguably also 
have an invested interest in the concept of psychopathy, since those diagnosed with the 
disorder are generally given longer sentences (Lee, 2007), are perceived to be less 
treatable (Harris & Rice, 2006), and are viewed as a higher risk of recidivism following 
release (Tengström, Grann, Lăngström & Kullgren, 2000). Psychopathy is therefore an 
important concept in forensic and clinical settings and as a consequence it is crucial that 
the measurement of the construct is as accurate as possible (Wright, 2009).  
 
The last decade has seen a number of significant advances in the assessment of 
psychopathy, specifically due to the development of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; 
Hare, 1980) and its subsequent revision (Hare, 1991, 2003).  
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3.3 The Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) and its development
7
 
 
The development of the PCL began in 1978. The aim was for a measure that empirically 
assessed the criteria proposed by Cleckley (1982, i.e. 16 personality characteristics 
including superficial charm and good intelligence, a lack of remorse or shame, poor 
judgment and failure to learn from experience) and a number of traits and behaviours 
previously associated with the clinical construct (Hare & Neumann, 2006). An item 
pool of approximately 100 was subjected to a series of statistical analyses to establish 
those items with the best psychometric properties (Hare & Neumann, 2006). Twenty-
two items were retained and included in the original PCL. According to Hare and 
Neumann (2006), initial analyses identified the measure as having good levels of 
internal reliability and construct validity in a forensic sample. 
 
The PCL was subjected to a number of modifications following feedback from 
professionals (Hare & Neumann, 2006). The changes involved the alteration of item 
titles and item descriptions. For example, “Irresponsible behaviour as a parent” was 
found to be too specific and was changed to “Irresponsibility” (Hare & Neumann, 
2006). Two items were deleted (i.e. “Drug or alcohol abuse not direct cause of 
antisocial behaviour” and “Previous diagnosis as psychopath or similar”) as they 
provided little useful information and relied too much on past diagnosis (Hare & 
Neumann, 2006). Scoring instructions were changed to allow users to omit items and to 
score items against a prototypical description (Hare & Neumann, 2006). These changes 
formed the basis of the revised version of the PCL, the PCL-R.   
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the PCL-R has been viewed as “the measure of 
choice” for assessing psychopathy (Cooke & Michie, 1997, p. 3). It contains 20 items 
and uses a semi-structured interview and collateral (e.g. file) information, along with 
specific scoring criteria to assess the personality and behavioural traits related to the 
construct (Hare & Neumann, 2006). Each item is rated on a three-point scale, with 
‘zero’ suggesting that the individual does not meet the item criteria; ‘one’ indicating 
that the individual may meet the criteria; and ‘two’ suggesting the individual fully meets 
the item criteria. Total scores can range from 0 to 40, with scores indicating the degree 
                                                        
7
 Appendix one provides an overview of the psychometric qualities of the Psychopathy Checklist and its 
revision. 
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to which the individual meets the prototypical description of clinical psychopathy. Cut-
off scores for psychopathy range from 25 (United Kingdom) to 30 (United States).  
 
The difference in cut-off scores between the United Kingdom and United States has 
been argued to reflect the prevalence of the disorder in the two countries. Using the cut-
off of 25, Cooke (1998), and Cooke and Michie (1997), found the prevalence of 
psychopathy to be 8% in a sample of Scottish prisoners, and 29% in North American 
prisoners. Furthermore, the difference in the diagnostic cut-off has also been attributed 
to environmental and cultural differences, as these have been found to influence the 
behavioural expression of psychopathy (e.g. Cooke, 1998; Cooke & Michie, 1997). 
Thus, assessing the construct across different cultures using only a categorical (i.e. ‘cut-
off’) approach may present as problematic. The inclusion of a dimensional approach 
maybe more appropriate, particularly as researchers have found the PCL-R and its 
derivatives to be largely dimensional in nature (e.g. Walters et al. 2007). The 
combination of categorical and dimensional approaches in the assessment of 
psychopathy would allow for clinicians to state which psychopathic personality traits 
are central to the individual’s presentation, as well as commenting on the severity of 
each.  
 
Moving onto the structure of the PCL-R, the measure assesses psychopathy via two 
highly correlated factors: Factor 1 (F1) and Factor 2 (F2). Factor one is characterised by 
interpersonal and affective features, whilst factor two resembles an impulsive and 
antisocial lifestyle (Hare, 1991). According to Hare (1991), F1 psychopathy consists of 
the following traits: glibness/superficial charm; grandiose sense of self-worth; 
pathological lying; conning/manipulative; lack of remorse or guilt; shallow affect; 
callous/lack of empathy; and a failure to accept responsibility for own actions. F2 on the 
other hand was characterised by a need for stimulation/proneness to boredom; parasitic 
lifestyle; poor behavioural controls; early behavioural problems; lack of realistic, long-
term goals; impulsivity; irresponsibility; juvenile delinquency; and revocation of 
conditional release (Hare, 1991). 
 
The PCL-R has been found to have good reliability and validity, with a wealth of 
articles and book chapters devoted solely to evaluating its psychometric properties 
(Vitacco, Lishner & Neumann, 2012). Despite this support, a number of researchers 
(e.g. Cooke & Michie, 1997, 2001; Skeem & Cooke 2010a,b) have expressed their 
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concerns with the measure, specifically in relation to its structure. Cooke and Michie 
(1997) suggested that the two factors underpinning the PCL-R were not of equal 
importance. They identified that F1 was statistically better at defining psychopathy than 
F2. In light of this, Cooke and Michie (1997) concluded that the personality traits 
associated with F1 were the core features of the construct and should therefore be 
weighted accordingly on the PCL-R.  
 
In a later study, Cooke and Michie (2001) evaluated the construct validity of the two-
factor model. They were of the view that the two factors delineated by Hare (1991) may 
not be a true reflection of psychopathy as they were “founded on ad hoc statistics, in 
particular, the misinterpretation of congruence coefficients” (p. 183). Cooke and Michie 
(2001) sampled data from a large forensic sample, which constituted of North American 
men. The same data had previously been used to develop the PCL-R (Cooke & Michie, 
2001). Their results suggested that the two-factor model does not accurately describe 
psychopathy and instead proposed a three-factor model that comprised the following 
equally-weighted components: Arrogant and deceitful interpersonal style; Deficient 
affective experience; and Impulsive and irresponsible behavioural style (Cooke & 
Michie, 2001). According to Cooke and Michie (2001), all components have to be 
present for an individual to be diagnosed with clinical psychopathy. 
 
Cooke and Michie’s (2001) three-factor model placed reduced emphasis on criminality 
and more on personality pathology, as four of the items associated with F2 psychopathy 
were excluded
8
. It also placed more emphasis on affect when compared to Hare’s 
(1991) two-factor model. The new model suggested that criminality was a correlate, 
rather than a component of psychopathy (Cooke & Michie, 2001), which is in 
agreement with the early conceptions proposed by Schneider and Cleckley (i.e. the 
notion that some psychopaths are ‘successful’ and are able to function within society 
without offending, or engage in less serious antisocial behaviour). The over emphasis 
on criminality in the original PCL may have resulted from the characteristics of the 
sample used to develop it, i.e. North American prisoners; of which all were men (Cooke 
& Michie, 2001). It may also reflect DSM’s conceptualisation of the disorder, in that it 
does not explicitly distinguish psychopathy from ASPD (Forth, Bo & Kongerslev, 
2013). 
                                                        
8
 i.e. poor behavioural control, early behavioural problems, revocation of conditional release and criminal 
versatility. 
 29 
 
Blackburn (2007a) also recognised that the over focus on forensic samples in the 
psychopathy research has resulted in the construct being viewed as a type of criminal 
personality. He states that the literal meaning of psychopathy is “psychologically 
damaging”, but it has come to mean “socially damaging” (Blackburn, 2007a, p. 8). 
Furthermore, Blackburn (2007a) argued that psychopathy may not involve criminal 
behaviour and instead should be conceptualised as a disorder of personality, 
characterised by abnormal (as opposed to criminal) variants of ‘normal’ personality 
dimensions. Thus, it can be seen that researchers have argued that the PCL-R has 
overlapped with a behavioural measure and has deviated away from psychopathy as 
personality, moving towards a more behavioural approach. 
 
Moving back to the structure of psychopathy, as defined by the PCL-R, Neumann, 
Kosson, Forth and Hare (2006) disagreed with the decision made by Cooke and Michie 
(2001) to exclude four of the items originally belonging to F2. They felt that the 
elimination of these items was not appropriate, as the items have been found to play a 
vital role in the development of psychopathy (Frick & Marsee, 2006). Additionally, 
Williams et al. (2007) state that the three-factor model of psychopathy only provides an 
adequate fit when the four items are not included. They suggest that the inclusion of 
these items produces a more statistically valid model, a model comprising four factors 
(Williams et al. 2007).  
 
Following minor revisions to the PCL-R in 2003, Hare (2003) moved away from his 
traditional two-factor model of psychopathy and proposed that a four-factor model 
could better represent the measure. This model consisted of the following factors: 
Interpersonal; Affective; Lifestyle; and Antisocial (Hare, 2003). The interpersonal, 
affective, and lifestyle factors were identical to the three factors proposed by Cooke and 
Michie (2001). However the fourth factor (i.e. the antisocial component) included the 
four items excluded by Cooke and Michie (2001) and one additional item, ‘Serious 
criminal behaviour’ (Hare & Neumann, 2006). Hare and Neumann (2010) argue that 
Cooke and Michie (2001) contradict themselves in their three-factor model in that they 
include an antisocial lifestyle component, yet still suggest that psychopathy should be 
conceptualised through personality traits rather than criminal behaviour.  
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Therefore, it becomes apparent that there is disagreement surrounding the factor 
structure of PCL-R conceptualisation of psychopathy and as to whether the construct is 
personality or behaviour-based. The boundaries of the construct may require further 
clarification (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996), particularly since researchers have also 
failed to resolve this dispute. Research has found support for both the three-factor and 
four-factor model in community (e.g. Williams et al. 2007; Sevecke, Pukrop, Kosson & 
Krischer, 2009), psychiatric (e.g. Hill, Neumann & Rogers, 2004; Vitacco, Neumann & 
Jackson, 2005), and forensic samples (e.g. Johansson, Andershed, Kerr & Lavander, 
2002; Neumann, Hare & Johansson, 2013a).  
 
Application between sex 
 
Interestingly, there appears to be more agreement surrounding the factor structure of 
psychopathy in women, with Cooke and Michie’s (2001) three-factor model being more 
successful (e.g. Jackson, Rogers, Neumann & Lambert, 2002). According to Logan and 
Weizmann-Henelius (2012), the four-factor model of psychopathy (specifically the 
antisocial factor) and its applicability to women has been questioned given the sex 
differences in the expression of antisocial behaviour, attitudes and beliefs.  
 
Furthermore, in line with evolutionary theory, it has been postulated that psychopathic 
women are more likely to use subtle interpersonal dominance and exploitative strategies 
rather than antisocial behaviour or physical aggression as a method of meeting their 
needs (Kreis & Cooke, 2011). Research (e.g. Salekin, Rogers & Sewell, 1997) has also 
highlighted sex differences in the original two-factor model of psychopathy. Salekin et 
al. (1997) identified that F1 in women was characterised by a lack of empathy or guilt, 
interpersonal deception, proneness to boredom, and sensation seeking. F2 was 
underpinned by early behavioural problems, promiscuity, and adult antisocial 
behaviour. Interestingly, impulsivity, poor behavioural controls, and a lack of realistic 
long-term goals loaded onto both factors (Salekin et al. 1997). A ‘failure to accept 
responsibility for own actions’ did not load onto either component in women, which is 
surprising given that Hare (1991) identified this as a fundamental characteristic of the 
disorder (Salekin et al. 1997). Other researchers (e.g. Jackson et al. 2002) exploring the 
construct in women have failed to replicate the two-factor model. Thus, it appears that 
the PCL-R items function differently, with the two and four-factor models having little 
empirical application to women.  
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Further sex differences have been found in the prevalence of PCL-R defined 
psychopathy (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). In the general population, the 
prevalence of psychopathy in men has been identified to occur at a rate of 1%, with this 
figure being even lower in women (Forth, Brown, Hart & Hare, 1996). When exploring 
the extent of the construct in mental health settings, research has highlighted a notable 
sex difference. In a study of 42 matched men and women, de Vogel and de Ruiter 
(2005) identified 24% of the men sampled to be psychopathic, whilst only 10% of the 
women reached the diagnostic cut-off. Levels of psychopathy in psychiatric institutions 
have generally been found to be lower than that identified in correctional settings 
(Strand & Belfrage, 2005). In correctional settings, women generally exhibit similar 
levels of psychopathy to their male counterparts, i.e. 15 to 30% (Huss, 2009). However 
findings are varied and women tend to fall towards the lower end of this range (Verona 
& Vitale, 2006). For example, Salekin et al. (1997) found only 16% of women residing 
at a North American prison met the higher diagnostic cut-off for psychopathy (i.e. a cut-
off of 30). According to Logan & Weizmann-Henelius (2012), in higher secure settings, 
sex differences in psychopathy are less apparent, with levels of the disorder becoming 
almost identical across sexes (e.g. Strachan, 1993).  
 
Findings such as these bring into question the applicability of the PCL-R to women, as 
the measure has only been found to perform the same as in men when psychopathy 
presents at a severe degree and/or when a history of antisocial behaviour is present. It is 
possible that the prevalence rates for women may therefore be inaccurate. Thus, the 
PCL-R may not be adequately capturing the manifestation of psychopathy in women, or 
among those whose psychopathic traits (specifically the traits relating to antisocial 
conduct) are less evidenced (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). Research 
investigating psychopathy in women has therefore been limited to both a male 
conceptualisation of the disorder and a measure that has been developed and validated 
with men (Kreis & Cooke, 2011).  
 
Many researchers have administered the PCL-R to both men and women with the belief 
that it assesses psychopathy equally in both populations (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 
2012). This is unsurprising, as Skeem and Cooke (2010a) note how the theoretical 
construct and the assessment of psychopathy have somewhat become synonymous. That 
is, researchers are in danger of equating the two, when in fact they should treat the 
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assessment and manifestation of the disorder as separate entities. With this in mind, it is 
important to examine the applicability of the PCL-R to women, once again identifying 
any sex differences.  
 
Symptoms in psychopathic women have been argued to be less severe when compared 
to men (Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). Furthermore, in a qualitative study examining 
experts’ observations and evaluations, Forouzan (2003, cited in Forouzan & Cooke, 
2005) identified that manipulation in women was related to provocativeness, whilst in 
men it was associated with ‘conning’ behaviour. Impulsivity and conduct disorder in 
women manifested through running away, self-harming, manipulation, and participating 
in criminal offending, whereas in men the two traits were characterised primarily by 
physical aggression. In terms of interpersonal symptoms, glibness, superficial charm, 
and a grandiose sense of self-worth only became evident in the more severe cases of 
psychopathy in women.  
 
A number of experts also suggested that certain traits may have a different meaning 
across sexes. For example, ‘promiscuous sexual behaviour’ may be understood as a 
desire to exploit others, whilst in men it may reflect sensation seeking or mating effort 
(Forouzan, 2003, cited in Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). Societal norms were also argued to 
have an influence in the assessment of psychopathy, in that experts stated that ‘material 
dependency’ may be viewed as ‘parasitic’ in men, but may be culturally accepted in 
women (Forouzan, 2003, cited in Forouzan & Cooke, 2005). From this, it can be 
assumed that there are sex differences in the expression of psychopathy as measured by 
the PCL-R, with psychopathy in women presenting as more discrete and harder to 
detect (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012) using the PCL-R.  
 
Findings such as these highlight the importance of developing a new assessment of 
psychopathy; an assessment that can be applied to both men and women. In the 
meantime the PCL-R manual requires revising, as it lacks the guidance needed to 
interpret the items when working with women (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). A 
lack of guidance could result in the misinterpretation or underestimation of psychopathy 
in women.  
 
Despite the sex differences identified, the PCL-R has been found a reliable measure in 
women (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012), with its predictive ability being almost 
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identical to that found in men (e.g. Nicholls, Ogloff, Brink & Spidel, 2005). Given the 
overall success of the PCL-R (Zolendek, Lilienfeld, Patrick & Fowler, 2006), Hare and 
colleagues have developed derivative measures to assess psychopathy in a wide variety 
of contexts (Hare & Neumann, 2006). These include the Psychopathy Checklist: 
Screening Version (PCL:SV; Hart, Cox & Hare, 1995) and the Psychopathy Checklist: 
Youth Version (PCL:YV; Forth, Kosson & Hare, 2003). Both measures have been 
found to have similar psychometric properties to the PCL-R (Hare & Neumann, 2006). 
 
The Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) 
 
The PCL:SV was primarily developed for use in the MacArthur Risk Assessment study
9
 
(Hare & Neumann, 2006). It is used as a screen for psychopathy (Hare & Neumann, 
2006). The measure contains 12 items, with the rater assessing the items in the same 
manner adopted for the PCL-R (Forth et al. 2013). However, scoring of the PCL:SV 
requires less detailed information and can therefore be applied more readily to 
community samples where collateral information is not always available, thus requiring 
a need to rely on self-report  (Hemphill & Hart, 2003).  
 
When developing the PCL:SV the items used in the PCL-R were shortened and a 
number combined to form several collapsed items (Forth et al. 2013). For example, 
PCL:SV item three, ‘Deceitful’, was produced from simplifying and combining the 
PCL-R item ‘Pathological lying’ and ‘Conning and Manipulative’ (Forth et al. 2013). 
The PCL:SV has also been described as a “relatively quick and inexpensive way of 
assessing psychopathic traits” (Hart et al. 1995, p. 1), thus making it particularly useful 
for research purposes.  
 
In terms of the factor structure, findings for the PCL:SV mirror those obtained when 
using the PCL-R (Forth et al. 2013). Research has found support for the two-, three-, 
and four-factor structures (e.g. Cooke, Michie, Hart & Hare, 1999; Guy & Douglas, 
2006), therefore suggesting that the debate surrounding the structure of psychopathy 
also extends to this measure. However, more recent research has highlighted that Hare’s 
(2003) four-factor model provides a more adequate fit (e.g. Vitacco et al. 2005). 
Currently, the PCL:SV has been split into two parts resembling the two-factor structure 
                                                        
9
 The MacArthur violence risk assessment study was designed to improve the validity and effectiveness 
of clinical risk assessment, as well as provide information on the association between mental disorder and 
violence to enhance policy and mental health law (American Psychological Association, 1996). 
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of the PCL-R, with each component then potentially being split into a further two facets 
(Forth et al. 2013).  
 
The Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV) 
 
The youth version of the Psychopathy Checklist, the PCL:YV, is intended for use with 
adolescents. However, it is not used to diagnose psychopathy in young people per se, 
but rather as an indicator for detecting problematic behaviour in the future and to 
develop specialised interventions (Hare & Neumann, 2006).  
 
Assessing psychopathy in children and adolescents has given rise to much controversy 
amongst researchers, as certain individuals argue that traits central to understanding the 
disorder (e.g. empathy) may not reach full maturation until adulthood (Lilienfeld, 1998). 
Assigning the label of ‘psychopathy’ to an individual who has not yet reached maturity 
may be viewed as unethical, particularly as the label may have a negative impact on the 
child or adolescent (Dolan, 2004)
10
.  
 
Summary 
 
The PCL-R and its derivatives thus represent significant advances in the exploration and 
assessment of psychopathy (Forth et al. 2013). The PCL-R has been identified as being 
psychometrically sound.  However, there remains debate surrounding which traits and 
behaviours underpin the construct, with research now pointing towards a more 
personality-based approach. The PCL-R’s applicability to women has also been 
questioned. Researchers are unsure as to whether the measure is adequately capturing 
the construct in this population. These issues raise concerns due to the serious 
consequences involved when diagnosing an individual as ‘psychopathic’ (Forth et al. 
2013).  Further exploration into the applicability of the PCL-R and its factor structure is 
therefore warranted.  
 
The concerns surrounding the PCL-R have also led researchers to develop alternative 
methods of assessing the construct (Fowler & Lilienfeld, 2013). Many of these 
alternatives rely heavily on self-report and observations, with more recent developments 
                                                        
10
As the current research focuses solely on adults, further discussion of the PCL:YV is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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incorporating measures to assess implicit cognitive and affective psychopathic 
processing
11
. The next two sections discuss these assessments in more detail.  
 
3.4 Self-report measures of psychopathy
12
 
 
As discussed, the PCL-R assessment process involves an extensive review of an 
individual’s collateral information. Administration of the measure is also time 
consuming and requires formal training. Thus, for many purposes (i.e. for research and 
assessing psychopathy in non-institutionalised samples) the PCL-R may not always be 
appropriate (Copestake, Gray & Snowden, 2011). Given this, there have been several 
attempts to develop a new self-report measure of psychopathy to act as an alternative to 
the PCL-R and its derivatives. 
 
According to Lilienfeld and Fowler (2006), self-report measures are economical, easily 
administered, allow for the detection of different response styles, and yield useful 
information relating to the absence of affective traits. However, there are also a number 
of disadvantages, which have led to the belief that self-report measures are not suitable 
when assessing psychopathy. Psychopathic individuals, for example, have been 
associated with lying, a lack of insight, and an inability to report accurately on affect, 
therefore raising questions regarding the validity of self-report when measuring the 
construct (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
 
Lilienfeld and Fowler (2006) acknowledge these disadvantages, but also state that there 
are a “number of misconceptions that have led to misunderstandings regarding the 
potential uses and misuses of questionnaires for detecting the disorder” (p. 111). This 
has resulted in clinicians prematurely discounting the value of self-report when in fact 
the responses provided by psychopathic individuals generate diagnostically helpful 
information about the way they view themselves and the world (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 
2006). Additionally, in a meta-analytic review examining self-reported psychopathic 
traits and response styles, Ray et al. (2013) concluded that individuals with psychopathy 
are often willing to admit to many undesirable traits and behaviours. Self-report 
measures may therefore have some utility in the assessment of the construct. 
 
                                                        
11
 See Chapter four and five for a more detailed discussion on psychopathic processing. 
12
 Appendix two provides an overview of the psychometric qualities of each self-report measure of 
psychopathy discussed. 
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Early self-report psychopathy measures (e.g. the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory: Psychopathic Deviate [MMPI PD; McKinley & Hathaway, 1944] and the 
Millon Clinical Multi-Axial Clinical Inventory-II [MCMI-II; Millon, 1987]) have been 
criticised as they were not specifically designed to assess psychopathy per se, but 
instead were primarily developed to monitor criminal deviance or antisocial behaviour 
(Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). It is therefore unsurprising that early measures lack 
concurrent validity and only relate to F2 of the PCL-R, ignoring the core interpersonal 
and affective features of the disorder (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
 
In an attempt to resolve this problem, researchers developed several new self-report 
measures to directly assess the construct. These include the Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995), the Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale (SRP; Hare, 1985), the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; 
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996), the Elemental Psychopathy Assessment (EPA; Lynam et 
al. 2011a), and the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM; Patrick, 2010). These will 
be examined in the ensuing paragraphs.  
 
The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) 
 
Given the strong empirical evidence surrounding the PCL-R and its utility in assessing 
psychopathy in forensic samples, Levenson et al. (1995) wished to create a similar 
means of measuring the construct in non-institutionalised samples. Levenson et al. 
(1995) aimed to develop a new measure of psychopathy that paralleled the two-factor 
model outlined by the PCL-R. Levenson et al. (1995) hypothesised that F1 and F2 
mapped onto the distinctions made by Karpman (i.e. primary and secondary 
psychopathy; See p. 10), viewing F1 as representative of ‘primary psychopathy’ and F2 
as a marker of ‘secondary psychopathy’. Karpman (1955, cited in Skeem et al. 2003) 
held the belief that primary psychopaths were callous, manipulative, selfish and 
untruthful, whilst secondary psychopaths were neurotic and engaged in antisocial 
behaviour that was driven by strong emotional impulses. 
 
Levenson et al. (1995) proposed that primary and secondary psychopathy would be 
evidenced in a non-institutionalised sample. However in terms of secondary 
psychopathy, they speculated that non-institutionalised samples would not commit 
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serious antisocial behaviour, but may still engage in behaviour that deviates from social 
norms, e.g. gambling and promiscuous sexual behaviour. 
 
Levenson et al. (1995) developed the LSRP, which consisted of 26 items rated via a 
four-point likert type scale. The LSRP was constructed to provide indices of PCL-R F1 
and F2, which in conjunction with Karpman’s description, were named ‘primary 
psychopathy’ and ‘secondary psychopathy’ (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Levenson and 
colleagues stated that the primary and secondary psychopathy scales could be 
differentiated on the basis of trait anxiety
13
 (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Individuals 
with high scores on the primary scale are likely to have low trait anxiety, whilst high 
scorers on the secondary scale are likely to be represented by high levels of trait 
anxiety. In terms of the items used to assess the construct, the primary psychopathy 
scale is denoted by items such as, “Looking out for myself is my top priority” and “I tell 
other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I want”, whereas the 
secondary psychopathy scale is represented by items such as “Love is overrated” and “I 
am often bored”.  
 
Although the two-factor structure of the LSRP has been strongly replicated in a number 
of confirmatory factor analyses (e.g. Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999), it is worth 
noting that other researchers have suggested a three-factor solution provides a more 
accurate fit (e.g. Brinkley, Diamond, Magaletta & Heigel, 2008; Sellbom, 2011). This 
three-factor model is identical to that proposed by Cooke and Michie (2001). It 
therefore appears that the debate surrounding the factor structure of psychopathy also 
extends to include self-report measures. 
 
Regarding reliability, Levenson et al. (1995) found the measure to have good internal 
consistency in a sample of 487 undergraduate psychology students. The primary 
psychopathy scale was identified as being more reliable, agreeing with the 
conceptualisations made by Cleckley (1982), namely that primary psychopathy (i.e. the 
interpersonal and affective features) when compared to secondary psychopathy may be 
more prominent in non-institutionalised populations. Lynam et al. (1999) also found the 
LSRP to have excellent internal consistency and test-retest reliability in a larger sample 
of students.  
                                                        
13
 Trait anxiety reflects the long-term tendency to respond to unpleasant situations or threatening stimuli 
in an anxious manner. It can occur at both a conscious and unconscious level (Bados, Gómez-Benito & 
Balaguer, 2010). 
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When examining the validity of the LSRP, the measure has been found to significantly 
correlate with the factor and total scores of the PCL-R in a sample of Caucasian and 
African-American participants (e.g. Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith & Newman, 2001), thus 
demonstrating concurrent validity with an existing measure of psychopathy. In addition 
to this, Brinkley et al. (2001) found good construct validity for the LSRP, with the 
measuring displaying similar behavioural correlates to the PCL-R.  
 
However, in contrast to the PCL-R, the LSRP did not correlate with non-violent 
offending. This may reflect the different populations used to develop each measure. 
Further support was provided by Lynam et al. (1999), who examined the construct 
validity of the LSRP and found that those scoring high on the measure also used a 
greater variety of drugs, were more likely to report heavy drinking and commit a greater 
variety of antisocial acts, and were more likely to be arrested.  
 
In terms of personality traits, Lynam et al. (1999) also found that total scores on the 
LSRP were significantly associated with agreeableness and conscientiousness, with 
primary psychopathy mainly relating to the former personality domain. This is 
consistent with previous research findings (e.g. Widiger & Lynam, 1998; Miller, 
Lynam, Widiger & Leukefeld, 2001).  
 
Sex differences in psychopathy, as measured by the LSRP, followed a similar pattern to 
those identified using the PCL-R. Men were identified as scoring higher than women on 
primary psychopathy and were considerably higher on antisocial action, boredom 
susceptibility, and thrill and adventure seeking (Levenson et al. 1995). This finding is 
consistent with other researchers (e.g. Salekin, Rogers, Ustad & Sewell, 1998; Jackson 
et al. 2002) who found the construct higher in men regardless of the population under 
study. 
 
Despite empirical support for the LSRP, the measure is not without its limitations. 
Levenson et al. (1995) found the primary and secondary psychopathy scales moderately 
correlated with each other. This correlation questions the discriminant validity of the 
two scales, as Karpman (1955, cited in Skeem et al. 2003) stated that primary 
psychopathy and secondary psychopathy are distinct, i.e. they are etiologically different 
(Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
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Levenson et al. (1995) also found primary psychopathy to positively correlate with a 
measure of trait anxiety. Although this correlation was weak, the absence of a 
significant negative correlation between the two creates uncertainty around the 
measure’s construct validity (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006) as primary psychopathy has 
been associated with low levels of anxiety (e.g. Skeem et al. 2003). Lynam et al. (1999) 
argue that this finding may be due to the absence of items explicitly examining affect, 
specifically anxiety. Interestingly however, Hare’s (2003) PCL-R has also been 
criticised for this (Lilienfeld, 1994) despite Neumann et al’s. (2013a) claim that low 
anxiety and fearlessness are comprehensively accounted for by the existing items.  
 
Furthermore, Lynam et al. (1999) also found the discriminant validity of the LSRP 
primary psychopathy scale to be problematic, in that they identified it to be more highly 
associated with antisocial behaviour than with measures of core affective and 
interpersonal features. Thus, the LSRP, like the PCL-R, may also be criticised for over-
focusing on behaviour rather than on the core personality traits associated with the 
disorder.  
 
The Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP) 
 
Hare (1985) also recognised the need to develop a new self-report measure based on the 
PCL concept. Hare (1985) developed the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale using item 
reduction procedures. He identified 75 items that differentiated individuals scoring high 
on the PCL from those scoring low (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). From this pool of 
items, Hare selected 29 that correlated strongly with the PCL total score and 
incorporated them in his new self-report measure of psychopathy, the SRP (Lilienfeld & 
Fowler, 2006).  
 
Hare (1985) administered the SRP to a sample of 226 prisoners. Although the 
coefficient alpha of the measure was good, the new measure did not correlate strongly 
with the PCL. An inspection of the SRP responses revealed that prisoners completed the 
measure in a manner that was inconsistent with their collateral information (Hare, 
1985). The SRP also did not adequately capture the core features of the construct, 
namely features relating to superficial charm, callousness and deception (Lilienfeld & 
Fowler, 2006). Given this, Hare decided to make amendments to the SRP to improve its 
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relationship with the PCL (and later the PCL-R), in turn increasing the validity of the 
measure (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). 
 
In the second version of the SRP (i.e. SRP-II; Hare, Harpur & Hemphill, 1989), Hare 
and his colleagues assembled 60 items to provide more comprehensive coverage of 
psychopathy and its core features (Williams & Paulhus, 2004). Williams and Paulhus 
(2004) note that Hare placed special emphasis on 31 of these items, as they were 
theoretically aligned with the two-factor model underpinning the PCL-R. These 31 
items are often used as the shortened version of the SRP-II (Williams & Paulhus, 2004).  
 
Like the PCL-R, Hare noted that the SRP-II also assessed psychopathy via two factors, 
with the first measuring the core personality traits of the disorder and the second the 
behavioural characteristics (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). However, Williams and 
Paulhus (2004) and Benning, Patrick, Salekin and Leistico (2005) identified SRP-II 
factor one (SRP-II F1) to be less replicable and reliable than SRP-II factor two (SRP-II 
F2). Several researchers (e.g. Williams & Paulhus, 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Lester, 
Salekin & Sellbom, 2013) have also explored the factor structure of the measure and 
have suggested a different model to that originally proposed
14
. 
 
Williams and Paulhus (2004) examined the factor structure of the SRP-II in a sample of 
students. The full 60 items were found to be underpinned by two broad factors 
explaining 21% of the total variance. The first included elements of PCL-R F2, i.e.. 
impulsivity and antisocial acts (Williams & Paulhus, 2004). However, Williams and 
Paulhus (2004) note that a number of further personality features also loaded onto this 
factor, e.g. manipulation. They consequently named this factor ‘Manipulative Trouble-
Making’. The second factor consisted of items linked to low anxiety and self-
confidence, named ‘Emotional Stability’. Williams and Paulhus (2004) stated that their 
factor structure was inconsistent with Hare’s two-factor model, and may instead reflect 
the excess of anxiety-related items and a lack of antisocial behaviour items
15
 included in 
the SRP-II (60 items). When examining the SRP-II as a whole (either as a 31 item, or a 
60 item measure), the measure demonstrated good concurrent validity with another self-
report measure of psychopathy, the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI), and 
                                                        
14
 There has been less published research on the SRP-II when compared to other self-report psychopathy 
measures as the items have never been published. Instead, they were distributed internally in the form of a 
three-page leaflet (Williams & Paulhus, 2004). 
15
 These items were deemed not appropriate when assessing for psychopathy in non-forensic samples 
(Williams et al. 2007). 
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replicated a similar pattern of correlations with the Big Five personality domains
16
 
(Williams & Paulhus, 2004). The total score of the SRP-II (31 items) also positively 
correlated with self-reported delinquency, providing evidence for the use of the SRP-II 
when measuring psychopathy in non-forensic samples (Williams & Paulhus, 2004). 
 
To improve the validity of the measure, Williams et al. (2007) reduced the number of 
anxiety items and added more behavioural items to the SRP-II item pool, which in turn 
increased the number of items to 77. Factor analyses conducted on these items 
suggested the measure now better resembled a four-factor model; a model similar to that 
underpinning the current PCL-R and its derivatives (Williams et al. 2007).  
 
The four-factor model consisted of the following components: ‘Interpersonal 
Manipulation’ (IM); ‘Criminal Tendencies’ (CT); ‘Erratic Lifestyle’ (EL); and ‘Callous 
Affect’ (CA). As Williams et al. (2007) note, the addition of the new behavioural items 
revealed a new distinct factor relating to criminality (CT). However, it is important to 
note that this factor did not develop solely due to the addition of the items. Instead the 
items may have been dispersed across the previous three-factors (Williams et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, these new four factors correlated positively with one another, providing 
evidence that the SRP-II was tapping into an underlying superordinate factor, that of 
‘psychopathy’ (Williams et al. 2007).  
 
Williams et al. (2007) performed further analyses on their revised edition of the 
measure and found it to have an acceptable level of internal consistency. The validity of 
the measure in a student sample was also supported by statistically significant 
correlations with the PPI, the LSRP, and a wide variety of socially offensive activities, 
including bullying, drug abuse, driving misconduct, crime, and anti-authority (Williams 
et al. 2007). Of particular interest is the fact that all four components identified by 
Williams et al. (2007) were related to misconduct, which indicate that a criminality 
component is in fact useful when measuring psychopathy in community samples.  
 
Lester et al. (2013) also subjected the SRP-II (60 items) to a number of factor analyses. 
They indicated a two-factor model did not adequately fit the data in a sample of 1,257 
undergraduate students.  A four-factor solution, which included 36 of the items from the 
                                                        
16
 The Big Five personality model consists of five broad personality domains representing Extraversion, 
Openness, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
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pool, was found to provide an accurate fit (Lester et al. 2013). However, this factor 
structure was different to the four-factor model delineated by Williams et al. (2007) in 
that the model did not focus on criminality. Lester et al. (2013) noted that their model 
comprised of the following components: ‘Interpersonal’; ‘Disinhibition/Impulsivity’; 
‘Fearlessness’; and ‘Cold-heartedness’. An item-level inspection revealed that this 
model tapped into the conceptualisation of psychopathy first proposed by Cleckley 
(1982). Correlational analyses also provided further support for the model, with total 
and subscale scores also significantly correlating with constructs relevant to 
psychopathy, including maladaptive attachment styles.  
 
Thus, whilst the SRP-II has been shown to have good psychometric properties, 
specifically in terms of reliability and validity, it appears that researchers have failed to 
agree on the factor structure underpinning the measure and whether this should include 
a component focusing on antisocial behaviour. A decision was made to further refine 
the SRP to provide coverage of the four-factor model outlined by Williams et al. (2007) 
and Hare (2003). The third edition of the SRP, the SRP-III (Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, 
in press), like its predecessors, has also performed well in a number of studies testing 
community populations (e.g. Mahmut, Menictas, Stevenson & Homewood, 2011; Watt 
& Brooks, 2012; Neal & Sellbom, 2012) and was found to have good validity and 
reliability for non-incarcerated men and women.  
 
Indeed, according to Neal and Sellbom (2012), the SRP-III may be a useful tool to help 
understand the three-factor versus four-factor structure debate, as three of the 
components found to underpin the measure (i.e. IM, EL and CA) tap into the three-
factor model of psychopathy proposed by Cooke and Michie (2001). The addition of CT 
aligns the measure with Hare’s (2003) four-factor solution. Further exploration into the 
factor structure of self-report psychopathy is clearly a likely useful direction for future 
research. 
 
The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) 
 
When developing the PPI, Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) recognised that most self-
report measures of psychopathy appear primarily based on the PCL-R and assess 
antisocial behaviour rather than the personality traits originally described by Cleckley 
(1982). As a result, Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) questioned the generalisability of the 
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research defining psychopathy using behavioural-based measures to the traditional 
conception of the construct. Consequently, Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) developed 
the PPI as a “pure measure of the personality-based approach” (p. 491). That is, when 
constructing the new measure the authors focused only on personality traits and did not 
include any behaviourally-based items.  
 
According to Lilienfeld and Fowler (2006), Lilienfeld and Andrews adopted an 
exploratory approach to test construction of the PPI and generated a pool of items from 
a large number of characteristics that have been used to define psychopathy in the 
academic literature. The items were then tested across three iterative rounds and 
subjected to a number of factor analyses involving 1,156 psychology students 
(Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). The PPI consists of 187 items
17
, which are rated via a four-
point likert type scale (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Examples of the items include, “I 
always look out for my own interests before worrying about those of the other guy” and 
“Even when others are upset with me, I can usually win them over with my charm”. The 
PPI also contains validity scales to detect problematic responding.  
 
In terms of the structure of the measure, exploratory analyses identified that 
psychopathy, as defined by the PPI, could be understood through eight factors: 
Machiavellian Egocentricity; Social Potency; Cold-heartedness; Carefree 
Nonplanfulness; Fearlessness; Blame Externalization; Impulsive Nonconformity; and 
Stress Immunity
18
.  
 
According to Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996), these subscales are useful when clarifying 
the nature of the personality traits underpinning the construct. They also acknowledge 
that it would be impossible for their measure to contain all facets relevant to the 
construct and state that the eight subscales contain the most relevant features of 
prototypical psychopathy. Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) propose that the multifactorial 
nature of the PPI may ultimately help clarify whether psychopathy results from 
maladaptive interactions among certain personality traits, or whether the construct exists 
as a set of co varying symptoms. Research into these two possibilities remains ongoing.  
 
                                                        
17
 A revised version of the PPI (the PPI-R) is available that had its reading level reduced and any 
culturally specific items removed (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
18
 Blame externalization and Stress Immunity may not be essential features of psychopathy as they have 
been found to load poorly onto their respective higher-order factor (e.g. Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; 
Claes et al. 2009). 
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By developing a measure based solely on personality, Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) 
hoped to capture the affective-interpersonal facet of psychopathy, considered the core 
feature of the disorder. The validation studies conducted by Lilienfeld and Andrews 
(1996) provided general support for the psychometric properties of the PPI and 
suggested it was a useful tool to assess psychopathy in noncriminal populations.  
 
When the PPI was correlated with measures of ASPD, it was found to possess 
substantial variance that was not shared with antisocial behaviours. This finding, once 
again, highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the personality traits of 
psychopathy and behaviours often associated with the construct (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 
1996). However on closer inspection, the PPI correlated more strongly with ASPD than 
with a measure of peer-rated Cleckley psychopathy, thus raising concerns surrounding 
the PPI’s discriminant validity with antisocial behaviour (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
 
One possible explanation for this is that although the PPI was purposely developed as a 
personality-based self-report, the authors still included items that somewhat reflected 
antisocial behaviour, e.g. “I stretch the rules to see how much I get away with” 
(Neumann, Uzieblo, Crombez & Hare, 2013b). Nonetheless, Lilienfeld and Andrews 
(1996) found their measure to display discriminant validity with a number of other 
constructs conceptually unrelated to psychopathy, e.g. depression and schizophrenia 
spectrum conditions.  
 
Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen and Krueger (2003) explored the factor structure of 
the PPI in a community sample of men and examined the personality and behavioural 
correlates of each factor. Factor analyses indicated that the subscales underpinning the 
PPI (excluding cold-heartedness, which did not load onto a component) closely 
resembled two dominant factors; Factor one (PPI-I; also known as Fearless Dominance) 
was marked by impulsive, non-conformity, blame externalization, Machiavellian 
egocentricity, and carefree nonplanfulness, which Benning et al. (2003) summarised as 
reflecting imperturbability, social dominance, and venturesomeness. The second factor 
(PPI-II; also known as Self-Centered Impulsivity or Impulsive Antisociality) consisted 
of the stress immunity, social potency, and fearlessness subscales. Benning et al. (2003) 
described this factor as reflecting unconventional attitudes, poor planning, 
aggressiveness, and estrangement from others.  
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Interestingly, the two PPI factors paralleled PCL-R F1 and F2
19
, indicating that the PPI 
may be a useful self-report tool for assessing psychopathy. However, unlike the PCL-R, 
the PPI factors were found to be unrelated, suggesting that the PPI taps into facets 
independent of psychopathy (Benning et al. 2003). According to Benning et al. (2003), 
the uncorrelated nature of these two factors suggests that personality and antisocial 
features of psychopathy may be underpinned by different neurobiological and 
etiological processes. It also calls into question that the PPI assesses psychopathy as a 
unitary construct (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
 
Regarding parallels between the PPI and the PCL-R factors, both PPI-I and PCL-R F1 
were found to have poor relationships with child and adult antisocial behaviour, 
including drug and alcohol abuse (e.g. Hare, 1991). Positive associations occurred 
between PPI-I, F1, and socioeconomic status, education and intelligence (e.g. Harpur et 
al. 1989). PPI-I was also negatively predicted by stress reaction and harm avoidance, 
and positively predicted by social potency. These findings again mirror the personality 
correlates of F1 (Benning et al. 2003), in that PPI-I was distinct from the behavioural 
correlates of the disorder. Low trait anxiety also appeared to be a prominent feature of 
PPI-I. Thus, an individual characterised by PPI-I could: 
 
“be described as unreactive in anxiety-provoking situations, persuasive and 
socially dominant, and willing to engage in risky activities while lacking normal 
anticipatory fear in risky or dangerous circumstances” (Benning et al. 2003, p. 
346).  
 
This description fits well with the conceptusalisation of primary psychopathy (Benning 
et al. 2003).  Like PPI-I, PPI-II also mapped onto its PCL-R counterpart, F2. PPI-II was 
found to be positively associated with indices of antisocial behaviour, substance abuse, 
and impulsivity (Benning et al. 2003). The PPI factor was also negatively related with 
socioeconomic status, education, and verbal intelligence. Benning et al. (2003) 
concluded that like PCL-R F2, PPI-II was largely associated with externalizing 
psychopathology, namely, “symptoms of child conduct disorder, adult antisocial 
behaviour, alcohol dependence, and drug dependence” (Benning et al. 2003, p. 346).  
 
                                                        
19
 Copestake et al. (2011) did not find similar findings for the PPI-R. PPI-R-I did not significantly 
correlate with PCL-R F1 in their study. They attributed this finding to the different populations used to 
develop the two measures. 
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As discussed, the cold-heartedness subscale did not load onto the PPI two-factor 
structure outlined by Benning et al. (2003). This finding has also been replicated in a 
sample of offenders (e.g. Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld, Patrick & Test, 2008), a 
psychiatric sample (e.g. Claes et al. 2009) and found as part of a meta-analytic review 
on the factor structure of the PPI (e.g. Marcus, Fulton & Edens, 2013). Thus, contrary to 
initial postulation, it appears that cold-heartedness is unrelated to the two PPI factors.  
 
The consistency of this finding is surprising given that both Cleckley (1982) and Hare 
(1991, 2003) state that ‘callousness’ and a ‘lack of empathy’ are key features of the 
disorder. Benning et al. (2003) provides an explanation for these unusual findings. On 
closer inspection of the items, many tap into PPI cold-heartedness and appear to better 
represent sentimentality, imaginativeness, and emotional reactivity. High scores on the 
items were more indicative of a lesser extreme of these traits (due to the reverse items) 
rather than of callousness or cruelty (Benning et al. 2003). PPI cold-heartedness 
therefore appears underpinned by predispositions that are distinct from other PPI 
subscales. Nonetheless, this finding does suggest that sentimentality, imaginativeness, 
and emotional reactivity are unrelated to the construct of psychopathy.  
 
The PPI total score, as well as the two-factor model outlined by Benning et al. (2003), 
has also been identified in male offenders (e.g. Poythress, Edens & Lilienfeld, 1998
20
; 
Patrick, Edens, Poythress, Lilienfeld & Benning, 2006; Edens et al. 2008) and a sample 
of psychiatric inpatients (e.g. Claes et al. 2009), which lends support for the robustness 
of the PPI and the two-factor model. Patrick et al. (2006) identified that the PPI factors 
demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity with measures of personality 
and clinical symptomatology. PPI-II was found to positively correlate with antisocial 
features, aggression, borderline features, and alcohol and drug problems.  
 
PPI-I, however, did not significantly correlate with these features, with the exception of 
alcohol problems, for which a weak negative relationship was identified. Significant 
positive correlations were noted between several internalizing symptoms (e.g. anxiety, 
anxiety-related disorders, and somatic complaints) and PPI-I. In contrast, PPI-II was 
found to have a positive relationship with these. Patrick et al (2006) concluded that with 
                                                        
20
 It is important to note that Poythress et al. (1998) did not find the PPI subscales ‘Fearlessness’ and 
‘Stress Immunity’ to be related to the PCL-R. This brings into question the importance of such factors in 
psychopathy. As an alternative explanation, the finding may also be due to PCL-R not including items 
that directly tap into anxiety. 
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the exception of a number of variables (e.g. self-reported empathy), PPI-I and PPI-II 
differed significantly from one another.  
 
Considering only the total score of the PPI and failing to examine the two distinct 
factors would restrict a clinician’s ability to predict whether an individual may present 
with certain symptoms or behaviours (Patrick et al. 2006). Further evidence for the 
PPI’s discriminant validity has been provided by Claes et al. (2009) who did not find 
any significant relationships between the presence of Axis I disorders (i.e. psychiatric 
disorders, excluding disorders of personality) and PPI scores.  
 
Regarding women offenders, Berardino, Meloy, Sherman and Jacobs (2005) also found 
support for the unrelated two-factor model. However in their study the PPI factors did 
not mirror the two PCL-R factors. Arguably this may be due to a sex bias in that 
psychopathy may present differently in women. Whilst PPI-II tapped into the deviant 
antisocial characteristics found within PCL-R F2, it also contained an interpersonal 
subscale (i.e. Machiavellian Egocentricity). This subscale would normally be found to 
associate with PCL-R F1. Such findings emphasise the problems when attempting to 
separate the interpersonal and behavioural facets of psychopathy (Berardino et al. 
2005).  
 
Berardino et al. (2005) also report on the PPI presenting with good convergent and 
discriminant validity in their sample of female offenders. Evidence was also found for 
the diagnostic utility of the PPI in women, in that 87% of the sample were correctly 
classified either as a psychopath or not (Berardino et al. 2005). Nevertheless, on closer 
inspection of the data, Berardino et al. (2005) recognised that the detection rate for 
psychopathy was smaller than the ability to correctly classify as non-psychopathic. 
Thus, the PPI appears more successful at ruling out rather than detecting the construct 
of psychopathy in women (Berardino et al. 2005).     
 
A more recent study conducted by Neumann et al. (2013b) concluded that the PPI two-
factor model may not be as robust as previously thought. Exploratory structural 
equation modeling (ESEM) indicated that five to six factors needed to be extracted 
before an acceptable model fit was achieved. The results also suggested that the two PPI 
factors are multidimensional rather than unidimensional. Treating PPI-I and PPI-II as 
unidimensional, however, may limit their validity (Neumann et al. 2013b). Neumann et 
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al. (2013b) also found PPI-I to lack the ability to discriminate individuals with 
psychopathy from those without the disorder.  
 
A study conducted by Neumann, Malterer and Newman (2008) also failed to replicate 
the two-factor model delineated by Benning et al. (2003). In a larger sample of male 
offenders, Neumann et al. (2008) found a three-factor model to provide a better fit to the 
PPI. The three-factor model was said to constitute a fearlessness impulsive antisociality 
component; a component that reflects high extraversion and low neuroticism; and a 
final component that was coined ‘callous-indifferent’21. Although the PPI fulfills its 
original purpose (i.e. to assess a wide range of psychopathic characteristics denoted by 
the academic literature), the study by Neumann et al. (2008) raises questions as to 
whether the PPI subscales can be narrowed into a model consisting of two, three, or a 
higher number of factors. Thus, findings from both studies (e.g. Neumann et al. 2008; 
Neumann et al. 2013b) indicate that researchers are still questioning the PPI, 
specifically in terms of structure. 
 
Again this illustrates how there is little consensus among researchers as to what 
components underpin the construct of psychopathy. Neumann et al. (2008) argues that 
this debate may be more easily resolved by examining the basic elements of 
psychopathy, that is, exploring the construct as a broad model of general personality. 
Other researchers (e.g. Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006) state that it would be valuable to 
examine the relationship between the PPI and laboratory indices relevant to 
psychopathy (e.g. go-no-go tasks) to increase understanding into the psychobiological 
deficits underpinning the construct. None of the self-report measures described here 
have been applied in this manner and therefore indicates a need for further research to 
examine the assessment of psychopathy in more detail. 
 
The Elemental Psychopathy Assessment (EPA) 
 
Lynam and Widiger (2007) and Neumann et al. (2008) both agree that in order to fully 
understand the construct of psychopathy in terms of its factor structure, it is important 
to examine the basic elements of the disorder rather than attempt to identify elements 
                                                        
21
 The ‘Fearless Impulsive Antisociality’ component is underpinned by the following PPI subscales: 
Fearlessness; Impulsive nonconformity; Blame externalization; and Machiavellian egocentricity. Stress 
immunity and Social potency constituted the high extraversion and low neuroticism component. Lastly, 
Coldheartedness and Carefree non-planfulness were associated with the ‘Callous-indifferent’ factor. 
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from compound traits. Compound traits could be better described as the items belonging 
to the PCL-R, with each item being made up of a number of different personality traits. 
Lynam et al. (2011a) recognised the importance of this and developed a new self-report 
measure of psychopathy (i.e. the EPA) that utilised the basic elemental models of 
general personality, namely the personality traits conceptualised by the Five Factor 
Model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
 
The FFM is a widely known trait model, allowing for a common language that can be 
used to describe psychopathy (Wilson, Miller, Zeichner, Lynam & Widiger, 2011). It is 
made up of five broad personality domains representing extraversion, 
conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism, and agreeableness. Consistent with 
Blackburn (2007a), the EPA was developed to measure psychopathy through 
maladaptive variants of each of the FFM domains (Wilson et al. 2011). In total, it 
contains 18 scales, each relating to the different facets of extraversion (e.g. coldness, 
dominance, and thrill-seeking), neuroticism (e.g. anger, urgency, unconcern, self-
contentment, self-assurance, and invulnerability), antagonism (e.g. distrust, 
manipulation, self-centeredness, opposition, arrogance, and callousness), and 
conscientiousness (e.g. impersistence, disobliged, and rashness) most commonly 
associated with prototypical psychopathy (Lynam et al. 2011a). In line with previous 
research (e.g. Miller et al. 2001), openness was not included in the EPA. Initially, scale 
development included 30 items per scale. However this item pool was reduced to 14-18 
items per scale following an iterative process, i.e. through the removal of redundant 
items and via group discussion (Lynam et al. 2011a). 
 
Although little research has been conducted exploring the EPA, researchers have found 
the self-report to demonstrate good concurrent validity with other psychopathy 
measures in community samples (e.g. Lynam et al. 2011a; Wilson et al. 2011; Miller, 
Hyatt, Rausher, Maples & Zeichner, 2014) and prisoners (e.g. Lynam et al. 2011a). The 
EPA subscales have also been found to evidence good convergent and discriminant 
validity with factor scores from the PPI-R, LSRP, and SRP-III (Wilson et al. 2011). 
More specifically, Wilson et al. (2011) identified that psychopathy F1 scales, such as 
LSRP primary psychopathy, were strongly associated with the EPA subscale derived 
from FFM agreeableness. Additionally, F2 psychopathy scales (i.e. LSRP secondary 
psychopathy) were found to be associated with the EPA subscales representing FFM 
agreeableness and FFM conscientiousness.  
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These findings are supported in the meta-analysis completed by Lynam and Derefinko 
(2006). However, whilst the PPI-R here appeared to contain most of the content found 
within the EPA, the LSRP and SRP-III lacked items relating to negative emotionality, 
as represented by EPA scales, such as self-assurance, invulnerability, and self-
contentment (Wilson et al. 2011). As previously stated, negative emotionality was 
central to Cleckley’s (1982) description of the construct but not Hare’s (2003). Given 
that the LSRP and SRP-III was developed based on Hare’s (1991, 2003) description, it 
is unsurprising that these two measures contain less content relating to negative 
emotionality.  
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that the divergent relations between the EPA subscales and 
factors from the PPI-R, LSRP, and SRP-III emphasise the inconsistencies across self-
report measures of psychopathy. The EPA total score was found to correlate 
significantly with aggression, antisocial behaviour, substance abuse, and alcohol abuse 
(Wilson et al. 2011). Consistent with previous research (e.g. Miller et al. 2001; Lynam 
& Derefinko, 2006; Few, Miller & Lynam, 2013), Wilson et al. (2011) identified that 
the EPA scales derived from FFM agreeableness and conscientiousness were the two 
scales most strongly associated with externalizing behaviours associated with 
psychopathy.   
 
In terms of the factor structure of the EPA, the measure was found to be underpinned by 
a consistent four-factor structure in a large sample of students (n = 907). The four-factor 
model consisted of antagonism (low levels of FFM agreeableness), emotional stability, 
disinhibition (low levels of conscientiousness), and narcissism (Few et al. 2013). This 
factor structure was found to account for a substantial amount of variance across 
existing self-report measures of psychopathy (Few et al. 2013). More interestingly, Few 
et al. (2013) recognised that EPA factors explained an additional 16% of the variance in 
psychopathy beyond the variance accounted for by established self-report psychopathy 
measures, such as the PPI, LSRP, and SRP-III. Such findings provide further validation 
of the EPA as a valuable tool when assessing the basic elements of psychopathy.  
 
Furthermore, the EPA four-factor structure associated with known conceptualisations of 
the construct, in that EPA antagonism was positively related to nine out of ten subscales 
from existing psychopathy measures, and EPA disinhibition was identified as 
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consistently correlating with psychopathy subscales that assess impulsive behaviour, 
such as LSRP secondary psychopathy and SRP-III erratic lifestyle (Few et al. 2013).  
EPA emotional stability was strongly associated with PPI-FD but found to correlate 
poorly with the LSRP and SRP-III. Once again, this demonstrates that both the EPA and 
PPI-FD contain content not included in other measures of psychopathy (Few et al. 
2013). Nonetheless, the assessment of psychopathy via an Elemental Personality 
Approach appears to be promising, as it views psychopathy as a disorder of ‘normal’ 
personality, and would benefit from further research. 
 
The Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM) 
 
The TriPM also adopts an elemental approach when assessing psychopathy. However, 
unlike the EPA, the TriPM does not focus on normal personality. Instead, the measure 
is based on the developmental psychopathy literature and assesses the disorder through 
three core phenotypic constructs: 1). Disinhibition; 2). Boldness; and 3). Meanness. 
These three constructs are captured via 58 self-report items that are rated using a four-
point likert scale.  
 
In terms of the phenotypic domains, ‘disinhibition’ is used to capture impaired impulse 
control, deficient behavioural restraint and a propensity towards poor regulation of 
affect and urges. ‘Meanness’ however, includes attributes that relate to deficient 
empathy, poor attachment, excitement seeking and empowerment through cruelty. The 
third domain ‘boldness’ entails a capacity to remain calm in difficult situations 
involving pressure or threat, high self-assurance and social efficacy (Patrick et al. 2009). 
Thus, from this description it become evident that the TriPM explicitly captures affect 
in psychopathy, but does not attend well to cognition; a finding that appears to extend 
across all self-report measures of psychopathy. 
 
Research examining the TriPM remains in its early stages. However, one study 
conducted by Drislane, Patrick and Arsal (2013) compared the triarchic measure to 
other self-report measures of psychopathy. Results indicate that existing self-reports, 
such as the LSRP, PPI and SRP-III, operationalise psychopathy differently. Whilst the 
LSRP has a strong representation of both ‘disinhibition’ and ‘meanness’, the PPI and 
SRP-III exhibited prominent representations of ‘boldness’, as well as ‘disinhibition’ and 
‘meanness’ (Drislane et al. 2013). It therefore becomes clear that the self-report 
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assessment of psychopathy is not consistent across measures and further research is 
required to develop a new measure that promotes a unified understanding of the 
disorder.  
 
Nevertheless the TriPM has been found to have good construct validity. The three 
phenotypic domains underpinning the measure related to the FFM in line with 
conceptual expectation (e.g. Poy, Segarra, Esteller, López & Moltó, 2014). Moreover, 
Poy et al. (2014) identified that convergence among the three triarchic domains was 
reflected mainly in low levels of agreeableness. Whilst this finding is encouraging, in 
that researchers are beginning to recognise the importance of considering psychopathy 
through personality rather than behavioural features, further research is required to 
examine the role of psychopathic processing in the assessment of psychopathy.  
 
At this point it is also important to recognise that the self-report measures outlined in 
this Chapter, including the TriPM, were developed using mainly community samples 
and thus, the extent to which each measure captures psychopathy in other populations, 
such as psychiatric patients, remains an area in need of further investigation. One 
question that may arise from this limitation is whether the self-report measures are in 
fact assessing a specific type of psychopathy; a type that comprises of high functioning 
and socially successful individuals with certain psychopathic traits (Lilienfeld, 1998). 
Additional study is required to clarify this. Nevertheless, developments in the self-report 
assessment of psychopathy in non-criminal samples has allowed for a better 
understanding of ‘successful psychopathy’. This is arguably necessary to identify the 
protective factors that may prevent individuals with the disorder from engaging in 
antisocial behaviour (Lilienfeld, 1998). 
 
Summary 
 
Self-report measures have been identified as well-validated alternatives to the PCL-R. 
Research has highlighted their ability to effectively assess the construct across 
populations. However, it is important to note that there are differences across these 
measures and they do not always associate with non self-report psychopathy. This may 
relate to their development, in that most self-report measures of psychopathy were 
developed and validated using students or community samples. The PCL-R however, 
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was developed and tested among forensic populations and thus, discrepancies may have 
occurred due to differences in sample characteristics.  
 
Furthermore, there also appears little consensus as to what components underpin 
psychopathy, with a number of measures suggesting that an antisocial component is 
crucial when assessing the disorder in community samples. It therefore becomes 
apparent that the debate surrounding the factor structure of psychopathy also extends to 
self-report. This issue may in part be due to researchers using the PCL-R as a guide 
when developing and validating new measures.  
 
There are also a number of inconsistencies in content across self-report measures of 
psychopathy, specifically in relation to the items tapping into the role of affect and 
cognition. Whilst certain measures place an emphasis on measuring affect (e.g. anxiety), 
such as in the PPI, others seem to ignore it (i.e. the LSRP). Cognition in psychopathy 
has also been neglected, with many measures failing to include items to assess this. The 
lack of agreement in factor structure along with the inconsistencies in content, question 
the assessment of psychopathy using existing self-report measures.  
 
As discussed, there are other methods of assessing psychopathy that include observation 
and more recently, implicit testing (i.e. timed tasks and vignettes to capture less explicit 
cognitive and affective processing that is relevant to assessments of psychopathy). 
These methods may provide a more accurate assessment of psychopathy, particularly 
when the individual is concerned with positive impression management, lacks insight, 
or is unaware of their own shortcomings (Fowler & Lilienfeld, 2013). The next section 
provides an overview of observation and implicit testing methods. It is important to 
recognise that these alternatives have been under researched in comparison to the PCL-
R and self-report measures of psychopathy. 
 
3.5 Other developments in the assessment of psychopathy 
 
Besides the PCL-R and its derivatives, other assessment tools of psychopathy have been 
developed. These are different to the PCL-R in that they are more interactive, adopting 
various techniques such as observations, staff ratings and implicit testing. More recent 
developments in psychopathy assessment include the Interpersonal Measure of 
Psychopathy (IM-P; Kosson, Steuerwald, Forth & Kirkhart, 1997), the Psychopathy Q-
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Sort Prototype (PQS; Reise & Oliver, 1994), the Comprehensive Assessment of 
Psychopathic Personality (CAPP; Cooke, Hart, Logan & Michie, 2004), and the Affect, 
Cognitive, and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012). Each measure 
will be examined in turn.  
 
The Interpersonal Measure of Psychopathy (IM-P) 
 
According to Kosson et al. (1997), the IM-P was developed to improve the assessment 
of the interpersonal features of psychopathy. Clinical descriptions of psychopathy, such 
as those outlined by Cleckley (1982), suggest that interpersonal features are the core 
component of the disorder (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010). In support, Doninger and Kosson 
(2001) state that there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that psychopathy 
should be interpreted through interpersonal behaviour.  
 
Development followed a three-step process, which included the following phases: 1). A 
review of the academic literature; 2). An informal survey conducted with psychopathy 
researchers; and 3). ‘Clinical intuitions’ formed from past experiences with clients. 
From this, Kosson et al. (1997) developed 21 items and included them in the IM-P
22
. 
The IM-P is described as an observation-based measure, whereby the clinician 
quantifies the client’s interpersonal behavior during a semi-structured interview; an 
interview similar to that conducted when completing the PCL-R (Vitacco & Kosson, 
2010). 
 
Kosson et al. (1997) found that the IM-P had high internal consistency and inter-rater 
reliability, and was more strongly correlated with scores on PCL-R F1 than with F2. A 
similar pattern of results was found for the PCL:SV (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010). 
However, in a study conducted by Zolondek et al. (2006), the IM-P did not demonstrate 
incremental validity beyond the interpersonal domain of the PCL-R. Thus, questions 
have been raised surrounding the unique contribution of the measure. Nonetheless, 
Zolondek et al. (2006) recognised that the IM-P is less structured than the PCL-R and 
                                                        
22
 The IM-P contains the following items: 1). Interrupts 2). Refuses to tolerate interruption; 3). Ignores 
professional boundaries; 4). Ignores personal boundaries; 5). Tests interviewer; 6). Makes personal 
comments; 7). Makes requests of interviewer; 8). Tends to be tangential; 9). Fills in dead space; 10). 
Unusual calmness or ease; 11). Frustration with argument avoidance; 12). Perseveration; 13). Ethical 
superiority; 14). Expressed narcissism; 15). Incorporation of interviewer into personal stories; 16). 
Seeking of alliance; 17). Showmanship; 18). Angry; 19). Impulsive answers; 20). Expressed toughness; 
and 21). Intense eye contact (Kosson et al. 1997).  
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may be of particular use when observing individuals in their social interactions with 
others.   
 
Vitacco and Kosson (2010) examined the internal structure of the IM-P via exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analyses and found a 17-item three-factor structure to provide a 
good fit in a sample of European American (n = 592) and African American prisoners 
(n = 583). The three factors were as follows: 1). Dominance (e.g. attempts to control 
and express their agenda); 2). Grandiosity (e.g. attempts to express their toughness and 
superiority to others); and 3). Boundary violations (e.g. fails to respect professional 
relationships) (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010). Grandiosity had the strongest correlation with 
several facet scores on the PCL-R when compared to the other two factors, thus 
indicating that IM-P-defined grandiosity may somewhat overlap with the PCL-R’s 
operationalisation of the construct (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010). From this, Vitacco and 
Kosson (2010) proposed that their three-factor model, relating to the interpersonal 
dimensions of psychopathy, may prove useful in encouraging others to investigate 
interpersonal behaviour that may be of particular relevance to the disorder. 
 
Psychopathy Q-Sort Prototype (PSQ) 
 
Like the IM-P, the PSQ also relies on observer ratings.  In spite of the benefits of using 
observational techniques in assessments
23
, Lilienfeld (1998) argues that there has been 
little development in instruments that directly measure adult psychopathy using this 
method. This may be due to the subjectivity of observational techniques in that they are 
open to interpreter bias. Nonetheless, Reise and Oliver (1994) developed a Q-sort 
prototype to assess psychopathy.  
 
A Q-Sort method is the ranking of variables or statements according to an instruction or 
condition (Block, 1961). Reise and Oliver (1994) asked seven judges with expertise in 
psychopathy to sort the 100 items of the California Q-Set
24
 into a forced quasi-normal 
distribution in line with Cleckley’s (1982) conceptualisation of the disorder (Lilienfeld, 
1998). The seven Q-sorts produced by the judges were merged to form the Psychopathy 
Q-sort (PQS) (Lilienfeld, 1998).  
 
                                                        
23
 Observational techniques avoid problems associated with self-report, such as impression management. 
24
A language instrument consisting of a set of personality variables. The instrument contains instructions 
for ordering these variables to describe a designated individual (Block, 1961). 
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According to Lilienfeld (1998) the judges rated the following items as most 
characteristic of psychopathy: ‘Is self-indulgent’ and ‘Is personally charming’. Despite 
the good intentions of Reise and Oliver (1994), the PSQ has received little attention to 
date. More recent measures, such as the CAPP and ACL, have abandoned the sole use 
of observational techniques in the assessment of psychopathy and have included more 
interactive techniques, such as semi-structured interviews, staff rating and implicit 
methods. 
 
Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP) 
 
The CAPP is a relatively new personality-based model and clinical assessment of 
psychopathy. The assessment was developed using a lexical approach to personality.  
Thus, it uses adjectives belonging to everyday language to describe each personality 
trait (Hoff, Rypdal, Mykletun & Cooke, 2012). The CAPP comprises a semi-structured 
interview and staff rating scale. It is dynamic in nature and has the potential to assess 
change in symptom severity (Kreis, Cooke, Michie, Hoff & Logan, 2012). The model 
conceptualises the construct through six broad domains (i.e. Attachment, Behavioural, 
Cognitive, Dominance, Emotional, and Self) covering the full range of psychopathic 
traits (Kreis et al. 2012).  
 
According to Kreis et al. (2012), each domain is represented by a number of symptoms, 
with each symptom further defined by several trait-descriptive adjectives. For example, 
the attachment domain is underpinned by detached; uncommitted; unempathic; and 
uncaring symptomology (Cooke et al. 2004).  The CAPP has several advantages over 
existing measures of psychopathy (e.g. the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised) in that it 
is designed to assess change, focusing on personality traits rather than behavioural 
consequences of personality pathology (Kreis et al. 2012). Thus, it is reverting back to 
the original conceptualisation of the disorder first proposed by Cleckley (1982). In 
addition to this, the CAPP model is one of the first tools to explicitly recognise the 
importance of cognition and affect in the measurement of psychopathy.  This 
recognition is a significant development in the assessment of the disorder, as it 
emphasises the importance of considering the integral mechanisms underpinning the 
construct.  Cognition in particular is an element that has been most neglected. 
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Although the CAPP is in its early stages of testing, a number of studies have been 
conducted to examine the content validity of the measure (e.g. Kreis & Cooke, 2011; 
Kreis et al. 2012; Hoff et al. 2012). Kreis et al. (2012) recruited 132 mental health 
professionals to rate the extent to which CAPP symptoms represent psychopathy. The 
study identified the measure to have good content validity, with the following 
symptoms found to be particularly prototypical of psychopathy: lack of remorse, 
unempathic, self-centered, manipulative, lack emotional depth, deceitful, insincere, self-
aggrandizing, sense of entitlement, and self-justifying (Kreis et al. 2012). Kreis et al 
(2012) recognised that these symptoms were also features of the PCL-R. They proposed 
that symptom ratings might have been subject to a degree of PCL measurement bias. In 
other words, the PCL-R may have influenced the experts when rating the symptoms of 
the CAPP.  
 
Kreis et al. (2012) also found the cognitive domain to be rated as least prototypical of 
psychopathy. This may reflect the fact that cognition is not well represented in measures 
of psychopathy, with cognitive processing not always easy to access and assess (Kreis 
et al. 2012). The study found the interpersonal domains to be the most prototypical of 
psychopathy, closely followed by emotional and behavioural domains.  
 
Hoff et al. (2012) also found good content validity for the CAPP. In their study, they 
recruited community residents (n = 553), prison staff (n = 32) and mental health 
professionals (n = 211) to rate the symptoms. Hoff et al. (2012) state that PCL 
measurement bias was unlikely to have an effect in their study, as people in the 
community were unlikely to be influenced by the PCL instrument or the psychopathy 
literature. Additionally, the community residents rated the symptoms in a similar 
manner to the healthcare professionals, suggesting that the CAPP is “not purely a 
clinical invention” (Hoff et al. 2012, p. 423). The interpersonal domains (e.g. the self, 
dominance, and attachment) were rated as central to the concept of psychopathy, 
supporting Cleckley’s (1982) definition of the disorder. Less emphasis was placed on 
the behavioural domain. The findings of Hoff et al. (2012) therefore support 
recommendations made by Cooke and Michie (2001), Blackburn (2007a) and Skeem 
and Cooke (2010a,b), to view psychopathy as a disorder of personality rather than a 
behavioural entity. 
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The CAPP’s potential application to women as well as men has also been explored. 
Kreis and Cooke (2011) argue that the CAPP has good content validity across both 
sexes. In their study, Kreis and Cooke (2011) identified that psychopathic women were 
rated by healthcare professionals as more manipulative, emotionally unstable, and less 
grandiose and domineering than their male counterparts. Kreis and Cooke (2011) also 
found the interpersonal domains to be rated the most important components of 
psychopathy. Cognition was again viewed as the least important domain. This finding 
may be due to cognition being assessed at an explicit level. Implicit methods, such as 
those adopted in the ACL, may reveal different findings.  
 
Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL) 
 
The ACL provides an assessment of general functioning across three broad domains: 
Affect, Cognition and Lifestyle. It can be administered to determine the presence of 
psychopathic functioning. Like Cleckley (1982), Ireland and Ireland (2012) view 
cognitive and affective processing to be integral aspects of the disorder and therefore 
developed the ACL to assess cognition and affect at an implicit and explicit level. The 
ACL assesses psychopathic functioning via collateral information, an interview, timed 
case scenarios, self-report, and an evaluation of presentation during assessment. The 
measure therefore includes an observational element like the IM-P. Scores are generated 
to provide a general functioning profile in line with the DSM-V (proposed)
25
 and ICD-
10 diagnostic criteria of psychopathic personality. It is important to note that the ACL is 
currently in the early stages of development and validation but is the only psychopathy 
measure to date that considers both affect and cognition at an implicit level. 
 
Four empirical studies conducted by Ireland, Ireland, Lewis, Miller and Keeley 
(submitted) have examined the reliability and validity of the ACL
26
. Study one piloted 
the ACL and identified acceptable levels of reliability (e.g. α range, .58 to .71; total α 
.87) in a sample of students (n = 42). Study two expanded on this and found evidence 
for convergence between the ACL and an existing validated measure of psychopathy, 
the PCL:SV, in a larger sample of students (n = 50). In addition to this, implicit affect 
correlated positively with the PCL:SV total, albeit not highly. Implicit cognition also 
                                                        
25
 DSM-V had proposed a definition of psychopathy that captured ASPD but also wider elements. The 
ACL considered this definition as well as Cleckley (1982) and researchers, such as Cooke & Michie 
(2001), as the defining features. 
26
 Only the first three studies will be discussed as the fourth relates to the findings identified in this thesis.  
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correlated positively with the PCL:SV total, with the exception of moral reasoning. 
However, it is important to note that implicit affect and moral reasoning were not 
expected to demonstrate strong correlations with the PCL:SV, as the PCL:SV lacks 
items that attend to these variables. Internal consistency of the ACL was found to be 
higher than in the previous study (e.g. α range, .60 to .76; total α .88).   
 
Study three examined the ACL in a sample of young offenders (n = 84, age range 18 to 
25) and again found the measure to have acceptable levels of internal consistency (e.g. α 
range, .57 to .77; total α .83). The contribution of collateral information for this sample 
was identified as improving reliability to good levels. Thus, whilst only in its 
preliminary stages, the ACL is proving to be a reliable and valid measure of cognitive 
and affective processing in psychopathy across samples. 
 
The ACL and CAPP both offer promising indication that researchers have begun to 
recognise the importance of including items that tap into cognition and affect in the 
measurement of psychopathy. As discussed, existing measures have neglected these 
aspects of psychopathy and are therefore failing to provide a true assessment of the 
disorder, i.e. psychopathy as ‘abnormal personality’. Measures that attend to cognitive 
and affective processing could provide a more thorough assessment of psychopathy. 
Such measures would also further research in the area, allowing psychological theory to 
be applied more readily to the construct. 
 
Summary 
 
It appears that more recent psychopathy assessments are placing an increased emphasis 
on personality and the role of psychopathic processing. Thus, new measures are 
beginning to attend to the integral aspects of the disorder first proposed by Cleckley 
(1982). The use of implicit testing to assess psychopathic processing appears to be 
promising, as this will help avoid difficulties associated with response bias. Assessing 
psychopathy via implicit measures is a recent development in the area and the ACL is 
the only measure exploring this. The inclusion of implicit testing in the assessment of 
psychopathy may enhance understandings of the disorder, specifically in terms of 
cognitive and affective processing.  
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3.6 Concluding comments 
 
The assessment of psychopathy via the PCL-R and self-report is well validated across 
populations, as well as in men and women. However there are questions regarding the 
factor structure of psychopathy, with this debate extending to self-report measures. 
Researchers have suggested that psychopathy is underpinned by a two-, three-, and 
four-factor model, with the latter being favoured by Hare (2003). There is more 
agreement surrounding the likely factor structure of psychopathy in women, in that the 
three-factor model has been found a more accurate fit. Nonetheless, sex differences are 
evident in the assessment of psychopathy, with researcher’s questioning the PCL-R’s 
applicability to women. 
 
The lack of agreement relating to the factor structure of psychopathy has stimulated 
controversy surrounding the conceptualisation of the disorder. Researchers have argued 
that the PCL-R overlaps with a behavioural measure, thus ignoring the core personality 
traits delineated by Cleckley (1982). Further research is therefore required to understand 
this complex disorder. A challenge for the new generation of researchers will be to 
refine assessment tools and incorporate specialised methods to measure the fundamental 
components of psychopathy, such as cognitive and affective processing. 
 
Understanding the construct through cognitive and affective processing may prove vital 
in reaching consensus on the factor structure of psychopathy, particularly as it may help 
clarify the role of antisocial behavior. A more detailed discussion of cognition and 
affect in psychopathy will be presented in the ensuing two Chapters.   
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Chapter 4. 
PSYCHOPATHY: COGNITIVE PROCESSING 
 
 
4.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides an overview on cognitive processing in psychopathy. It 
commences by making a distinction between explicit and implicit processing before 
examining the early development of important elements of specific cognition in 
psychopathy, such as cognitive schemas. The Chapter will then move on to discuss 
information processing in psychopathy, followed by a role for moral reasoning. 
Cognition is an integral aspect of psychopathy and in order to fully understand the 
construct these processes must be reviewed.  
 
A number of theories and models will be introduced throughout the Chapter to account 
for the functional impairments in psychopathic cognition. This includes the Reflective-
Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the Cognitive-Interpersonal Theory of 
Psychopathy (Blackburn, 2003), Huesmann’s (1998) Integrated Model of Information 
Processing, the Response Set Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998; Patterson & 
Newman, 1993), and Kohlberg’s (1958) Cognitive Model of Moral Development.  
 
4.2 Cognitive processing in psychopathy 
 
Psychopathy is a complex disorder with largely unknown etiology and processes (Hiatt 
& Newman, 2006). Though empirical studies investigating the disorder have found 
broad, subtle deficits in cognitive processing, the literature has tended to focus more on 
the role of affect
27
. It is essential, however, to examine cognitive processing in 
psychopathy. Cleckley (1982), for example, stated that cognition is an integral aspect of 
the construct and impairments in this area predispose individuals to behave in a manner 
that is unhelpful to themselves and harmful to others. Thus, understanding cognitive 
processing in psychopathy may further improve the assessment, treatment and 
management of those with the disorder.  
 
                                                        
27
 Chapter five provides an overview on affective processing in psychopathy. 
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Despite the increasing interest in cognition in psychopathy (e.g. Blackburn, 2007a), 
there is a lack of research directly examining cognitive processing in the disorder due to 
researchers and clinicians failing to incorporate cognition fully in the assessment of 
psychopathy and to see the construct as a concept distinct from personality disorder 
(Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012). The lack of research may also stem from the complex 
experimental techniques or testing involved when assessing cognition (Schaich Borg & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), as these are often time consuming and require training to 
administer. This is complicated further by the need to assess cognition at both an 
explicit and implicit level. 
 
4.3 Explicit vs. implicit processing
28
 
 
Research (e.g. Back et al. 2009; Reich, Below & Goldman, 2010) has demonstrated that 
individuals process information about themselves and their surroundings at both an 
explicit (conscious and controlled) and implicit level (unconscious and automatic). 
Whilst there is a wealth of literature focusing on explicit processing and its role in 
personality and behaviour, implicit processing has received little attention in 
comparison (Banse & Greenwald, 2007). However, recent developments in measures 
designed to assess implicit processing has resulted in an increased interest in the area. 
Examples of such measures include the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) and the Puzzle Test (Ireland & Birch, 2013).  
 
In contrast to explicit processing, which has been described as controlled, declarative 
and conscious (Banse & Greenwald, 2007), implicit or ‘automatic’ processing has been 
viewed as a spontaneous process requiring little cognitive effort (Fleischhauer, Strobel, 
Enge & Strobel, 2013; Ireland & Adams, submitted). Further to this, a number of 
researchers (e.g. Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000) have suggested that implicit and 
explicit processing stem from two independent systems that are activated in different 
situations, and predict different types of behaviour (Briñol, Petty & Christian Wheeler, 
2006). The latter includes a number of behaviours including aggression (Ireland & 
Birch, 2013), self-harm (Randall, Rowe, Dong, Nock & Colman, 2013) and substance 
misuse (Stacy & Wiers, 2006). Thus, it becomes apparent that implicit and explicit 
processing systems function differently and require investigating as distinct concepts.  
 
                                                        
28
 In this section the term ‘processing’ includes both cognitive and affective processing. 
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Several theoretical models account for differences between explicit and implicit 
processing. One model in particular, the Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 
2004) suggests that behaviour occurs as a result of two interactive systems: a reflective 
system and an impulsive system. The reflective system is argued to represent explicit 
processing as it is based on a propositional process, slowly eliciting behaviour as a 
consequence of conscious accessible information (Ireland & Adams, submitted). The 
impulsive system conversely, is thought to activate behaviour without conscious 
thought, operating with little effort through “spread-of-activation processes in the 
associative memory network” (Fleischhauer et al. 2013, p. 155). To simplify, the 
Reflective-Impulsive Model proposes two systems, one thoughtful and one automatic, 
which interact with one another and therefore co-exist. The activation of behaviour (or 
behavioural schema) may be triggered by both of these systems (Back et al. 2009; 
Ireland & Adams, submitted). Distinguishing between the systems that underpin 
impulsive behaviour and thoughtful action therefore becomes crucial, especially when 
understanding processing in more complex presentations such as psychopathy.  
 
Impulsive, ‘automatic’ responding has been considered a central feature of psychopathy 
(Hare, 1991, 2003). Despite this, impulsive implicit processing has received little 
empirical attention in the psychopathy literature, with studies focusing solely on explicit 
methods. However, given the behavioral characteristics of the disorder (i.e. an 
impulsive irresponsible lifestyle often involving antisocial tendencies; Roberts & Coid, 
2007), it could be logically expected that psychopathic individuals would be 
characterised by less controlled and more automatic processing, requiring less effort. 
Further research is therefore needed to examine psychopathic processing at both an 
implicit and explicit level in order to further understanding in this area.  
 
At the measurement level, implicit processing in psychopathy is not well represented, 
with measures such as the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) and the 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al. 1995) failing to 
account for implicit systems in the disorder. Most psychopathy measures examine the 
construct at an explicit level. This is problematic, especially as explicit measures are 
limited to what the individual is consciously aware of.  It is therefore open to deception 
and impression management (Bluemke, Friedrich & Zumbach, 2010). Implicit measures 
avoid these biases and may be more suited to assessing psychopathy, particularly as 
those with the disorder are associated with traits such as pathological lying (Snowden et 
 64 
al. 2004). Implicit measures also allow for the examination of more automatic 
processing (Ireland, 2011; Ireland & Adams, submitted). Thus, the application of 
implicit measures may allow for examination into the mechanisms underpinning the 
behavioral characteristics of psychopathy associated with more automatic responding 
(e.g. antisocial behaviour). 
 
The importance of measuring explicit and implicit processing in psychopathy is 
accounted for by the Reflective-Impulsive Model which, as discussed, suggests that 
both systems interact with one another to predict certain types of behaviour. The 
introduction of the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 
2012) is therefore promising, as this newly developed measure assesses cognition and 
affect in psychopathy at an implicit and explicit level. Implementing this measure will 
assist researchers to understand cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy at an 
unconscious level.  
 
Cognitive and affective processing occurring at an unconscious level is not immediately 
evident to the individual concerned and therefore cannot be effectively captured via 
self-report or interview, as these assessment strategies require a degree of awareness 
(Ireland & Adams, submitted). Thus, it becomes apparent that in order to fully 
understand psychopathic processing, specialised measures are required; measures that 
incorporate an implicit element and can assess the more automatic, uncontrolled 
systems underpinning the disorder. 
 
Summary 
 
Investigating implicit processing in psychopathy may provide some new theoretical 
insights, specifically in relation to cognition and affect. The inclusion of an implicit 
component in the assessment of psychopathy is crucial when advancing research. 
Implicit assessment will expose the more automatic, unconscious processes 
underpinning the disorder; which are yet to be understood. Implicit processing has also 
been argued to interact with more controlled explicit systems, and this should not be 
ignored. It is therefore important that psychopathy and psychopathic processing are 
examined implicitly and explicitly. 
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As discussed, implicit and explicit processing predict different types of behaviours 
depending on the context. Central to this, is the concept of cognitive schema. Cognitive 
schemas act as a guide for behaviour, forming pathways between the behaviour and the 
processing system (Back et al. 2009). Thus, cognitive schemas are a fundamental aspect 
of cognition in psychopathy and will be discussed next. 
  
4.4 Early development of cognitive schemas
29
 
 
The term “schema” has been extensively used within the area of psychology, 
specifically in relation to cognitive development (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003). In 
this context, Young et al. (2003) conceptualised schema as an “abstract cognitive plan 
that serves as a guide for interpreting information and problem solving” (p. 7).  
 
Beck (1967)
30
 also referred to schema in his early work on cognitive therapy and 
described schema as a useful tool for making sense of life experiences. Beck argued that 
schemas often form during childhood and continue to develop; later being used to 
interpret experiences encountered as an adult. Schemas are susceptible to distortion and 
are therefore not always an accurate representation of the self, others, and the world 
(Beck, 1967). However, due to the need for ‘cognitive consistency’ (i.e. the human 
drive for a stable view of the self and others), schemas are known to be “superimposed 
on later life experiences, even when they are no longer applicable” (Young et al. 2003, 
p. 7). Thus, schemas can be described as adaptive or maladaptive. 
 
Young et al. (2003) proposed that some schemas, particularly those that form as a result 
of unmet core emotional needs and ‘toxic’ early life experiences, might account for the 
core features of personality disorder. This would be expected to extend to psychopathy, 
since like personality disorder it is also underpinned by abnormal personality pathology. 
Furthermore, Beck, Freeman and Davis (2004) argued that schemas are the fundamental 
units of personality, and traits such as “withdrawn” and “arrogant” may be viewed as 
the real-life expression of schemas (p. 18). The inflexibility of personality disorders, 
and indeed psychopathy, could also be viewed as an extreme manifestation of cognitive 
                                                        
29
 Whilst much of this section focuses on those schemas developed during early childhood, other theorists 
(e.g. Erikson, 1950) have proposed that cognitive schemas also develop later on in life, particularly in 
‘normal’ rather than clinical populations. However such a discussion would be beyond the scope of this 
Chapter.  
30
 Beck’s definition of schemata is different to that presented by Young. Young focuses more on how 
attachment has been the main disrupting factor. 
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consistency. That is, the disorders may stem from rigidly held maladaptive beliefs 
(Reeves & Taylor, 2007). 
 
In relation to abnormal personality, Young et al. (2003) defined a specific subset of 18 
schemas named ‘Early Maladaptive Schemas’ (EMS). EMS were collectively described 
as:  
“A broad, pervasive theme or pattern… comprised of memories, emotions, 
cognitions, and bodily sensations… regarding oneself and one’s relationships 
with others… developed during childhood and adolescence… elaborated 
throughout one’s lifetime… and dysfunctional to a significant degree” (Young 
et al. 2003, p. 7). 
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that for a schema to be classified as maladaptive, it needs to 
negatively impact upon an individual’s view of themselves and their interpersonal 
functioning.  Young et al. (2003) categorised his EMS into a conceptual model 
representing five ‘schema domains’: 1). Disconnection and Rejection; 2). Impaired 
Autonomy and Performance; 3). Impaired Limits; 4). Other-Directedness; and 5). Over 
vigilance and Inhibition. Table one display the five schema domains and the EMS that 
underpin each of these. 
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Table 1: EMS and schema domains. 
 
 
Domain EMS Description 
 
Disconnection 
and Rejection 
 
Abandonment/Instability 
 
Mistrust/Abuse 
 
Emotional Deprivation 
 
Defectiveness/Shame 
 
Isolation/Alienation 
 
 
 
Individuals with schemas in 
this domain are thought to 
often originate from a family 
that is unstable, abusive, cold, 
rejecting and isolated. 
Impaired 
Autonomy and 
Performance 
Dependence/Incompetence 
 
Vulnerability to Harm or 
Illness 
 
Enmeshment/Undeveloped Self 
 
Failure 
 
 
This domain focuses on one’s 
own expectations, and suggests 
that the environment may 
impact on an individual’s 
perceived ability to function 
successfully in society.  
Impaired Limits Entitlement/Grandiosity 
 
Insufficient Self-Control/Self-
Discipline 
Individuals in this domain may 
have difficulties respecting the 
rights of others, making 
commitments, setting realistic 
goals and cooperating with 
others. They may also have an 
exaggerated sense of 
superiority.  
 
Other-
Directedness 
Subjugation of Needs/Emotions 
 
Self-Sacrifice 
 
Approval/Recognition-Seeking 
 
This domain is underpinned by 
schemas that are associated 
with an individual’s excessive 
drive to meet others’ needs 
rather than their own. 
 
 
Overindulgence 
and Inhibition 
Negativity/Pessimism 
 
Emotional Inhibition 
 
Unrelenting Standards/Hyper 
criticalness 
 
Punitiveness  
This domain relates to an 
excessive emphasis on the 
suppression of one’s own 
desires, needs and feelings to 
meet internalized rules and 
expectations. 
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It is important to recognise that individuals may hold a number of schemas across the 
five domains and are not necessarily restricted to one. Individuals may also have 
schemas that are positive, as Young et al. (2003) recognise that for every EMS there is a 
corresponding adaptive belief. However this is not articulated well in his work, which 
has arguably resulted in a lack of research on positive schema, especially in relation to 
psychopathy. 
 
Understanding psychopathy through both maladaptive and adaptive cognitive schema 
may prove beneficial in recognising the intrinsic components of the disorder (Wilks-
Riley & Ireland, 2012).  More recent conceptualisations of psychopathy (e.g. Hare, 
1991, 2003) have tended to focus solely on maladaptive, antisocial personality traits, 
failing to take into account the existence of any positive features. Examining positive 
cognitive schema in psychopathy may therefore help resolve this, providing a more 
holistic understanding of the disorder including both positive and negative 
characteristics. 
 
Several researchers (e.g. Reeves & Taylor, 2007; Carr & Francis, 2010; Lawrence, 
Allen & Chanen, 2011) have found evidence for EMS in those with personality disorder 
at a clinical and sub-clinical level. However, the presence of EMS has been identified to 
be higher in clinical populations (e.g. Lawrence et al. 2011), suggesting EMS may 
predispose an individual to certain types of psychopathology. This may extend to 
psychopathy as certain personality disorders, i.e. antisocial, narcissistic and borderline, 
overlap with the construct (Huchzermeier et al. 2007). 
 
Research has found different schemas to underpin different personality disorders (e.g. 
Reeves & Taylor, 2007; Carr & Francis, 2010). For example, Reeves and Taylor (2007) 
found EMS to significantly predict all personality disorder symptoms delineated in 
DSM-IV in a sample of 804 students. More specifically, they identified the following 
schemas to be significant predictors of the personality disorders associated with the 
definition of psychopathy: Insufficient self-control/self-discipline; Social Isolation; 
Abandonment; Enmeshment; Emotional Inhibition; Entitlement; and Mistrust/Abuse. 
These cognitive schemas may therefore also relate to the construct of psychopathy.  
 
However this must be regarded as speculative, as there is a clear absence of research 
examining the link between psychopathy and cognitive schema. Wilks-Riley and 
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Ireland (2012) suggest that this neglect has occurred due to the psychopathy literature 
being dominated by an over-interest in measure development and the construct’s 
association with offending behaviour. It may also stem from the content of early 
psychopathy conceptions (e.g. Cleckley, 1982), which appeared to place more emphasis 
on the role of affect in comparison to cognition. 
 
Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012) are the only researchers to date to explore the direct 
association between positive and negative cognitive schema and psychopathy across 
general and forensic samples. A clear role for cognitive schema in psychopathy was 
identified. Whilst there was a lack of association between psychopathy and Young’s 
EMS, evidence was found for both positive and negative cognitive schema assessed via 
the Schemata: Positive and Negative, and Affect Assessment (SPANA-2; Wilks-Riley 
& Ireland, 2012). The notion that psychopathy is underpinned by positive schema 
supports the notion of ‘successful psychopathy’ and that the disorder is not always 
characterised by negative and antisocial traits. According to Wilks-Riley and Ireland 
(2012), the over focus on psychopathy as ‘antisocial personality’ has resulted in 
researchers failing to acknowledge the positive cognitions underpinning the disorder.  
 
Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012) also found evidence for a schema structure that was 
consistent with psychopathy across samples, thus highlighting that cognition is of equal 
importance and not population-specific. The schema structure consisted of an ‘others’ 
schema (i.e. Abusive/Uncaring others) and three self-schemas: ‘Worthless/Self-Dislike’; 
‘Positive Self’; and ‘Calm/Happy’. Unsurprisingly, negative cognitive schema was 
positively associated with overall [increased] levels of psychopathy, primary 
psychopathy and secondary psychopathy. Positive cognition was also associated with 
the disorder.  
 
When examining primary and secondary psychopathy, positive cognition was not 
associated with the latter. Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012) suggested that secondary 
psychopathy captures the antisocial component of the disorder.  The absence of positive 
schema would appear consistent with this. Furthermore, the notion that primary 
psychopathy does capture the core features of the disorder (Blackburn, 2007a) 
reinforces the role for positive cognitive schema in psychopathy.  
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These findings indicate that schemas relating to personality challenges, and indeed 
psychopathy, are not always maladaptive and can be adaptive. It therefore becomes 
apparent that enhancing our understanding of psychopathy through cognitive schema 
will not only allow practitioners to identify and target a psychopathic individual’s core 
beliefs, but it will also enable a more optimistic-based approach to treatment and 
formulation (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012). It will allow practitioners to highlight 
strengths in their clients as opposed to focusing on the negatives. More research 
exploring cognitive schema in psychopathy would help facilitate this. 
 
Blackburn’s (2003) Cognitive-Interpersonal Theory of Psychopathy provides further 
support for the role of cognitive schema in psychopathy. This theory is based on the 
notion that early interpersonal interactions generate strong biased expectations of how 
others are likely to respond to another’s behaviour. An upbringing characterised by 
hostility and abuse would be likely to produce a hostile expectation, or hostile schema, 
of others and the world. Blackburn (2003) suggests that a particular behaviour “pulls” a 
specific type of response from another person (p. 63).  
 
To illustrate, a hostile response would invite a hostile reaction, which in turn provides 
feedback confirming this biased expectation. This interpersonal style is commonly 
associated with psychopathy and provides one explanation as to why those with the 
disorder express a lack of concern and empathy towards others (Blackburn, 2003). That 
is, psychopathic individuals are may instigate unhelpful reactions from others, which 
would fuel an expectation that the world is an unhelpful place. They are therefore likely 
to behave in a manner that is conducive to this belief. 
 
Thus, the cognitive-interpersonal model proposes that those with psychopathy have a 
distorted belief system originating from early developmental challenges and interactions 
with others, and it is this dysfunctional belief system that motivates many of the traits 
and behaviours associated with the disorder. However, in order for a schema to trigger 
behaviour, or an emotion, it must first be activated (Young et al. 2003). 
 
Activation of a cognitive schema depends on two factors; the severity and pervasiveness 
of the schema (Young et al. 2003). According to Young et al. (2003), a more severe and 
pervasive schema would be likely to be activated by a greater number of situations and 
generate a more intense emotion or behaviour that lasts longer. However, researchers 
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have argued that some cognitive schemas are more accessible than others (e.g. Riso et 
al. 2006).  
 
Furthermore, whilst Young’s EMS have been described as more accessible and can be 
assessed via self-report measures (Riso et al. 2006), researchers also recognise that 
some cognitive schemas are implicit and can only be revealed through information 
processing tasks (Segal, 1988), such as Self-Referent Information Processing (SRIP) 
tasks
31
 (e.g. Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977) and the Puzzle Test
32
 (Ireland & Birch, 
2013). This reinforces the need to assess cognition in psychopathy at both an implicit 
and explicit level.  
 
Once activated, cognitive schemas (adaptive or maladaptive) are involved in the 
evaluation of incoming data, as well as the selection and implementation of a relevant 
strategy (Beck et al. 2004). Schemas consequently introduce a bias for cognitive 
processes (Beck et al. 2004), including those associated with the processing of 
information and moral reasoning.  
 
Summary 
 
Cognitive schemas, both positive and negative, appear to be an integral aspect of 
psychopathy, yet their relationship with the disorder is not well understood. More 
research is required to account for positive cognition in psychopathy and to develop 
treatment strategies that incorporate this strength.  A more detailed understanding of 
cognitive schema in psychopathy would also allow for a balanced description of the 
disorder that incorporates both maladaptive and adaptive features. 
 
As discussed, schemas are involved in the interpretation and evaluation of information 
and are therefore known to influence other aspects of cognition. This Chapter will now 
move on to examine these, commencing with a theoretical review of information 
processing in psychopathy. 
 
                                                        
31
 According to Rogers et al. (1977), the self appears to function as a superordinate schema that is 
involved in the processing of personal information. SRIP tasks are used to examine this at an implicit 
level. 
32
 Ireland and Birch (2013) state that the Puzzle Test was designed to implicitly assess an individual’s 
tendency to identify with aggression. 
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4.5 Information processing in psychopathy 
 
Information processing has been identified to play a significant role in moderating 
affect, behaviour and decision-making (Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, Li & Newman, 2012). 
In combination with a maladaptive personality style, deficits in information processing 
have been related to psychopathy and have been used to provide an explanation as to 
why individuals with this disorder engage in offending behaviour (Wallace, Schmitt, 
Vitale & Newman, 2000). This section will examine information processing in 
psychopathy, applying theory to allow for an understanding of cognitive functioning in 
those with the disorder. 
 
Huesmann’s (1998) model of information processing is a good starting point to explain 
cognition in psychopathy as it takes into account childhood learning.  It also touches on 
the role of implicit processing (i.e. how cognitions can occur at an automatic level; 
Ireland & Birch, 2013). Whilst this model is normally used to explain the development 
of aggression, it has a far broader application and can also be adopted to illustrate the 
cognitive characteristics of psychopathy, particularly those that promote antisocial 
tendencies.  
 
Huesmann (1998) suggests that learning occurs through both enactive (i.e. learning 
from one’s own behaviour) and observational learning processes (i.e. viewing other’s 
behaviour). To illustrate, consider the following example: a child who frequently 
experiences others behaving violently is likely to respond in the same manner when 
confronted or victimized. According to Huesmann (1998), the likelihood of learnt 
behaviour becoming habitual is dependent on others’ responses to an individual’s 
actions, as well as the causal factors that instigated and maintained the behaviour. 
However, the individual’s ability to interpret these depends on their cognitive capacity 
and information processing system (Huesmann, 1998). To fully understand habitual 
learned behaviour, it is first important to examine information processing in 
combination with environmental factors and personal characteristics.    
 
Cognitive scripts are central to information processing and like schemas they are open 
to bias. Huesmann (1998) argues that scripts are stored in an individual’s memory and 
govern how a person should behave in response to a situation. He also states that they 
influence an individual’s perception of what the outcome of their behaviour is likely to 
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be which in some cases may lead to biases such as hostile attribution bias. Thus, 
cognitive scripts act as a guide for behaviour and are determined by individual 
differences, such as psychopathy.  
 
Cognitive scripts are integrated into this model. It is proposed that the decision-making 
process at the moment of behaviour involves five elements that occur simultaneously 
and not in a step by step approach: 1). The individual encounters the social problem; 2). 
They evaluate the cues in the environment; 3). They search their memory for a script to 
guide the behaviour; 4). They evaluate the generated script; and 5). The individual 
behaves in accordance to the script. 
 
Within this model there are three elements (i.e. two, three and four) at which individual 
differences, such as psychopathy, can affect the outcome. Given that psychopathic 
individuals have a distorted belief system (Blackburn, 2003; Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 
2012) and are unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions (Newman, Schmitt 
& Voss, 1997; Newman, 1998), it is expected that they will experience difficulties when 
evaluating the environment, selecting and executing an appropriate script, and 
monitoring the effectiveness of this. Thus, those with psychopathy are likely to appraise 
events incorrectly and respond in a manner that is inconsistent to the situation; hence 
their propensity for violent [or antisocial] offending. 
 
Huesmann (1998) recognised that evaluating the ‘appropriateness’ of a script plays a 
crucial role when deciding which scripts are stored, retrieved and utilised. For an 
individual to encode a script, the behaviour must have some relevance to an event or be 
reinforced through enactive learning (i.e. the behaviour is found to be useful when 
solving social problems or challenges). Therefore a script with salient cues, or one that 
has proven successful in the past, is more likely to be encoded in the memory system.  
 
Taking into account their inability to effectively evaluate their chosen script and 
consider the appropriateness of the subsequent behaviour, psychopathic individuals are 
likely to develop a network of cognitive scripts conducive to inappropriate or unhelpful 
responding. It becomes apparent that information processing is a crucial aspect of 
cognition when understanding psychopathy and therefore warrants further investigation, 
especially as there is a lack of research directly applying Huesmann’s model to the 
disorder.  
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According to Huesmann (1998), an individual’s emotional state, alongside their 
memory contents, also has an influence over the behaviours they attend to and encode. 
For example, an individual who is angry and has an extensive network of cognitive 
scripts that are conducive to aggression may over attend to others’ physical behaviour. 
They may also be more accepting of aggression than an individual whose memory is 
filled with pro-social alternatives. This is further complicated by the notion that an 
individual’s emotional state can also be triggered by environmental stimuli (particularly 
stimuli that was present at the time the script was stored), which in turn may cue 
cognitions that define their feelings (Huesmann, 1998). Thus, cognition is not always an 
independent process and the interactive effects of other systems, such as affective 
processing, should also be considered. 
 
At this point it is important to note that psychopathy has been associated with an 
inability to effectively identify and evaluate emotion (e.g. Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone 
& Palermo, 2012; Brook, Brieman & Kosson, 2013). This is likely to have an influence 
over the cues they attend to, their evaluation of these, and the cognitive script that is 
consequently retrieved. Thus, to clarify, if an emotional state is unrelated to the 
situation, an individual may select and interpret the wrong cues leading to biased 
responding. False evaluation of this responding is likely to perpetuate the accessing and 
subsequent utilisation of the cognitive script.  
 
Evidence for this has been found to occur in those with psychopathy (e.g. Serin, 1991; 
Vitale et al. 2005). Vitale et al. (2005) identified that psychopathy in a sample of male 
offenders (assessed via the PCL-R) significantly predicted hostile attribution bias. That 
is, the results suggested that psychopathic individuals have a tendency to attribute 
others’ behaviour to hostile intent. They concluded that individuals with the disorder 
utilise less information when making attributions and are more likely to rely on self-
schemas (i.e. schemas that often portray the world and others as hostile and 
unpredictable; Cleckley, 1976). It therefore becomes increasingly evident that 
psychopathic individuals have a number of functional deficits and biases that interfere 
with their ability to process information accurately and respond appropriately. 
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Summary 
 
Individuals with psychopathy have deficits in information processing that predispose 
them to engage in antisocial behaviour. In accordance with Huesmann’s model, 
psychopaths can be conceptualized as experiencing difficulties when attending to, 
interpreting, and evaluating cues.  This results in the storage of scripts that when 
retrieved, leads to responding that is inconsistent with the situation. Other factors, such 
as affective processing, may also have a significant influence on information 
processing. Thus, cognition may not be an independent process when interpreting and 
evaluating information in psychopathy.  
 
Whilst Huesmann’s model takes into account learning and the impact this has on the 
processing of information, it does not consider the role of [cognitive] self-regulation. 
This process is fundamental when understanding information processing in psychopathy 
and is better considered through the Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998).  
 
4.6 Response modulation in psychopathy 
 
The Response Modulation Hypothesis is an attention-based model (Blair, Mitchell & 
Blair, 2005). It refers to the automatic interruption of goal-directed behaviour in 
accordance with information that is peripheral to an individual’s current focus of 
attention (Zeier, Maxwell & Newman, 2009). Response modulation involves a shift in 
attention from ongoing behaviour to its evaluation (Blair et al. 2005).  
 
According to Wallace et al. (2000), this automatic information processing activity does 
not require conscious control and is fairly effortless. It is therefore an implicit process 
and the automatic shift in attention is crucial in allowing an individual to monitor and if 
necessary to use information that is external to their primary focus of attention to alter 
their dominant ‘response set’ (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). That is, it enables an 
individual to regulate their ongoing behaviour in accordance to their surroundings. This 
argues again for a role for implicit cognition in psychopathic processing.  
 
Cognitive self-regulation is an important aspect of response modulation and according 
to Wallace et al. (2000) this process involves three distinct phases: 1). Self-monitoring 
(i.e. observing one’s own behaviour); 2). Self-evaluation (i.e. comparing behavioural 
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performance with one’s own standards); and 3). Self-reinforcement (i.e. one’s reaction, 
positive or negative, to self-evaluation).  Each of these phases requires controlled 
information processing which can be easily interrupted if attention is needed elsewhere 
(Wallace et al. 2000). Self-regulatory processes are vital when making modifications to 
behaviour in response to contextual information. If available information indicates that 
behaviour is inappropriate then it is stopped and a new response set is initiated (Wallace 
et al. 2000).  
 
It has been proposed that individuals with psychopathy present with deficits in response 
modulation and are therefore unable to automatically anticipate the consequences of 
their actions (Newman, 1998), i.e. they are unable to alter their primary focus of 
attention when a dominant response set has been established. Due to reduced automatic 
processing, psychopathic individuals arguably find self-regulation more effortful and 
therefore encounter difficulties evaluating and appropriately altering their behaviour, 
especially when engaged in goal-directed activity (Wallace et al. 2000).  
 
Thus, the lack of ability to regulate or adjust their response set may account for the 
antisocial or maladaptive behaviours commonly perpetrated by those with the disorder. 
Difficulties when processing the meaning of contextual information may also account 
for deficits in affective processing, poor passive avoidance (i.e. failure to avoid stimuli 
paired with negative reinforcement) and impulsivity (Blair et al. 2005). The Response 
Modulation Hypothesis is therefore an important model when understanding cognition 
in psychopathy and has generated a significant amount of research on the topic. A 
review of this literature is crucial when examining response modulation deficits in 
psychopathy. 
 
Newman et al. (1997) examined response modulation deficits in a sample of 124 (56 
African American and 68 Caucasian
33
) offenders from a minimum-security prison. The 
researchers aimed to examine whether individuals with psychopathy are unresponsive to 
motivationally-neutral (i.e. unrelated to punishment) contextual cues that are peripheral 
to their dominant response set. Using the conceptualisation of psychopathy outlined by 
Cleckley (1976), Newman et al. (1997) subdivided their sample into high and low 
                                                        
33
 Newman et al. (1997) tested their hypotheses using the subsample of Caucasian offenders due to 
previous research finding a cultural difference in response modulation deficits. Research has found a 
weaker group difference between non-psychopathic and psychopathic African American prisoners on 
laboratory tasks when compared to their Caucasian counterparts (e.g. Kosson, Smith & Newman, 1990). 
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anxious psychopathic and non-psychopathic participants. A picture-word task (P-W 
task) similar to that developed by Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) was adopted to 
evaluate individual differences in the processing of contextual cues.  
 
Participants were first presented with a ‘P’ or ‘W’ on the computer screen, which 
informed them as to whether the trial was either a picture trial (i.e. ‘P’) or word trial (i.e. 
‘W’). This arguably established a dominant response set (Newman et al. 1997). 
Depending on the type of trial, participants were instructed to indicate by pressing a 
button whether the stimuli presented in the test display was related to the stimuli shown 
in the context display. For example, on the word trial, participants must focus on the 
word in the context display and ignore the picture. This is the opposite for the picture 
trial. After each trial participants received feedback indicating whether they were 
correct or not. For correct answers participants received a monetary reward.  
 
Results indicated that low anxious individuals with psychopathy did not display the 
usual interference effects. Instead, they engendered significantly less interference when 
compared to the low anxious controls (Newman et al. 1997). These findings are 
consistent with the Response Modulation Hypothesis and suggest that low-anxious 
psychopathic individuals (i.e. primary psychopathy) experience difficulties in the 
automatic processing of contextual cues.  The finding that high anxiety psychopaths 
experienced more interference than high anxiety controls supported suggestions that this 
subsample is not characteristic of ‘true psychopathy’ (Newman et al. 1997). That is, 
individuals with high levels of anxiety may have different processes governing their 
behaviour. Similar findings to those of Newman et al. (1997) have been replicated in the 
community (e.g. Sadeh & Verona, 2008) and in psychopathic women detained in prison 
(e.g. Vitale, Brinkley, Hiatt & Newman, 2007), indicating that selective attention 
abnormalities in psychopathy are applicable across samples. 
 
To examine the extent to which psychopathic individuals fail to attend to peripheral 
information is associated with both automatic and controlled processes, Jutai and Hare 
(1983) studied event-related brain potentials
34
 (ERP) that were induced by tones. The 
amplitude of the ERP component is said to reflect the automatic direction of attention 
(Wallace et al. 2000). Participants were subjected to tones either whilst engaged in a 
                                                        
34
 Event related potentials are a measure of brain response in relation to a specific cognitive or sensory 
event. 
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computer game (acting as goal-directed behaviour) or when engaged in no task. Jutai 
and Hare (1983) identified that psychopathic and non-psychopathic individuals did not 
differ on the ERP amplitude when they were not playing on the computer games.  
 
However, the amplitude of the ERPs was significantly less for the psychopathic group 
when the competing activity was introduced. The psychopath’s lack of response to the 
incongruent information (i.e. the tones) indicates that attentional and controlled 
processing resources were not allocated to the processing of peripheral information 
(Wallace et al. 2000).  
 
If these resources had been allocated then impairment in performance, or in this case, an 
increase in ERP amplitude would have been evident. In light of these findings, it can be 
proposed that the ‘implicit’ automatic direction of attentional and the ‘explicit’ 
controlled processing resources to peripheral information occurs less readily in 
psychopathic individuals when compared to their non-psychopathic counterparts 
(Wallace et al. 2000). Explicit and implicit cognitive processing therefore appears 
different in those individuals with psychopathy, justifying further investigation. 
 
Further support for the occurrence of response modulation deficits in psychopathy have 
been identified by Zeier et al. (2009). Zeier et al. (2009) recognised that whilst other 
researchers (e.g. Newman et al. 1997; Smith, Arnett & Newman, 1992; Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002) have found evidence for response modulation deficits in psychopathy, 
they have failed to eradicate the possibility of an emotional or motivational explanation. 
In other words, they have not directly tested the role of attention to contextual 
information whilst controlling for the motivational or emotional aspects of the activity.  
 
According to Zeier et al. (2009), it is important to do this in order to fully understand 
information processing in psychopathy, as the relative lack of concern for peripheral 
information may be “functionally similar” to the lack of concern for others, or 
fearlessness (p. 555). In their experiment, Zeier et al. (2009) adopted a modified version 
of the Flanker Task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).  
 
The Flanker Task includes a series of trials, with a number of these presenting a pre-
target attentional cue indicating where the target stimulus will be displayed; therefore 
establishing a dominant response set. Other trials draw participants’ attention to both 
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target and distractor locations ensuring there was no primary focus of attention. In line 
with the Response Modulation Hypothesis and previous research findings (e.g. Jutai & 
Hare, 1983), it was expected that individuals with psychopathy would not differ to non-
psychopaths on these tasks (Zeier et al. 2009). Two different types of cuing 
manipulations were also introduced to further explore the role of attention. Exogenous 
cues drawing attention to the stimulus automatically and endogenous cues directing 
individuals to shift their focus of attention. By only including conditions that differed on 
attentional focus, they were able to limit their findings to the role of attention and ignore 
any possible influence due to motivation or emotional processing.  
 
In Zeier et al. (2009), 110 Caucasian men incarcerated in a medium security prison were 
split into high and low levels of anxiety, as well as psychopathic and non-psychopathic 
subgroups. They found that individuals with primary psychopathy (i.e. individuals with 
psychopathy characterised by low levels of anxiety) were significantly less affected by 
information that was peripheral to their main focus of attention when identifying where 
the target would appear. However, as expected, low anxious psychopathic and non-
psychopathic individuals displayed similar levels of interference in conditions that 
directed their attention to both target and distractor locations. It therefore becomes 
evident that attention plays a significant role in the sensitivity to contextual information 
in primary psychopathy once a dominant response set has been established (Zeier et al. 
2009).  
 
Deficits in response modulation have also been used to account for poor passive 
avoidance learning in psychopathy (Wallace et al. 2000). According to Blair et al. 
(2005), passive avoidance learning is instrumental and involves learning to respond to 
stimuli that give rise to a reward and avoiding those that result in punishment. Thus, 
passive avoidance learning requires the development of a stimulus-reinforcement 
association, that is, an association between stimulus and either a reward or punishment 
(Blair et al. 2005).  
 
When presented with situations that require this type of learning, individuals with 
psychopathy (particularly low-anxious psychopaths) have been found to commit more 
errors than non-psychopaths (e.g. Newman & Kosson, 1986; Thornquist & Zuckerman, 
1995). They have also been found to pause less following punished responses (e.g. 
Newman, Patterson, Howland & Nichols, 1990). These findings have been consistently 
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replicated and have been identified to become more evident when a dominant response 
set has been established (e.g. O’Brien & Frick, 1996). In accordance with the Response 
Modulation Hypothesis, poor performance on passive avoidance tasks may relate to a 
psychopathic individual’s inability to shift their attention from the goal to obtain a 
reward to the peripheral punishment information (Blair et al. 2005).  
 
Summary 
 
It therefore becomes apparent that individuals with psychopathy encounter difficulties 
when processing information that is peripheral to their current response set. The 
accessibility of peripheral information is arguably dependent on the automatic 
allocation of cognitive resources (Wallace et al. 2000). It appears that when these 
resources are being used elsewhere the psychopathic individual’s ability to process 
peripheral information is reduced.  
 
Thus, in line with Cleckley’s (1982) description, individuals with the disorder do not 
display evidence of deficits in response modulation until their automatic (implicit) and 
controlled (explicit) processing resources are allocated to achieving a goal (Wallace et 
al. 2000). This is not to say that those with psychopathy cannot redirect their attention 
and regulate their own behaviour; it is just more effortful. It is important to note 
however, that the Response Modulation Hypothesis is not without its criticisms (i.e. it 
does not take into account ‘healthy’ cognition) and it is unclear as to what extent the 
model is synonymous to more contemporary theories of attention
35
 (Blair et al. 2005). 
 
Nonetheless, it is evident that individuals with psychopathy suffer from deficits when 
processing information and it is these deficits that impact on their decision-making and 
self-regulation capabilities.  Impairments in these areas may also influence their moral 
reasoning capabilities (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), as it becomes 
evident that psychopathic individuals experience difficulties when taking all 
information into account, especially when engaged in goal-directed behaviour. This 
moves this Chapter into the area of moral reasoning. 
 
 
                                                        
35
 Discussions relating to the more contemporary models of attention, such as the Biased Competition 
Model (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), are beyond the scope of the thesis. The Biased Competition Model 
focuses on visual attention and this aspect of information processing is not assessed in this research. 
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4.7 Moral reasoning in psychopathy 
 
Moral reasoning (or moral judgment) is a difficult construct to define due to many 
different usages of the term (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Schaich Borg 
and Sinnott-Armstrong (2013) define ‘moral judgment’ as “the mental state or event of 
judging that some act, institution, or person is morally wrong or right, good or bad” (p. 
109). 
 
Whilst this definition appears relatively simple, there is controversy as to what is 
considered a moral judgment and the factors underpinning this. For example, 
participants have been found to have deficits in some types of moral judgments but not 
others (e.g. Parkinson et al. 2011). Different acts have also been identified to require 
different cognitive abilities (e.g. Cushman, 2008). Both of these issues have been 
complicated further by some researchers failing to distinguish moral judgment from 
affect, or moral emotion such as empathy
36
 (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013).  
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that there are several complications when examining moral 
reasoning and as a result assessing the concept becomes problematic, especially as there 
is no clear definition. It is therefore unsurprising that researchers investigating moral 
reasoning in psychopathy have adopted a number of different assessment strategies, e.g. 
the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Kohlberg, 1958); the Defining Issues Test (DIT; 
Rest, Cooper, Masanz & Anderson, 1974); the Moral Judgment Task (MJT; Lind, 
1978); the Moral/Conventional Test (Turiel, 1983); philosophical scenarios; and self-
report
37 . This, in combination with the lack of research on ‘moral cognition’ in 
psychopathy has made it difficult to draw firm conclusions from the literature. 
Nonetheless, the ensuing paragraphs will provide an overview of the research on moral 
reasoning in psychopathy. ‘Moral cognition’ will be used interchangeably with moral 
reasoning from this point forward.  
 
Using the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), Link, Scherer and Byrne (1977) examined 
moral judgment in a sample of psychopathic prisoners (n = 16), non-psychopathic 
                                                        
36
 According to Schaich Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (2013), it is possible to have moral judgment 
without affect. This section reviews only those studies that focus on moral judgment, not moral emotion 
(i.e. empathy).  
37
 Whilst the thesis will examine moral reasoning using scenarios of real-life dilemmas presented in the 
Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012), it is important to also review 
other assessment strategies to fully understand ‘moral cognition’ in psychopathy. 
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prisoners (n = 16) and prison staff (n = 16). The MJI required participants to deliberate 
on a number of moral dilemmas, to which they had to give their reasons supporting their 
conclusion. The MJI is interested in the reasons why an individual decides whether 
something is right or wrong and splits these into three levels (with each level presenting 
with two sublevels; Kohlberg, 1958): ‘Pre-conventional reasoning’ (i.e. reasons 
focusing on immediate consequences); ‘conventional reasoning’ (i.e. reasons based on 
the expectations of others); and ‘post-conventional reasoning’ (i.e. the reasons 
underpinning complex moral principles that are separate to social norms or rules) 
(Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013).  
 
According to Kohlberg (1958) and his Cognitive-developmental Theory of Moral 
Reasoning, moral development occurs in stages, with the latter stages, i.e. the post-
conventional reasoning level, reflecting improved moral judgment. Over time, 
individuals are said to experience a qualitative transformation in that their structure of 
thought develops as they mature (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Structure of thought refers 
to the cognitive configurations that underlie moral content, rather than the content itself, 
i.e. the shape, pattern or organisation of responses (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).  
 
In Link et al. (1977), 16 psychopathic patients presented with more structured thought, 
i.e. more post-conventional reasoning, than non-psychopaths and staff. Whilst this 
finding is surprising, it is important to recognise that Link et al. (1977) assessed 
psychopathy via the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Thus, 
individuals classified as psychopathic in this study may not meet the diagnostic cut-off 
of the PCL-R. It is therefore difficult to generalise these findings to psychopathy today.  
 
O’Kane, Fawcett and Blackburn (1996) administered the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to 
a small sample of high-secure psychiatric patients (n = 40). The DIT aims to assess an 
individual’s level of moral reasoning in line with Kohlberg’s (1958) model. Participants 
were presented with six moral dilemmas derived from the Moral Judgment Interview 
(MJI). They are then required to rate and rank 12 considerations (each representing one 
of Kohlberg’s six moral stages) for each dilemma in accordance to their importance 
when making the decision. Participants are then asked to rank-order the four most 
important considerations. 
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O’Kane et al. (1996) did not identify any significant associations between moral 
reasoning and PCL-R defined psychopathy after controlling for IQ. Despite not 
reaching statistical significance, it is important to note however that they found moral 
reasoning to negatively correlate with psychopathy, which is in line with the expectation 
that those with the disorder make more inferior moral judgments. The lack of 
significance in this study may be explained through the sample size and low base rate of 
psychopathy.  
 
Young et al. (2012) conducted a more recent study using another adaptation of the 
Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), the Moral Judgment Task (MJT). The MJT is also 
based on Kohlberg’s (1958) stages of moral development and requires participants to 
respond to two moral dilemmas using a scale ranging from -3 to +3. Participants are 
then asked to rate 12 moral arguments; six that are consistent with their judgment and 
six that are against it (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). These arguments are 
assessed on a likert scale ranging from (-4) “I strongly reject” to (+4) “I strongly agree”. 
Two different scores are calculated from the MJT; the moral preference score and the 
C-score. The C-score is useful as it reflects an individual’s ability to recognise and 
weigh arguments regardless of whether these arguments are consistent with their own 
opinion (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013).  
 
In Young et al. (2012), individuals with psychopathy were found to have ‘abnormal’ 
moral cognition, namely they rated accidental harm as more morally permissible than 
non-psychopaths did. No differences between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic 
groups were found for the remaining moral conditions: intentional harms; attempted 
harms; and neutral acts. Young et al. (2012) explained their significant finding through 
the Response Modulation Hypothesis, indicating that deficits in information processing 
may also account for problems in other areas of psychopathic processing.  
 
Moreover, Young et al. (2012) state that whilst accidents normally occur as a result of 
an individual causing harm unintentionally, a degree of blame is usually assigned to the 
person. One possible reason as to why psychopathic individuals view accidental harm as 
less blameworthy is that they attend only to the information that is central to an event. 
Thus, individuals with the disorder may have focused solely on the person’s intentions 
rather than the conflicting peripheral information and negative outcome.      
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In contrast to Kohlberg’s cognitive model of moral development, Turiel (1983) 
proposed that moral reasoning begins to develop early in life. He stated that moral 
violations and conventional violations
38
 can be differentiated by individuals as young as 
three years old. Kohlberg (1958), however, suggested that this distinction cannot be 
achieved until an individual is at the post-conventional reasoning stage. Turiel (1983) 
also argued that moral decisions are serious, based on consequences, and do not take 
into account location, time and authority. That is, actions that are deemed morally 
wrong remain morally wrong even when authorities allow them to occur (Schaich Borg 
& Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013).  
 
Thus, in accordance with Turiel (1982), moral judgments may develop separately to 
conventional reasoning, indicating that the two may be controlled and maintained 
through different cognitive systems (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Several 
researchers (e.g. Blair, 1995; Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1995; Aharoni, Sinnott-
Armstrong & Kiehl, 2012) have investigated whether the moral/conventional distinction 
extends to the construct of psychopathy. 
 
Blair (1995) examined the moral/conventional distinction in a sample of ten 
psychopathic and ten non-psychopathic individuals recruited from two high secure 
hospitals in England. Psychopathy was assessed via the PCL. To measure the 
moral/conventional distinction, he adopted four moral stories and four conventional 
stories previously used in the academic literature. Results indicated that unlike those 
without the disorder, individuals with psychopathy did not make a moral/conventional 
distinction
39
 and this was found to correlate with the following PCL items: ‘a lack of 
remorse or guilt’, ‘callous/lack of empathy’ and ‘criminal versatility’. Blair (1995) also 
found psychopaths made less reference to the victim’s welfare when judging the stories.  
 
Interestingly, Blair (1995) also recognised that those with the disorder treated 
conventional transgressions as moral transgressions instead of moral transgressions as 
                                                        
38
An example of a conventional violation is that it is wrong for a child to hit another child. The moral 
violation relating to this would be that it is wrong for a child to hit another, even if they have been told 
that it is acceptable to do so (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). 
39
 Whilst this finding has been related to the Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM; Blair, 1995) model, 
this model is outlined in the next Chapter as it focuses on an individual’s ability to appropriately identify 
affect. 
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conventional transgressions
40
. Thus, it appears that individuals with psychopathy have 
difficulty when defining moral violation. As Maxwell and Le Sage (2009, p. 79) note, 
they tend to have a “flat view” of the seriousness of rule breaking. Further support for 
these findings has been provided by a similar study conducted by Blair and colleagues 
(e.g. Blair et al. 1995). 
 
For this study, a larger sample of psychopathic (n = 20) and non-psychopathic (n = 20) 
participants were recruited from a high secure hospital and a prison. In support of the 
previous study, Blair et al. (1995) identified that whilst participants in the non-
psychopathic group were generally able to make the distinction between moral and 
conventional violations, psychopathic individuals were not. However when this was 
explored further, psychopathic individuals were found to be able to make a distinction 
for the ‘seriousness’ dimension.  
 
One possible explanation for this is that individuals with psychopathy are able to 
cognitively make the distinction for the seriousness dimension, but think that moral and 
conventional violations are equally authority-dependent and therefore inflate their 
scores on these items for impression management purposes (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2013), i.e. to prove that they have been reformed and understand rules 
(Shoemaker, 2011). Whilst the findings of Blair et al. (1995) cannot confirm this, other 
researchers (e.g. Aharoni et al. 2012) have attempted to provide more insight into the 
moral/conventional distinction in psychopathy.  
 
However before discussing the findings of Aharoni et al. (2012), it is important to 
acknowledge that Blair et al. (1995) also identified that psychopathic individuals, when 
compared to their non-psychopathic counterparts, were less likely to incorporate other’s 
welfare into the justifications behind their responses to moral transgression stories. This 
was found to significantly correlate with the ‘lack of remorse/guilt’ PCL item and fit 
well with the prototypical description of the clinical psychopath described by both 
Cleckley (1982) and Hare (1991, 2003).      
 
Aharoni et al. (2012) aimed to overcome the possibility of impression management 
when investigating the moral/conventional distinction in psychopathy. By introducing a 
                                                        
40
 According to Blair (1995), moral transgressions relate to acts that violate moral standards and do not 
take into consideration the rights and welfare of others. Conventional transgressions however, are 
associated with the violation of rules within the social system, such as breaking the law. 
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forced-choice component, they were able to remove the incentive to rate all of the 
stimuli as morally wrong. Participants (109 prisoners and 30 students) were informed 
that half of the stimuli had been previously rated as morally wrong, and the other half as 
morally right. Thus, in order to maximize their score and maintain the investigator’s 
positive impression participants had to classify all of the stimuli correctly.  
 
In contrast to previous findings, Aharoni et al. (2012) identified that individuals with 
psychopathy performed similar to controls when distinguishing moral from 
conventional transgressions. However, the affective and antisocial facets of the PCL-R 
predicted reduced performance when making this distinction. Those individuals with 
deficits in affect or those with a poor understanding of moral norms (i.e. delinquents) 
may therefore be more inclined to make poor moral judgments (Aharoni et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, the inconsistent findings outlined so far reflect the need to conduct further 
investigation into moral reasoning in psychopathy. It may also be beneficial to use a 
different test to assess moral reasoning; a test that incorporates the use of philosophical 
scenarios or real-life dilemmas. 
 
Philosophical scenarios vary in detail and allow researchers to pit conflicting moral 
principles against each other to find out which moral principle prevails (Schaich Borg & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Many of these scenarios consist of a personal versus an 
impersonal dilemma. According to Schaich Borg and Sinnot-Armstong (2013), a 
personal dilemma was argued to constitute a situation that was likely to cause harm and 
this harm was inflicted with intent and was person-specific. Any other situations that 
did not meet this criterion were classified as impersonal.  
 
It has been proposed that individuals with psychopathy are more likely than controls to 
judge acts outlined in personal moral scenarios as more permissible than those 
described in impersonal situations due to their deficits in affective processing (Schaich 
Borg & Sinnot-Armstrong, 2013). A number of studies have used philosophical 
scenarios when examining moral reasoning in psychopathy (e.g. Cima, Tonnaer & 
Huaser, 2010; Pujol et al. 2012; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier & Newman, 2012; Stevens, 
Deuling & Armenakis, 2012).  
 
Cima et al. (2010) recruited a sample of adult male participants and split these into three 
distinct categories: healthy controls (n = 35), psychopathic offenders (n = 14) and non-
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psychopathic offenders (n = 23). A PCL-R cut-off score of 26 was used to classify 
individuals as psychopathic. All participants were presented with seven impersonal 
dilemmas and 14 personal dilemmas taken from the work of Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley and Cohen (2001).  
 
Results suggested that psychopathic individuals responded to personal and impersonal 
dilemmas in the same manner as healthy controls and non-psychopaths, i.e. they viewed 
impersonal dilemmas as more permissible than personal dilemmas. Additionally, there 
were no group differences in moral judgments for either type of dilemma. Cima et al. 
(2010) concluded that whilst individuals with psychopathy have been previously found 
to present with deficits in cognitive functioning when discriminating between moral and 
conventional transgressions, this deficit does not appear to apply when judging moral 
dilemmas relating to personal and impersonal situations.    
 
Pujol et al. (2012) also found similar findings to Cima et al. (2010), in that behavioural 
data showed psychopathic individuals (n = 22) and non-offenders (n = 22) to provide 
similar responses to most personal dilemmas, with the exception of two out of a 
possible 24 situations. No obvious group differences in moral judgments were 
identified. However, those participants classified as psychopathic were found to have a 
significant reduction in neural functioning. Thus, psychopathic individuals may use 
different neurobiological strategies to healthy controls when making moral judgments.  
 
Pujol et al. (2012) included participants in the psychopathic group with a PCL-R score 
of 16. It is therefore unclear as to how many individuals scored above 30, leaving the 
possibility that higher scorers (i.e. > 30) may present with differences that do not appear 
in the samples recruited by both Pujol et al (2012) and Cima et al. (2010) (Schaich Borg 
& Sinnot-Armstrong, 2013). Further investigation is required. 
 
Using a PCL-R cut-off score of 30, Koenigs et al. (2012) identified that psychopathic 
offenders endorsed a greater proportion of acts than non-psychopathic offenders. This 
was found to be particularly the case for impersonal dilemmas. However, when 
differentiating psychopathic individuals by their levels of anxiety, Koenigs et al. (2012) 
found that those in the low-anxious group (i.e. primary psychopathy) permitted a 
significantly greater proportion of the acts outlined in the personal moral dilemmas 
when compared to non-psychopaths. There was no significant difference identified 
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between individuals with high levels of anxiety (i.e. secondary psychopathy) and non-
psychopaths on personal moral judgment. 
 
These findings suggest that whilst psychopathic individuals in general endorse more 
acts relating to impersonal harm and rule violation than their non-psychopathic 
counterparts, low-anxious psychopaths are more willing to permit personal harms to 
achieve their behavioral goal (Koenigs et al. 2012). Koenigs et al. (2012) state that their 
findings reflect a particular affective/inhibitory deficit that may only be found in 
primary psychopathy.  
 
Abnormal moral cognition has been found to extend to psychopathy in the community 
(i.e. successful psychopathy). Stevens et al. (2012) recruited a sample of undergraduate 
students (n = 272) and assessed moral disengagement through participant responses to 
four ethical `scenarios adapted from Loviscky, Trevino and Jacobs (2007). According to 
Stevens et al. (2012), these scenarios presented participants with a range of ethical 
dilemmas commonly found in the workplace, e.g. cutting corners to meet deadlines. 
Psychopathy was measured using the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III (SRP-III).  
 
Results highlighted that individuals in the community with high levels of psychopathic 
traits were more likely than individuals with low levels to make unethical judgments 
relating to ethical business dilemmas. Such findings add to the academic literature on 
successful psychopathy, in that psychopathic individuals residing in the community are 
more likely to make decisions that are conducive to a range of instances of wrongdoing 
and unethical behaviour (Stevens et al. 2012). Further support for this has also been 
identified in a study using self-report methods of assessing moral reasoning (e.g. Glenn, 
Iyer, Graham, Koleva & Haidt, 2009).  
 
Glenn et al. (2009) administered a battery of self-report measures
41
 to 2,517 adult male 
volunteers who signed up to the study online. Moral deficits were identified in those 
scoring high on the LSRP. The deficits observed primarily related to the domains of 
‘Harm’ and ‘Fairness’. In light of this, Glenn et al. (2009) proposed that individuals 
                                                        
41
 The battery included the following measures: The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP); 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire; Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale; Interpersonal Reactivity Index; 
Social Dominance Orientation Questionnaire; Disgust Scale-Revised; and the Ethics Positions 
Questionnaire. 
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with high levels of psychopathic traits living in the community were less likely to 
consider moral principles relating to harm and fairness when making moral decisions.  
 
The researchers also found that individuals with psychopathic tendencies were more 
likely to violate moral principles of any type for non-moral incentives such as money. 
Thus, demonstrating further evidence for deficits in information processing, specifically 
response modulation, in that psychopaths were unable to monitor and regulate their 
behaviour when a goal had been established. It is important to recognise however, that 
this study relied heavily on self-report and due to the potential for impression 
management, the findings may not reflect participants’ true moral beliefs. 
 
Summary 
 
A number of studies have found evidence for poor moral reasoning in psychopathy. 
Whilst this appears to be subtle, it may account for some of the adverse decisions made 
by those with the disorder. It is also important to recognise however, that several 
researchers did not find evidence of any specific deficits in moral reasoning.  
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that further research is required; research with larger 
participant pools and higher rates of psychopathy. Existing research has been accused of 
failing to reach any meaningful conclusions due to their small sample sizes and low 
prevalence of the disorder (Schaich Borg & Sinnot-Armstrong, 2013). The 
incorporation of an implicit measure to assess for moral cognition is also warranted, as 
this will help draw out ‘true beliefs’ and control for impression management. Those 
with psychopathy may attempt to present themselves as ‘moral’ in a bid to manipulate 
others. Whilst implicit measures have rarely been adopted in the psychopathy literature, 
such measures would help to assess moral reasoning at an unconscious automatic level; 
a level that is not consciously controlled by the individual. 
 
4.8 Concluding comments 
 
The literature on cognitive processing in psychopathy highlights a broad array of 
deficits (Hiatt & Newman, 2006). These deficits, despite being subtle, play a significant 
role in psychopathy. That is, they account for a number of personality traits and 
behavioural characteristics commonly associated with the disorder. 
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From the literature, it appears that dysfunctional schemas in psychopathy give rise to 
poor moral judgments, and interpretations and conclusions that are consistently biased 
(Wallace et al. 2000). However, it is important to conclude that schemas are not always 
maladaptive. The presence of positive schemas in psychopathy is a novel and promising 
finding, in that treatment can be tailored to incorporate this strength.  
 
Empirical studies examining cognition, particularly moral reasoning, have been 
criticised for recruiting small sample sizes, having low base rates of psychopathy, and 
for failing to control for impression management. Thus, incorporating an implicit 
element into these studies will reduce the potential for deception and allow cognition to 
be examined at an unconscious, automatic level. Improvements in the methods used to 
assess for cognition will also enable a more in-depth theoretical understanding of 
psychopathy. Further research incorporating these recommendations is therefore 
warranted. 
 
Lastly, the mechanisms underlying specialised processes, such as decision-making, 
information processing and self-regulation, are complex and may not be fully 
understood through investigating cognition as an independent process (Baskin-Sommers 
& Newman, 2012). Instead, researchers are now beginning to consider the interactive 
effects of cognition on other systems, such as affective processing. Examining the 
relationship between cognition and affect will allow for a unified understanding of 
psychopathy; an understanding that can be promoted through one theoretical framework 
(Hiatt & Newman, 2006). A more detailed discussion on this will be provided in the 
next Chapter, along with a review of the literature on affective processing in 
psychopathy.   
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Chapter 5. 
PSYCHOPATHY: AFFECTIVE PROCESSING 
 
 
5.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides an overview on affective processing in psychopathy. It examines 
the affective abnormalities commonly associated with the disorder, specifically those 
relating to identifying and evaluating emotion. Several researchers (e.g. McCord & 
McCord, 1964; Meloy, 1988) considered the psychopath unable to experience emotion, 
and according to Cleckley (1976) it is this lack of emotional experience that many 
psychopathic traits (i.e. a lack of remorse and guilt) follow. Thus, deficits in affective 
processing appear a central feature of psychopathy and a review of these deficits will be 
helpful in understanding the construct. 
 
Several theories have been proposed to account for the functional deficits in affective 
processing in psychopathy. This includes the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 
1957); the Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS; 
Gray, 1970, 1987); the Violence Inhibition Mechanism Model (VIM; Blair, 1995); and 
Beck’s (1987) Theory of Emotional Disorders. These theories will be introduced 
alongside a review of the relevant empirical studies investigating emotion and 
psychopathy. 
 
Lastly, the Chapter also attends to the relationship between cognitive and affective 
processing, providing an explanation of the interactive effects of these two processes on 
psychopathy. This will prove useful, especially as cognition and affect have largely 
been studied as two separate systems (Dvorak-Bertsch, Curtin, Rubinstein & Newman, 
2009).  
 
5.2 Affective processing in psychopathy 
 
Psychopathy has been viewed as a chronic clinical condition characterised by unusual 
emotional experiences (Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000). These unusual experiences have 
appeared in many conceptualisations of psychopathy (e.g. Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1991, 
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2003; Cooke & Michie, 2001), including those made in the early 19
th
 century. For 
example Pinel (1801/1962, cited in Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000) argued that those with 
psychopathy experienced deficits in ‘passion’ and affect, but not reasoning (hence, the 
term manie sans delire, which translates to madness without confusion; See p. 5).  
 
Cleckley (1982) proposed 16 personality traits that he felt were clinically relevant to the 
construct of psychopathy. Four of these were associated with deficits in affect: 1). 
Absence of nervousness; 2). General poverty of major affective reactions; 3). Lack of 
guilt and remorse; and 4). Incapacity for deep affectional bonds. The portrayal of 
psychopathy through these personality traits led to the view that all psychopathic 
individuals were relatively emotionless (Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000). However, whilst 
Cleckley (1982) argued that most emotional reactions exhibited by psychopaths were 
dramatic displays lacking deep and sustained affect, he did note that such individuals 
were not fully devoid of emotion.  
 
Furthermore, Cleckley (1982) suggested that psychopathic individuals suffer from 
detachment between their cognitive and affective processing systems. This may 
consequently impact on their ability to utilise emotion to modify their behaviour 
accordingly (Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000). Thus, whilst it may be inappropriate to view 
those individuals with psychopathy as emotionless, it is important to recognise that 
there may be other systems, such as moral development and information processing, 
that also play a significant role (Baskin-Sommers & Newman, 2012). The psychopath’s 
ability to experience emotion and profit from this may be more complex than originally 
anticipated and warrants further investigation.     
 
Blair et al. (2005) also place significant emphasis on affective processing in 
psychopathy, stating that it is the impairment in emotional learning that acts as the root 
cause of psychopathy. They believe that impairments in emotional learning give rise to 
the characteristics associated with ‘true psychopathy’ (i.e. PCL-R factor one; 
interpersonal and affective deficits), such as a lack of guilt, remorse and empathy. 
However according to Blair et al. (2005), this impairment does not necessarily relate to 
an increase in PCL-R factor two (i.e. antisocial behaviour); although they do argue that 
emotion dysfunction will predispose an individual to learn antisocial means of 
achieving their goals.    
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Interestingly, Blair et al. (2005) relate emotional impairment in psychopathy to atypical 
amygdala functioning caused by genetic abnormalities. This is supported by recent 
research (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Blonigen, Carlson, Krueger & Patrick, 2003; Tsuchiya & 
Adolphs, 2007), which has found the amygdala to function differently in those children 
on the trajectory for developing the disorder. Thus, it appears that Blair et al. (2005) are 
of the opinion that there is a genetic contribution to the affective deficits associated with 
the construct, and it is this contribution that initiates the development of psychopathy.  
 
Figure one outlines the causal model of the development of psychopathy proposed by 
Blair et al. (2005). It provides a neurocognitive account of the disorder and allows the 
reader to understand how deficits in cognition and affect link to psychopathic 
personality and behaviour.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A causal model of the development of psychopathy (Blair et al. 2005, p. 111).  
 
In terms of the cognitive aspects of the model, amygdala dysfunction has been linked to 
reduced attention (e.g. Anderson & Phelps, 2001) and problems with socialisation (Blair 
et al. 2005), as well as other difficulties, including instrumental learning and 
reward/punishment processing (e.g. Baxter & Murray, 2002). An individual who 
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presents with difficulty attending to emotional stimuli is likely to have impairments in 
their emotional learning.  
 
However when examining ‘socialisation’, Blair et al. (2005) state that the amygdala 
responds to fear and sadness of victims allowing for the formation of ‘moral stimulus-
reinforcement associations’ (See p. 97), which in turn induce empathy. Individuals who 
are less fearful due to early amygdala dysfunction will not find the distress cues of 
others aversive and it will therefore be difficult to socialise appropriately (Wootton, 
Frick, Shelton & Siverthorn, 1997; Blair, 2003; Blair et al. 2005); possibly leading to 
antisocial or unhelpful interactions. This is expanded upon in this Chapter’s discussion 
of VIM. 
 
Whilst this thesis does not directly examine the development of psychopathy, it is 
important to take note of the neurocognitive model proposed by Blair et al. (2005) as it 
emphasises the importance of cognition and affect in the disorder and indeed, the 
interplay between the two. 
      
According to Brook et al. (2013), investigating the detection of emotional stimuli forms 
the most basic analysis of affective processing and therefore becomes a good starting 
point for discussion. This moves this Chapter on to the topic of identifying emotion in 
psychopathy.  
 
5.3 Emotion recognition in psychopathy 
 
There are two theories that account for emotion recognition in psychopathy; the 
Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957) and the Violence Inhibition Mechanism 
Model (VIM; Blair, 1995)
42
. Both propose that impairments in emotion recognition 
relate to the development of the disorder. These two theories are therefore important 
when attempting to understand the intrinsic mechanisms of the disorder from which it 
developed. Each theory will be discussed in turn.   
 
 
 
                                                        
42
 Whilst Beck’s (1987) theory of emotional disorders also explores emotion recognition, it will be used 
in this Chapter to illustrate the evaluation of emotion in psychopathy. 
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The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis 
 
This theory originates from an empirical study conducted by Lykken in 1957. Like 
Cleckley and Karpman, Lykken (1957) also recognised that there was a specific sub-
type of psychopath (i.e. the primary psychopath) that was absent from any “neurotic 
motivations, hereditary taint or dissocial nurture” (p. 6). As discussed (See p. 10), it has 
been argued that primary psychopaths are characterised by an absence of defective 
emotional reactivity, specifically in relation to anxiety (e.g. Karpman, 1955, cited in 
Skeem et al. 2003). 
 
In support, Lykken (1957) hypothesised that those with primary psychopathy were 
defective in their ability to develop anxiety as an anticipatory emotional response to 
warning signals. He proposed that individuals with this defect generally display little 
anxiety in life situations that normally trigger this type of response. According to 
Lykken (1957), primary psychopaths are also incapable of avoidance learning in 
situations where such learning can only be caused through the mediation of an anxiety 
response. Lykken therefore appears to view primary psychopaths as suffering from 
deficits in fear conditioning and poor passive avoidance learning, with these deficits 
becoming increasingly evident in situations that would normally induce anxiety. 
 
To test this, Lykken (1957) recruited 49 individuals classified as psychopathic and split 
these into two groups reflecting primary and secondary psychopathy. A battery of tests 
that measured anxiety reactivity or conditioning was administered. As predicted, 
primary psychopaths demonstrated reduced levels of anxiety and less avoidance of 
punished responses than secondary psychopaths and ‘healthy’ controls. 
 
Thus, the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis assumes that ‘healthy’ individuals are 
frightened of punishment. This fear is paired with the action that resulted in punishment, 
therefore reducing the likelihood of the individual engaging in the action in the future 
(Blair et al. 2005). However, individuals with psychopathy are less afraid of punishment 
due to their defective emotional reactivity (i.e. deficits when recognising fear). 
Consequently, they experience less arousal to punishment and make weaker 
associations between their behaviour and emotion. Psychopathic individuals are 
therefore more likely than ‘healthy’ controls to continue to engage in the punished 
action, demonstrating poor passive avoidance learning (Blair et al. 2005).  
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Poor passive avoidance is a key component of the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis; yet 
the theory does not provide a detailed account of this learning process (Blair et al. 
2005). Instead, poor passive avoidance in psychopathy may be better understood 
through the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) proposed by Gray (1970, 1987).  
 
The BIS, and its counterpart, the Behavioural Activation System (BAS) considers a 
neurobiological approach to implicit behavioural motivation. Both motivational systems 
are reciprocally related, in that one system inhibits the activation of another (Newman, 
MacCoon, Vaughn & Sadeh, 2005). Whilst the BAS is sensitive to reward and activates 
behaviour, BIS is sensitive to punishment cues and initiates passive avoidance. From 
this perspective, an individual with weak BIS would be dominant in conflict situations 
and slow to cease responding in loss-type situations (Fowles & Dindo, 2006). 
 
When applied to psychopathy, primary psychopathy has been associated with low BIS 
and average BAS, whereas secondary psychopathy has been argued to relate to high 
BAS and average BIS (Lykken, 1995). The suggestion here indicates that primary 
psychopaths experience difficulty at an unconscious level when generating automatic 
responses to punished stimuli, as well as stopping responding following punishment 
(Blair et al. 2005). Thus, weak BIS may account for the fear deficit in psychopathy (e.g. 
Lykken, 1995), as well as behavioural disinhibition and low levels of anxiety (Fowles & 
Dindo, 2006). In terms of secondary psychopathy, the high BAS and average BIS would 
mean that such individuals are active avoidant and, unlike primary psychopaths, over 
focus on reward-based cues.  
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that individuals with psychopathy fail to account for 
emotional stimuli (specifically fear) due to poor passive avoidance and defective 
emotional reactivity. These processes occur automatically and are not consciously 
controlled (Blair et al. 2005). Assessing emotional recognition in psychopathy therefore 
requires measurement at an implicit level. Further support for the role of implicit 
processing in emotion recognition has been provided by the Violence Inhibition 
Mechanism Model (VIM) Model. 
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The Violence Inhibition Mechanism Model
43
 
 
Blair (1995) considered the Violence Inhibition Mechanism Model (VIM) to be an 
implicit cognitive process, which when activated by non-verbal cues of distress, triggers 
a withdrawal response. That is, the model assumes that all humans are predisposed to 
find distress cues (i.e. negative emotion) aversive and are punished by signals of another 
person’s upset (Blair et al. 2005). The model therefore relies largely on an individual’s 
ability to recognise negative emotion, such as fear and sadness. 
 
It is important to note that VIM does not imply that all responses to distress cues are the 
same. According to Blair (1995), other processes, such as executive functioning (e.g. 
attending to important details), have a significant influence on the final behavioural 
response and can overrule the VIM-predisposition to withdraw. For example, if the 
individual does not attend to the distressing emotional cues then the behavioural 
response to withdraw will not be generated. Thus, it becomes apparent that an 
individual’s ability to identify emotion and respond appropriately is not only governed 
by affective processing systems, but also that of cognition. 
 
At its simplest form, VIM has been proposed to develop from early experiences of 
socialisation. These include experiences that involve recognising and withdrawing from 
others’ distress cues that have been caused by the self (Blair, 1995). During these early 
socialisation experiences, individuals arguably develop representations of the context 
through perspective taking with the victim (i.e. via classical conditioning
44
) (Blair, 
1995). This perspective taking results in the expansion of representing triggers of VIM 
that when activated generate arousal, which can be interpreted as moral emotion, 
including empathy. 
 
A lack of moral emotion has been associated with the construct of psychopathy (e.g. 
Cleckley, 1982; Hare, 1991, 2003). It would not be unreasonable to suggest then that 
VIM is somewhat dysfunctional in those with the disorder. The lack of VIM in 
psychopathy may reflect the psychopath’s inability to empathise with their victim and 
                                                        
43
 It is important to note that there is an expansion to the VIM model, the Integrated Emotions Systems 
Model (Blair, 2005). However, this model describes empathy as a unitary function within the field of 
cognitive neuroscience and is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis does not examine psychopathy 
at a neurological level. 
44
 Classical conditioning is the learning of new behaviours via association. Two stimuli are paired 
together to generate a learned response. 
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without this, there will be no association made between the victim’s internal state and 
the activation of VIM (Blair, 1995; Blair et al. 2005). The representations of acts that 
cause others harm simply do not become triggers for VIM and the psychopath 
experiences little arousal as a consequence of this. Thus, impairments in VIM may 
result in the absence of moral emotion in psychopathy, as well as poor moral reasoning 
and a reduced responsiveness to sad and fearful facial expressions (Blair et al. 2005).   
 
To expand on this, the psychopath's general disability to decode and respond 
appropriately to social signals, particularly others' emotion, has been linked to empathic 
dysfunction (Domes, Hollerbach, Vohs, Mokros & Habermeyer, 2013), which is 
considered an essential feature of the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy (e.g. Cleckley, 
1982; Hare, 1991). There is some evidence for a general impairment of affect 
recognition in psychopathy (e.g. Dawel et al. 2012) and this has been related to the 
'cognitive' facet of empathy (i.e. interpreting and describing an emotional state based on 
another person's expression of emotion; Domes et al. 2013). 
  
The 'emotional' aspect of empathy however, focuses on an individual's responsiveness 
to another's affective state (i.e. vicariously feeling another person's emotion; Domes et 
al. 2013). Like cognitive empathy, affective empathy has also been associated with 
psychopathy. Early descriptions (e.g. Cleckley, 1982) of the construct for example, 
proposed that psychopaths were unable to feel compassion for others. Whilst both 
cognitive (i.e. perspective-taking) and affective (i.e. compassion) empathy are captured 
in VIM, some researchers (e.g. Blair, 2005; Dolan & Fullam, 2006; Jones, Happé, 
Gilbert, Burnett & Viding, 2010) have proposed that psychopathic individuals lack the 
ability to feel compassion, rather than the ability to understand others' inner states at an 
intellectual level (Domes et al. 2013).   
  
Without detracting from the main focus of this section, research (e.g. Blair, Jones, Clark 
& Smith, 1997; Blair, 1999) has found individuals with psychopathy to demonstrate 
reduced vicarious conditioning (i.e. they presented with a decreased autonomic response 
to stimuli associated with others' upset or distress), thus providing some evidence of 
impairment in the emotional components of empathic functioning. Cognitive empathy 
however has received less support in the psychopathy literature, with Dadds et al. 
(2009) stating that impairments in this aspect of functioning resolve as the psychopath 
matures and "learns to talk the talk about others' emotion" (p. 599). This finding is 
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supported to an extent by a number of studies (e.g. Kosson, Suchy, Libby & Mayer, 
2002; Montagne et al. 2005) concluding that individuals [adults] with 
psychopathy demonstrate impairment in the recognition of some emotional expressions, 
but not others. It therefore becomes apparent that empathy dysfunction in psychopathy 
is yet to be fully understood, specifically in relation to cognitive empathy where 
research has produced a mixed body of findings (Brook & Kosson, 2013). It may be 
that the psychopath's empathy deficits relate to other factors, such as the role of 
attention (e.g. Newman, 1998), intelligence (Blair et al. 2004) and poor passive 
avoidance (e.g. Eysenck, 1967; Trasler, 1978). 
 
Poor passive avoidance has been proposed to mediate the inhibition of inappropriate 
behaviour and the development of socialisation (Eysenck, 1967; Trasler, 1978). As 
emphasised by Blair (1995), socialisation is crucial in the formation of cognitive and 
affective empathy. Without socialisation, individuals are unable to develop 
representations of the context through perspective taking, and consequently fail to 
generate the arousal necessary to induce empathy. The most common explanation for 
poor passive avoidance learning in psychopathy relates to deficiencies in fear 
conditioning (Lykken, 1957; Eysenck, 1967; Trasler, 1978). That is, levels of fear 
arousal in psychopathy are not sufficient to sustain conditioning or initiate avoidance 
learning (Lykken, 1957; Newman et al. 1990).  
 
In addition to deficiencies in fear conditioning, Eysenck (1967) also related poor 
passive avoidance to personality. He was of the opinion that extraverts form conditioned 
responses slowly and were therefore less socialised than introverts (Blackburn, 2006). 
This therefore implies that extraverts take longer when forming the necessary 
associations required to empathise with others. Eysenck (1967) was of the opinion that 
psychopaths, and indeed criminals, have high levels of extraversion, neuroticism and 
psychoticism. Whilst psychoticism has not been readily linked to conditioning, it has 
been related to ‘primary psychopathy’ due to the underpinning facets of hostility, 
impulsivity and egocentricity. Eysenck’s theory of psychopathy has been criticised for 
providing an explanation at a descriptive level, failing to empirically link personality 
traits, such as psychoticism, to socialisation (Blackburn, 2006). 
 
Nevertheless from a theoretical perspective, it appears that individuals with 
psychopathy have processing deficits that predispose them to encounter difficulties 
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when identifying emotional expressions, specifically expressions relating to fear and 
sadness. A more comprehensive review of the psychopathy literature is required to 
examine whether the proposals of both VIM and the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis are 
consistent with empirical findings.  
 
Emotion recognition in psychopathy: A review of the literature 
 
The majority of researchers (e.g. Kosson et al. 2002; Blair et al. 2004; Montagne et al. 
2005; Hastings, Tangney & Stuewig, 2008; Iria, Barbosa & Paixão, 2012) investigating 
emotion recognition in psychopathy have focused on ‘basic’ facial expression45 (i.e. 
universal expressions relating to anger, fear, surprise, happiness, disgust and sadness). 
Using computerised affect recognition tasks, these researchers have attempted to clarify 
whether emotion recognition deficits in psychopathy are specific, or whether they are 
pervasive and relate to several different types of emotion. 
 
Facial affect recognition tasks usually consist of an established set of validated 
photographs of faces depicting basic emotional expressions (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 
1976). It is important to note however, that these tasks generally provide an explicit 
assessment of affect, failing to account for implicit processing. Thus, the following 
review is based solely on explicit affective processing in psychopathy. It appears that 
implicit emotion recognition has been neglected in the study of psychopathy, which is 
surprising considering that both the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis and VIM are 
considered to be motivated by implicit processes. 
 
Nevertheless, Kosson et al. (2002) identified that psychopathic offenders present with 
impairments in nonverbal emotional processing, specifically in relation to facial affect 
recognition. The finding that psychopathic individuals present with impairments when 
identifying facial disgust is somewhat consistent with the Dysfunctional Fear 
Hypothesis and VIM for specific affective abnormalities. In contrast to these two 
theories, results indicated that psychopaths are not deficient at classifying fear and 
sadness.  However, Kosson et al. (2002) recognised that this finding may have occurred, 
as the task materials did not provide a sensitive enough measure for individual 
                                                        
45
 Other researchers have examined affective processing in psychopathy using vocal affect recognition 
tasks (e.g. Blair et al. 2002; Bagley, Abramowitz & Kosson, 2009; Hiatt, Lorenz & Newman, 2002). 
Whilst findings indicate that psychopaths present with deficits in vocal affect recognition, there are too 
few studies to draw any firm conclusions at this point (Brook et al. 2013). This thesis will not be 
examining vocal affect recognition in psychopathy.  
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differences when classifying certain emotions. Thus, discrepancy between the current 
study and that of Lykken (1957) and Blair (1995) may relate to differences in 
methodological design. 
 
When participants have been presented with fearful and sad expressions, those with 
psychopathy have been found to exhibit less autonomic responding than non-
psychopaths (e.g. Blair et al. 1997). In light of this, Kosson et al. (2002) concluded that 
psychopathic offenders may not have deficits when identifying fear and sadness, but 
may instead have problems initiating autonomic activity in response to these emotional 
expressions. However, this statement was speculative and the researchers recommend 
further investigation in this area. 
 
Contrary to expectations, Kosson et al. (2002) found psychopathic individuals to be 
more effective at recognising anger when compared to non-psychopaths. Whilst this 
finding had not been previously identified in the literature, it does correlate with 
suggestions that psychopathic individuals are characterised by a heightened attention to 
aggressive features (e.g. Doninger & Kosson, 2001). On reflection, this finding also fits 
well with the notion that psychopaths have cognitive schemas that portray others and 
the world as hostile (e.g. Blackburn, 2003). Such individuals may therefore be more 
sensitive to expressions of anger as a result of this. Though this finding can be 
accounted for and provides a potential example of the interplay between cognition and 
affect, it is not consistent with the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis, as this theory states 
that psychopathic individuals should demonstrate impairments when identifying 
threatening stimuli.  
 
Like Kosson et al. (2002), Blair et al. (2004) found no evidence of impairment when 
identifying the facial expression anger. Psychopaths may therefore exhibit recognition 
deficits for certain emotions and not others. Nevertheless, it may be that individuals 
with psychopathy are in fact not threatened by anger. It appears that research has 
automatically assumed how the expression of anger is interpreted in psychopathy 
without empirically testing this. This is a criticism of the literature and provides greater 
rationale as to why affective processing in psychopathy warrants further investigation.    
 
In support of the theories outlined, Blair et al. (2004) identified that psychopathic 
individuals presented with a selective impairment when recognising fearful facial 
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expressions. Psychopaths when compared to ‘healthy’ controls made more errors for 
fearful expressions and continued to do so even when the expression had morphed into 
its prototypical form, making it easier to recognise. Blair et al. (2004) stated how this 
result was not influenced by the methodological design of the experiment. To elaborate, 
whilst psychopathic individuals encountered problems when identifying fear, 
participants as a whole (i.e. including both psychopaths and non-psychopaths) found 
‘disgust’ the most difficult expression to recognise. Thus, task difficulty cannot account 
for the significant findings; rather the results may reflect the actual deficits of those with 
the disorder. 
 
Other studies have also found support for a fear recognition deficit in psychopathy (e.g. 
Montagne et al. 2005; Iria et al. 2012). Iria et al. (2012) identified individuals with 
psychopathy, regardless of being criminal or not, to demonstrate a reduced ability to 
recognise fear and sad facial expressions when compared to non-psychopaths. High 
levels of psychopathy associated with a specific affective deficit when identifying fear 
and sadness, which is consistent with the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis and VIM. 
Non-criminal psychopaths did not perform differently to criminal psychopaths. This 
indicates that criminality does not influence emotional processing in psychopathy and 
impairments may be consistent across samples (i.e. psychopaths found in community, 
forensic and clinical populations). It could be argued that psychopaths show a weakness 
in recognising others’ emotional expressions, which may account for their propensity to 
manipulate and violate the rights of others (Iria et al. 2012).   
 
It is important to note that Iria et al. (2012) found psychopathy to be related to the 
misidentification of anger. This finding is inconsistent with Kosson et al. (2002) and 
Blair et al. (2004), who identified psychopathic individuals to have the ability to 
recognise this emotion. Thus, it appears that the psychopathy literature has found mixed 
findings for the recognition of specific emotional expressions. 
 
One possible explanation for the inconsistent findings highlighted here is that research 
has generally assessed emotional recognition in psychopathy in the context of ‘cold’ 
cognition as opposed to ‘hot cognition’. It is certainly feasible that any deficits in 
recognition may only arise during periods of increased arousal (i.e. hot cognition) and 
not during the un-aroused experiments adopted. Further research is warranted to clarify 
this.  
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Clinical accounts of psychopathy (e.g. Cleckley, 1982) state that the disorder is 
characterised by a general absence of affect. This would arguably lend itself to the 
suggestion that psychopaths have an affective deficit when recognising a variety of 
emotions, not just that of sadness and fear. It could, for example, be suggested that 
psychopathic individuals experience difficulty when identifying all types of emotion, 
which would also account for the inconsistency in findings.  
 
Hastings et al. (2008) found support for this suggestion and identified that psychopathic 
individuals experienced difficulty when recognising happy and sad facial expressions. 
Although correlations between psychopathy and their ability to recognise other 
emotions, such as anger, fear and sadness, did not reach significance, Hastings et al. 
(2008) noted that the direction of these were all negative. This would consequently 
suggest that the disorder is associated with recognition deficits for a number of different 
types of emotional expressions. 
 
In an attempt to quantitatively clarify this, Dawel et al. (2012) conducted a meta-
analysis examining facial affect recognition in adult psychopaths. This analysis revealed 
that those with the disorder presented with deficits when identifying both positive and 
negative emotion. Moreover, the researchers acknowledged that these deficits were 
pervasive, with psychopaths displaying significant impairments when identifying fear, 
happiness, surprise and sadness. Weighted effect sizes were negative for anger and 
disgust, though not statistically significant (Dawel et al. 2012). 
Summary 
 
Thus, it becomes evident that psychopathy is associated with impairments in emotional 
recognition. This deficit is pervasive and relates to both positive and negative emotion. 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis and VIM appear to be too specific and consequently 
do not acknowledge that those with the disorder have difficulty identifying other 
emotions as well fear and sadness.  
 
At this point, it is important to note that additional research is needed to examine 
emotional recognition in psychopathy at an implicit level, as existing research has failed 
to take this into consideration. Assessing emotional recognition at an implicit level is 
important when understanding the impulsive, automatic processes underpinning the 
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psychopath’s emotional experiences and may add clarification to the inconsistent 
findings.  
 
Further research is also required to account equally for cognition and the interaction it 
has with affect in psychopathy. This is poorly understood in the psychopathy literature, 
Research that examines emotional recognition during periods of increased arousal (i.e. 
hot cognition) would also be of particular benefit, as contexts involving ‘hot cognition’ 
are more likely to draw out the natural tendencies of the psychopath.  
 
Emotion recognition is only one aspect of affective processing in psychopathy. A great 
deal of attention in recent years has also focused on the psychopath’s evaluation of 
emotional stimuli. According to Steuerwald and Kosson (2000), some of the more 
robust findings indicate that those with the disorder present with impairments when 
processing emotional stimuli and this may be influenced by a number of cognitive 
factors. This moves the Chapter into the evaluation of emotion in psychopathy. 
 
5.4 Evaluating emotion in psychopathy  
 
In his writings, Cleckley (1976) recognised inconsistency between the psychopath’s 
ability to appraise affective information and ability to use this information to respond 
appropriately. He recognised that psychopathic individuals were able to demonstrate 
normal appraisal of explicit emotional cues in an abstract sense (i.e. during verbal 
discussions), but had difficulty using these cues at an implicit level to guide their 
judgments and behaviour (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). This highlights the discrepancy 
between explicit and implicit reactions to emotion in psychopathy and suggests that 
those with the disorder may have some form of deficit underpinning their implicit 
processing when evaluating emotional cues.  
 
Whilst existing theories (e.g. VIM and the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis) address 
emotional deficits in psychopathy, it is unclear how they account for the inconsistency 
identified by Cleckley (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). Beck’s (1987) Theory of Emotional 
Disorders however, can be applied to the construct to explain this ‘paradox’. Although 
this theory was originally proposed to account for depression and anxiety, it has been 
found to have some utility when explaining abnormal affective processing in 
psychopathy (Blackburn, 2006). 
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Beck’s Theory of Emotional Disorders 
 
According to Beck’s Theory of Emotional Disorders, specific emotions result from the 
cognitive appraisal of a situation (Blackburn, 2006). This appraisal manifests at both an 
explicit and implicit level and influences the emotion type experienced (Wells, 1997). 
As Blackburn (2006) notes, Beck’s theory relies heavily on implicit beliefs, which are 
also known as cognitive schemas (See, p. 65). 
 
Beck (1987) argues that specific emotions result from the cognitive appraisal of the 
effect that events have on one’s self or personal views. For example, Blackburn (2006) 
describes that the emotion of anger is a consequence of the appraisal of an unwanted 
violation that one perceives to be either offensive or threatening. Cognitive schemas are 
central to an individual’s personal view of the world (Beck, 1987) and therefore 
influence the individual’s appraisal. However, schemas are often associated with biases, 
which arise from past personal learning history (Blackburn, 2006). Such biases are a 
source of emotional dysfunction and link to information processing challenges. That is, 
they give rise to distorted automatic self-evaluations and attributions of causality that 
would lead to inappropriate affective experiences and responding (Blackburn, 2006). 
 
As discussed, psychopathic individuals are associated with information processing 
challenges (e.g. Newman, 1998) and poor early maladjustment (e.g. Frodi, Dernevik, 
Sepa, Philipson & Bragesjö, 2001). It is not unreasonable then to suggest that they also 
have distorted self-evaluations and biased attributions of causality, which would impact 
upon their ability to effectively evaluate and react appropriately to others’ feelings and 
circumstances. Thus, Beck’s theory is not stating that psychopaths are unable to benefit 
from emotional cues; they just have problems when evaluating and interpreting them. 
 
Beck’s theory emphasises the importance of examining affective processing in 
psychopathy at an implicit level, i.e. via cognitive schemas that influence information 
processing, and consequently give rise to abnormal affective experiences. The theory 
also highlights the role of cognitive-affective interactions in modulating the 
manifestation of affective processing in psychopathy. Moreover, it appears that 
cognitive schemas, and indeed information processing, have a significant influence on 
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emotional experiences in psychopathy, in that they determine how affective cues are 
evaluated.  
 
However, one limitation of Beck’s theory is that it does not capture the role of attention, 
which has previously been found to be a crucial aspect of psychopathic functioning (e.g. 
Newman, 1998). According to the Response Modulation Hypothesis (See p. 75), the 
emotional deficit of psychopathic individuals varies as a function of attentional focus 
(Baskin-Sommers & Newman, 2012). The Response Modulation Hypothesis states that 
individuals with psychopathy do not attend to peripheral cues, which may include 
important information required to effectively evaluate other’s emotion.  
 
Thus, it becomes apparent that in order to fully understand affective processing, 
specifically the evaluation of emotion in psychopathy, these two theories must be 
considered along with a review of the relevant literature. It is important to note 
however, that there has been a lack of research directly examining Beck’s theory and 
almost all studies have applied their findings to the Response Modulation Hypothesis.  
 
Evaluating emotion in psychopathy: A review of the literature 
 
Adopting a lexical decision task, Lorenz and Newman (2002) examined affective 
processing in a sample of psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders. Lexical 
decision tasks assume that emotion words prime associational networks on the basis of 
their emotional content or valence (Bower, 1981). To illustrate for example, the word 
‘heaven’ would normally be associated with positive emotion.  
 
Results indicated that non-psychopaths scoring low on anxiety demonstrated greater 
emotion utilisation than low-anxious psychopaths. That is, low-anxious psychopaths 
failed to access the affective associations primed by stimulus words and were 
consequently unable to relate the emotional valence of the word with a type of emotion 
(e.g. the word ‘heaven’ to positive emotion) (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). However both 
groups were found to rate emotional words in a similar manner, thus providing support 
for the paradox identified by Cleckley. In other words this supports the inconsistency 
proposed between the psychopath’s ability to appraise affective information and their 
ability to use this information to respond appropriately.  
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Previous research (e.g. Williamson et al. 1991; Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993) has 
found similar findings to that of Lorenz and Newman (2002), although it is important to 
note that both Williamson et al. (1991) and Patrick et al. (1993) used different methods. 
Whilst Williamson et al. (1991) examined affective processing using event related 
potentials (ERP), Patrick et al. (1993) assessed startle responses (i.e. a sudden reaction 
to startling stimuli) whilst individuals observed slides differing in affective valence. 
Thus, Lorenz and Newman’s (2002) results appear to be consistent with other studies 
using different methods. 
 
Lorenz and Newman (2002) related their findings to the Response Modulation 
Hypothesis rather than to defective affective processing per se. They recognised that 
psychopaths were less influenced by the word’s affective connotations (i.e. information 
that is incidental to the direct meaning of the word) than non-psychopaths when 
engaging in goal directed behaviour, which in this instance was the experimental task.  
 
Thus, taking into account similarities between their emotional and information-
processing deficiencies, psychopath’s affective deficits, like their self-regulatory 
deficits, may involve impairment when processing secondary information (Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002). Moreover, individuals with psychopathy, particularly those 
characterised by low levels of anxiety, may be unable to implicitly activate the 
associative networks primed by peripheral emotional cues and instead may be more 
dependent on deliberate, conscious processing.  
 
Further support for the role of the Response Modulation Hypothesis when evaluating 
affective stimuli has been provided by a number of researchers, including Mitchell, 
Richell, Leonard and Blair (2006), and Glass and Newman (2009). Glass and Newman 
(2009), for example, examined the differential effects of emotion on memory for 
primary versus secondary information. The researchers recognised that low-anxious 
psychopathic offenders were able to benefit from emotional cues that were central to 
their attentional focus and recalled more emotional words as a result. Emotional stimuli 
that were presented outside of the psychopath’s attentional set did not influence recall.     
 
According to Glass and Newman (2009), low-anxious psychopaths presented with a 
strong emotion memory effect for the stimuli presented in their primary focus. This 
effect remained evident even for the stimuli that was displayed for a limited amount of 
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time. Thus, the findings of this study are not consistent with existing theories, such as 
VIM and the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis, which state that psychopath’s are 
characterised by an affective deficit. Rather, the results suggest that the psychopath’s 
ability to evaluate and process emotional stimuli remains intact. It is their processing of 
contextual information that is impaired, which is cognition and relates to the role of 
attention. 
 
In light of the findings, Glass and Newman (2009) concluded that individuals with 
psychopathy appeared unable to connect emotional experiences to contextual cues, 
specifically those that fell out their primary focus of attention. As a result, this may 
impair the psychopath’s ability to benefit from one of the fundamental roles of emotion; 
redirecting attention. If emotion fails to redirect the psychopath’s attention they will be 
less likely to learn from the contextual cues that link to significant emotional events and 
consequently, fail to appreciate the impact of their actions (Glass & Newman, 2009). 
Glass and Newman (2009) argue that such events will result in the psychopath having a 
limited experience of emotion, which will influence their ability to effectively evaluate 
emotion due to difficulty appreciating the broader context. 
 
Glass and Newman’s (2009) conclusion arguably fits well with Beck’s (1987) theory, in 
that the psychopath’s ability to benefit from emotional cues is limited to their primary 
focus of attention. This leads to a limited experience of emotion, or a biased view of 
emotional experiences that give rise to cognitive schemas, which maintain such beliefs. 
Whilst this link is only speculative, it would be valuable to empirically examine this to 
obtain a greater understanding of the mechanisms underpinning affective processing in 
psychopathy. 
 
Abnormal attentional processes have also been found to relate to the psychopath’s 
intrinsic fear deficit (e.g. Dvorak-Bertsch et al. 2009). More specifically, Dvorak-
Bertsch et al. (2009) identified that individual differences in the affective-interpersonal 
component of psychopathy (i.e. PCL-R F1; Hare, 2003) were not associated with 
impairment in threat processing. Instead, Fearless Dominance (which has a unique 
relationship with PCL-R F1; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) was associated with a 
reduced fear response only when attentional focus had shifted away from threat-relevant 
stimuli. Thus, it appears that abnormal attention and poor passive avoidance in 
psychopathy, captured by the Response Modulation Hypothesis, account for the 
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deficient fear response exhibited by those with disorder. Dvorak-Bertsch et al. (2009) 
found similar findings to Lorenz and Newman (2002) and Glass and Newman (2009) in 
a sample of students (n = 55), therefore suggesting that findings are consistent across 
samples.  
 
At this point it is also important to note that the Response Modulation Hypothesis is 
different to the BIS model, in that it proposes that individuals will be responsive to 
threat or emotional cues as long as they are in the psychopath’s primary focus of 
attention. In other words, individuals with psychopathy are able to process and evaluate 
fearful emotion, but the effectiveness of this is dependent on attentional demands of the 
situation. The BIS maintains that psychopaths are deficient at processing such stimuli 
regardless of attentional focus. 
  
Anderson and Stanford (2012) further examined emotional processing differences in 
psychopathy using affective event-related potential (ERP) modulation (n = 40). Results 
indicated that individuals with high levels of psychopathy demonstrated increased ERP 
differentiation between emotional and neutral stimuli when their attention was directed 
towards these. However, the researchers state that it would be incorrect to state that 
psychopathic individuals process emotion at the same level as their non-psychopathic 
counterparts. Instead, Anderson and Standford (2012) argued that their data revealed 
psychopaths failing to achieve the same level of differentiation between emotional and 
neutral cues to that identified in ‘healthy’ controls. Thus, whilst attention appears to 
have a significant influence on affective processing in psychopathy, the characteristics 
of the ERP waveform indicated that processing may also be influenced by alternative 
neural processes that account for specific abnormalities (Anderson & Standford, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, Anderson and Stanford (2012) state that their results provide evidence for 
an implicit differentiation between emotional and neutral stimuli. That is, they argue 
that the implicit mechanisms associated with early discriminatory processes that link to 
the psychopath’s attention and memory are either delayed or absent (i.e. they take 
longer to process emotional stimuli). However, when attention is explicitly required for 
task performance, ERP waveforms suggest that their level of processing becomes 
comparable to that of non-psychopaths. Deficits when processing emotional stimuli in 
psychopathy may therefore occur mainly at an implicit level. 
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Verona, Sprague and Sadeh (2012) advanced on previous research by examining 
inhibitory control and negative emotional processing in psychopathy. By focusing 
solely on negative emotion the researchers’ aimed to understand the psychopath’s 
evaluation of specific types of emotion. When compared to those with ASPD, 
individuals with psychopathy were found to demonstrate reduced neural processing of 
negative emotion and this was not affected by inhibitory control demands. Verona et al. 
(2012) found that psychopaths were unable to distinguish negative emotional stimuli 
from neutral stimuli even when cognitive demands were low. This partially suggests 
that emotional processing in psychopathy may not be solely due to attentional 
abnormalities, as participants continued to present with deficits when there was no 
attentional demand or behavioural goal (i.e. a dominant response set had not been 
established).    
 
Despite this, Verona et al. (2012) found some support for the Response Modulation 
Hypothesis in that those with psychopathy failed to process the negative emotional 
properties of the word, which in the case was secondary to the primary task of inhibiting 
responses. It therefore appears that individuals with psychopathy may be less influenced 
by affective information when engaging in cognitive tasks. According to Verona et al. 
(2012) attending to the emotional content of words is crucial for generating more 
socially appropriate responding. The results of this study would therefore account for 
antisocial tendencies of those with psychopathy, as it is becoming clear that such 
individuals experience difficulty when evaluating emotional cues due to their attention 
challenges.  
 
A more recent study conducted by Baskin-Sommers, Curtin and Newman (2013) 
expanded on the findings highlighted by Glass and Newman (2009) and Verona et al. 
(2012) and stated that in addition to attention, processing load may also determine 
whether psychopathic individuals presented with emotional deficits. Baskin-Sommers et 
al (2013) identified that a high processing load (i.e. more complex information) when 
compared to a low processing load (i.e. simple information) may have greater influence 
on emotional reactivity of psychopaths. Moreover, a high processing load together with 
an increased attentional demand may create a bottleneck, whereby psychopathic 
individuals have difficulty processing multiple channels of information simultaneously 
(Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013). Thus, there is reason to suspect that the attention 
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bottleneck is impeding affective processing in psychopathy. However, this is a 
relatively new finding and further research is needed.  
 
Summary 
 
It becomes evident that individuals with psychopathy have deficits in their ability to 
evaluate emotional stimuli. Individuals with psychopathy appear to be reliant on 
conscious processing when evaluating emotion, as research has found evidence for 
numerous implicit deficits, which link to their ability to discriminate between emotional 
stimuli and activate associative networks primed by peripheral emotional cues. More 
recent research has generally found this to relate to the Response Modulation 
Hypothesis, in that psychopaths are unable to attend to emotional information that is 
outside their primary focus of attention. This explanation may also extend to account for 
the recognition deficits discussed in the first part of this Chapter.  
 
Examining the interaction between cognition and affect appears to be crucial when 
understanding psychopathic functioning and yet, until fairly recently, it has been poorly 
captured in the literature. Additional research is therefore required to investigate the 
interplay between cognition and affect in psychopathy.  
 
5.5 Concluding comments 
 
The literature on affective processing in psychopathy concludes that individuals with 
the disorder have deficits that impact on their ability to identify and evaluate emotional 
information. These deficits arguably account for the psychopath’s propensity to 
manipulate and take advantage of others without experiencing any remorse, guilt or 
fear.  
 
Affective deficits in psychopathy have been understood through a number of different 
theories. Whilst these theories each propose that the emotional experiences of 
psychopaths are underpinned by different mechanisms, Baskin-Sommers and Newman 
(2012) note that the theories are not mutually exclusive and could co-exist. Thus, it may 
be that psychopaths are underpinned by a number of processing deficits from different 
theories. For example, individuals with psychopathy may be unable to recognise others’ 
distress cues due to early socialisation challenges, and their dysfunctional cognitive 
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schemas and abnormal attentional processes maintain this problem. Existing research 
has tended to limit its focus to one or two of these processes rather than capturing them 
all and investigating how they interact. In order to fully understand affective processing 
in psychopathy research needs to examine a range of emotion functioning deficits 
within a single sample. At the same time, it would also be beneficial to investigate how 
these deficits interact with cognition, as this is yet to be understood in the psychopathy 
literature. 
 
Furthermore, implicit processing has been found to influence the evaluation of emotion 
in psychopathy and therefore forms an important part of this thesis. It has become 
evident that psychopaths are able to adequately process explicit emotional information, 
but it is when this information is more complex and is secondary to other stimuli that 
their implicit processing deficits become evident. However in order to make firm 
conclusions, further research is required to investigate affective processing in 
psychopathy using specialised techniques that allow for an assessment of emotion at an 
explicit and implicit level.  
 
The next Chapter will summarise the key points identified in this Chapter and the 
previous Chapters, and utilise this to present a rationale for the research together with 
the thesis aims and predictions. 
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Chapter 6. 
ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
6.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter describes how gaps in the literature will inform the aims and predictions 
of the thesis. Attention will be directed towards issues relating to the assessment and 
measurement of psychopathy, as well as to cognitive and affective processing. The 
Chapter will conclude by drawing predictions for the research based on the review of 
the empirical literature. An overview of how the thesis will address these predictions is 
also provided. 
 
6.2 Rationale for the research 
 
Since the 19
th
 century, a number of conceptualisations have been proposed attempting 
to define the construct of psychopathy. Whilst these conceptualisations traditionally 
viewed psychopathy as mental illness (e.g. Pinel), the focus changed towards the early 
20
th
 century, with psychopathy being associated with abnormal personality pathology 
(e.g. Kraepelin, Schneider and Karpman). The view of psychopathy as abnormal 
personality was largely accepted. However, experts were unable to reach an agreement 
on the underlying features of the disorder, with some placing an emphasis on antisocial 
behaviour (e.g. Kraepelin) and others on deficits in affect (e.g. Schneider).     
 
Cleckley (1982) recognised this discrepancy and through clinical observation he 
proposed a profile of the prototypical psychopath that defined the disorder via 16 
personality traits. Cleckley did not view antisocial behaviour as a defining feature of 
psychopathy and this was reflected in his description of the disorder. Nevertheless, he 
did place emphasis on cognition and affect, stating that psychopaths suffer from deficits 
in these two areas. For example, he described them as making poor judgments and as 
having a general poverty in major affective reactions. Although deficits in affect had 
previously been associated with descriptions of the disorder, cognition was largely 
neglected. Thus, Cleckley’s conceptualisation proved to be crucial in highlighting the 
importance of both cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy.   
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Since Cleckley’s description of the disorder, the Psychopathy Checklist and its revision 
(PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 2003) have been developed. The PCL-R is currently held as the 
‘gold standard’ for assessing psychopathy (Decuyper, De Pauw, De Fruyt, De Bolle & 
De Clercq, 2009), and has attempted to clinically operationalise and define the construct 
(Sevecke et al. 2009). A factor analysis of the PCL-R identified two stable correlated 
components. Component one was found to relate to a number of interpersonal traits (i.e. 
grandiosity, deception, and a lack of remorse or guilt), whilst component two was 
associated with various chronically unstable, socially deviant behavioural characteristics 
(i.e. impulsivity and irresponsibility; Hare et al. 1991).  
 
Numerous researchers (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 1997; Cooke & Michie, 2001; Blackburn, 
2007a) have expressed their concerns surrounding the PCL-R, specifically in relation to 
its structure and content. Cooke and Michie (2001), for example, revisited the factor 
structure of the PCL-R and argued that three rather than two psychopathic components 
could be determined from the items. They proposed that psychopathy is more reliably 
underpinned by interpersonal, affective and lifestyle features. Their model placed more 
emphasis on an affective component, highlighting the importance of affect in 
psychopathy. In agreement with Cleckley and Schneider, Cooke and Michie (2001) also 
placed a reduced emphasis on criminality, stating that this was a correlate more than a 
component of the disorder. 
 
Neumann et al. (2006) disagreed with the three-factor model proposed by Cooke and 
Michie (2001). They argued that the elimination of the PCL-R items tapping into 
antisocial behaviour was not appropriate, as these items had been used to develop the 
measure. Additionally, Neumann et al. (2006) noted that the inclusion of these items 
provided a more statistically valid model, a model comprising of four components 
(Williams et al. 2007). Thus, it appears that there are unanswered questions regarding 
core features of the disorder, with disagreement on whether the construct is personality 
or behavioural-based. An expert consensus on the fundamental components of 
psychopathy would allow for a consistent approach that would extend to the assessment 
and treatment of the disorder.  
 
Indeed, the current view of psychopathy as ‘criminal psychopathy’ explains in part the 
over-focus on forensic populations in the literature. It also reflects the measurement of 
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psychopathy via the PCL-R and the unclear history of the disorder in the DSM, with the 
construct being equated with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). Viewing 
psychopathy as a behavioural entity has consequently led to many core features of 
psychopathy being ignored, specifically those relating to interpersonal, affective and 
cognitive functioning.   
 
As noted, Cleckley (1976) argued that criminality was not an essential feature of 
psychopathy. Instead, he proposed that those with psychopathy suffer from a 
psychological deficit (both cognitive and affective) that predisposes them to behave in a 
manner that is harmful to themselves and others (Wallace et al. 2000). Cognition and 
affect are therefore integral aspects of psychopathy and yet this is not well researched, 
particularly with regards to cognition. Research has been limited to a small number of 
cognition and emotional variables and has not accounted for the interplay between the 
two.  
 
Research has identified that those with psychopathy tend to have cognitive deficiencies 
in attention, information processing and behavioural inhibition. Individuals with 
psychopathy have been found to have deficits in response modulation (Newman, 1998). 
Response modulation represents an individual’s ability to adapt to their environment 
when selecting and employing cues. This is problematic for those with psychopathy as 
they have difficulties in processing information outside their primary focus of attention 
whilst engaging in goal-directed behaviour (e.g. Jutai & Hare, 1983; Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002; Zeier et al. 2009). This leads them to select and respond to 
inappropriate cues.  
 
Individuals with psychopathy are therefore less likely to appreciate the consequences of 
their actions and as a result encounter difficulties when engaging in all the elements of 
information processing specified by Huesmann (1998), i.e. they carry out an 
inappropriate response, attend to the wrong element of feedback and then encode the 
dysfunctional script for future use.  The psychopath’s inability to evaluate a response set 
and acknowledge the consequences may result in events that give rise to the 
development of maladaptive cognitive schemas (Wallace et al. 2000).  
 
Schemas are an important element of cognitive functioning with a basis in early life 
experiences. Maladaptive cognitive schemas, in combination with an abnormal 
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personality style, explain why those with psychopathy are generally associated with 
offending behaviour and poor moral reasoning. It therefore becomes evident that 
cognitive schemas are a crucial aspect of psychopathic functioning and require further 
investigation, especially as there is a lack of research in this area.  
 
In addition to their cognitive deficits, those with psychopathy have been found to have 
deficits in affective processing, i.e. they have been found to present with impairments 
when recognising emotion (e.g. Dawel et al. 2012) and when evaluating emotional 
stimuli (e.g. Williamson et al. 1991). Central to describing these deficits are the 
Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957), the Violence Inhibition Mechanism 
Model (VIM; Blair, 1995), as well as Beck’s Theory of Emotional Disorders (Beck, 
1987).  
 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis focuses on deficient affective reactivity and 
proposes that individuals with psychopathy are less afraid of punishment due to their 
impairments when recognising emotion, specifically fear (Lykken, 1957). The 
hypothesis argues that psychopathic individuals experience less arousal to punishment 
and make weaker associations between their behaviour and emotions. Consequently, 
they are more likely than non-psychopaths to continue to engage in the punished action, 
demonstrating poor passive avoidance to negative emotional stimuli. 
 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis has been criticised for being too specific and for 
attending only to fear. This criticism extends to VIM, which solely focuses on negative 
emotion, such as sadness, thus neglecting other emotional expressions. Both theories 
also fail to recognise the interplay between affect and cognition, which has been found 
to crucial when understanding psychopathic processing (e.g. Glass & Newman, 2009).  
 
VIM assumes that all humans are predisposed to find distress cues unpleasant and are 
punished by signals of others’ distress (Blair et al. 2005). During early socialisation, 
Blair (1995) stated that individuals develop representations of affective experiences 
through role taking with the victim. This results in the expansion of representing 
triggers of VIM that when activated generate arousal, which can be interpreted as moral 
emotion.   
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VIM has been noted to be problematic in those with psychopathy (Blair et al. 2005). 
The lack of VIM in psychopathy may capture the psychopath’s inability to demonstrate 
empathy and without this, there will be no relationship made between the victim’s 
emotion and the activation of VIM (Blair, 1995; Blair et al. 2005). The representations 
of acts that cause others harm therefore do not become triggers for VIM and the 
psychopath experiences little arousal as a consequence of this. Impairments in VIM may 
result in the absence of moral emotion in psychopathy, poor moral reasoning and a 
reduced responsiveness to sadness and fear. 
 
Moving on to the evaluation of emotional stimuli, Beck’s theory states that specific 
emotions result from the cognitive appraisal of a situation (Blackburn, 2006). The 
nature of the appraisal influences the emotion experienced. As Blackburn (2006) notes, 
Beck’s theory relies heavily on the concept of schema which, as discussed, is central to 
an individual’s personal view of the world. Beck argues that specific emotions result 
from the cognitive appraisal of the effect events have on one’s self or personal views 
(e.g. self or personal schema).  
 
Cognitive schemas are also associated with biases that arise from emotional 
dysfunction, information-processing challenges, and past personal learning history 
(Blackburn, 2006), which encourage individuals to misperceive threats or to over-
emphasis threat. Research has found those with psychopathy to be related to such biases 
(e.g. Frodi et al. 2001). Thus, it is unsurprising that psychopaths have dysfunctional 
cognitive schemas, which lead to distorted self-evaluations and biased attributions of 
causality that influence their ability to effectively understand and react appropriately to 
other’s emotion. 
 
More recent developments have attempted to investigate the interaction between 
cognition and affect to provide a more detailed understanding of psychopathic 
functioning. In light of this, a number of researchers (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; 
Glass & Newman, 2009) have argued that psychopaths do not have deficits in affective 
processing per se, rather their inability to allocate attention outside their primary focus 
limits their experience of emotion. As a consequence, psychopathic individuals are 
unable to effectively evaluate emotion and appreciate the impact their actions have on 
others and themselves. However, it is important to note that research investigating this 
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interplay has only captured inattention and there may be other variables that have an 
influence. 
 
Cognitive and affective processing becomes important when understanding 
psychopathy as it forms an element of ‘true psychopathy’, i.e. psychopathy as abnormal 
personality as opposed to criminal personality (Cleckley, 1982). Psychopathic 
processing is not wholly explicit and can occur at an implicit level. Unlike explicit 
processing, which is conscious and declarative, implicit processing is absent of 
conscious awareness (Amodio & Ratner, 2011). Research investigating psychopathic 
functioning has neglected the study of implicit cognitive and affective processing. This 
is problematic as implicit processes are an important aspect of functioning; they appear 
to drive social behaviour, particularly when responses are made quickly without prior 
thought (Amodio & Ratner, 2011). There is a need to explore this area in more depth to 
gain a greater understanding of both explicit and implicit processing in psychopathy, 
and to extend our theoretical understanding of this construct. 
 
Moving into the area of measurement, as mentioned, the PCL-R is currently the core 
assessment tool for clinical psychopathy. It addresses factors via a self-report interview 
and a review of collateral information. The PCL-R has been described as a valid and 
reliable measure across institutionalised samples (Hare, Clark, Grann & Thornton, 
2000) although its application to general samples is poorly researched by comparison. 
This is due to problems with acquiring background information from community 
samples, e.g. offending history, childhood background. There is, however, an increasing 
interest in understanding psychopathy within the community (Neumann & Hare, 2008) 
and among women (Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). The PCL-R screening 
version (PCL:SV; Hart et al. 1995) has been adopted in the research to explore this 
further but fails to capture implicit processing, as it is based solely on the PCL-R 
interpretation of psychopathy and does not incorporate a self-report (scale) component. 
 
In addition to the PCL-R and its derivatives, there are four self-report measures of 
psychopathy available: 1). Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III (SRP-III; Paulhus et al. in 
press); 2). Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996); 3). 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al. 1995); and 4). 
Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM; Patrick, 2010). Whilst the TriPM has received 
little empirical attention, research has identified that the SRP-III, PPI and LSRP fail to 
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converge with one another, specifically in terms of content (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006; 
Williams et al. 2007). This has proven to be problematic, particularly since emergence 
of a three-factor model supported suggestions that the measurement of psychopathy via 
the PCL-R was not a true assessment of personality and had overlapped with a 
behavioural measure (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001). The differences among the self-
report measures may stem from different strategies used in their development. None of 
the measures were developed using an expert Delphi approach where consensus in 
opinion is the primary goal. A Delphi approach would allow for expert agreement on 
measure content, which would resolve current disputes surrounding the factor structure 
of psychopathy.   
 
Nevertheless, the increased emphasis on personality has encouraged several researchers 
to revert to the original conceptualisation of psychopathy (i.e. the conceptualisation first 
proposed by Cleckley, 1982) as ‘abnormal personality’ as opposed to ‘criminal 
personality’ (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001; Skeem & Cooke, 2010a,b). The view of 
psychopathy as ‘criminal behaviour’ has resulted in the PCL-R neglecting important 
aspects of psychopathic functioning, such as cognition and affect. As indicated, these 
form the core elements of personality and should be included in an assessment of the 
disorder. Thus, the PCL-R may arguably be viewed as inadequate as it does not attend 
to all aspects of the disorder, failing to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
psychopathy and psychopathic processing. 
 
More recent measures of psychopathy have begun to incorporate specialist techniques in 
their assessment of the disorder. The Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; 
Ireland & Ireland, 2012), for example, examines psychopathy at a categorical and 
dimensional level via observation, collateral information, an interview, timed case 
scenarios, self-report, and an evaluation of presentation during assessment 
(observational assessment). Cognitive and affective functioning is also assessed using 
explicit and implicit methods. Examining psychopathy using a combination of different 
techniques, including self-report, would allow for the development and refinement of 
psychopathy assessment. That is, it would determine what is required to provide a 
holistic examination of psychopathy, one that is sensitive to cognitive and affective 
processing. 
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Thus, a new self-report measure of psychopathy is required that is in agreement with 
experts in the field and explores explicit cognitive and affective processing in detail. A 
collaborative approach with psychopathy measures that incorporate an implicit 
assessment of psychopathic processing will enable an understanding of cognition and 
affect at both a controlled (conscious) and automatic (unconscious) level. This is yet to 
be understood in the academic literature and will allow for psychological theories, such 
as Response Modulation, VIM and the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis to be better 
applied. The application of specialist assessment techniques, such as those adopted in 
the ACL (e.g. observation, timed case scenarios, interview, etc.) will also help 
determine the components required to provide an accurate and thorough assessment of 
the disorder.  
 
6.3 Aims and predictions of the research 
 
Taking into account the rationale presented here, this section will now present the aims 
of the thesis together with the associated predictions. Examples of the literature will be 
cited to support the predictions made. 
 
Research has highlighted a lack of consensus among experts as to what components 
underpin psychopathy, with suggestions for a two- (e.g. Hare, 1991), three- (e.g. Cooke 
& Michie, 2001) and four-factor model (e.g. Hare, 2003). Experts have also been found 
to equate the construct of psychopathy with its assessment (Skeem & Cooke, 2010a), 
consequently viewing the disorder as a behavioural entity ignoring the fundamental 
aspects relating to interpersonal, cognitive and affective functioning.  
 
Further to this, historical conceptualisations of psychopathy have placed little emphasis 
on cognition (e.g. conceptions provided by Kraepelin, Schneider and Karpman) and this 
appears to have extended to research examining the disorder (Hiatt & Newman, 2006). 
Affective processing however has been argued to be a central feature of psychopathy 
but has not been captured well in its measurement (Lilienfeld, 1994). Thus, given the 
suspected influence of the PCL-R on understandings of psychopathy, it would not be 
illogical to predict that experts will define psychopathy similar to that of the PCL-R, 
placing less emphasis on psychopathic processing, particularly cognition as it not well 
understood when compared to affect. 
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In light of this, the following aims and predictions have been proposed:  
 
Aim 1:  To understand psychopathy from an expert perspective and gain a 
consensus on the fundamental components of psychopathy. 
 
Aim 2:  To develop and refine a new self-report measure of psychopathy 
that is sensitive to explicit cognition and affect.  
 
Aim 3: To use the new self-report measure, alongside existing 
psychopathy measures, to further understanding of explicit 
cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy. 
 
Predictions: 1). Experts are expected to restate the PCL definition of 
psychopathy. 
 
 2). Experts are expected to capture the affective components of 
psychopathy in their understanding of the construct, but not 
cognition. 
 
There are differences across existing self-report measures of psychopathy, specifically 
in relation to their content (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Whilst certain measures, such as 
the LSRP, suggest that an antisocial component is required when assessing the disorder, 
others do not (e.g. the PPI). Inconsistencies in content also extend to the assessment of 
psychopathic processing. Measures such as the PPI place emphasis on affect, whereas 
others ignore this aspect of psychopathy (e.g. the LSRP and SRP). As noted, the 
measurement of cognition has consistently received little attention. 
 
Despite the inconsistencies noted here, research has found existing self-report measures 
of psychopathy to correlate positively with one another (e.g. Williams et al. 2007; 
Marcus et al. 2013). Research has also highlighted their ability to effectively assess the 
construct across populations (e.g. Poythress et al. 1998; Edens et al. 2008). Consistent 
with this, the new measure presented in this thesis (the Psychopathic Processing and 
Personality Assessment; PAPA) is predicted to behave in a comparable manner. 
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Similarly, the new self-report measure is expected to present with good construct 
validity and correlate with cognition and affect as identified in the psychopathy 
literature. Thus, the new measure is predicted to associate with positive cognitive 
schema, negative cognitive schema, and negative affect (e.g. Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 
2012). It is also predicted to correlate with a tendency for hostile responding (e.g. Vitale 
et al. 2005), deficits in moral reasoning (e.g. Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), 
and an inability to identify and evaluate emotion accurately (e.g. Glass & Newman, 
2009; Dawel et al. 2012).   
 
Thus, the following predictions have been outlined: 
 
Aim 4: To evaluate the new self-report (PAPA) measure across 
populations. 
 
Predictions: 3). The PAPA will positively associate with existing psychopathy 
measures (e.g. the LSRP and PCL:SV). 
 
4). The PAPA will positively associate with a) negative cognitive 
schema; and b) positive cognitive schema. 
 
 5). The PAPA will positively associate with negative affect. 
 
 6). The PAPA will positively associate with a) fewer emotional 
words identified; and b) a lower strength of feeling for own and 
others’ emotion46.  
 
7). The PAPA will positively associate with a) higher levels of 
hostile responding; and b) less support for a moral outcome in 
dilemmas. 
 
Research has highlighted that those individuals with psychopathy have an array of 
explicit and implicit cognitive deficits. Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012) found a clear 
role for cognitive schema in psychopathy. They identified that psychopathy was 
underpinned by both positive and negative cognitive schema and this was consistent 
                                                        
46
 These two variables correspond to deficits when identifying and evaluating/feeling emotion. 
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across samples, thus highlighting that cognition in psychopathy may not differ across 
student, forensic and clinical populations. Although evidence was found for positive 
cognitive schema in psychopathy, it is predicted that these schemas will be more 
evident in ‘healthy’ controls that present with fewer cognitive deficits. 
 
From the psychopathy literature, it becomes evident that dysfunctional schemas give 
rise to poor moral judgments (e.g. Glenn et al. 2009; Young et al. 2012) and biased 
interpretations that may lead to hostile responding (e.g. Vitale et al. 2005). Selective 
attention abnormalities in psychopathy have also been found to be applicable across 
samples (e.g. Newman et al. 1997; Vitale et al. 2007; Sadeh & Verona, 2008), providing 
further support that cognition in the disorder is not population-specific.   
 
In order to further examine explicit and implicit cognitive processing in psychopathy, 
the following aims and predictions were proposed: 
  
Aim 5:  To examine explicit and implicit cognitive processing in 
psychopathy across populations. 
 
Predictions: 8). Those with higher levels of psychopathy will present with 
fewer positive cognitive schemas than individuals with lower 
levels of psychopathy. 
 
 9). Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will present 
with more negative cognitive schemas than those with lower 
levels of psychopathy. 
 
10). Those with higher levels of psychopathy will be less likely to 
support a moral outcome in dilemmas than individuals with lower 
levels of psychopathy. 
 
11). Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will display 
higher levels of hostile responding than those with lower levels of 
psychopathy.  
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The literature on affective processing in psychopathy concludes that individuals with 
the disorder have deficits that impact on their ability to experience remorse and 
empathy. More specifically, research has found psychopathic individuals to have 
difficulty when identifying emotion (e.g. Kosson et al. 2002; Blair et al. 2004; Dawel et 
al. 2012). Research is yet to determine whether this is emotion-specific or if it is 
applicable to all emotional expressions. Nevertheless, Iria et al. (2012) found non-
criminal psychopaths to demonstrate similar affective deficits to psychopathic 
offenders, thus highlighting that impairment in emotion recognition may be consistent 
across samples.  
 
Individuals with psychopathy have also been found to exhibit deficits in their ability to 
evaluate emotion (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Dvorak-Bertsch et al. 2009; Anderson 
& Stanford, 2012). Anderson and Stanford (2012) concluded that psychopaths rely on 
conscious (explicit) processing when evaluating emotion, as they appear to have 
implicit [cognitive] deficits that relate to their ability to attend fully to emotional 
information. That is, they have been identified as unable to attend to emotional 
information outside their primary focus of attention, specifically when a dominant 
response set has been established (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2006; Dvorak-Bertsch et al. 2009). 
This interplay between cognition and affect has been recognised in psychopaths from 
forensic settings (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002) and the community (e.g. Glass & 
Newman, 2009), thus reinforcing the notion that deficits in psychopathic processing are 
not sample-specific. Lastly, it is important to note that Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012) 
found negative affect to be largely associated with the disorder. 
 
In light of this, the following predictions were outlined: 
 
Aim 6:  To examine explicit and implicit affective processing in 
psychopathy across populations. 
 
Predictions: 12). Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will present 
with more schemas associated with negative affect than those 
with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
13). Those with higher levels of psychopathy will identify less 
emotional stimuli than those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
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14). Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will 
demonstrate a lower strength of feeling for their own and others’ 
emotion than those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
 
6.4 Addressing the research aims and predictions 
 
The aims outlined above will be addressed across three studies. The first study (See 
Chapter seven) aims to understand the construct of psychopathy from an expert 
perspective via a Delphi survey and a literature review. The study also intends on 
developing a new self-report measure of psychopathy (PAPA) that is in agreement with 
experts in the field and captures cognition and affect, so that it can be used in study two 
and three to further understanding of psychopathic processing. It is important that the 
new self-report measure captures cognition and affect equally to allow for an 
examination of the interplay between the two.  
 
The new self-report measure will be evaluated and refined in the second study (See 
Chapter eight). Study two will focus on exploring the processing deficits 
(cognition/affect) identified in the Delphi survey. It will investigate the role of explicit 
processing in psychopathy via cognitive schema (both maladaptive and adaptive) and 
explicit negative affect, using the new self-report measure to assist with this. Forensic 
and student samples will be recruited to ensure that the new self-report can be applied 
across populations. 
 
The final study, study three (See Chapter nine), will continue to evaluate and refine the 
new self-report measure of psychopathy. The new self-report will be applied alongside 
an implicit assessment of cognition and affect (e.g. the ACL), and an existing clinical 
measure of the disorder (e.g. PCL:SV) to understand how affect and cognition (both 
implicit and explicit) are presenting in both the consensus definition of psychopathy and 
psychopathy defined through clinical methods. This approach will allow for a detailed 
examination of implicit processing, thus providing a means of determining how this 
specifically relates to psychopathy and whether it enhances explicit approaches to 
measurement. The application of measures, such as the ACL, which offer an assessment 
of psychopathy via different techniques (e.g. observation, a review of collateral 
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information, interview, implicit methods, etc.) will also help establish what components 
are required to provide a comprehensive assessment of the disorder; an assessment that 
also attends to cognition and affect.  
 
A clinical sample will be recruited in study three to investigate the applicability of the 
new self-report measure to this specialised population. Overall the thesis will allow for 
an examination of psychopathic processing across a variety of different populations, i.e. 
student, forensic and clinical. 
 
In summary, there are four outcomes of the research:  
 
1). A more developed understanding of what components underpin psychopathy 
using expert consensus. 
 
2). The development and refinement of measurement using this consensus 
definition, with an outline as to what this should include. 
 
3). A more detailed understanding of how affect and cognition, both implicit and 
explicit, are associated with psychopathy using the consensus definition and pre-
exiting definitions (e.g. PCL approaches). 
 
4). An outline of what a comprehensive assessment of psychopathy sensitive to 
affect and cognition should include (e.g. observation, collateral, implicit 
methods, etc.). 
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Chapter 7. 
STUDY 1: USING AN EXPERT DELPHI STUDY TO 
EXAMINE AREAS OF IMPORTANCE IN 
PSYCHOPATHY 
 
 
7.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The study comprised a review of the relevant literature and an expert Delphi survey. 
The Delphi survey was conducted to 1). Understand psychopathy from an expert 
perspective, including attention to the role of cognition and affect; and 2). Use these 
observations, along with a literature review to develop a self-report measure of 
psychopathy that captured cognition and affect, and could be used in later studies to 
further understanding of processing in psychopathy. 
 
The Delphi survey consisted of three rounds. The method and results for each will be 
presented in turn. This will be followed by a discussion of the study, which will include 
an overview of the limitations and issues for further research. A flowchart (Figure one) 
has been provided to guide the reader through this chapter. 
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Study 1: Using an expert Delphi study to examine areas of importance 
in psychopathy 
Rationale for using a Delphi 
survey 
Details of participants  
Round one of the Delphi 
survey (n = 32) 
Round two of the Delphi 
survey (n = 30) 
Round three of the Delphi 
survey (n = 27) 
Review and discussion 
Developing the new self-
report (PAPA) measure 
Development 
Results – Thematic analysis 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A flowchart of the processes underpinning study one. 
Procedure – Ethics, 
administration & approach to 
analysis 
Results – Thematic analysis 
Participants 
Materials 
Procedure 
Results – Thematic analysis 
Participants 
Materials 
Procedure 
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7.2 Rationale for using a Delphi survey 
 
Following a review of the literature, there appeared a number of issues surrounding the 
current assessment of psychopathy and as to what constitutes the construct. Given this, 
it was considered beneficial to explore an understanding of psychopathy using experts 
in the field. Experts were invited to provide their opinion via a Delphi survey.  
 
A Delphi survey is an interactive
47
 technique that allows the refinement of opinion over 
a number of rounds, with the ultimate aim of reaching agreement (Vosmer, Hackett & 
Callanan, 2009). Responses are collated at the end of each round and fed back to the 
individuals providing them with an opportunity to change their previous opinion in light 
of the group response. It also allows each participant to provide further comment as the 
rounds progress. Vosmer et al. (2009) suggest that a consensus level of 80% should be 
adopted to ensure that a high level of agreement is obtained. This consensus level was 
accepted and used throughout study one. 
 
According to Skjutar, Christensson and Millersdorf (2009), exploring a concept through 
the professional perspective, i.e. via a Delphi survey, allows for a more holistic 
understanding. In terms of the current study, this technique would ensure that all aspects 
of psychopathy are being considered. Delphi surveys have been successfully utilised 
across a number of disciplines, including nursing (e.g. Boldt, Velstra, Brach, Linseisen 
& Cieza, 2013), medicine (e.g. Wildi, Hensel, Wertli, Michel & Steurer, 2013), health 
psychology (e.g. Kirchberger, Cieza & Stucki, 2008), forensic psychology (Tetley, 
Jinks, Huband, Howells & McMurran, 2012) and social care (e.g. Melpignano & 
Collins, 2003). They have also been used to develop diagnostic instruments, such as the 
assessment and screening tool towards the prevention of mother-to-child HIV 
transmission (PMTCT; Adegbehingbe, Paul-Ebhohimhen & Marais, 2006), and the 
empowerment questionnaire for inpatients (EQuIP; Lopez, Orrell, Morgan & Warner, 
2010). 
 
The following sections provide an overview of the participants recruited, and the 
development and progression of the Delphi survey. This will include details pertaining 
to the materials administered and the procedure used. The results of each round will also 
be presented. 
                                                        
47
 A procedure that involves a repetition of steps to achieve a desired outcome (Vosmer et al. 2009). 
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7.3 Participants 
 
The expert panel was populated using a purposive sampling technique. This technique 
involves selecting participants based upon their characteristics, and in this instance, 
knowledge and experience. Experts were identified to take part if a review of the 
academic literature identified them as having authored a ‘fair’ impact48 publication on 
psychopathy. Forensic practitioners (HM Prison Service) with experience in the 
assessment of psychopathy were also recruited. Approximately 200 experts overall were 
approached. 
 
In total, 32 experts (16% response rate) participated in round one. Twenty-three were 
recruited from the United Kingdom, seven from North America, one from Canada, and 
one from Australia. Fifty six percent of the experts reported clinical experience in the 
assessment of psychopathy. Thirteen percent had published at least one-peer reviewed 
paper on the topic, and 31% had previously done both, i.e. published a paper and 
assessed for the construct. 
 
7.4 Round one of the Delphi survey 
 
Round one provided the experts with a list of items that could be used to develop an 
expert understanding of the construct and be employed in the new self-report measure 
of psychopathy. The experts had to rate these items in terms of the extent to which they 
felt each item best described psychopathy and should be included in the new measure. 
The aim of round one was to gain an agreement on whether each item should or should 
not be included and to also give experts opportunity to suggest further items that may 
have been missed.  
 
7.5 Round one: Development of the Delphi survey 
 
The items used in round one were generated from a systematic literature review 
conducted on the area of psychopathy. The literature was accessed through the 
following online databases: Academic Search Complete; Medline; PsycINFO; and 
                                                        
48
 Articles published in journals with an impact factor greater than .50 were identified as having fair 
impact. An impact factor reflects the average number of citations to articles published in a particular 
journal.  
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PsycARTICLES. The search terms ‘psychopathy’ and ‘psychopathic personality’ were 
used and abstracts (n = 277) belonging to the accessible peer-reviewed articles 
published over the last ten years (i.e. 2001 to 2011) were examined.  
 
From this, 48 articles that were deemed the most relevant were studied in depth. The 
author looked for key findings that could be applied to better understand the construct 
and would be suitable for inclusion in a new self-report. Two hundred and twenty nine 
articles were not examined, as they did not directly study the construct of psychopathy 
or its measurement. Moreover, the author was informed by items/overarching concepts 
from previous research, such as the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 
2003). Table two lists the articles that were examined in full. 
 
Table 2: Articles used to generate the items for round one (n = 48). 
 
Author(s) Year Title 
 
Bagley, Abramowitz 
& Kosson 
 
2009 
 
Vocal affect recognition and psychopathy: 
Converging findings across traditional and cluster 
analytic approaches to assessing the construct 
Benning, Patrick, 
Hicks, Blonigen & 
Krueger 
2003 Factor Structure of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory: Validity and Implications for Clinical 
Assessment 
Berardino, Meloy, 
Sherman & Jacobs 
2005 Validation of the psychopathic personality inventory 
on a female inmate sample 
Blackburn, Logan, 
Donnelly & Renwick 
2008 Identifying psychopathic subtypes: Combining an 
empirical personality classification of offenders with 
The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
Blagov et al. 2011 Personality constellations in incarcerated 
psychopathic men 
Claes et al.  2009 Validation of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
among psychiatric inpatients: Sociodemographic, 
cognitive and personality correlates 
Coid & Min 2008 The distribution of psychopathy among a household 
population: categorical or dimensional? 
Copestake, Gray & 
Snowden 
2011 A comparison of a self-report measure of 
psychopathy with the psychopathy checklist-revised 
in a UK sample of offenders 
Decuyper, De Pauw, 
De Fruyt, De Bolle & 
De Clercq  
2009 A meta-analysis of psychopathy-, antisocial PD- and 
FFM associations 
Derefinko & Lynam 2007 Using the FFM to conceptualize psychopathy: A test 
using a drug abusing sample 
   
  (Continued) 
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Table 2: Continued. 
 
 
Author(s) Year Title 
   
Edens & McDermott 2010 Examining the construct validity of the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory–Revised: Preferential 
correlates of fearless dominance and self-centered 
impulsivity 
Glass & Newman 2006 Recognition of Facial Affect in Psychopathic 
Offenders 
Guy, Edens, Anthony 
& Douglas 
2005 Does Psychopathy Predict Institutional Misconduct 
Among Adults? A Meta-Analytic Investigation 
Habel, Kühn, 
Salloum, Devos & 
Schneider 
2002 Emotional processing in psychopathic personality 
Hansen, Johnsen, 
Thornton, Waage & 
Thayer 
2007 Facets of psychopathy, heart rate variability and 
cognitive function 
Hare & Neumann 2009 Psychopathy: Assessment and forensic implications 
Hare & Neumann 2010 The Role of Antisociality in the Psychopathy 
Construct: Comment on Skeem and Cooke (2010) 
Hicks, Vaidyanathan 
& Patrick 
2010 Validating female psychopathy subtypes: 
Differences in personality, antisocial and violent 
behavior, substance abuse, trauma, and mental health  
Kennealy, Skeem, 
Walters & Camp 
2010 Do Core Interpersonal and Affective Traits of PCL-
R Psychopathy Interact With Antisocial Behavior 
and Disinhibition to Predict Violence? 
Kreis & Cooke 2011 Capturing the Psychopathic Female: A 
Prototypicality Analysis of the Comprehensive 
Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP) 
Across Gender 
Lee & Salekin 2010 Psychopathy in a noninstitutional sample: 
Differences in primary and secondary subtypes 
Lindberg et al. 2009 Psychopathic traits and offender characteristics -- a 
nationwide consecutive sample of homicidal male 
adolescents 
Long & Titone 2007 Psychopathy and verbal emotion processing in non-
incarcerated males 
Lynam et al. 
 
2011b Assessing the Basic Traits Associated With 
Psychopathy: Development and Validation of the 
Elemental Psychopathy Assessment 
Marcus, John & Edens 2004 A Taxometric analysis of psychopathic personality 
Marion & Sellbom 2011 An examination of gender-moderated test bias on the 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
Mayer, Kosson & 
Bedrick 
2006 Neuropsychological implications of selective 
attentional functioning in psychopathic offenders 
   
   
  (Continued) 
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Table 2: Continued. 
   
Author(s) Year Title 
 
Miranda, MacKillop, 
Meyerson, Justus & 
Lovallo 
 
2009 
 
Influence of antisocial and psychopathic traits on 
decision-making biases in alcoholics 
Neumann & Hare 2008 Psychopathic Traits in a Large Community Sample: 
Links to Violence, Alcohol Use, and Intelligence 
Neumann, Hare & 
Newman 
2007 The super-ordinate nature of the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised 
Neumann, Malterer & 
Newman 
2008 Factor structure of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory (PPI): Findings from a large incarcerated 
sample 
Ogloff 2006 Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder 
conundrum 
Patrick, Edens, 
Poythress, Lilienfeld 
& Benning 
2006 Construct validity of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory two-factor model with offenders 
Pereira, Huband & 
Duggan 
2008 Psychopathy and personality. An investigation of the 
relationship between the NEO-Five Factor Inventory 
(NEO-FFI) and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(PCL-R) in a hospitalized sample of male offenders 
with personality disorder 
Ruiz, Pincus & 
Schinka 
2008 Externalizing pathology and the five-factor model: A 
meta-analysis of personality traits associated with 
antisocial personality disorder, substance misuse, 
and their co-occurrence 
Sadeh & Verona 2008 Psychopathic personality traits associated with 
abnormal selective attention and impaired cognitive 
control 
Sadeh, Verona, 
Javdani & Olson 
2009 Examining psychopathic tendencies in adolescence 
from the perspective of personality theory 
Seibert, Miller, Few, 
Zeicher & Lynam 
 
 
2011 An examination of the structure of self-report 
psychopathy measures and their relations with 
general traits and externalising behaviours 
Skeem, Mulvey & 
Grisso 
2003 Applicability of traditional and revised models of 
psychopathy to the Psychopathy Checklist: 
Screening Version 
Smith, Edens & 
Vaughn,  
2011 Assessing the external correlates of alternative factor 
models of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-
Short Form across three samples 
Verona, Patrick & 
Joiner 
2001 Psychopathy, antisocial personality and suicide risk 
Verschuere, Crombez, 
De Clercq & Koster 
2005 Psychopathic traits and autonomic responding to 
concealed information in a prison sample 
Viding 2004 Annotation: Understanding the development of 
psychopathy 
   
  (Continued) 
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Table 2: Continued. 
   
Author(s) Year Title 
   
Walsh, Allen & 
Kosson 
2007 Beyond social deviance: Substance use disorders and 
the dimensions of psychopathy 
Walters, Brinkley, 
Magaletta & Diamond 
2008 Taxometric Analysis of the Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale 
Warren & Clarbour 2009 Relationship between psychopathy and indirect 
aggression use in a noncriminal population 
Wilson, Miller, 
Zeichner, Lynam & 
Widiger 
2011 An examination of the Validity of the Elemental 
Psychopathy Assessment: Relations with Other 
Psychopathy Measures, Aggression, and 
Externalising Behaviours 
Wogan & Mackenzie 2007 An inmate classification system based on PCL: SV 
factor scores in a sample of prison inmates 
 
 
Fifty-eight items were developed from the literature review via thematic analysis
49
. 
These are presented in Table three. All of the items were categorised into one of seven 
over-arching themes: Defining the Construct; Interpersonal Features; Behavioural 
Characteristics; Cognition; Affect; Developmental Factors; and associated Health 
Factors.  
 
In round one, experts had to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each 
item via a five-point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
Experts were also given the opportunity to suggest anything they felt was missing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
49
 An explanation of the stages involved in thematic analysis can be found on p. 134. 
 135 
Table 3: Items included in round one. 
 
Items 
Defining the Construct 
1. Psychopathy is underpinned by an interpersonal component (selfish, callousness, and remorseless use of others). 
2. Psychopathy is underpinned by a socially deviant behavioural component (a chronically unstable, and antisocial lifestyle). 
3. Offending behaviour is a correlate, rather than a component of psychopathy. 
    Psychopathy is defined through a series of abnormal personality traits: 
4. Glibness/superficial charm 
5. Grandiose sense of self-worth 
6. Pathological lying 
7. Conning/manipulative 
8. Lack of remorse or guilt 
9. Shallow affect 
10. Callous/lack of empathy 
11. Failure to accept responsibility for actions 
12. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom 
13. Parasitic lifestyle 
14. Poor behavioural controls 
15. Early behavioural problems 
16. Lack of realistic, long-term goals 
17. Impulsivity 
18. Irresponsibility 
19. Juvenile delinquency 
20. Revocation of conditional release 
21. Promiscuous sexual behaviour. 
22. Psychopaths have a propensity to engage in thrill and adventure seeking behaviour. 
23. Psychopathy is best viewed as a personality disorder. 
(Continued) 
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Table 3: Continued. 
 
Items 
24. Psychopathy is manifested at an early age, but remains stable over the course of an individual’s life. 
25. Psychopathy is a dynamic construct, i.e. an individual’s level of psychopathy can increase or decrease over their life. 
Interpersonal Features 
26. Psychopaths have difficulties in forming and maintaining personal bonds. 
27. Psychopaths perceive others as ‘objects’ rather than people. 
Behavioural Characteristics 
28. Psychopaths do not respond to punishment. 
29. Psychopaths are represented by high rates of recidivism. 
30. Psychopaths are often criminally versatile. 
31. Psychopaths are poorly integrated. 
Cognition 
32. Psychopaths do not attend to information that is not central to an event, i.e. they ignore peripheral information. 
33. Psychopaths have biased judgments of causality. 
34. Psychopaths have an organised pattern of thought that is distorted. 
35. Psychopaths often interpret everyday social situations as aggressive or hostile. 
36. Psychopaths have difficulties with abstract concepts. 
37. Psychopaths have a lack of insight. 
38. Psychopaths are able to accurately evaluate and use emotive language when explicitly directed to do so. 
39. Psychopaths are unable to inhibit their responses to avoid punishment. 
Affect 
40. Psychopaths are less influenced by emotion, e.g. emotional words, in comparison to non-psychopaths. 
41. Psychopaths are unable to recognise and understand emotion and therefore do not modify their behaviour accordingly. 
42. Psychopaths are less sensitive to experiencing emotion because they are trying to avoid experiencing negative emotion. 
43. Psychopaths display low fearfulness. 
Developmental Factors 
44. Psychopathy results from problems in attachment that occurs during infancy. 
  (Continued) 
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Table 3: Continued. 
 
Items 
45. Attachment problems that have occurred between a child and their caregiver(s) are unlikely to lead to psychopathy. 
46. Psychopaths often experience damage to their personality during childhood. 
47. Psychopaths have a harsh and rejecting childhood. 
      As a child, a psychopath will have been exposed to: 
48. Poor parenting, such as emotional abuse 
49. Physical and/or sexual abuse 
50. Caregiver conflict 
51. Caregiver separation 
52. A large family size, e.g. three or more children. 
Associated Health Factors 
53. High levels of psychopathy often occur along with an Axis I disorder, i.e. mental illness. 
54. Psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths to exaggerate Axis I (mental illness) symptoms, or malinger. 
55. Psychopaths regularly use illicit substances 
56. Psychopaths exhibit more alcohol and drug-dependence symptoms than non-psychopaths. 
57. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges. 
58. Psychopaths with a substance misuse problem often have a co-occurring mental illness. 
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7.6 Round one: Procedure 
 
Ethical issues 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology, University of Central 
Lancashire. Prior to taking part, participants were sent an invitation via email. The 
email contained an information sheet, providing experts with details relating to the aims 
of the research, consent, withdrawal, confidentiality, anonymity and what would be 
required of them. The research team’s contact details were also provided.  
 
Participants gave consent by ticking a box prior to completing the survey. All 
participants were sent a debrief sheet once they had completed all three rounds, or upon 
withdrawal
50
. 
 
Administration 
 
All three rounds were administered online using Survey Monkey
51
. Round one was split 
into seven sections, with each section representing one of the seven themes identified 
from the literature review. At the beginning of each section, participants were provided 
with the following instructions: “Using the rating scale provided please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. Please only select one 
response for each statement unless otherwise instructed to do so”. Figure two displays 
how each item included in round one was presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A screenshot of the item layout used in round one. 
                                                        
50
 Appendix three provides copies of the materials used in study one. 
51
 Survey Monkey is an online organisation that allows its users to create their own web-based 
questionnaires and surveys. 
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At the start of round one, experts were reminded that the survey was only interested in 
the clinical construct of psychopathy, not the legal definition
52
. Participants were given 
four weeks to return round one. They were sent a reminder one week prior to the 
submission deadline.   
 
Approach to analysis 
 
Participants’ data from round one was analysed by calculating the average percentage 
agreement and disagreement for each item. In line with recommendations (e.g. Vosmer 
et al. 2009; Kingston et al. 2011), a consensus of 80% was set across all three rounds to 
ensure that a high level of agreement was achieved. The items in round one, which 
achieved an agreement of 80% or greater (i.e. ≥80%) reached the required consensus to 
be included in round two.  
 
A thematic analysis was also conducted on the comments and suggestions made by the 
experts to examine themes emerging from these. Thematic analysis is a qualitative 
method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within the data (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that thematic analysis involves six stages:  
 
 Stage one focuses on becoming familiar with the data 
 Stage two involves the initial coding of the data 
 Stage three entails searching for the themes 
 Stage four involves reviewing the themes 
 Stage five involves defining and labeling the themes 
 Stage six entails writing the report 
 
All of the stages are not fully distinct from one another and the researcher is allowed to 
go back and forth over the stages to improve the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
                                                        
52
 Experts were encouraged to view psychopathy as ‘abnormal personality’ rather than a behavioural 
construct used to describe individuals who inherently commit antisocial behaviour due to personal 
deficiencies.  
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7.7 Round one: Results 
 
The average percentage agreement and disagreement for each item can be seen in Table 
four. The average percentage agreement was calculated by adding the percentage of 
experts who indicated on the likert-type scale that they ‘agreed’ with the item to the 
percentage of experts who indicated that they ‘strongly agreed’ with the same item. For 
example, in round one 50% of the experts indicated that they ‘agreed’ with item two. 
Nineteen percent stated that they ‘strongly agreed’ with item two. Thus, adding these 
two percentages together suggested that item two, “psychopathy is underpinned by a 
socially deviant behavioural component”, had an average percentage agreement of 
69%
53
.  The average percentage disagreement was calculated in a similar manner, 
namely the percentage of experts who stated that they ‘disagreed’ with the item was 
added to the percentage of experts who ‘strongly disagreed’ with that particular item.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
53
 The average percentage agreement and disagreement for each item may not always total 100%, as the 
experts were also able to rate each item with the option of ‘neither agree or disagree’. For example, if 
96% of experts agreed with an item and 4% neither agreed nor disagreed, the average percentage 
agreement for this item would be 96%. 
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Table 4: The average percentage agreement and disagreement for all items in round one (n = 32). Values in bold type reached the required consensus 
level of 80%. 
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement Disagreement 
Defining the Construct   
1. Psychopathy is underpinned by an interpersonal component (selfish, callousness, and remorseless use of others). 100 0.0 
2. Psychopathy is underpinned by a socially deviant behavioural component (a chronically unstable, and antisocial 
lifestyle). 
68.6 21.9 
3. Offending behaviour is a correlate, rather than a component of psychopathy. 71.9 18.8 
4. Glibness/superficial charm*. 84.4 9.4 
5. Grandiose sense of self-worth*. 90.6 6.2 
6. Pathological lying*. 90.7 6.2 
7. Conning/manipulative*. 93.8 6.2 
8. Lack of remorse or guilt*. 93.8 6.2 
9. Shallow affect*. 87.5 9.4 
10. Callous/lack of empathy*. 93.8 6.2 
11. Failure to accept responsibility for actions*. 87.6 6.2 
12. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom*. 81.3 6.2 
13. Parasitic lifestyle*. 81.3 6.2 
14. Poor behavioural controls*. 56.3 15.6 
15. Early behavioural problems*. 59.4 21.9 
16. Lack of realistic, long-term goals*. 64.5 12.9 
17. Impulsivity*. 71.9 9.4 
18. Irresponsibility*. 71.9 12.5 
19. Juvenile delinquency*. 40.7 34.4 
20. Revocation of conditional release*. 34.4 37.5 
21. Promiscuous sexual behaviour*. 53.2 21.9 
  (Continued) 
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Table 4: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement Disagreement 
22.  Psychopaths have a propensity to engage in thrill and adventure seeking behaviour. 84.4 9.4 
23. Psychopathy is best viewed as a personality disorder. 81.2 9.4 
24. Psychopathy is manifested at an early age, but remains stable over the course of an individual’s life. 62.5 25.0 
25. Psychopathy is a dynamic construct, i.e. an individual’s level of psychopathy can increase or decrease over their 
life. 
56.3 15.6 
Interpersonal Features   
26. Psychopaths have difficulties in forming and maintaining personal bonds. 84.4 9.4 
27. Psychopaths perceive others as ‘objects’ rather than people. 71.9 12.5 
Behavioural Characteristics    
28. Psychopaths do not respond to punishment. 28.2 43.7 
29. Psychopaths are represented by high rates of recidivism. 81.3 3.1 
30. Psychopaths are often criminally versatile*. 75.0 0.0 
31. Psychopaths are poorly integrated. 28.2 21.9 
Cognition   
32. Psychopaths do not attend to information that is not central to an event, i.e. they ignore peripheral information. 31.3 28.1 
33. Psychopaths have biased judgments of causality. 50.0 12.5 
34. Psychopaths have an organised pattern of thought that is distorted. 59.4 12.5 
35. Psychopaths often interpret everyday social situations as aggressive or hostile. 50.0 25.0 
36. Psychopaths have difficulties with abstract concepts. 25.0 34.4 
37. Psychopaths have a lack of insight. 56.3 21.9 
38. Psychopaths are able to accurately evaluate and use emotive language when explicitly directed to do so. 59.4 25.1 
39. Psychopaths are unable to inhibit their responses to avoid punishment. 25.0 50.0 
Affect   
40. Psychopaths are less influenced by emotion, e.g. emotional words, in comparison to non-psychopaths. 93.7 6.2 
  (Continued) 
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Table 4: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement Disagreement 
41. Psychopaths are unable to recognise and understand emotion and therefore do not modify their behaviour 
accordingly. 
46.9 37.5 
42. Psychopaths are less sensitive to experiencing emotion because they are trying to avoid experiencing negative 
emotion. 
28.2 15.6 
43. Psychopaths display low fearfulness. 71.9 15.6 
Developmental Factors   
44. Psychopathy results from problems in attachment that occurs during infancy. 34.4 21.9 
45. Attachment problems that have occurred between a child and their caregiver(s) are unlikely to lead to 
psychopathy. 
25.0 37.6 
46. Psychopaths often experience damage to their personality during childhood. 56.3 18.8 
47. Psychopaths have a harsh and rejecting childhood. 34.4 12.5 
48. Poor parenting, such as emotional abuse. 62.6 6.3 
49. Physical and/or sexual abuse. 46.9 9.4 
50. Caregiver conflict. 43.8 9.4 
51. Caregiver separation. 48.4 3.2 
52. A large family size, e.g. three or more children. 9.3 28.2 
Associated Health Factors   
53. High levels of psychopathy often occur along with an Axis I disorder, i.e. mental illness. 31.3 40.7 
54. Psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths to exaggerate Axis I (mental illness) symptoms, or malinger. 37.5 34.4 
55. Psychopaths regularly use illicit substances. 75.0 15.6 
56. Psychopaths exhibit more alcohol and drug-dependence symptoms than non-psychopaths. 34.4 31.2 
57. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges. 78.1 6.3 
58. Psychopaths with a substance misuse problem often have a co-occurring mental illness. 31.2 18.8 
Note. Items marked with an * are items taken from the PCL-R   
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Table four indicates that of the 58 items included, 16 reached a consensus of ≥80% with 
experts indicating that they agreed/strongly agreed that these items are important and 
should be included in the next round. Forty-two items did not reach the consensus but 
were included in round two as the author decided to give the experts another 
opportunity to rate them in light of their previous response and also since it was 
apparent that experts were presenting the PCL-R items exclusively. This decision was 
made as it was felt that the consensus cut-off of 80% might have been too high for this 
reason. 
 
For example, almost all of the items taken from the PCL-R reached the required 
consensus cut-off for inclusion in round two, with the exception of ‘poor behavioural 
controls’, ‘impulsivity’, ‘juvenile delinquency’, ‘revocation of conditional release’, 
‘promiscuous sexual behaviour’, and ‘psychopaths are often criminally versatile’. This 
issue will be discussed later. Items relating to the interpersonal features of psychopathy 
(e.g. psychopaths have difficulties in forming and maintaining personal bonds) also 
appeared to meet, or were close to meeting the cut-off (i.e. 71.9%). However, the items 
tapping into behavioural characteristics, cognition, affect, developmental factors and the 
associated health factors of psychopathy appeared to lack expert agreement.  
 
Thematic analysis 
A thematic analysis was conducted on the experts’ comments and suggestions. Experts’ 
comments and suggestions were grouped into twelve themes, as follows
54
: Stability of 
the Construct (6.3%); Negative Personality Characteristics (21.9%); Aggression 
(15.6%); Fear and Anxiety (18.8%); Reasoning Ability and Decision Making (13%); 
Emotional Processing (9.4%); Relationships with Others (18.8%); Substances and Risk-
Taking Behaviour (9.4%); Schemas (9.4%); Experience of Emotion (9.4%); Poor 
Parenting (13%); and Gene/Environment Interaction (6.3%). 
 
During analysis, connections between these themes were noted. The themes that shared 
a common link were categorised into super-ordinate themes. Table five provides an 
overview of the themes identified along with some illustrating comments. 
 
                                                        
54
 The percentages in parentheses correspond to the percentage of experts who made suggestions that fell 
into a particular theme. 
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Table 5: The themes identified during the thematic analysis along with examples of 
experts' suggestions and comments to illustrate (nb. Percentages in parenthesis relate 
to the percentage of experts who made suggestions that fell into a particular theme). 
Super-
Ordinate 
Theme (%) Suggestion/Comment 
Defining the 
Construct 
Stability of the 
Construct (6.3) 
“Offenders with psychopathy can be 
treated and therefore their characteristics 
can be moderated over time”. 
 
 Negative Personality 
Characteristics (21.9) 
“Suspicious, selfish, and hostile”. 
“Sadistic personality traits”. 
 
Behavioural 
Characteristics 
 
Aggression (15.6) 
 
“Reactive vs. instrumental aggression 
components”. 
“Psychopathic individuals experience a 
cold, hard vengeful anger, which is often 
misinterpreted as instrumental 
aggression”. 
 
 Substances  and Risk-
Taking Behaviour 
(9.4) 
“Psychopaths use substances at a high 
rate and engage in risky sexual 
behaviour”. 
 
Cognition 
 
Reasoning Ability and 
Decision Making (13) 
 
 
“Rigidity of thought processes”. 
 “They discount other people in their 
decision-making”. 
 Schemas (9.4) “Need to describe specific schemata that 
are common among psychopaths”. 
 
Affect Fear and Anxiety 
(18.8) 
“They are relatively fearless in the 
context of threat”. 
“They have a lack of fear or anxiety”. 
“People often misinterpret the fear 
response of psychopaths”. 
 
 Emotional Processing 
(9.4) 
“Psychopaths have difficulties processing 
emotion”. 
“People with psychopathic traits may not 
recognise or understand emotions others 
are experiencing”. 
 
 Experience of 
Emotion (9.4) 
“Many psychopaths can intellectually 
describe emotions without having any 
real sense of what they feel like”. 
“Psychopaths feel high levels of certain 
kinds of affect (anger, irritation) but 
lower levels of others (joy, sadness, 
anxiety). 
  (Continued) 
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Inter-rater reliability of themes 
 
A co-rater was asked to place the comments and suggestions made by the experts in 
round one into themes so that inter-rater reliability could be calculated
55
. All of the 
comments and suggestions made by the experts were considered. Table six displays the 
number of suggestions and comments placed into themes by the author and co-rater, 
identifying where agreement was present or absent. 
 
Table 6: Inter-rater reliability for the comments and suggestions made in round one. 
  Co-Rater 
  Present Absent 
Author Present 37 13 
 Absent 13 0 
  
The two raters placed 74% of the experts’ comments and suggestions into the same 
themes. However given that percentage values do not take into consideration any 
agreements that may have occurred by chance, Cohen’s Kappa was also calculated. The 
inter-rater reliability for the raters was found to show fair agreement (Landis & Koch, 
1977); Kappa = .26, p< .05. 
                                                        
55
 The co-rater was a postgraduate with training in the understanding and assessment of psychopathy. 
Table 5: Continued. 
 
Super-
Ordinate 
Theme Suggestion/Comment 
Developmental 
Factors 
Relationships with 
Others (18.8) 
“Disrupted peer relations”. 
“They can form relationships and attach 
to others”. 
 
 Poor Parenting (13) “Inconsistent care/lack of punishment”. 
“Psychopaths have typically been 
exposed to parental antipathy, i.e. feeling 
hated”. 
 
 Gene/Environment 
Interaction (6.3) 
“There is a large genetic influence and 
much of the developmental factors are 
really either expressions of parental 
psychopathy or reactions to the difficulty 
of rearing a psychopathic child”. 
“Tough urban environment”. 
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7.8 Round two of the Delphi survey 
 
Round two was conducted to allow experts to rate the items in light of the group 
response. Round two was also aimed to attain an agreement on the suggestions and 
comments made by the experts in the previous round.  
 
7.9 Round two: Participants 
 
Thirty experts completed round two (n = 30). A 94% response rate was obtained. A 
debrief sheet was emailed to the two experts who withdrew from round two. 
 
7.10 Round two: Materials 
 
Round two consisted of 96 items. The increase in item number was due to 38 additional 
suggestions made by the experts. The items were again categorised into the seven 
themes used in round one. However, in this round each theme was split into three 
subsections: Section one consisted of those items that reached the required consensus in 
the first round for that particular theme; section two comprised those items that did not 
reach a consensus; and section three consisted of additional items proposed by the 
experts. All experts were again given the opportunity to make suggestions. 
 
Section one 
 
For those items in section one, the average percentage agreement and disagreement was 
fed back to the experts
56
. This information was provided to encourage the experts to 
reach more of a consensus on each item. The experts had to respond to each item using 
a five-point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56
 Appendix three contains a copy of the Delphi survey. This provides details of the feedback given to 
participants at each round. 
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Section two 
 
In terms of section two (i.e. those items that did not reach an agreement), experts had to 
state either ‘yes’ they felt that an item should be included, or ‘no’ that it should be 
discarded from the survey.  
 
Section three 
 
As this section consisted of the new items suggested by the experts, experts had to rate, 
for the first time, the extent to which they felt that each item should be included in the 
next round. This was completed using a five-point likert scale ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).   
 
7.11 Round two: Procedure 
 
Experts received an email containing a link to round two. All participants were given a 
three-week deadline to return the survey. A reminder was sent one week prior to this. 
The inclusion/exclusion criteria used for round two was identical to that used the 
previous round, e.g. items has to achieve an agreement of 80% or greater (i.e. ≥80%) to 
be included in the next round. 
 
Round two was analysed using the same method adopted for round one. The average 
percentage agreement and disagreement was calculated for each item and a thematic 
analysis was conducted on the suggestions and comments made. 
 
7.12 Round two: Results 
 
The average percentage agreement and disagreement for each item in round two was 
calculated
57
. In terms of section two, the percentage agreement was determined from the 
percentage of experts who responded ‘yes’ to an item. The percentage disagreement was 
calculated from the percentage of experts who answered ‘no’ to an item. Table seven 
displays the percentages for each item. 
                                                        
57
 The average percentage agreement and disagreement for each item in section one and three may not 
always total 100%, as the experts were able to rate these items with the option of ‘neither agree or 
disagree’. For example, if 98% of experts agreed with an item and 2% neither agreed nor disagreed, the 
average percentage agreement for this item would be 98%. 
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Table 7: The average percentage agreement and disagreement for all items in sections one and three, and average percentage inclusion and exclusion 
for items in section two. Values in bold type reached the required consensus level of 80% in round two of the Delphi survey (n = 30). 
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
Defining the Construct   
Section 1: Items that achieved agreement in the previous Round   
1. Psychopathy is underpinned by an interpersonal component (selfish, callousness, and remorseless use of 
others). 
96.6 0.0 
2. Glibness/superficial charm*. 93.4 3.3 
3. Grandiose sense of self-worth*. 96.7 0.0 
4. Pathological lying*. 86.7 0.0 
5. Conning/manipulative*. 100 0.0 
6. Lack of remorse or guilt*. 100 0.0 
7. Shallow affect*. 96.7 3.3 
8. Callous/lack of empathy*. 100 0.0 
9. Failure to accept responsibility for actions*. 93.4 0.0 
10. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom*. 83.3 0.0 
11. Parasitic lifestyle*. 83.4 0.0 
12. Psychopaths have a propensity to engage in thrill and adventure seeking behaviour. 86.6 0.0 
13. Psychopathy is best viewed as a personality disorder. 90.0 0.0 
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
14. Psychopathy is underpinned by a socially deviant behavioural component. 53.3 46.7 
15. Offending behaviour is a correlate, rather than a component of psychopathy. 86.7 13.3 
16. Poor behavioural controls*. 76.7 23.3 
17. Early behavioural problems*. 76.7 23.3 
18. Lack of realistic, long-term goals*. 73.3 26.7 
19. Impulsivity*. 82.8 17.2 
  (Continued) 
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Table 7: Continued. 
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
20. Irresponsibility*. 90.0 10.0 
21. Juvenile delinquency*. 53.3 46.7 
22. Revocation of conditional release*. 36.7 63.3 
23. Promiscuous sexual behaviour*. 53.3 46.7 
24. Psychopathy is manifested at an early age, but remains stable over the course of an individual’s life. 73.3 26.7 
25. Psychopathy is a dynamic construct, i.e. an individual’s level of psychopathy can increase or decrease 
over their life. 
69.0 31.0 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
26. Psychopathic individuals experience a cold, hard vengeful anger, which is often misinterpreted as 
instrumental (planned) aggression. 
40.0 16.7 
27. Psychopaths can have both stable and dynamic features. 96.6 0.0 
28. Psychopaths have a coping response to threat. 66.7 3.3 
29. The need to dominate the social environment. 76.7 10.0 
30. Sadistic personality traits. 30.0 26.7 
31. Use of violence when not threatened. 53.3 10.0 
32. Cruelty to others. 80.0 3.3 
33. Resilient to stress/anxiety. 36.7 36.7 
34. Relative fearlessness in the context of threat. 73.4 10.0 
Interpersonal Features   
Section 1: Items that achieved agreement in the previous Round   
35. Psychopaths have difficulties in forming and maintaining bonds. 100 0.0 
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
36. Psychopaths perceive others as ‘objects’ rather than people. 80.0 20.0 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
37. Interpersonal factors appear to be particularly important in the domain of female psychopathy. 36.7 6.7 
  (Continued) 
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Table 7: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
38. Psychopaths feel superior to others, i.e. they view others as weak. 90.0 3.3 
39. Psychopaths are unsentimental. 80.0 3.3 
40. Psychopaths view others instrumentally. 96.7 3.3 
41. Psychopaths are frightened of intimacy and closeness as they associate this with harm. 30.0 43.3 
42. Their charm and positive attitude can leave others feeling motivated and enthused. 60.0 10.0 
43. Psychopaths manipulate others for their own needs. 96.7 0.0 
44. Psychopaths are over-optimistic about the future. 66.7 10.0 
Behavioural characteristics   
Section 1: Items that achieved agreement in the previous Round   
45. Psychopaths are represented by high rates of recidivism. 86.7 0.0 
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
46. Psychopaths do not respond to punishment. 60.0 40.0 
47. Psychopaths are often criminally versatile*. 80.0 20.0 
48. Psychopaths do not fit in well with others. 46.7 53.3 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
49. Not all psychopaths express their symptoms through criminal behaviour. 90.0 3.3 
50. In the community individuals with psychopathy often channel their psychopathic traits into an 
environment that supports them, i.e. their work environment. 
80.0 6.6 
51. Psychopaths frequently use violence/aggression. 66.6 3.3 
52. Psychopaths are generally more likely to engage in instrumental aggression than reactive aggression. 23.3 33.3 
Cognition   
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
53. Psychopaths do not attend to information that is not central to an event, i.e. they ignore peripheral 
information. 
60.0 40.0 
54. Psychopaths have biased judgments of causality. 63.3 36.7 
  (Continued) 
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Table 7: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
55. Psychopaths have an organised pattern of thought that is distorted. 69.0 31.0 
56. Psychopaths interpret everyday social situations as aggressive or hostile. 66.7 33.3 
57. Psychopaths have difficulties with abstract concepts. 70.0 30.0 
58. Psychopaths have a lack of insight. 73.3 26.7 
59. Psychopaths are able to accurately evaluate and use emotive language when explicitly directed to. 60.0 40.0 
60. Psychopaths are unable to inhibit their responses to avoid punishment. 55.2 44.8 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
61. Psychopaths think of themselves rather than others. 96.7 0.0 
62. Psychopaths are rigid in thought. 50.0 10.0 
63. Psychopaths are primed to interpret threatening stimuli more. 40.0 16.6 
64. Psychopaths possess maladaptive cognitive schemas. 70.0 3.3 
65. Psychopaths possess adaptive cognitive schemas. 37.9 20.7 
Affect   
Section 1: Items that achieved agreement in the previous Round   
66. Psychopaths are less influenced by emotion, e.g. emotional words, in comparison to non-psychopaths. 96.7 3.3 
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
67. Psychopaths are unable to recognise and understand emotion and therefore do not modify their 
behaviour accordingly. 
55.2 44.8 
68. Psychopaths are less sensitive to experiencing emotion because they are trying to avoid experiencing 
negative emotion. 
36.7 63.3 
69. Psychopaths display low fearfulness. 73.3 26.7 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
70. Psychopaths have an impaired emotional learning. 83.3 6.7 
71. Psychopaths have a different internal experience of emotion. 76.6 3.3 
72. Psychopaths dissociate from their affect or emotion. 43.3 20.0 
  (Continued) 
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Table 7: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
73. Psychopaths are shame averse. 46.6 23.3 
74. Psychopaths experience high levels of certain kinds of affect, i.e. anger and irritation.  70.0 3.3 
75. Psychopaths experience low levels of certain kinds of affect, i.e. joy, sadness, and anxiety. 70.0 6.7 
Developmental factors   
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
76. Psychopathy results from problems in attachments that occur during childhood. 63.3 36.7 
77. Psychopaths often experience damage to their personality during childhood. 73.3 26.7 
78. Psychopaths have a harsh and rejecting childhood. 56.7 43.3 
79. Poor parenting, such as emotional abuse. 73.3 26.7 
80. Physical and/or sexual abuse. 63.3 36.7 
81. Caregiver conflict. 60.0 40.0 
82. Caregiver separation. 60.0 40.0 
83. A large family size, e.g. three or more children. 20.0 80.0 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
84. Psychopaths are more likely to have caregivers with psychopathic traits. 56.7 23.3 
85. As a child, a psychopath will have typically been exposed to parental antipathy, i.e. feeling hated by 
their caregiver(s). 
46.7 6.7 
86. A lack of peer support. 30.0 40.0 
87. Inconsistent parental/caregiver discipline. 66.7 3.3 
88. Poor parental/caregiver role modeling. 76.6 0.0 
89. Antisocial or delinquent caregivers. 62.1 6.9 
Associated health factors   
Section 2: Items that did not achieve agreement in the previous Round   
90. High levels of psychopathy often occur along with an Axis I disorder, i.e. mental illness. 33.3 66.7 
91. Psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths to exaggerate Axis I symptoms, or malinger. 56.7 43.3 
  (Continued) 
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Note. Items marked with an * are items taken from the PCL-R 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Agreement/Inclusion Disagreement/Exclusion 
92. Psychopaths regularly use illicit substances. 76.7 23.3 
93. Psychopaths exhibit more alcohol and drug-dependence symptoms than non-psychopaths. 40.0 60.0 
94. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges, e.g. challenges 
relating to impulsivity and irresponsibility. 
53.3 46.7 
95. Psychopaths with a substance misuse problem often have a co-occurring mental illness. 33.3 66.7 
Section 3: Additional Items suggested by the Experts   
96. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges relating to 
callousness and manipulativeness. 
13.3 6.6 
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Table seven indicates that one item (i.e. item 83, psychopaths are associated with a large 
family size, e.g. three or more children) reached the required consensus to be discarded. 
Of the 96 items included, 30 items reached an agreement of ≥80% and were therefore 
included in round three under the heading of ‘Agreement’. The remaining 65 items did 
not reach the required cut-off but were still included in round three under the heading of 
‘No agreement’. This decision was made as some items were close to reaching the 
required consensus level and it would serve as a final check against discarding them in 
error. Table seven shows that approximately one-third of the items were close to 
achieving a consensus, with 39 of the items reaching an average percentage agreement 
or disagreement that fell between 60 and 79%. 
 
Defining the construct, Interpersonal Features, and Behavioural Characteristics all had a 
number of items that achieved a consensus level of ≥80%. The items belonging to the 
themes Cognition, Affect, Developmental Factors, and associated Health Factors again, 
all appeared to be lacking in agreement. As for the previous round, the items associated 
with the PCL-R achieved the greatest level of expert agreement. 
 
Thematic analysis 
 
The suggestions and comments made by the experts in round two were also analysed 
using thematic analysis. There were fewer suggestions made in this round as many of 
the experts’ suggestions had already been incorporated following the completion of 
round one. Nevertheless, two themes were identified
58: 1). ‘Fear and Anxiety’ (13.3%); 
and 2). ‘Views relating to themselves and others’ (6.7%). These themes were 
categorised into super-ordinate themes. Table eight provides an overview of the themes 
identified during the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
58
 The percentage in parentheses corresponds to the percentage of experts who made suggestions that fell 
into that particular theme. 
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Table 8: The themes identified during the thematic analysis along with examples of 
experts' suggestions and comments to illustrate (nb. Percentages in parenthesis relate 
to the percentage of experts who made suggestions that fell into that particular theme). 
 
Super-
Ordinate 
Themes Suggestion/Comment 
Affect Fear and Anxiety 
(13.3) 
“Low anxiousness. Hare originally included this and 
Newman always requires it”. 
   
Cognition Views relating to 
Themselves and 
Others (6.7) 
“Absolute certainty that their actions are justified”. 
“Unconcerned about the opinions of others”. 
 
Inter-rater reliability was again calculated as conducted earlier. Full agreement was  
obtained. 
 
7.13 Round three of the Delphi survey 
 
The overall aim of round three was to confirm the consensus of each of the items and 
resolve any remaining lack of clarity. Round three also aimed to begin to finalise the 
items to be included in the new self-report measure of psychopathy. The method and 
results for this round are presented next. 
 
7.14 Round three: Participants 
 
Twenty-seven experts completed round three (n = 27). There was therefore a 90% 
response rate. 
 
7.15 Round three: Materials 
 
Round three consisted of 99 items. The number of items increased slightly from round 
two due to three additional items suggested by experts. All items were categorised into 
the seven themes used in rounds one and two. The items in round three were split into 
three separate lists. The first comprised of those items that achieved an agreement in 
round two. The second list contained those items that did not reach a consensus, and the 
third included all of the additional items suggested by the experts. 
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For those items in the first list, i.e. agreed content, the average percentage agreement 
was fed back to the experts. The experts had indicate whether each item should appear 
in the new self-report measure of psychopathy via a five-point likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Experts also had the option of ticking a box 
to indicate that a particular item should not be included. An identical scale was used to 
rate the additional items suggested by the experts. 
 
For those items that did not reach agreement, experts had to indicate for the last time 
whether they thought each item should be included in the measure. They had to state 
either ‘yes’ that the item does need to be included, or ‘no’ to inform the author that the 
item can be discarded. The average percentage agreement was also fed back to the 
experts for these items.  
 
7.16 Round three: Procedure 
 
An email containing a link to round three was sent to the experts. Experts were given 
three weeks to complete and return the survey. A reminder was sent to the participants 
one week prior to the submission deadline. All experts, including the three that did not 
participate in this round, were sent a debrief sheet. 
 
The average percentage agreement and disagreement were calculated for each item. 
This was calculated using the same method adopted in previous rounds. 
 
7.17 Round three: Results 
 
Each item needed to have an average agreement of 80% or higher (i.e. ≥80%) to be 
included in the new self-report measure of psychopathy. Those items that did not 
achieve this, or had an average disagreement that reached 80% were not included.  
 
Predictions: 
 
Experts are expected to restate the PCL definition of psychopathy. 
 
Experts are expected to capture the affective components of psychopathy in their 
understanding of the construct, but not cognition. 
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Table nine shows the average percentage agreement and disagreement for each item 
included in round three. Items are presented in descending order, starting with those 
items that achieved the highest level of expert agreement. 
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Table 9: The average percentage agreement and disagreement for all items included in round three (n = 27). Values in bold type reached an expert 
agreement of 80% or more. 
 
 Percentage (%) 
Items Theme Agreement Disagreement 
1. Psychopathy is underpinned by an interpersonal component (selfish, callousness, and 
remorseless use of others). 
Defining features 100 0.0 
2. Conning/manipulative. Defining features 100 0.0 
3. Lack of remorse or guilt. Defining features 100 0.0 
4. Callous/lack of empathy. Defining features 100 0.0 
5. Psychopaths manipulate others for their own needs. Interpersonal 100 0.0 
6. Psychopaths think of themselves rather than others. Cognition 100 0.0 
7. Irresponsibility. Defining features 96.3 0.0 
8. Psychopaths have difficulties in forming and maintaining personal bonds. Interpersonal 96.3 0.0 
9. Shallow affect.  Defining features 96.3 0.0 
10. Failure to accept responsibility for actions. Defining features 96.3 0.0 
11. Psychopaths view others instrumentally. Interpersonal 96.3 0.0 
12. Psychopaths can have both stable and dynamic features. Defining features 96.2 0.0 
13. Grandiose sense of self-worth. Defining features 96.2 0.0 
14. Psychopaths are less influenced by emotion, e.g. emotional words, in comparison to non-
psychopaths. 
Affect 92.6 0.0 
15. Psychopaths have a propensity to engage in thrill and adventure seeking behaviour. Defining features 92.6 0.0 
16. Glibness/superficial charm. Defining features 92.6 3.7 
17. Psychopaths frequently use violence/aggression. Behavioural 92.6 7.4 
18. Psychopaths display low fearfulness. Affect 92.6 7.4 
19. Pathological lying. Defining features 92.5 0.0 
20. Poor behavioural controls. Defining features 88.9 11.1 
21. Early behavioural problems. Defining features 88.9 11.1 
  (Continued) 
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Table 9: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Theme Agreement Disagreement 
22. Psychopaths perceive others as ‘objects’ rather than people. Interpersonal 88.5 0.0 
23. Psychopaths are often criminally versatile. Behavioural 85.2 0.0 
24. Psychopaths are cruel to others. Defining features 85.2 0.0 
25. Psychopaths are unsentimental. Interpersonal 85.2 0.0 
26. Not all psychopaths express their symptoms through criminal behaviour. Behavioural 85.2 3.7 
27. In the community, individuals with psychopathy often channel their psychopathic traits into 
an environment that supports them. 
Behavioural 85.2 3.7 
28. Lack of realistic, long-term goals. Defining features 85.2 14.8 
29. Psychopaths regularly use illicit substances. Health factors 85.2 14.8 
30. Psychopaths have an impaired emotional learning. Affect 84.6 0.0 
31. Psychopaths have a different internal experience of emotion. Affect 84.6 15.4 
32. Poor parental/caregiver role modeling. Developmental 84.6 15.4 
33. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom. Defining features 81.5 0.0 
34. Parasitic lifestyle. Defining features 81.5 0.0 
35. Psychopaths feel superior to others, i.e. they view others as weak. Interpersonal 81.5 0.0 
36. Offending behaviour is a correlate, rather than a component of psychopathy. Defining features 81.5 11.1 
37. Psychopathy is manifested at an early age, but remains stable over the course of an 
individual’s life. 
Defining features 81.5 18.5 
38. Relative fearlessness in the context of threat. Affect 81.5 18.5 
39. A psychopath’s charm and their positive attitude can leave other feeling motivated and 
enthused. 
Interpersonal 81.5 18.5 
40. Psychopaths have biased judgments of causality. Cognition 81.5 18.5 
41. Psychopaths possess maladaptive cognitive schemas. Cognition 81.5 18.5 
42. Psychopaths experience high levels of certain kinds of affect, i.e. anger and irritation. Affect 81.5 18.5 
43. Psychopaths experience high levels of certain kinds of affect, i.e. joy, sadness, and anxiety. Affect 80.8 19.2 
  (Continued) 
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Table 9: Continued.   
   
 Percentage (%) 
Items Theme Agreement Disagreement 
44. Psychopaths are over-optimistic about the future. Interpersonal 77.8 22.2 
45. Psychopaths do not attend to information that is not central to an event, i.e. they ignore 
peripheral information. 
Cognition 77.8 22.2 
46. Psychopaths have a lack of insight. Cognition 77.8 22.2 
47. Psychopathy is best viewed as a personality disorder. Defining features 77.7 0.0 
48. Inconsistent parental/caregiver discipline. Developmental 76.9 23.1 
49. Impulsivity. Defining features 74.1 0.0 
50. Psychopaths have an organised pattern of thought that is distorted. Cognition 74.1 25.9 
51. Psychopathy is a dynamic construct, i.e. an individual’s level of psychopathy can increase or 
decrease over their life. 
Defining features 73.1 26.9 
52. Poor parenting, such as emotional abuse. Developmental 73.1 26.9 
53. Psychopaths are represented by high rates of recidivism. Behavioural 70.4 3.7 
54. Psychopaths are unconcerned about the opinions of others. Cognition 70.4 11.1 
55. Psychopaths have a coping response to threat. Developmental 70.4 29.6 
56. Psychopaths often experience damage to their personality during childhood. Developmental 70.4 29.6 
57. Antisocial or delinquent caregiver(s). Developmental 69.2 30.8 
58. Psychopaths interpret everyday social situations as aggressive or hostile. Cognition 66.7 33.3 
59. Psychopaths do not respond to punishment. Behavioural 66.7 33.3 
60. Psychopaths are able to accurately evaluate and use emotive language when explicitly 
directed to do so. 
Affect 66.7 33.3 
61. The need to dominate the social environment. Defining features 66.7 33.3 
62. Primary psychopaths, i.e. individuals whose psychopathy is genetically based, have low 
levels of anxiousness. 
Affect 66.6 7.1 
63. Physical and/or sexual abuse. Developmental 65.4 34.6 
64. Caregiver conflict. Developmental 61.5 38.5 
   (Continued) 
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Table 9: Continued.    
    
  Percentage (%) 
Items Theme Agreement Disagreement 
65. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges, i.e. 
impulsivity and irresponsibility. 
Health factors 61.5 38.5 
66. Use of violence when not threatened. Defining features 59.3 40.7 
67. Psychopathy is underpinned by socially deviant behavioural component (a chronically 
unstable and antisocial lifestyle). 
Defining features 59.3 40.7 
68. Promiscuous sexual behaviour. Defining features 57.7 42.3 
69. Psychopathy results from problems in attachments that occur during childhood. Developmental 55.6 44.4 
70. Juvenile delinquency. Defining features 51.9 48.1 
71. Psychopaths are unable to inhibit their responses to avoid punishment. Cognition 51.9 48.1 
72. Psychopaths are rigid in thought. Cognition 51.9 48.1 
73. Caregiver separation. Developmental 48.1 51.9 
74. Psychopaths are more likely to have caregivers with psychopathic traits. Developmental 48.1 51.9 
75. Psychopaths are unable to recognise and understand emotion and therefore do not modify 
their behaviour accordingly. 
Affect 48.1 51.9 
76. Psychopaths are sensitive to threat. Affect 44.4 25.9 
77. Psychopaths have a harsh and rejecting childhood. Developmental 44.4 55.6 
78. Psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths to exaggerate Axis I (mental illness) 
symptoms, or malinger. 
Health factors 44.4 55.6 
79. Revocation of conditional release. Defining features 40.7 59.3 
80. As a child, a psychopath will have typically been exposed to parental antipathy, i.e. feeling 
hated by their caregiver(s). 
Developmental 38.5 61.5 
81. Psychopaths are shame averse. Affect 37.0 63.0 
82. Psychopaths dissociate from their affect and emotion. Affect 34.6 65.4 
83. Interpersonal factors appear to be particularly important in female psychopathy. Interpersonal 33.3 66.7 
   (Continued) 
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Table 9: Continued.    
    
  Percentage (%) 
Items Theme Agreement Disagreement 
84. Psychopathic individuals experience a cold, hard vengeful anger, which is often 
misinterpreted as instrumental (planned) aggression. 
Defining features 29.6 70.4 
85. Resilient to stress/anxiety. Defining features 29.6 70.4 
86. A lack of peer support. Developmental 26.9 73.1 
87. Secondary psychopaths, i.e. those individuals whose psychopathy is environmentally based, 
have high levels of anxiousness. 
Affect 25.9 18.5 
88. Sadistic personality traits. Defining features 25.9 74.1 
89. Psychopaths are generally more likely to engage in instrumental (planned) aggression than 
reactive (emotional) aggression. 
Behavioural 25.9 74.1 
90. Psychopaths have difficulties with abstract concepts. Cognition 25.9 74.1 
91. Psychopaths are primed to interpret threatening stimuli more. Cognition 25.9 74.1 
92. Psychopaths possess adaptive cognitive schemas. Cognition 22.2 77.8 
93. Psychopaths exhibit more alcohol and drug-dependence symptoms than non-psychopaths. Health factors 19.2 80.8 
94. Psychopaths with a substance misuse problem often have co-occurring mental illness. Health factors 15.4 84.6 
95. Psychopaths are frightened of intimacy and closeness as they associate this with harm. Interpersonal 14.8 85.2 
96. Psychopaths are less sensitive to experiencing emotion because they are trying to avoid 
experiencing negative emotion. 
Affect 14.8 85.2 
97. Psychopaths do not fit in well with others. Behavioural 14.8 85.2 
98. Psychopaths who use illicit substances are more likely to have personality challenges, i.e. 
callousness and manipulativeness. 
Health factors 11.5 88.5 
99. High levels of psychopathy often occur along with an Axis I disorder, i.e. mental illness. Health factors 0.0 100 
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All of the items with an agreement of 80% or greater (i.e. ≥80%) were retained. Forty-
three items achieved the required cut-off and were included in the new self-report 
measure. These items are marked in bold type in Table nine. The author also decided to 
retain and include two additional items that did not reach the required consensus cut-off 
(i.e. ‘Impulsivity’ and ‘Psychopathy is best viewed as a personality disorder’), as the 
academic literature highlighted them as particularly important (e.g. Blackburn, 2007b; 
Ray, Poythress, Weir & Rickelm, 2009). Their final inclusion/exclusion will be 
determined later in study two. 
 
Items associated with the PCL-R again appeared to achieve the most agreement among 
experts. However, most items
59
 relating to ‘Developmental Factors’ and ‘associated 
Health Factors’, did not reach agreement to be included in the new measure, indicating 
that experts placed little importance on these two themes when understanding and 
assessing the construct. 
 
Round three indicated that experts generally viewed psychopathy as underpinned by 
both interpersonal features and behavioural characteristics. In terms of cognitive and 
affective processing, experts agreed that those with psychopathy have biased judgments 
of causality, possess maladaptive cognitive schemas, display low fearfulness, have both 
an impaired emotional learning and a different internal experience of emotion, and are 
less influenced by emotion. Experts also viewed psychopathic individuals as 
experiencing developmental problems, specifically poor parental/caregiver modeling. 
 
7.18 Developing the new self-report measure of psychopathy 
 
The items that achieved the level of required agreement after round three were 
transformed into items for the new self-report measure of psychopathy. Following the 
recommendations of Bowling (2009) and Rattray and Jones (2007), these items required 
simplifying and transforming into the first person. For example, ‘Psychopaths 
manipulate others for their own needs’ was changed to ‘I will use people to get what I 
want’. Dephi items that contained more than one component were split so that the self-
report did not contain double-baralled questions. For example, ‘Glibness/superficial 
charm’ was separated into ‘I am able to talk myself out of situations by not answering 
                                                        
59
 With the exception of two: 1). ‘Psychopaths regularly use illicit substances’; and 2). ‘As a child, a 
psychopath will have experienced poor parental/caregiver role modeling’. 
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questions directly’ and ‘I am described as a ‘charmer’ by those that know me’. The new 
measure contained 54 items in total so that all of the Delphi items were fully captured. 
These are presented in Table ten. 
 
Table 10: Items used in the new self-report measure of psychopathy. 
 
 
Items (actual number in PAPA) 
 
Agreed theme 
I am only interested in myself (1).  Defining Features 
I would describe myself as one of the most confident around 
(3). 
Defining Features 
I often take chances that could be risky to me or others (6). Defining Features 
I often don’t think of the consequences of my actions (7). Defining Features 
As a person, I have always stayed the same (8). Defining Features 
I have been described as a cruel person who does not worry 
about hurting others (9). 
Defining Features 
Others would describe me as an irritable person with problems 
controlling my temper (11). 
Defining Features 
I regularly view others as lazy (14). Defining Features 
I am not that bothered about others (16). Defining Features 
Others complain that I never take the blame for my mistakes 
(20). 
Defining Features 
If others can help me, I expect them to do this without me 
returning the favour (21). 
Defining Features 
I find it impossible to resist temptation (22). Defining Features 
I am able to talk myself out of situations by not answering 
questions directly (30). 
Defining Features 
If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly think of a way out (31). Defining Features 
I am often bored (33). Defining Features 
I see no problem in living off the State/Government (35). Defining Features 
I enjoy doing things that are exciting or new (36). Defining Features 
I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a ‘con artist’ by those 
who know me (46). 
Defining Features 
I always accept responsibility for what I do (47). Defining Features 
I don’t see why others can’t take care of me (48). Defining Features 
I can be unpredictable (49). Defining Features 
I have clear goals for my long-term future (54). Defining Features 
I will use people to get what I want. Interpersonal 
I have a talent at making people feel good about themselves 
(12). 
Interpersonal 
I am described as a ‘charmer’ by those that know me (17). Interpersonal 
I find most people are weak and not worth bothering with (18). Interpersonal 
I tend to keep in touch with those close to me (24). Interpersonal 
I regularly view others as irritating (34). Interpersonal 
I can often find myself viewing others as nothing more than 
‘objects’ (38). 
Interpersonal 
I find it difficult to give emotional and personal support to 
others (43). 
Interpersonal 
  (Continued) 
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Table 10: Continued.  
   
 
Items (actual number in PAPA) 
 
Agreed theme 
I often find myself thinking that I am more important than 
others (45). 
Interpersonal 
Others would describe me as a very intense person who has 
difficulty getting on with others (51). 
Interpersonal 
I have a problem with using alcohol (15). Behavioural 
I often get into trouble more than others (23). Behavioural 
I am able to commit a wide number of behaviours that, if 
caught, would get me into trouble (37). 
Behavioural 
I am an aggressive person in a number of situations (39). Behavioural 
I use illegal drugs more than most people I know (42). Behavioural 
I see a lot of hostility around me (13). Cognition 
I am a creative person who can think of more than one way of 
dealing with problems (27). 
Cognition 
The world is a threatening place, you have to ‘watch your 
back’ (28). 
Cognition 
I tend to think of one solution to a problem and stick to it (41). Cognition 
I often find people behave aggressively or in a hostile manner 
towards me (50). 
Cognition 
I do not feel guilty when I cause others to feel pain or hurt (2). Affect 
I often experience strong negative emotions, such as anger, 
sadness, and hatred (5). 
Affect 
I can allow my feelings to interfere with my decisions (10). Affect 
When I feel sad I can quickly make myself happy again (19). Affect 
I find it difficult to comfort others when they are upset (25). Affect 
I would describe myself as someone who is often ‘fearless’ 
when faced with a threat (26).  
Affect 
I often feel in touch with other people’s feelings (29). Affect 
I often experience strong positive emotion, such as happiness 
and joy (32). 
Affect 
I very rarely experience fear (40). Affect 
If I do something wrong I will feel bad about it (44). Affect 
I find it easy to form strong emotional relationships with others 
(52). 
Affect 
As a child I often got into trouble more than others (53). Developmental  
 
When developing a new self-report measure, Bowling (2009), along with Rattray and 
Jones (2007), recognised that the type of question, the language used, and the order of 
items may all promote response bias. Consideration was made when ordering the items, 
in that controversial, negative or emotive items were not placed at the beginning of the 
new measure. Additionally, to reduce acquiescent response bias (i.e. the tendency to 
agree with a statement or respond in the same way to all statements; Rattray & Jones, 
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2007), the author ensured that a mixture of both negatively
60
 and positively worded 
items
61
 were included. Ten items were reversed (i.e. item numbers 10, 19, 24, 27, 29, 
32, 44, 47, 52 and 54).  
 
The readability of the new measure was analysed using the Flesch-Kincaid Test. This 
test assigned a reading score of 75.3 out of a possible 100 to the new measure. Higher 
scores indicate greater comprehension. The test suggested that participants require a 
fifth grade level of education (American Educational System) to be able to read and 
understand the new self-report. This equates to ‘Year 6’ (pupils aged between 10 and 11 
years) in the United Kingdom’s Educational System. 
 
The timeframe used for the new self-report measure was ‘in general’, as it was clear 
from the literature and the Delphi survey that psychopathy is not a transient syndrome, 
but instead is persistent and re-occurring. The measure instructed participants to rate the 
extent to which each item described them using a structured response format. This took 
the form of a five-point likert scale ranging from ‘Very unlike me’ (1) to ‘Very like me’ 
(5).  
 
The proposed self-report measure of psychopathy was named the ‘Psychopathic 
Processing and Personality Assessment – version one (PAPA-1)62. The aim was to use 
this measure in the ensuing studies to assess its validity and content. 
 
Specifically, the reliability, construct validity, internal consistency and concurrent 
validity of the PAPA-1 will be determined in the ensuing study, study two, and further 
explored in study three. Cronbach’s alpha will be calculated and the new measure 
correlated with existing measures of psychopathy known to have good psychometric 
properties (i.e. the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale; LSRP). Construct validity 
(i.e. how well the items represent the underlying conceptual structure; Rattray & Jones, 
2007) will also be examined. Content validity (i.e. whether the scale represents the 
concept the measure is intended to assess; Rattray & Jones, 2007) was established 
through the systematic review of the academic literature and the expert Delphi survey.  
                                                        
60
 Item numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 
38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 53. 
61
 Item numbers 3, 8, 12, 17, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40, 44, 47, 52 and 54. 
62
 A copy of PAPA-1 can be found in Appendix four. 
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7.19 Discussion 
 
This study involved a review of the psychopathy literature and an expert Delphi survey. 
It aimed to generate an expert understanding of the construct, with a particular emphasis 
on psychopathic processing (both cognition and affect). The findings of the literature 
review and Delphi survey were used to develop a new self-report measure of 
psychopathy that was in agreement with experts in the field and also captured the core 
personality features of the disorder originally proposed by Cleckley (1982). Thus, the 
new measure aimed to assess abnormal personality over criminal behaviour; focusing 
more on cognition and affect than existing self-report measures of psychopathy, such as 
the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al. 1995) and the 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP-III; Paulhus et al. in press). 
 
Experts agreed that psychopathy could be understood through interpersonal factors, 
behavioural characteristics, deficits in cognition and affect, and developmental factors. 
The theme ‘Associated health factors’ lacked expert consensus and this may reflect the 
notion that ‘health’ and psychopathy are somewhat distinct constructs. That is, health 
factors are arguably dynamic in nature, where as psychopathy is static and experiences 
little change. Thus, health factors may not be considered relevant to psychopathy. 
 
Experts appeared to be influenced by the PCL-R definition of psychopathy and rated 
items relating to this as most important. The prediction that experts would restate the 
PCL definition was therefore supported. This finding is consistent with Skeem and 
Cooke (2010a) who recognised that the theoretical construct and the assessment of 
psychopathy have somewhat become synonymous. It would not be unreasonable to 
suspect that experts rated familiar items more favorably and this would account for the 
high level of agreement on the PCL-R items. Experts sampled in the present study 
appeared to have an understanding of psychopathy that is congruent with the PCL-R. 
 
As noted by Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012), the academic literature has tended to over 
focus on the assessment of psychopathy and the behavioural features of the disorder. 
Whilst the literature has acknowledged the role of affect (e.g. Steuerwald & Kosson, 
2000; Glass & Newman, 2009; Dawel et al. 2012), it has received little attention in 
comparison (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 2001). This also extends to cognitive processing in 
psychopathy, with a significant lack of research in this area (e.g. Blackburn, 2007a; 
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Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012; Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Nevertheless, 
experts rated items examining cognition and affect as important when understanding the 
disorder.  
 
Experts rated items tapping into affect as more important than those associated with 
cognition. Only three items examining cognition reached the required consensus to be 
included in the new self-report measure, whereas seven ‘affect’ items met the criteria. 
As expected, item agreement was lower for both cognition and affect when compared to 
the interpersonal and behavioural features of the disorder.  
 
Thus, partial support was found for the prediction stating that experts were expected to 
capture the affective components of psychopathy in their understanding of the construct, 
but not cognition. Cognitive processing was poorly captured in experts’ understanding 
of the disorder and this may indicate a lack of familiarity with the academic literature in 
this area. 
 
When compared to the interpersonal and behavioural features of the disorder, cognition 
and affect are not well understood (e.g. Flor, 2007) and this is illustrated in the Delphi 
survey. Fewer items associated with cognitive and affective processing reached the 
required consensus level. This finding may be accounted for through the experts 
sampled. A small number of experts took part in the survey, of which over half were 
Forensic Psychologists. Such individuals will have administered the PCL-R as part of 
their roles. This may have biased their responses as the PCL-R lacks items that attend to 
cognition and affect.  
 
However, it is important to note that ten items examining cognition and affect did reach 
the required level of agreement to be included in the new self-report measure. This may 
be attributed to a small number of the experts (i.e. 13%) who were solely academics and 
had published at least one peer-reviewed paper on the topic of psychopathy. These 
individuals may arguably have more insight into the cognitive and affective 
underpinnings of the disorder and would therefore be likely to rate such items as 
important. 
 
In terms of cognition and affect, experts agreed that individuals with psychopathy have 
biased judgments of causality [cognition], possess maladaptive cognitive schemas 
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[cognition] and display low levels of fear [affect]. They also have an impaired 
emotional learning [affect], a different internal experience of emotion [affect], and are 
less influenced by emotion [affect]. This understanding of psychopathy is consistent 
with the academic literature in that research has found individuals with the disorder to 
present with biased judgments (e.g. Vitale et al. 2005), have negative cognitive schemas 
(e.g. Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012), have deficient emotional reactivity (e.g. Lykken, 
1957), experience problems when identifying (e.g. Blair et al. 2004; Dawel et al. 2012) 
and in evaluating emotions (e.g. Glass & Newman, 2009; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013).  
 
The expert understanding of psychopathic cognition and affect also overlaps with a 
number of psychological theories, including Beck’s (1987) Theory of Emotional 
Disorders, Huesmann’s (1998) Theory of Information Processing, the Violence 
Inhibition Mechanism Model (VIM; Blair, 1995), and the Dysfunctional Fear 
Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957). Both Beck (1987) and Huesmann (1998) recognise that 
biases in cognitive schema influence information processing and consequently give rise 
to attributions of causality that are inconsistent with the situation. Such attributions 
relate to abnormal affective experiences and therefore account for the psychopath’s 
different internal experience of emotion (Beck, 1987). The Delphi survey captured the 
processes outlined here, thus aligning the expert definition of psychopathy with existing 
psychological theory.  
 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis and VIM however, propose that psychopathic 
individuals are unable to identify emotion and this would inevitably impact on their 
emotional learning and vice versa. Whilst the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis states that 
individuals with psychopathy have deficient emotional reactivity and therefore 
experience less arousal to fear (Lykken, 1957), VIM suggests that impairments stem 
from early socialisation and difficulties associated with perspective-taking (Blair, 1995). 
The findings from the Delphi survey were largely consistent with both of these theories. 
However, experts attended less to the early developmental experiences proposed by 
VIM and how these relate to cognition and affect. It is anticipated that the application of 
theory to the expert understanding of psychopathy, and indeed the new self-report 
measure, will become clearer as this thesis progresses. 
 
The inclusion of cognition and affect in the expert definition of psychopathy, albeit 
rather briefly, allows for a theoretical understanding of the construct that extends to the 
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new self-report measure; thus, enabling a theory-driven approach when assessing for 
psychopathy. The consensus on cognition and affect also suggests that experts are 
reverting to the original conceptualisation of the disorder as abnormal personality (i.e. 
Cleckley, 1976). However, this must be interpreted with caution as experts also placed 
an emphasis on behavioural features, associating psychopathy with criminality. 
Nevertheless, as discussed, this may be an outcome of the experts sampled, which 
moves this discussion on to the limitations of the study.  
 
7.20 Limitations of the study 
 
The present study is not without its limitations. A small number of experts took part in 
the Delphi survey and this mainly consisted of Forensic Psychologists from HM Prison 
Service. Such individuals will have administered the PCL-R and this may have 
influenced their ratings, in that they may have defined psychopathy similar to that of the 
PCL-R rather than expressing their own views on the construct.  
 
A larger and more diverse sample size would have reduced the possibility of this bias, 
thus allowing for an in-depth consideration of all aspects of psychopathy, including 
cognitive and affective processing. Recruiting experts from a variety of disciplines, 
including psychiatry, nursing, clinical psychology, social care and occupational therapy 
would allow for an eclectic perspective of psychopathy that could be narrowed down 
via a Delphi approach to a consensus understanding of the disorder. It is important to 
note that the study originally aimed for this. 
 
The high consensus cut-off (i.e. ≥ 80%) adopted in the present study may have also 
influenced the number of items that reached agreement and included in the new self-
report. A lower cut-off may have allowed for more items, specifically those tapping into 
cognition and affect, to be included in the new measure. These items could have been 
removed if required following the evaluation and refinement of the measure in the 
ensuing studies. The high consensus cut-off was important however for producing a 
reliable and valid self-report measure.  
 
Psychopathic processing was not fully accounted for by the experts, with this being 
particularly the case for cognition. It is worth highlighting that experts did not view 
cognition and affect as equally important and this is reflected in the number of items 
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that reached agreement for each processing system (i.e. affect, n = 7; cognition, n = 3). 
To examine the interaction between cognition and affect in psychopathy, it is important 
that both of these processes are captured equally. Thus, to resolve this, the following 
studies will adopt additional measures that also attend to processing in psychopathy to 
allow for an examination into this interplay. 
 
7.21 Concluding statement 
 
It becomes apparent that experts view psychopathy as being underpinned by 
interpersonal and behavioural features, as well as cognitive, affective and 
developmental factors. Whilst experts gravitated towards the PCL-R definition, the 
inclusion of items associated with cognition and affect allowed for their understanding 
of psychopathy, and indeed the new self-report measure, to be aligned with theory. 
 
Experts identified a number of processing deficits associated with psychopathy. The 
following study will expand on this, further exploring these processing deficits in a 
sample of prisoners and students. Explicit processing in psychopathy will be explored 
via cognitive schema and negative affect, particularly as the Delphi survey identified 
cognitive schemas to be an integral aspect of the disorder. The new self-report measure 
will be adopted to assist with this exploration and at the same time, will be evaluated 
and refined.  
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Chapter 8. 
STUDY 2: EXPLICIT COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE 
PROCESSING IN PSYCHOPATHY: EXAMINING 
STUDENT AND FORENSIC SAMPLES 
 
 
8.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The expert Delphi study (See Chapter seven) identified psychopathy to be associated 
with biased judgments of causality and maladaptive cognitive schemas. Experts also 
viewed those with the disorder to have a different experience of emotion and to be less 
influenced by emotion. The present study aimed to examine these deficits in more detail 
by exploring the role of explicit cognition and affect in self-report psychopathy in 
forensic and student samples via cognitive schema and negative affect.  
 
The new self-report measure (i.e. the Psychopathic Processing and Personality 
Assessment – version one; PAPA-1) developed from the expert Delphi study will assist 
with this exploration, determining its value when assessing explicit cognition and affect 
in psychopathy and the relevance of these processes in the measurement of the 
construct. The new measure will also be evaluated across populations and refined. 
 
This Chapter provides details relating to participants, materials and procedure. Findings 
of the study are also presented along with a discussion. This is followed by a 
conclusion, highlighting the implications for clinical practice and recommendations for 
future research. 
 
It is important to note that the present study focuses solely on explicit cognition and 
affect in psychopathy. Implicit processing will be addressed in the next Chapter. 
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8.2 Participants 
 
Four hundred and thirty one participants were sampled. One hundred and twenty one 
were male prisoners
63
 and 310 university students (154 men and 156 women). The 
response rate for the forensic sample was 30% and for the student sample, 44%. 
 
All prisoners were recruited from a Category B
64
 private prison in the North West of 
England. Prisoners were divided into four offence types based on their reported index 
offence. Violent offenders (32.2%) reported offences such as actual bodily harm 
(ABH), grievous bodily harm (GBH), robbery, armed robbery, and murder. Drug-
related offenders (16.5%) reported being convicted of offences such as drug possession, 
drug supply and drug manufacturing. Acquisitive offenders (19.0%) were associated 
with offences such as burglary. Offences that did not fall into any of the previous three 
categories were classified as ‘other’. Other (22.3%) included offences such as 
vandalism, breach of probation order and dangerous driving. Twelve prisoners (9.9%) 
did not provide details of their index offence and none reported committing a sexual 
offence. 
 
Students were sampled at a North West university. They were recruited from 
recreational areas on-campus, including canteens and common rooms. Descriptive 
statistics for student and forensic samples are presented in Table 11. Whilst all students 
provided details of their age, ten prisoners did not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63
 The researcher did attempt to obtain a female forensic sample. However this was not possible, as the 
National Offender Management Service (NOMS) did not grant access. 
64
 ‘Category B’ is a prison security classification. Prisoners are assigned to one of four categories (i.e. A 
to D) based on their offence and risk. Category B relates to those who do not require conditions of 
maximum security but require restrictions that prevent escape.  
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the participants sampled. 
 
 n Mean age SD 
Forensic sample    
Violent offenders 39 32.13 8.12 
Drug-related offenders 20 32.85 7.82 
Acquisitive offenders 23 29.41 8.79 
Other 27 30.92 11.83 
Offence not identified 12 35.20 14.89 
Total 121 31.58 9.46 
    
Student sample    
Men 154 23.01 6.07 
Women 156 23.29 7.15 
Total 310 23.19 6.63 
 
 
8.3 Materials
65
 
 
All participants received a study coversheet. This included information on the purpose 
of the research, the procedure used, consent and withdrawal process, confidentiality, 
advantages and disadvantages of taking part, handling raw data, and contact details of 
the research team. 
 
The study employed the following measures
66
: 
 
Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment – version one (PAPA-1): This is 
the new self-report measure of psychopathy based on the findings from the expert 
Delphi study (See Chapter seven). The measure consisted of 54 items
67
 (e.g. “I am only 
interested in myself”; “I do not feel guilty when I cause others to feel pain or hurt”). 
Participants rated each item using a five-point likert scale ranging from very unlike me 
(1) to very like me (5). The measure examined the personality and behavioural traits 
related to psychopathy, with an emphasis on explicit cognitive and affective processing. 
Ten items were inverted controlling for response sets. 
 
                                                        
65
 Appendix four contains all materials used in study two. 
66
 The three measures were selected as they could be administered to both forensic and community 
samples without the researcher requiring any formal training. 
67
 Item 8 (“I have always stayed the same”) provides an assessment of stability and was not included in 
the scoring of PAPA-1. 
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Prior to administering the PAPA-1, the measure was piloted with a student sample (n = 
20) to assess its readability and layout. The following questions were added to the end 
of the measure to assist with this, “Overall do you think the questionnaire was easy to 
read?”, “Overall do you think the questionnaire was easy to understand?”, “Did you 
struggle to answer any of the questions?”, “Did you find the questionnaire instructions 
easy to understand?”, “Do you think the response scale is appropriate for the measure?”, 
and “Do you think the layout and structure of the questionnaire was clear?” 
 
The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al. 1995): This is a 
26 item self-report measure developed to assess psychopathic traits within community 
and forensic samples. The measure broadly corresponds to both factors of PCL-R 
defined clinical psychopathy, i.e. factor one (F1; primary psychopathy), was assessed 
through 16 items such as, “looking out for myself is my top priority” and “I often 
admire a really clever scam”. Factor two (F2; secondary psychopathy) was examined 
through ten items such as, “I don’t plan anything very far in advance”. All items were 
rated on a four-point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(4). Seven items were inverted, again controlling for response sets.  
 
Schemata: Positive and Negative, and Affect assessment – version two (SPANA-2; 
Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012): This measure examined positive and negative cognitive 
schema, and negative affect associated with psychopathy. The SPANA-2 assessed 
negative cognitive schema through the following subscales: Abandoned; Mistrustful 
self/distrustful others; Worthless; Uncaring others; Abusive others; and Intolerant of 
others. Positive cognitive schema was examined via Happy/sociable; Hardworking; 
Calm controlled; Caring; Easy going; and Worthwhile.  
 
Negative cognitive schema was assessed through items such as “I am isolated” and “I 
hate myself”, whilst positive cognitive schema was associated with items such as “I get 
on well with others” and “I am a caring person”. Items such as, “I am not in touch with 
my emotions” and “I am fairly cut off from my feelings” were used to address negative 
affect.  
 
Participants had to rate the items on a five-point likert scale ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The measure consisted of 65 items; 30 were 
associated with positive cognitive schema, 30 with negative cognitive schema, and five 
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with negative affect. Twenty-nine items were reverse scored to control for response 
sets.  
 
8.4 Procedure 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Central Lancashire and the 
National Research Ethics Service (NRES): Northern and Yorkshire. The new self-report 
measure, the PAPA-1, was initially piloted using a sample of 20 university students. As 
noted, this was to assess the measure’s layout and readability. The pilot was successful 
and the PAPA-1 was employed in the full study. 
 
For the prison sample, all participants (except those residing on the healthcare wing and 
in segregation) were approached during a period of lock down
68
. Prison officers 
distributed the study materials (i.e. the study coversheet, questionnaires, blank envelope 
and study debrief). All prisoners were allocated two days to read the materials, decide 
whether they wished to take part, and complete the measures. Prisoners were told to 
detach the study debrief and retain this, as they may wish to contact the research team at 
a later date. They were also instructed to place all questionnaires in the blank envelope 
provided and seal. The prison officers collected all questionnaires, complete or not. 
 
For the student sample, the researcher approached students in recreational areas (e.g. 
canteens and common rooms) on the university campus. Students were provided with a 
verbal explanation of the study and informed that participation was voluntary. All 
willing students were given a blank envelope containing the study materials. If the 
students wished for their data to be included in the research, they were told to return 
their completed questionnaires to the student support office in the School of 
Psychology. 
 
All participants received a copy of the study debrief. This provided participants with 
additional information, including details pertaining to the measures used and the 
research aims. Contact details for support agencies and the research team were also 
supplied. The study coversheet instructed all participants to only read the debrief once 
they had completed the questionnaires. However, if the participants read this prior to 
                                                        
68
 Lock down refers to the period of time when all prisoners are confined to their cells.  
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completing the measures this would not influence their response, as the study had no 
element of deception.  
 
8.5 Results 
 
This section will present the findings of the present study. It will commence by 
describing the data screening process. This will be followed by preliminary analyses 
exploring the internal consistency of the measures adopted and the prevalence of 
psychopathy in the populations sampled. The PAPA-1 will then be evaluated, 
examining its validity and structure across populations. The factor structure of the 
LSRP will also be investigated. Results will conclude by exploring the role of explicit 
processing in psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP, investigating the link 
between the construct and positive and negative cognitive schema, and negative affect. 
Predictions will be noted to remind the reader and maintain focus. 
 
8.6 Data screening 
 
All variables within the data set were examined to check for data entry errors, missing 
values, and the occurrence of univariate and multivariate outliers. One hundred and 
ninety eight values were identified as missing. A Little’s MCAR test revealed that the 
data was missing at random for the forensic sample (x
2
 = 4032.5, df = 4500, p> .05), but 
not the student sample (x
2
 = 3735.8, df = 3304, p< .001). Thus, only missing data for the 
forensic sample was replaced using Expectation Maximisation. Using Mehalanobis 
Distance with p< .001, 34 cases (22 prisoners and 12 students) were identified as 
multivariate outliers and were deleted from the data set. There were no univariate 
outliers. Three hundred and ninety seven cases (99 prisoners and 298 students) were put 
forward for further statistical analysis.  
 
It is important to note that prior to conducting the following analyses, tests were 
performed to check that each analysis met all necessary assumptions. No violations 
were found. 
 
A flowchart (Figure 3) has been provided to guide the reader through the results section 
of this Chapter. 
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Figure 4: A flowchart illustrating the contents of the results section for study two. 
Study two: Results 
Preliminary analyses Examining the internal consistency of 
PAPA-1, the LSRP and SPANA-2 
Evaluating PAPA-1 and 
the LSRP 
Examining the prevalence of PAPA-1 
and LSRP psychopathy 
Examining the factor structures of 
PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
Examining the validity of PAPA-1 and 
the LSRP 
Exploring the link 
between psychopathy 
(PAPA-1 and LSRP) and 
cognitive schema on the 
SPANA-2 
Examining the relationship between 
positive and negative cognitive schema 
and PAPA-1 and LSRP psychopathy 
Predicting PAPA-1 and LSRP 
psychopathy from positive and negative 
cognitive schema 
Further exploration of positive and 
negative cognitive schema in PAPA-1 
and LSRP psychopathy 
Exploring the link 
between psychopathy 
(PAPA-1 and LSRP) and 
negative affect on the 
SPANA-2 
Summary of results 
Examining the relationship between 
negative affect and PAPA-1 and LSRP 
psychopathy 
Predicting PAPA-1 and LSRP 
psychopathy from negative affect 
Further exploration of negative affect in 
PAPA-1 and LSRP psychopathy 
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8.7 Preliminary analyses 
 
This section refers to the internal consistency of the measures adopted and the 
prevalence of psychopathy in the samples studied. To remind readers, the following 
measures were administered: the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment 
– version one (PAPA-1), the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) and the 
Schemata: Positive and Negative, and Affect Assessment – version two (SPANA-2). 
  
Internal consistency of the PAPA-1, LSRP and SPANA-2 
 
Table 12 presents the internal consistency of the measures administered. It displays 
Cronbach’s alpha for each measure at an overall and subscale level across samples.   
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Table 12: Internal consistency of the PAPA-1, LSRP and SPANA-2 across samples. 
 
 Internal consistency (α) 
 Number 
of items 
Overall 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
Student 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
Forensic 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
PAPA-1        
Total 53 .88 (383) 5, 10, 12, 19, 27, 36 .87 (284) 5, 10, 19, 27, 36 .87 (99) 5, 10, 12, 19, 36, 52 
        
LSRP        
Total 26 .88 (393) - .87 (294) - .89 (99) - 
Primary 16 .87 (395) - .86 (296) - .89 (99) - 
Secondary 10 .75 (395) - .73 (296) - .74 (99) - 
        
SPANA-2        
Total 65 .94 (382) 24, 64, 65 .93 (283) 24, 57, 65 .94 (99) 24, 64, 65 
Abandoned 5 .84 (396) - .78 (297) - .89 (99) - 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful others 
5 .76 (394) - .74 (295) - .76 (99) - 
Worthless 5 .77 (395) - .78 (296) - .76 (99) - 
Uncaring others 5 .82 (396) - .78 (297) - .87 (99) - 
Abusive others 5 .83 (395) - .80 (296) - .86 (99) - 
Intolerant of others 5 .83 (396) - .82 (298) - .86 (99) - 
Happy/sociable 5 .65 (396) - .62 (297) - .73 (99) - 
Hardworking 5 .80 (396) - .82 (297) - .78 (99) - 
Calm controlled 5 .61 (397) - .54 (298) - .72 (99) - 
Caring 4 .77 (396) - .75 (297) - .81 (99) - 
Easy going 5 .70 (394) - .69 (295) - .72 (99) - 
Worthwhile 5 .61 (397) - .54 (298) - .73 (99) - 
Negative affect 5 .63 (396) - .65 (297) - .58 (99) - 
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The PAPA-1 and LSRP were found to have acceptable levels of internal consistency 
across samples. This was also the case for subscales underpinning the LSRP. In terms of 
SPANA-2, most subscales achieved an acceptable level of internal consistency. 
‘Happy/sociable’, ‘calm controlled’, ‘worthwhile’, and ‘negative affect’ demonstrated 
low levels. However, this was not expected to be high due to the number of items 
underpinning each subscale. 
 
Prevalence of psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
 
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics for the overall sample and for each sample 
separately across PAPA-1 and the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP). 
High mean scores on each measure indicate higher levels of psychopathy. 
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for overall, forensic and student samples (nb. Standard 
deviation in parenthesis). 
 
 
 PAPA-1 LSRP 
 
Population 
Mean 
(SD) 
 
n 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Mean 
(SD) 
 
n 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Overall 122.72 
(21.81) 
383 .41 -.23 52.18 
(11.23) 
393 .29 -.15 
Forensic 133.32 
(23.46) 
99 .14 -.34 56.46 
(11.83) 
99 .27 -.03 
Student 119.02 
(19.96) 
284 .39 -.31 50.74 
(10.65) 
294 .22 -.37 
 
Prisoners had higher psychopathy scores than students. This was significant for PAPA-1 
(t (381) = 5.86, p< .001) and LSRP (t (391) = 4.50, p< .001). It is important to note that 
the same results would have been obtained if an ANOVA was performed
69
.  
 
The descriptive statistics indicated positive skewness for both measures, with clustering 
to the left at the low values. Kurtosis values also revealed a relatively flat distribution. 
However this is expected when examining psychopathy, as most participants should 
score low due to the low prevalence of the disorder.  
 
                                                        
69 ‘Sample’ was coded onto one variable (i.e. overall sample). This variable had two levels, ‘forensic’ 
and ‘student’. ANOVA requires three or more levels (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and was therefore not 
appropriate. 
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8.8 Evaluating PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
 
This section will explore the factor structure of PAPA-1 and the LSRP. Comments will 
also be made about the validity of both measures.  
 
Prediction:  
 
The PAPA will positively associate with existing psychopathy measures (e.g. the 
LSRP).  
 
Factor structure of PAPA-1 
 
The PAPA-1 was subjected to a principal components analysis to determine the 
structure of psychopathy in the participants sampled. The participants were analysed as 
an overall group, as the forensic sample was too small (n = 99) to investigate separately 
and would not meet the requirements for factor analysis. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) 
recommend five cases for each item. The analysis presented here is exploratory. 
 
An Oblimin rotation
70
 extracted a three-component solution accounting for 19.0%, 
6.9%, and 4.9% of the variance respectively. Thus, explaining 30.8% of the variance in 
PAPA-1. An inspection of the scree plot supported this structure. The pattern matrix 
indicated that 11 items loaded onto component one, three on component two, and seven 
on component three. Thirty-two items did not load onto any component, i.e. they did not 
obtain a loading of .50 or above as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). The 
following items did not load onto any component (actual number in PAPA in 
parenthesis):  
 
 I do not feel guilty when I cause others to feel pain or hurt (2) 
 I would describe myself as one of the most confident around (3) 
 I have been described as a cruel person who does not worry about hurting others 
(9) 
 I can allow my feelings to interfere with my decisions [reverse] (10) 
 I regularly view others as lazy (14) 
                                                        
70
 An Oblimin rotation was performed, as the extracted components were likely to correlate with one 
another. 
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 I have a problem with using alcohol (15) 
 I am described as a ‘charmer’ by those that know me (17)  
 When I feel sad I can quickly make myself happy again (19) 
 Others complain that I never take the blame for my mistakes (20) 
 If others can help me, I expect them to do this without me returning the favour 
(21) 
 I tend to keep in touch with those close to me [reverse] (24) 
 I find it difficult to comfort others when they are upset (25) 
 I would describe myself as someone who is often ‘fearless’ when faced with a 
threat (26) 
 The world is a threatening place, you have to watch your back (28) 
 I often feel in touch with other people’s feelings [reverse] (29) 
 I am able to talk myself out of situations by not answering questions directly 
(30) 
 If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly think of a way out (31) 
 I often experience strong positive emotion, such as happiness and joy [reverse] 
(32)  
 I am often bored (33) 
 I regularly view others as irritating (34) 
 I see no problem in living off the State/Government (35) 
 I am an aggressive person in a number of situations (39) 
 I very rarely experience fear (40) 
 I tend to think of one solution to a problem and stick to it (41)  
 I use illegal drugs more than most people I know (42) 
 I find it difficult to give emotional and personal support to others (43) 
 I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a ‘con artist’ by those who know me 
(46) 
 I always accept responsibility for what I do [reverse] (47) 
 I don’t see why others can’t take care of me (48) 
 Others would describe me as a very intense person who has difficulty getting on 
with others (51) 
 I find it easy to form strong emotional relationships with others [reverse] (52) 
 I have clear goals for my long-term future [reverse] (54) 
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Items negatively correlating with the total component loading were deleted and 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each factor. One item was removed from 
component one (i.e. item 5: I often experience strong negative emotions, such as anger, 
sadness and hatred) increasing the alpha from .70 to .84. Negative inter-item 
correlations between item 5 and the remaining items on this component were identified. 
 
One item was also removed from component two (i.e. item 27: I am a creative person 
who can think of more than one way of dealing with problems) producing an alpha of 
.30. The removal of item 27 meant this component was no longer a scale and therefore 
deleted, as a scale requires three or more items. The removal of this component was 
consistent with the academic literature, as it captured a ‘positive view of self and 
abilities’. Positive traits are not often associated with psychopathy or its assessment 
(e.g. Hare, 1991, 2003). 
 
No items were deleted from component three and this factor had an alpha of .80. All 
inter-item correlations for this factor were positive. Table 14 presents the components 
underpinning PAPA-1. It displays the items, factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha for 
each component.  
 
Table 14: Item and factor loadings for each PAPA-1 component (nb. Cronbach’s alpha 
for each component is in parenthesis). 
 
Item 
number 
 
Item 
Factor 
loading 
   
F1: Dissocial tendencies (α = .84)  
  
23. I often get intro trouble more than others .63 
50. Others would describe me as a very intense person who has 
difficulty getting on with others 
.61 
6. I often take chances that could be risky to me or others .60 
49. I can be unpredictable .57 
7. I often don’t think of the consequences of my actions .56 
11. Others would describe me as an irritable person with problems 
controlling my temper 
.55 
53. As a child I often got into trouble more than others .55 
37. I am able to commit a wide number of behaviours that, if 
caught, would get me into trouble 
.53 
22. I find it impossible to resist temptation .52 
13. I see a lot of hostility around me .51 
  (Continued) 
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Table 14: Continued. 
 
 
   
Item 
number 
 
Item 
Factor 
loading 
   
F2: Negative views towards others (α = .80)  
   
4. I will use people to get what I want .71 
45. I often find myself thinking that I am more important than 
others 
.69 
44. If I do something wrong I will feel bad about it [reverse] .62 
18. I find most people are weak and not worth bothering with .59 
1. I am only interested in myself .58 
38. I can often find myself viewing others as nothing more than 
‘objects’ 
.58 
16. I am not that bothered about others .55 
 
‘Dissocial tendencies’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F1) positively correlated (r = .45, p< .001) with 
‘negative views towards others’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F2). Thus, as scores on ‘dissocial 
tendencies’ increased, so did scores on ‘negative views towards others’. 
 
Mean scores were calculated from items that had a loading of .50 or above and 
presented in Table 15. Higher scores indicate higher levels of that particular component. 
 
Table 15: Mean scores for the two components underpinning PAPA-1 (nb. Standard 
deviation in parenthesis). 
 
PAPA-1 subscale Mean (SD) 
F1: Dissocial tendencies 23.39 (7.90) 
F2: Negative views towards others 12.70 (4.66) 
 
The overall sample (n = 394) appeared to have higher levels of ‘dissocial tendencies’ 
than ‘negative views towards others’. 
 
Factor structure of the LSRP 
 
The LSRP was also subjected to a principal components analysis so that validity of this 
measure could be assessed and to allow for a more in-depth examination of self-report 
psychopathy. Following the recommendations for factor analysis outlined by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), the sample was studied as a whole rather than splitting it 
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by population. As previously noted, the forensic sample was too small (n = 99) to 
perform an individual factor analysis for this population. 
 
An Oblimin rotation
71
 extracted a two-component solution accounting for 26.4% and 
8.1% of the variance respectively. Thus, explaining 34.5% of the variance in the LSRP. 
An examination of the scree plot confirmed this structure. The pattern matrix indicated 
that 13 items loaded onto component one and seven on component two. Six items did 
not load onto any component, i.e. they did not obtain a loading of .50 or above as 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). 
 
Items that did not load onto any component are as follows (actual number in LSRP in 
parenthesis):  
 
 I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the bottom line 
(6) 
 I would be upset if my success came at someone else’s expense (10) 
 I often admire a really clever scam (11) 
 I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time [reverse] (19) 
 Before I do anything I carefully consider the possible consequences [reverse] 
(23) 
 Love is overrated (26) 
 
There were no negative inter-item correlations found for the LSRP. Additionally, no 
items negatively correlated with total component loadings.  
 
Table 16 presents the two components extracted from the LSRP. It displays the items, 
factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha for each component.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
71
 An Oblimin rotation was performed, as previous research (e.g. Levenson et al. 1995) found 
components extracted from the LSRP to correlate.  
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Table 16: Item and factor loadings for each LSRP component (nb. Cronbach's alpha for 
each component is in parenthesis). 
 
Item 
number 
 
Item 
Factor 
loading 
   
F1: Selfish, uncaring and manipulative posture towards others 
(primary psychopathy; α = .86) 
 
 
3. In today’ world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get 
away with to succeed 
.69 
14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone else to feel 
emotional pain [reverse] 
.67 
9. I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do 
what I want them to do 
.67 
16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others [reverse] .64 
2. For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with .62 
15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn’t 
lie about it [reverse] 
.59 
4. My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can .58 
5. Making a lot of money is my most important goal .56 
8. Looking out for myself is my top priority .54 
1. Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned 
about the losers 
.53 
7. People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve 
it 
.52 
12. I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my 
goals [reverse] 
.52 
13. I enjoy manipulating other people’s feelings .50 
   
F2: Impulsivity and a self-defeating lifestyle (secondary psychopathy; 
α = .74) 
 
   
22. Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just 
don’t understand me 
.64 
21. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start .60 
17. I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time .60 
18. I am often bored .60 
24. I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people .59 
20. I don’t plan anything very in advance .58 
25. When I get frustrated, I often “let off steam” by blowing my 
top 
.53 
 
Both components had acceptable levels of internal consistency. They were also found to 
positively correlate with each other (r = .41, p< .001). Thus, as levels of LSRP primary 
(i.e. LSRP F1) psychopathy increased, levels of LSRP secondary psychopathy (i.e. 
LSRP F2) also increased. 
 
 189 
Mean scores were calculated for each LSRP component from items that had a loading 
of .50 or above and presented in Table 17. Higher scores are indicative of higher levels 
of that particular component. 
 
Table 17: Mean scores for the primary and secondary psychopathy scales underpinning 
the LSRP (nb. Standard deviation in parenthesis). 
 
LSRP subscale Mean (SD) 
F1: Selfish, uncaring and manipulative posture towards others 
(primary psychopathy) 
24.68 (6.64) 
F2: Impulsivity and a self-defeating lifestyle (secondary 
psychopathy) 
15.19 (4.01) 
 
The overall sample (n = 395) appeared to have higher levels of primary psychopathy 
than secondary psychopathy.   
 
Validity of PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
 
A strong positive correlation was found between overall PAPA-1 and LSRP scores (r = 
.80, p< .001). This was also the case for forensic (r = .80, p< .001) and student (r = .78, 
p< .001) samples. Thus, as psychopathy scores on the PAPA-1 increased, so did 
psychopathy scores on the LSRP. PAPA-1 demonstrated concurrent validity with an 
existing self-report measure of psychopathy.  
 
The two components found to underpin PAPA-1 positively correlated with the LSRP 
components. Thus, indicating that as scores on ‘dissocial tendencies’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F1) 
and ‘negative views towards others’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F2) increased, scores on primary 
psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F1) and secondary psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F2) also increased. 
This demonstrates further evidence of validity for both self-report measures of 
psychopathy. Table 18 displays the correlation coefficients between these variables. 
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Table 18: Bivariate correlations between PAPA-1 and the LSRP subscales. 
 
 LSRP F1: Primary 
psychopathy (n) 
LSRP F2: Secondary 
psychopathy (n) 
 
PAPA-1 F1: Dissocial 
tendencies 
 
.50*** (392) 
 
.69*** (392) 
PAPA-1 F2: Negative 
views towards others 
.68*** (392) .35*** (393) 
*** p< .001 
 
As reliability and validity has now been ascertained, the next step is to examine explicit 
cognitive processing in psychopathy. This section will move on to investigate the role 
of cognition, specifically cognitive schema, in psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 and the 
LSRP. The components underpinning PAPA-1 and LSRP identified here will also be 
examined to establish how they associate with cognitive processing. 
 
8.9 Exploring the link between psychopathy and positive and negative cognitive 
schema 
 
The relationship between psychopathy and positive and negative cognitive schema 
measured by the Schemata: Positive and Negative, and Affect Assessment – version two 
(SPANA-2) will be explored. This will be closely followed by a series of standard 
multiple regression analyses, which will determine the amount of variance positive and 
negative cognitive schema explain in psychopathy defined via PAPA-1 and the LSRP. 
This section will conclude with a series of independent samples t-tests to establish 
whether positive and negative cognitive schema are influenced by level of psychopathy. 
 
Predictions: 
 
The PAPA will positively associate with a) negative cognitive schema; and b) 
positive cognitive schema. 
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will present with fewer positive cognitive 
schemas than individuals with lower levels of psychopathy. 
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Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will present with more negative 
cognitive schemas than those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
The Relationship between positive and negative cognitive schema and psychopathy 
assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
 
Several Pearson r bivariate correlations were conducted to determine the strength of 
relationship between positive and negative cognitive schema and psychopathy defined 
by PAPA-1 and the LSRP. Table 19 and 20 display the correlation coefficients between 
these variables.  
 
Table 19: Bivariate correlations between psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and positive 
and negative cognitive schema across samples. 
 
 PAPA-1 (n) 
 
 
Cognition 
 
 
Overall  
 
 
Forensic  
 
 
Student  
 
F1: Dissocial 
tendencies  
F2: Negative 
views towards 
others  
      
Positive schema      
Happy/sociable .32*** 
(382) 
.33** 
(99) 
.30*** 
(283) 
.24***  
(393) 
.30***  
(393) 
Hardworking .36*** 
(382) 
.37*** 
(99) 
.35*** 
(283) 
.30***  
(393) 
.22***  
(393) 
Calm controlled .39*** 
(383) 
.38*** 
(99) 
.34*** 
(284) 
.45***  
(394) 
.25***  
(394) 
Caring .51*** 
(382) 
.48*** 
(99) 
.55*** 
(283) 
.34***  
(393) 
.51***  
(393) 
Easy going -.05  
(381) 
.02  
(99) 
-.06 
(282) 
-.01  
(391) 
.05  
(391) 
Worthwhile .23*** 
(383) 
.45*** 
(99) 
.15* 
(284) 
.16**  
(394) 
.25***  
(394) 
      
Negative schema      
Abandoned .56*** 
(382) 
.55*** 
(99) 
.50*** 
(283) 
.50***  
(393) 
.36***  
(393) 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful 
others 
.51*** 
(380) 
.49*** 
(99) 
.46*** 
(281) 
.42***  
(391) 
.35***  
(391) 
Worthless .39*** 
(382) 
.35*** 
(99) 
.32*** 
(283) 
.41***  
(393) 
.21***  
(392) 
Uncaring others .52*** 
(382) 
.38*** 
(99) 
.53*** 
(283) 
.43***  
(393) 
.38***  
(393) 
      
     (Continued) 
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Table 19: Continued. 
 
    
      
 PAPA-1 (n) 
Cognition Overall Forensic Student F1: Dissocial 
tendencies 
F2: Negative 
views towards 
others 
      
Abusive others .55*** 
(382) 
.41*** 
(99) 
.56*** 
(283) 
.46***  
(392) 
.37***  
(392) 
Intolerant of 
others 
.60*** 
(382) 
.59*** 
(99) 
.60*** 
(283) 
.50***  
(393) 
.51***  
(393) 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
Positive cognitive schema correlated with psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 for the 
overall sample and when split into prisoners and students. In all instances, as 
psychopathy scores increased, so did levels of positive cognitive schema. The exception 
to this was ‘easy going’, which did not significantly correlate with PAPA-1. Correlation 
coefficients ranged from .24 to .55, thus relationships were weak to moderate in 
strength.  
 
Positive cognitive schema positively associated with each component underpinning 
PAPA-1. Thus, as ‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’ increased, 
positive cognitive schema also increased. However, ‘easy going’ did not significantly 
correlate with either component. Coefficients again indicated a weak to moderate 
relationship between variables.  
 
Negative cognitive schema positively correlated with PAPA-1 across populations. This 
was also the case for ‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’. 
Increased levels of negative cognitive schema were associated with increased PAPA-1 
scores across samples and subscales. Correlations were of moderate strength. 
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Table 20: Bivariate correlations between psychopathy assessed by the LSRP and 
positive and negative cognitive schema across samples. 
 
 LSRP (n) 
Cognition Overall Forensic Student F1: Primary F2: Secondary 
      
Positive schema      
Happy/sociable .31*** 
(392) 
.27** 
(99) 
.32*** 
(293) 
.26*** 
(394) 
.25***  
(394) 
Hardworking .39*** 
(392) 
.35*** 
(99) 
.41*** 
(293) 
.27*** 
(394) 
.35***  
(394) 
Calm controlled .46*** 
(393) 
.42*** 
(99) 
.45*** 
(294) 
.31*** 
(395) 
.44***  
(395) 
Caring .52*** 
(392) 
.48*** 
(99) 
.55*** 
(283) 
.49***  
(394) 
.29***  
(394) 
Easy going -.02  
(390) 
-.02  
(99) 
.01  
(291) 
-.03 
(392) 
.02  
(392) 
Worthwhile .29*** 
(393) 
.40*** 
(99) 
.27*** 
(294) 
.28*** 
(395) 
.12*  
(395) 
      
Negative schema      
Abandoned .52*** 
(392) 
.55*** 
(99) 
.47*** 
(293) 
.39***  
(394) 
.53***  
(394) 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful 
others 
.47*** 
(391) 
.49*** 
(99) 
.42*** 
(292) 
.36***  
(392) 
.46***  
(393) 
Worthless .35*** 
(391) 
.30** 
(99) 
.31*** 
(292) 
.20***  
(393) 
.42***  
(393) 
Uncaring others .50*** 
(393) 
.41*** 
(99) 
.49*** 
(294) 
.38***  
(394) 
.48***  
(395) 
Abusive others .50*** 
(391) 
.38*** 
(99) 
.51*** 
(292) 
.40***  
(393) 
.47***  
(393) 
Intolerant of 
others 
.57*** 
(392) 
.60*** 
(99) 
.54*** 
(293) 
.51***  
(394) 
.45***  
(394) 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01 
 
Negative cognitive schema positively correlated with the LSRP across samples and at 
factor level (i.e. primary and secondary psychopathy). Thus, as scores on the LSRP 
increased, negative cognitive schema also increased. Coefficients indicated that 
relationships were weak to moderate in strength. 
 
Positive cognitive schema also positively correlated with the LSRP at factor level and 
across samples. In this instance, as positive cognitive schema increased, LSRP scores 
also increased. The only exception to this was ‘easy going’, which did not significantly 
correlate with LSRP psychopathy. Correlations were weak to moderate. 
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Predicting psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP from positive and negative 
cognitive schema 
 
A series of standard multiple regression analyses were performed to explore the extent 
to which positive and negative cognitive schema predict PAPA-1 and LSRP scores. 
Factors underpinning both measures were also examined. Tables 21 to 24 display 
regression coefficients and standard error B for each analysis. Analyses were completed 
separately to reduce the risk of multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195 
Table 21: Predicting psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 across samples from positive and negative cognitive schema. 
 
 PAPA-1 
 Overall sample Forensic sample Student sample 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β 
          
Positive schema         
Happy/sociable -.85 (396) .42 -.10* -1.97 (99) .86 -.25* -.39 (297) .45 -.05 
Hardworking .40 (396) .31 .06 .73 (99) .60 .11 .16 (297) .35 .02 
Calm controlled 1.19 (397) .32 .16*** .44 (99) .61 .07 1.47 (298) .38 .19*** 
Caring 3.52 (396) .47 .35*** 1.60 (99) 1.13 .17 3.77 (297) .48 .40*** 
Easy going -.1.10 (394) .24 -.17*** -.96 (99) .57 -.14 -1.17 (295) .26 -.20*** 
Worthwhile -.56 (397) .41 -.07 2.42 (99) .91 .32** -1.55 (298) .45 -.18** 
          
Negative schema         
Abandoned 1.13 (396) .26 .22*** 1.81 (99) .47 .41*** .74 (297) .31 .14* 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful 
others 
.71 (394) .27 .13** 1.28 (99) .66 .22 .46 (295) .28 .09 
Worthless .17 (395) .26 .03 .05 (99) .52 .01 .28 (296) .32 .05 
Uncaring others -.47 (396) .36 -.08 -1.61 (99) .75 -.29* -.01 (297) .39 -.00 
Abusive others .70 (395) .37 .12 -.74 (99) .82 -.13 1.08 (296) .38 .19** 
Intolerant of 
others 
1.42 (396) .30 .25*** 2.64 (99) .69 .44*** 1.06 (297) .32 .20** 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
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PAPA-1: Overall sample 
 
The predictors accounted for 60% (R
2
 = .60, Adjusted R
2
 = .59) of the variance in 
psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 for the sample as a whole (F(12, 367) = 45.6, MSE = 
8989.4, p< .001). ‘Calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘mistrustful self/distrustful 
others’ and ‘intolerant of others’, were all positive predictors (for all, t ≥ 2.65, p< 01). 
Thus, as levels of these schemas increased, psychopathy scores on the PAPA-1 also 
increased. ‘Happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ were negative predictors (for both, t ≥ - 
2.03, p< 05) indicating that as these schemas increased, PAPA-1 scores decreased.  
 
PAPA-1: Forensic and student samples 
 
For the prisoners, the predictors explained 63% (R
2
 = .63, Adjusted R
2
 = .58) of the 
variance in PAPA-1 (F(12, 86) = 12.2, MSE = 2829.6, p< .001). ‘Happy/sociable’ and 
‘uncaring others’ were negative predictors (for both, t ≥ -2.14, p< 05), where as 
‘worthwhile’, ‘abandoned’ and ‘intolerant of others’ were positive predictors (for all 
positive, t ≥ 2.67, p< 01). As levels of the schemas ‘happy/sociable’ and ‘uncaring 
others’ increased, psychopathy defined via PAPA-1 decreased. This was the opposite 
for schemas ‘worthwhile’, ‘abandoned’ and ‘intolerant of others’, where increased 
levels of these associated with higher levels of PAPA-1.  
 
Predictors for the student sample accounted for 61% (R
2
 = .61, Adjusted R
2
 = .59) of 
the variance in PAPA-1 (F(12, 268) = 34.6, MSE = 5652.4, p< .001). PAPA-1 for 
students was positively predicted by ‘calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘abusive 
others’ and ‘intolerant of others’ (for all positive, t ≥ 2.39, p< 05). ‘Easy going’ and 
‘worthwhile’ were negative predictors (for both, t ≥ -3.49, p< 01). Thus for students, as 
levels of schemas ‘calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘abusive others’ and 
‘intolerant of others’ increased, so did scores on the PAPA-1. However, as levels of 
schemas ‘easy going’ and ‘worthwhile’ increased, PAPA-1 scores decreased.  
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Table 22: Predicting the PAPA-1 subscales from positive and negative cognitive schema. 
 
 PAPA-1 
 F1: Dissocial tendencies F2: Negative views towards others 
Predictor (n) B  SE B β B  SE B β 
       
Positive schema      
Happy/sociable (396) -.51 .17 -.17** -.02 .11 -.01 
Hardworking (396) .08  .13 .03 -.09 .08 -.06 
Calm controlled (397) .97  .13 .35*** -.02 .08 -.01 
Caring (396) .56  .19 .16** .91 .12 .43*** 
Easy going (394) -.28  .10 -.12** -.03 .06 -.02 
Worthwhile (397) -.29  .17 -.09 .00 .10 .00 
       
Negative schema      
Abandoned (396) .43 .11 .24*** .11 .07 .10 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful others 
(394) 
.20  .11 .10 .07 .07 .06 
Worthless (395) .27  .11 .13* -.10 .07 -.08 
Uncaring others (396) -.28 .15 -.13 .02 .09 .01 
Abusive others (395) .29 .15 .14 -.03 .09 -.02 
Intolerant of others 
(396) 
.33 .13 .16** .43 .08 .36*** 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
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PAPA-1 Factors: Overall sample 
  
Separate multiple regression analyses were completed for the two subscales of the 
PAPA-1. These were performed independently to reduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity.  
 
For ‘dissocial tendencies’ (i.e. PAPA F1), predictors explained 46% (R2 = .46, Adjusted 
R
2
 = .44) of the total variance (F(12, 378) = 26.6, MSE = 928.8, p< .001). This 
component was positively predicted by ‘calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, 
‘worthless’ and ‘intolerant of others’ (for all positive, t ≥ 2.46, p< .05), and negatively 
predicted by ‘happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ (for both, t ≥ -2.82, p< .01). Thus, as 
scores on the schemas positively predicting PAPA-1 increased, so did scores on 
‘dissocial tendencies’. This was the opposite for schemas negatively predicting PAPA-
1, with psychopathy scores on ‘dissocial tendencies’ decreasing as levels of these 
schemas increased.  
 
Forty-one percent of the variance (R
2
 = .41, Adjusted R
2
 = .40) in ‘negative views 
towards others’ (i.e. PAPA F2) was predicted by the predictors (F(12, 378) = 22.2, MSE 
= 291.3, p< .001). This component was positively predicted by the schemas ‘caring’ and 
‘intolerant of others’ (for both, t ≥ 5.61, p< .001). In this instance, as levels of these two 
schemas increased, scores on ‘negative views towards others’ also increased. 
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Table 23: Predicting psychopathy assessed by the LSRP across samples from positive and negative cognitive schema. 
 
 LSRP 
 Overall sample Forensic sample Student sample 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β 
          
Positive schema         
Happy/sociable -.77 (396) .22 -.18*** -1.53 (99) .40 -.39*** -.47 (297) .25 -.11 
Hardworking .38 (396) .16 .11* .46 (99) .28 .14 .38 (297) .19 .11 
Calm controlled 1.00 (397) .17 .26*** .68 (99) .29 .21* 1.22 (298) .21 .29*** 
Caring 1.46 (396) .24 .28*** .96 (99) .53 .20 1.51 (297) .27 .30*** 
Easy going -.46 (394) .13 -.14*** -.44 (99) .27 -.13 -.45 (295) .15 -.14** 
Worthwhile .14 (397) .21 .03 .95 (99) .43 .25* -.07 (298) .25 -.02 
          
Negative schema         
Abandoned .59 (396) .14 .23*** .86 (99) .22 .38*** .42 (297) .17 .15* 
Mistrustful 
self/distrustful 
others 
.39 (394) .14 .14** .87 (99) .31 .29** .24 (295) .15 .09 
Worthless -.18 (395) .14 -.06  -.30 (99) .24 -.10 -.22 (296) .18 -.07 
Uncaring others -.09 (396) .19 -.03 -.35 (99) .35 -.13 .06 (297) .22 .02 
Abusive others .11 (395) .19 .04 -1.05 (99)  .39 -.36** .44 (296) .21 .15* 
Intolerant of 
others 
.80 (396) .16 .28*** 1.60 (99) .32 .53*** .53 (297) .18 .19** 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
 
 200 
LSRP: Overall sample 
 
The predictors significantly explained 58% (R
2
 = .58, Adjusted R
2
 = .57) of the overall 
variance in psychopathy assessed by the LSRP (F(12, 377) = 44.0, MSE = 2382.4, p< 
.001). ‘Happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ were negative predictors (for both, t ≥ -3.59, 
p< .001), and ‘hardworking’, ‘calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘mistrustful 
self/distrustful others’ and ‘intolerant of others’ were positive predictors (for all, t ≥ 
2.40, p< .05). As levels of those schemas positively predicting the LSRP increased, so 
did psychopathy scores. This was the opposite for schemas negatively predicting the 
LSRP, with increased levels of these schemas being associated with lower levels of 
psychopathy.  
 
LSRP: Forensic and student samples 
 
The predictors accounted for 68% (R
2
 = .68, Adjusted R
2
 = .64) of the variance in LSRP 
psychopathy for the forensic sample (F(12, 86) = 15.3, MSE = 778.5, p< .001). 
Psychopathy in this sample was positively predicted by ‘calm controlled’, ‘worthwhile’, 
‘abandoned’, ‘mistrustful self/distrustful others’ and ‘intolerant of others’ (for all 
positive predictors, t ≥ 2.23, p< .05), and negatively predicted by ‘happy/sociable’ and 
‘abusive others’ (for both, t ≥ -2.72, p< .01). As those schemas positively predicting 
psychopathy increased, scores on the LSRP also increased. The opposite was found for 
schemas negatively predicting psychopathy, with these being associated with low scores 
on the LSRP. 
 
Fifty-six percent (R
2
 = .56, Adjusted R
2
 = .55) of the overall variance in LSRP 
psychopathy for the student sample was accounted for by the predictors (F(12, 278) = 
30.0, MSE = 1548.2, p< .001). For students, psychopathy assessed by the LSRP was 
positively predicted by ‘calm controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘abusive others’ and 
‘intolerant of others’ (for all, t ≥ 2.07, p< .05). ‘Easy going’ was a negative predictor of 
psychopathy for this sample (t = -3.14, p< .01). Thus, as levels of the schemas ‘calm 
controlled’, ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’, ‘abusive others’, and ‘intolerant others’ increased, 
scores on the LSRP also increased. In contrast, scores on the LSRP decreased for 
students when levels of the schema ‘easy going’ increased. 
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Table 24: Predicting the LSRP factors from positive and negative cognitive schema. 
 
 LSRP 
 F1: Primary psychopathy F2: Secondary psychopathy 
Predictor (n) B  SE B β B  SE B β 
       
Positive schema      
Happy/sociable (396) -.33 .15 -.13* -.22 .09 -.15* 
Hardworking (396) .04 .11 .02 .18 .07 .14** 
Calm controlled (397) .22 .12 .10 .47 .07 .34*** 
Caring (396) 1.05 .17 .35*** .12 .10 .06 
Easy going (394) -.20 .09 -.10* -.17 .05 -.10* 
Worthwhile (397) .23 .15 .09 -.20 .09 -.13* 
       
Negative schema      
Abandoned (396) .28 .09 .19** .21 .06 .23*** 
Mistrustful self/distrustful others 
(394) 
.16 .10 .09 .16 .06 .16** 
Worthless (395) -.24 .09 -.14* .10 .06 .09 
Uncaring others (396) -.07 .13 -.04 -.02 .08 -.02 
Abusive others (395) .01 .13 .01 .06 .08 .06 
Intolerant of others (396) .56 .11 .33*** .12 .06 .12 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
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LSRP factors: Overall sample 
 
Analyses for the LSRP subscales were completed separately to reduce the risk of 
multicollinearity. The predictors explained 43% (R
2
 = .43, Adjusted R
2
 = .42) of the 
variance in LSRP primary psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F1; selfish, uncaring and 
manipulative posture towards others), (F(12, 378) = 24.1, MSE = 620.0, p< .001). LSRP 
primary psychopathy was positively predicted by ‘caring’, ‘abandoned’ and ‘intolerant 
of others’ (for all positive predictors, t ≥ 3.04, p< .01). It was also negatively predicted 
by ‘happy/sociable’, ‘easy going’ and ‘worthless’ (for all negative predictors, t ≥ -2.19, 
p< .05). As those schemas acting as positive predictors increased, so did scores on 
LSRP primary psychopathy. In contrast, as schemas negatively predicting LSRP 
primary psychopathy increased, scores on this component decreased. 
 
The predictors accounted for 46% (R
2
 = .46, Adjusted R
2
 = .44) of the variance in LSRP 
secondary psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F2; impulsivity and a self-defeating lifestyle), (F(12, 
378) = 26.8, MSE = 240.3, p< .001). ‘Hardworking’, ‘calm controlled’, ‘abandoned’ 
and ‘mistrustful self/distrustful others’ positively predicted LSRP secondary 
psychopathy (for all positive predictors, t ≥ 2.72, p< .01), where as ‘happy/sociable’, 
‘easy going’ and ‘worthwhile’ acted as negative predictors (for all negative predictors, t 
≥ -2.28, p< .05). Thus, as schemas positively predicting LSRP secondary psychopathy 
increased, scores on this component also increased. However, scores on LSRP 
secondary psychopathy decreased when schemas acting as negative predictors 
increased. 
 
The Chapter will now examine the effect of level of psychopathy on positive and 
negative cognitive schema. Analyses will be completed for PAPA-1 and the LSRP. To 
remind readers, these analyses will investigate the following predictions:  
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will present with fewer positive cognitive 
schemas than individuals with lower levels of psychopathy.  
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will present with more negative 
cognitive schemas than those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
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Further exploration of positive and negative cognitive schema in psychopathy defined 
by PAPA-1 and the LSRP 
 
A series of independent samples t-tests were performed to examine whether positive 
and negative cognitive schema were influenced by level of psychopathy. 
 
A median split was conducted on PAPA-1 to separate participants into ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
levels of psychopathy. The median was 121.0 and those scoring above were classified 
into the ‘high’ group and those at or below this value into the ‘low’ group.  
 
A median split was also performed on the LSRP, separating participants into ‘high’ and 
‘low’ levels of psychopathy. The median was 52.0 and those scoring above this were 
classified into the ‘high’ group and those at or below into the ‘low’ group.  
 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for positive and negative cognitive schema using 
the median splits. Mean scores for level of PAPA-1 and LSRP are displayed in Table 
25. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics for positive and negative cognitive schema dependent 
on level of psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP (nb. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis). 
 
  Cognitive schema 
Measure Level n Positive  n Negative  
      
PAPA-1 High 187 60.60 (11.70) 187 81.28 (17.22) 
 Low 192 54.44 (11.50) 189 61.48 (15.37) 
      
LSRP High 182 61.95 (11.45) 181 80.24 (16.95) 
 Low 206 54.00 (11.44) 204 63.28 (17.15) 
 
Analyses revealed that there was a significant difference in level of PAPA-1 on positive 
(t (377) = 5.17, p< .001) and negative cognitive schema (t (374) = 11.77, p< .001), with 
those in the ‘high’ psychopathy category having more negative and positive cognitive 
schema than individuals in the ‘low’ category.  
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Further exploration also indicated that individuals in the ‘high’ LSRP psychopathy 
category to have more negative (t (383) = 9.74, p< .001) and positive cognitive schemas 
(t (386) = 6.83, p< .001) than those in the ‘low’ category.  
 
This Chapter will now move onto examine negative affect in psychopathy defined by 
PAPA-1 and the LSRP. 
 
8.10 Exploring the link between psychopathy and negative affect  
 
The relationship between psychopathy and negative affect assessed by the Schemata: 
positive and negative, and affect assessment – version two (SPANA-2) will be 
examined. A series of standard multiple regression analyses will also be conducted, 
establishing the amount of variance negative affect explains in both PAPA-1 and the 
LSRP. This section will conclude with a series of independent samples t-tests to 
determine whether negative affect is influenced by level of psychopathy. 
 
Predictions: 
 
The PAPA will positively associate with negative affect. 
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will present with more schemas 
associated with negative affect than those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
The relationship between negative affect and psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 and the 
LSRP 
 
A series of Pearson r bivariate correlations were conducted to investigate the strength of 
relationships between negative affect and PAPA-1 and the LSRP. Table 26 displays the 
correlation coefficients for these variables.  
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Table 26: Bivariate correlations between psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 and the 
LSRP, and negative affect across sample. 
 
 
 Negative affect (n) 
  
PAPA-1  
Overall .58*** (382) 
Forensic .60*** (99) 
Student .58*** (283) 
F1: Dissocial tendencies .41*** (393) 
F2: Negative views towards others .48 ***(393) 
  
LSRP  
Overall .56*** (392) 
Forensic .55*** (99) 
Student .55*** (293) 
F1: Primary psychopathy .49*** (394) 
F2: Secondary psychopathy .42*** (394) 
*** p< .001 
 
Negative affect positively correlated with overall PAPA-1 and LSRP across samples. It 
also correlated positively with both measures at factor level. Thus in all instances, as 
levels of negative affect increased, levels of psychopathy also increased. Coefficients 
indicated correlations were of weak to moderate in strength. 
 
Predicting psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP from negative affect 
 
A series of standard multiple regression analyses were conducted to explore the extent 
to which negative affect predicts psychopathy defined by PAPA-1 and the LSRP. 
Factors underpinning both measures were also explored. To reduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity all analyses were conducted separately.   
 
PAPA-1: Overall, forensic and student samples 
 
Negative affect accounted for 34% (R
2
 = .34, Adjusted R
2
 = .34) of the explained 
variance in PAPA-1 for the overall sample, and 35% (R
2
 = .35, Adjusted R
2
 = .35) and 
33% (R
2
 = .33, Adjusted R
2
 = .33) for the forensic and student samples respectively. All 
models were significant: Overall (F(1, 380) = 195.8, MSE = 61637.7, p< .001); forensic 
(F(1, 97) = 53.1, MSE = 19075.3, p< .001); and student (F(1, 281) = 13.8.8, MSE = 
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37139.3, p< .001). Negative affect was a positive predictor of PAPA-1 (for all, t ≥ 7.28, 
p< .001). Thus for all, as levels of negative affect increased, levels of psychopathy 
defined by PAPA-1 also increased.  
 
PAPA-1 factors: Overall sample 
 
Negative affect also explained 17% (R
2
 = .17, Adjusted R
2
 = .16) and 23% (R
2
 = .23, 
Adjusted R
2
 = .23) of the variance in ‘dissocial tendencies’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F1) and 
‘negative views towards others’ (i.e. PAPA-1 F2) respectively. Both models were 
significant: ‘Dissocial tendencies’ (F(1, 391) = 78.0, MSE = 4071.7, p< .001) and 
‘negative views towards others’ (F(1, 391) = 117.6, MSE = 1964.5, p< .001). Negative 
affect positively predicted the two PAPA-1 factors (for both, t ≥ 8.83, p< .001). In this 
instance, as negative affect increased, scores on both factors also increased. 
 
LSRP: Overall, forensic and student samples 
 
In terms of the LSRP, negative affect accounted for 31% (R
2
 = .31, Adjusted R
2
 = .31) 
of variance in psychopathy defined by the LSRP for the overall sample (F(1, 390) = 
176.3, MSE = 15340.3, p< .001). Negative affect also explained 30% of variance in 
psychopathy for the forensic sample (R
2
 = .30, Adjusted R
2
 = .30) and 31% for the 
student sample (R
2
 = .31, Adjusted R
2
 = .30). This was significant: Forensic (F(1, 97) = 
42.1, MSE = 4150.3, p< .001) and student (F(1, 291) = 128.6, MSE = 10157.6, p< 
.001). Psychopathy assessed by the LSRP was positively predicted by negative affect 
across samples (for all, t ≥ 6.48, p< .001). Thus for all, as negative affect increased, 
psychopathy scores on the LSRP increased. 
 
LSRP factors: Overall sample 
 
Both primary psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F1) and secondary psychopathy (i.e. LSRP F2) 
were positively predicted by negative affect (for both, t ≥ 9.03, p< .001), indicating that 
as negative affect increased, psychopathy scores on both LSRP factors also increased. 
Negative affect explained 24% (R
2
 = .24, Adjusted R
2
 = .24) of the variance in 
psychopathy for primary psychopathy and 17% (R
2
 = .17, Adjusted R
2
 = .17) for 
secondary psychopathy. This was significant: Primary psychopathy (F(1, 392) = 123.3, 
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MSE = 4143.4, p< .001) and secondary psychopathy (F(1, 392) = 81.5, MSE = 1086.7, 
p< .001). 
 
This Chapter will now examine whether level of psychopathy has an influence on 
negative affect measured by the SPANA-2. Analyses will be completed for both PAPA-
1 and LSRP. 
 
Further exploration of negative affect in psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the 
LSRP 
 
A series of independent samples t-tests were performed to determine whether negative 
affect was influenced by level of psychopathy.  
 
Using the same median split adopted when examining cognitive schema, participants 
were split into ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of psychopathy. To remind the reader, a median 
split of 121.0 was adopted for the PAPA-1. Participants in the ‘high’ category had an 
average PAPA-1 score greater than 121.0 and those in the ‘low’ category had a PAPA-1 
score of less than or equal to 121.0.  
 
The LSRP had a median split of 52.0 and those scoring above this were classified into 
the ‘high’ group and those at or below into the ‘low’ group. 
 
Using the median splits, descriptive statistics were calculated for negative affect. Mean 
scores for level of PAPA-1 and LSRP are displayed in Table 27. 
 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for negative affect dependent on level of psychopathy 
assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP (nb. Standard deviation in parenthesis). 
 
Measure Level n Negative affect 
    
PAPA-1 High 187 81.28 (17.22) 
 Low 189 61.48 (15.37) 
    
LSRP High 181 80.24 (16.95) 
 Low 204 63.28 (17.15) 
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Analyses revealed that there was a significant difference in level of PAPA-1 and LSRP 
on negative affect: PAPA-1 (t (374) = 11.77, p< .001) and LSRP (t (383) = 9.74, p< 
.001). Participants in the ‘high’ psychopathy category had higher levels of negative 
affect than individuals in the ‘low’ category. This was the case for both measures. 
 
8.11 Summary of results 
 
To summarise the findings outlined here, the new self-report measure, the PAPA-1, had 
acceptable levels of internal consistency across samples and demonstrated concurrent 
validity with an existing self-report measure of psychopathy, the LSRP. Factor analysis 
of the PAPA-1 extracted a two-component structure underpinned by ‘dissocial 
tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’. Factor analysis of the LSRP also 
identified a two-component solution. However in this instance, the two factors 
resembled primary (i.e. selfish, uncaring and manipulative posture towards others) and 
secondary (i.e. impulsivity and a self-defeating lifestyle) psychopathy. 
 
In terms of cognition, positive and negative cognitive schema correlated with, and 
predicted psychopathy assessed by PAPA-1 and the LSRP across samples. Individuals 
with high levels of PAPA-1 were found to have higher levels of positive and negative 
cognitive schema. This was also the case for psychopathy defined by the LSRP. 
 
Negative affect correlated with, and predicted psychopathy assessed by the PAPA-1 and 
the LSRP across samples. Those with ‘high’ levels of PAPA-1 were also identified as 
having more negative affect than those with ‘low’ levels of psychopathy. This was 
replicated for the LSRP.  
 
Thus, cognitive schema (positive and negative) and negative affect are integral aspects 
of psychopathy defined by both expert consensus (i.e. the PAPA-1) and pre-existing 
definitions (i.e. the LSRP). This Chapter will now move on to discuss the results in 
relation to the academic literature and psychological theory. 
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8.12 Discussion 
 
One aim of the present study was to evaluate the new self-report measure of 
psychopathy, the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment – version one 
(PAPA-1), and establish the components underpinning the disorder defined through 
expert consensus. Exploratory factor analysis extracted a two-component solution from 
PAPA-1 comprising ‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’. This 
was similar to the two-factor model of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; 
Hare, 1991), in that ‘negative views towards others’ was similar to the interpersonal 
component (i.e. PCL-R F1), and ‘dissocial tendencies’ to the chronically unstable, 
antisocial and socially deviant lifestyle component (i.e. PCL-R F2).  
 
Factor analysis of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) also extracted a 
two-component solution. This was consistent with that identified by Levenson et al. 
(1995) and Lynam et al. (1999), in that the measure was underpinned by a ‘primary 
psychopathy’ scale (i.e. selfish, uncaring and manipulative posture towards others) and 
a ‘secondary psychopathy’ scale (i.e. impulsivity and a self-defeating lifestyle). 
Replication of the Levenson et al. (1995) and Lynam et al. (1999) findings provide 
further support for the validity of the LSRP. 
 
Acceptable levels of internal consistency were found for the factors underpinning 
PAPA-1, and indeed for the measure as a whole. As well as demonstrating acceptable 
levels of internal consistency, PAPA-1 was also found to be a valid assessment of 
psychopathy in that it correlated with a pre-existing self-report measure; it positively 
correlated with the LSRP. This demonstrated concurrent validity and supported the 
prediction that the PAPA will positively associate with existing psychopathy measures 
(e.g. the LSRP).  
 
Further support for construct validity of PAPA-1 was evidenced through the prevalence 
of psychopathy identified in participants by this measure. Consistent with the literature 
(e.g. Strachan, 1993; Forth et al. 1996; Huss, 2009), PAPA-1 identified levels of 
psychopathy to be higher in prisoners than students. This was replicated for LSRP 
psychopathy. 
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PAPA-1 was also found to exhibit similar relationships with cognition to those 
identified by Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012). It positively correlated with positive and 
negative cognitive schema defined using the Schemata: Positive and Negative, and 
Affect Assessment – version two (SPANA-2). This provided additional evidence of 
construct validity and supported the prediction that the PAPA will positively associate 
with both negative and positive cognitive schema. 
 
A further aim of this study was to understand how explicit cognition is associated with 
psychopathy using an expert consensus definition (i.e. PAPA-1) and pre-existing 
definitions (i.e. the LSRP). As noted, analyses revealed that both positive and negative 
cognitive schema positively correlated with self-report psychopathy across samples. 
The only exception to this was ‘easy going’, which did not significantly correlate with 
PAPA-1. Nevertheless, a clear role for cognitive schema in psychopathy was identified 
supporting existing research (e.g. Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012).  
 
The notion that cognitive schema correlated with psychopathy extends its application 
beyond that of personality disorder. Cognitive schemas, including Early Maladaptive 
Schemas (EMS; Young et al. 2003), have been readily applied to personality disorder 
(e.g. Reeves & Taylor, 2007; Carr & Francis, 2010; Lawrence et al. 2011), but less so to 
psychopathy (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012). EMS focus solely on negative beliefs, 
neglecting positive characteristics.  
 
This study therefore broadens the description of schema as a clear role was found for 
both positive and negative cognition, with individuals exhibiting ‘high’ levels of 
psychopathy also presenting with high levels of positive and negative cognitive schema. 
Thus, the prediction stating that individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will 
present with more negative cognitive schemas than those with lower levels of 
psychopathy was supported. However, findings did not support the prediction that those 
with higher levels of psychopathy will present with fewer positive cognitive schemas. 
As noted, individuals with ‘high’ levels of psychopathy were found to exhibit more 
positive cognitive schemas than those with ‘low’ levels of psychopathy, thus indicating 
that cognitive schemas in psychopathy are not purely maladaptive and may also contain 
positive aspects.    
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The findings highlighted here also support early conceptualisations of the disorder, such 
as descriptions provided by Cleckley (1976) and Schneider (cited in Werlinder, 1978). 
Both Cleckley and Schneider proposed that not all psychopathic individuals were 
involved in criminality and could also be found residing in the community (Stover, 
2007). Thus, the finding that psychopathy is underpinned by positive cognitive schema, 
and indeed positive characteristics, is consistent with the notion of ‘successful 
psychopathy’ and that the disorder is not always associated with negative and antisocial 
traits.     
 
As expected, negative cognitive schema significantly correlated and predicted self-
report psychopathy across sample and at factor level. This finding is in agreement with 
Blackburn’s (2003) Cognitive-Interpersonal Theory of Psychopathy, as this model 
states that individuals with the disorder have a distorted belief system originating from 
early developmental challenges and unhelpful interactions with others. It is this 
dysfunctional belief system that Blackburn (2003) associated hostile or negative 
expectations of others and the world, which would be conducive to beliefs that others 
are abusive, uncaring or not worth bothering with. Interestingly, the schema ‘uncaring 
others’ negatively predicted PAPA-1 psychopathy in the forensic sample. However this 
finding only just reached statistical significance and may instead reflect the low sample 
size for this population. 
 
Positive cognitive schema also predicted self-report psychopathy. Whilst increased 
levels of ‘calm controlled’ and ‘caring’ predicted higher levels of PAPA-1 and LSRP 
psychopathy for the overall sample, increased ‘happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ 
predicted decreased levels of the construct. Thus, in terms of positive cognition, 
findings are mixed and suggest that not all positive schemas are conducive to 
psychopathy. Nevertheless, the findings highlighted here again reinforce the notion that 
cognitive schemas in psychopathy are not always maladaptive. 
 
Analyses revealed that both positive and negative cognitive schema correlated with 
psychopathy in a similar manner across samples. This suggests that cognition in 
psychopathy is not sample-specific and supports the view of schemas as fundamental 
units of personality associated with certain developmental experiences consistent across 
psychopathology (Beck, 1967; Beck et al. 2004; Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012). 
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as the regression analyses 
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found positive cognition to account for more explained variance in psychopathy in 
students than prisoners. Whilst this was expected, as students are arguably likely to have 
more positive beliefs about the self, others and the world than those unable to conform 
to societal rules, further research is required to determine whether this finding was an 
artifact of the sample composition. This is not to say however, that prisoners have less 
positive beliefs, they may just find it difficult to access these (Wallace et al. 2000).  
 
At factor-level, positive and negative cognitive schema demonstrated unexpected 
relationships with the two components underpinning PAPA-1: ‘Abandoned’, 
‘worthless’, ‘intolerant of others’, ‘happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ all predicted 
‘dissocial tendencies’ in a manner that was consistent with understandings of 
psychopathy. However, ‘calm controlled’ and ‘caring’ positively predicted this 
component, which is contrary to the characteristics normally associated with dissocial 
tendencies (i.e. impulsivity, reckless disregard of others, antisocial behaviour).  
 
This finding may reflect biases in the method used to collect data; individuals with 
psychopathy are associated with increased levels of deception and lying (Snowdon et al. 
2004) and this makes reliance on self-report problematic due to the possibility of 
malingering and impression management. Participants may have therefore rated 
themselves as more caring and calm to provide a positive impression. This explanation 
can also be applied to ‘negative views towards others’ to explain the unusual predictions 
exhibited by cognitive schema with this component.     
 
Positive and negative cognitive schema also predicted primary and secondary subscales 
of the LSRP in a manner that was inconsistent with understandings of the construct. In 
contrast to Wilks-Riley and Ireland (2012), who found positive cognitive schema to 
predict primary psychopathy but not secondary psychopathy, results of the present study 
indicated that positive cognition predicted both subscales. Whilst this provides further 
support for a role of positive cognitive schema in psychopathy (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 
2001), predictions with secondary psychopathy are questionable considering this scale 
reflects negative characteristics and antisocial tendencies. The inconsistent findings 
outlined here may be attributed to the low base rate of psychopathy identified in the 
participants sampled.   
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Nevertheless, positive and negative cognition were found to be integral aspects of 
psychopathy consistent across samples. The findings for positive cognitive schema have 
clear implications for clinical practice, specifically in terms of formulation and 
treatment. The inclusion of positive cognitive schema allows for an optimistic-based 
approach, which highlights the client’s strengths as opposed to weaknesses when 
tackling core beliefs (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012).  
 
In addition to cognition, the present study also aimed to explore negative affect in self-
report psychopathy. Negative affect, assessed via the SPANA-2, positively correlated 
with, and predicted psychopathy across samples and at factor-level. Thus, a clear role 
for negative affect that was shared across samples was identified. The prediction stating 
that the PAPA will positively associate with negative affect was supported. Participants 
with ’high’ levels of psychopathy also had statistically significant higher levels of 
negative affect than those with ‘low’ levels of the disorder (on the basis of median 
splits). This finding supported the prediction that individuals with higher levels of 
psychopathy will present with more schemas associated with negative affect than those 
with lower levels of psychopathy.  
 
Beck’s (1987) Theory of Emotional Disorders could account for the high level of 
negative affect associated with psychopathy in the present study. Beck (1987) argued 
that maladaptive cognitive schemas arising from distorted self-evaluations and biased 
attributions of causality impair an individual’s ability to understand, experience, and 
react appropriately to other’s feelings and circumstances. As a clear role for 
maladaptive cognitive schema was found for psychopathy, such processes are likely to 
sustain and promote higher levels of negative affect, such as anger, as other individuals 
react negatively towards the ‘psychopath’s’ inappropriate responding governed by their 
dysfunctional beliefs system. Whilst the present study did not directly examine the link 
between negative cognition and negative affect outlined here, findings suggest it could 
be a worthy area of further exploration.  
 
Further analyses are required to explore this interaction, and indeed affect in 
psychopathy in more detail. The present study examined affect through five self-report 
items focusing solely on negative affect, thus ignoring other aspects of affective 
processing, such as identifying and evaluating emotion, recognised as important in 
psychopathy (e.g. Dawel et al. 2012; Glass & Newman, 2009). A more detailed 
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examination would allow for theories such as the Violence Inhibition Mechanism 
Model (Blair, 1995) and the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957) to be 
applied.  This is the focus of the ensuing study where cognition and affect can be 
examined in more detail, allowing for further exploration of the PAPA-1. 
 
8.12 Limitations of the study 
 
As noted, assessing psychopathy and psychopathic functioning via self-report may 
prove problematic given that those with psychopathy have been characterised as 
manipulative and deceptive (Roberts & Coid, 2007). In order to manage potential 
reporting biases, such as malingering and impression management, the inclusion of an 
implicit assessment to examine psychopathic processing would prove useful.  This was 
not included in the current study but would further understanding of the role of 
cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy.  
 
Students and prisoners may also have anticipated the purpose of the measures and 
consciously manipulated their responses to skew the results, thus failing to provide a 
true reflection of psychopathic processing. This could be prevented in the ensuing study 
by setting a fixed time limit for the completion of measures. None of the measures used 
in this study had a timing element. As noted by Hoaken, Shaughnessyn and Pihl (2003), 
a time limit would bring out impulsive responding and interrupt social-information 
processing. Such individuals may become overwhelmed by the time limit and the 
response options, forcing them to draw upon their natural tendencies. 
 
The present study focused solely on cognitive schema and negative affect, ignoring 
other aspects of psychopathic processing, such as response modulation, information 
processing, moral reasoning and the identification and evaluation of emotion. The 
inclusion of explicit and implicit measures to assess these processes would allow for a 
more holistic understanding of psychopathic processing and in doing so, determining 
the components required for a comprehensive assessment of psychopathy that is 
sensitive to both cognition and affect. Extending these findings to other populations, 
such as psychiatric patients, would also allow for the PAPA to be applied and further 
refined. 
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The SPANA-2 provided a crude outline of negative affect, as it captured this through 
five items alone. This limits the extent to which negative affect can be applied to 
psychopathy. However, findings highlighted in the present study are sufficient to 
suggest that there is a clear role for affective processing in psychopathy and this should 
be explored in more detail. 
 
8.13 Concluding statement 
 
Findings suggest that PAPA-1 is thus far presenting as a reliable and valid measure of 
psychopathy in forensic and student samples. The PAPA correlated with, and was 
predicted by positive and negative cognitive schema, and negative affect. Findings 
acknowledged a clear role for positive cognitive schema in psychopathy, thus 
questioning conceptions of the disorder that focus purely on negative characteristics.  
 
The study provides evidence that cognition and affect are central to psychopathy 
defined by expert consensus and pre-existing definitions. However, the present study 
was limited to the exploration of psychopathic processing via cognitive schema and 
negative affect. Further research is therefore required to broaden this understanding to 
include implicit processing. The ensuing study will investigate this, and at the same 
time identify the components required to provide a thorough assessment of psychopathy 
that accounts further for cognition and affect.   
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Chapter 9. 
STUDY 3: IMPLICIT COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE 
PROCESSING IN PSYCHOPATHY: EXAMINING 
STUDENT AND CLINICAL SAMPLES 
 
 
9.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
The present study will continue to evaluate the Psychopathic Processing and Personality 
Assessment (PAPA) across populations, including a student sample and a clinical 
sample of high secure psychiatric patients. 
 
The study aims to use the PAPA in combination with an implicit assessment of 
cognition and affect in psychopathy (i.e. the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle 
Assessment, ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012) and a clinical measure of the disorder (i.e. 
the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, PCL:SV; Hart et al. 1995), to examine 
how cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy manifest at both an implicit and 
explicit level. This will enable the study to determine how psychopathic processing 
relates to an expert understanding of the construct (See Chapter seven) and clinical 
methods of assessing for psychopathy. 
 
The present study aims to explore how implicit cognitive and affective processing 
relates to psychopathy and at the same time, establish whether implicit measures will 
enhance the assessment of the disorder. The incorporation of measures that attend to 
both cognition and affect will allow for an examination of the interplay between the two 
processing systems. 
 
The study also aims to identify the components required to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of psychopathy, an assessment that is sensitive to both cognitive and 
affective processing.  
 
This chapter will outline the participants, materials and procedure adopted. Findings 
will be presented along with a discussion and limitations. This will be followed by a 
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conclusion, identifying implications for clinical practice and recommendations for 
additional research. 
 
9.2 Participants 
 
Ninety-one participants were sampled. Fifty were students and 41 were psychiatric 
patients. All participants were male. The response rate for the student sample was 96% 
and for the clinical sample, 37%.  
 
Of the 111 patients approached 41 did not consent (37%), 14 were transferred to another 
hospital during recruitment or were on trial leave (13%), eight were deemed unwell by 
their Responsible Clinician (7%), six were transferred to an unsuitable ward (5%), and 
one withdrew (1%).  
 
All patients were recruited from a high secure psychiatric hospital. Patients were 
approached on low and medium dependency wards. Those on high dependency wards 
or in seclusion were not sampled due to their increased risk and mental health. Patients 
on neurocognitive wards were also excluded from taking part, as they did not have the 
cognitive ability to engage. Average age of patients sampled was 39.8 years (SD = 
10.0).  
 
Students were recruited at a North West university. Average age of students was 22.5 
years (SD = 4.4).  
 
9.3 Materials 
 
All participants received a study coversheet
72
. This provided information on the 
research, including aims, procedure, details of the measures used, time scale, consent 
and withdrawal process, confidentiality, and data protection. Participants also received a 
consent form, which they had to sign prior to taking part.  
 
For the clinical sample, the Responsible Clinician had to provide written consent before 
the patient was approached. This was to ensure that the patient was suitable. 
                                                        
72
 Appendix five provides copies of the materials used in study three, with the exception of the ACL and 
PCL:SV as these are copyrighted and therefore cannot be included. However, a brief overview of these 
two measures has been provided to aid understanding. 
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Participants had to complete three measures: 
 
Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment – version two (PAPA-2): 
Following study two (See Chapter eight), thirteen items were removed from the PAPA 
that did not load across the factor analyses. Four items were also reworded as it was felt 
that the language used was too complex and required simplifying:  
 
 “As a person, I have always stayed the same” was changed to “As a person, I 
have never changed” 
 “I can allow my feelings to interfere with my decisions” to “I can allow my 
feelings to interfere with my decisions (e.g. cloud my judgment)”  
 “I can often find myself viewing others as nothing more than objects” to “I 
can find myself viewing others as nothing more than objects or things to be 
used” 
 “I can use illegal drugs more than most people I know” to “I use illegal 
drugs, or those that are not prescribed to me, more than most people I know”   
 
Four items were added to the measure to reflect the advances in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - version five (DSM-V; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), which had just been released. This included, “I am quick to respond 
in a hostile manner to threats or insults”, “I often feel socially close to others [reverse]”, 
“If I behave in an aggressive manner I often feel bad about it afterwards”, and “I often 
feel emotionally close to others [reverse]”.  
 
Thus, the measure now contained 45 items
73
. The rating system and instructions 
remained the same, with participants rating each item via a five-point likert scale 
ranging from very unlike me (1) to very like me (5). Eleven items were reversed to 
control for response sets.  
 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised: Screening Version (PCL:SV; Hart et al. 1995): The 
PCL:SV is a 12-item screening assessment of clinical psychopathy derived from the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991). The measure is based on a subset 
                                                        
73
 Item 8 (“As a person, I have never changed”) provides an assessment of stability and was not included 
in the scoring of the PAPA-2. 
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of PCL-R items that can be administered to community, forensic and clinical samples. 
A collateral review of background information (e.g. health records) is not required.  
 
The 12 items are grouped into two factors. Whilst factor one represents a callous, 
selfish, and remorseless use of others, factor two resembles a chronically unstable 
antisocial lifestyle. Factors one and two mirror PCL-R factors one and two respectively.  
  
Each item is rated via a three-point scale: Item does not apply (0); Item applies to a 
certain extent (1); and Item applies (2). Scores range from 0 to 24, with 13 as the 
recommended cut-off for clinical psychopathy (Hart et al. 1995).  
 
Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012)
74
: This is 
an interview that utilises collateral information to provide an assessment of general 
functioning across three broad domains; Affect, Cognition and Lifestyle. It can be 
administered to determine the presence of psychopathic functioning at an implicit and 
explicit level. The ACL assesses psychopathy via an interview, collateral information 
[completed for clinical sample only], timed case scenarios, self-report, and an 
evaluation of presentation during assessment (observation).  
 
Explicit cognition is examined via interview questions that address characteristics such 
as, ‘a lack of guilt/remorse and willingness to exploit and dominate’ (e.g. “If your 
actions have a bad impact on others how do you feel?”) and ‘cognitive impulsivity’. 
(e.g. “To what extent do you find it difficult to keep your mind focused on tasks?”). 
Participants’ responses were rated on a four-point likert scale where (0) suggests that a 
particular characteristic of explicit cognition was not evident and (3) indicates that it 
was extremely evident. Higher scores on this aspect of the ACL are indicative of 
psychopathic [explicit] cognitive processing. 
 
Implicit cognition however, is assessed via tests that focus on ‘making moral 
judgments’ and ‘a tendency for hostile responding’. This includes a conditional 
reasoning test (hostile responding) and moral judgment scenarios.  
 
The moral judgment task presented participants with three moral dilemmas. All 
participants were required to assign a percentage (0 to 100%) to indicate the extent to 
                                                        
74
 See Appendix five for an overview of the ACL. 
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which they agreed with each scenario. A score of 100% is suggestive of more support 
for a moral outcome in dilemmas. As noted, there were three moral dilemmas and 
therefore the maximum percentage that an individual could score on this task was 
300%.  
 
Percentage figures were recorded along with the number of reasons participants 
provided to support their answer, and the time it took to give these. According to the 
scoring criteria set by Ireland and Ireland (2012), psychopathic individuals should 
generate fewer reasons for each moral dilemma. Their initial response may be 
impulsive, but then they should take longer than ‘healthy’ controls to generate 
additional responses.  
 
For the hostile responding task, participants read through ten cases and selected one 
response from a series of four to account for the actions exhibited by individuals in each 
scenario. Out of the four available responses, one option was hostile, one was pro-social 
and two were neutral. This is a conditional reasoning test and is “good at managing 
intentional faking, providing that clients are not informed of the exact nature of the test” 
(Ireland & Ireland, 2012, p. 19).  
 
The hostile responding task was timed and participants had one minute to respond to a 
scenario. Participants scored one point for each hostile answer, one point for each pro-
social answer, and zero for other responses. Scores on this task ranged from 0 to 10, 
with higher scores indicating a preferred response type. For example, higher scores on 
hostile responding suggest that the participant is more likely to identify with hostility in 
ambiguous situations. 
 
Like explicit cognition, explicit affect was also assessed via interview questions. These 
questions explore characteristics such as, ‘recognising emotions’ (e.g. “How would you 
describe emotion?”), ‘callousness/lack of empathy’ (e.g. “How have you shown you 
have cared?”), ‘emotional impulsivity’ (e.g. “How frequently do your emotions 
change?”), and ‘anger/irritability’ (e.g. “What sorts of things happen to make you 
annoyed?”). Participants’ answers for this aspect of the ACL were rated on a four-point 
likert scale where (0) suggests that a particular characteristic of explicit affect was not 
evident and (3) indicates that it was extremely evident. Higher scores suggest the 
presence of psychopathic [explicit] affective processing. 
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The ACL investigates implicit affect through tests that address ‘identifying emotion’ 
and ‘evaluating emotion’. The identifying emotion task consisted of three paragraphs. 
Each paragraph contained seven emotion words (e.g. anxious, failure, angry). 
Participants had to read each paragraph and find all 21 emotion words without making 
an error. Participants were timed on how long it took them to complete the activity. The 
number of emotion words identified and time taken was recorded for each participant. 
  
Participants received a score of one for each emotion word identified. One point was 
deducted for each incorrect word selected. A maximum score of 21 could be achieved if 
all emotion words were identified and no errors were made. If no emotion words were 
identified, or participants made more errors than emotion words identified, a score of 
zero was given. A low score on this test indicates problems when identifying emotion. 
 
For the evaluating emotion task, participants read seven short stories and ranked them in 
order ranging from ‘very sad’ to ‘very happy’. Participants were told not to make any 
errors and that they would be timed. All participants started with a maximum score of 
seven. One score was deducted from this for each misplaced scenario. Thus, scores 
ranged from 0 to seven, with those participants making no errors achieving a score of 
seven. A low score on this task indicates problems when feeling/evaluating emotion.  
 
Participants also had to indicate via a five-point likert scale ranging from (1) none at all 
to (5) a lot, how much emotion each scenario produced in them and how much they felt 
it would produce in others. Total scores were calculated for this activity, one for their 
own feelings and one for others’ feelings. Scores ranged from 0 to 35 for each, with 
higher scores indicating stronger feelings.  
 
Participant performance throughout the measure was rated on a four-point likert scale 
where (0) suggests that a particular characteristic (e.g. a tendency for hostile 
responding) was not evident and (3) indicates that it was extremely evident. A score of 
three highlights the presence of a characteristic in the participant’s general functioning 
profile. Total scores on the general functioning profile ranged from 0 to 177, with the 
total decreasing to 111 when the collateral review was not considered (i.e. for the 
student sample).  
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Scores are generated to provide a profile in line with the proposed DSM-V
75
 diagnostic 
criteria of psychopathic personality. Thus, a higher profile score is indicative of more 
severe levels of psychopathy. The profile assesses psychopathy through the following 
traits: Callousness (Antagonism); Aggression (Antagonism); Manipulativeness 
(Antagonism); Hostility (Antagonism); Deceitfulness (Antagonism); Narcissism 
(Antagonism); Irresponsibility (Disinhibition); Recklessness (Disinhibition); and 
Impulsivity (Disinhibition) and was developed to be consistent with accepted 
definitions of psychopathy.  
 
9.4 Procedure 
 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Central Lancashire and the National 
Research Ethics Service (NRES): North West, Manchester South.  
 
The student sample was recruited via posters placed around the university campus, 
specifically in recreational areas (e.g. canteens and common rooms). This instructed 
students to email the researcher for additional information. Students expressing an 
interest were sent a study coversheet enabling them to make an informed decision on 
their participation.  
 
A convenient time and date for the research was arranged with students who confirmed 
that they were satisfied with the study protocol. All students were required to provide 
written consent. The research was completed in the laboratory rooms in the School of 
Psychology. Students, with the exception of two, completed the measures in one session 
lasting approximately 90 minutes. The exceptions completed the research across two 
sessions.  
 
In terms of the clinical sample, patients’ Responsible Clinicians were initially contacted 
to provide written consent. Upon receipt of this, patients were given the study 
coversheet by ward staff. The researcher visited each patient two days later to answer 
any questions and obtain written consent if they were happy with the study protocol and 
wished to participate.  
 
                                                        
75
 The ACL also provides a general functioning profile in line with the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for 
dissocial personality disorder. However for the purpose of this research, this study will focus on the 
DSM-V profile of psychopathy. 
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On average, patients completed the research across three sessions, with each session 
lasting approximately 40 minutes. During sessions the researcher was assisted with a 
member of ward staff to minimise risk, as the researcher was not familiar with each 
patient’s presentation. Accompanying staff were briefed prior to the start of each 
session to explain the purpose of the research and maintain confidentiality.  
 
Upon completion, all participants were debriefed and received £10.00 for their time. 
The study debrief provided participants with additional information on the research, 
contact details of support agencies and the research team, and the process for obtaining 
a copy of the research findings. 
 
9.5 Results 
 
This section will present the findings of the study. The data screening process will be 
outlined followed by the internal consistency of each measure adopted and preliminary 
analyses investigating the prevalence of psychopathy in the populations sampled. The 
PAPA-2 will be evaluated across samples. The results section will then explore the role 
of implicit and explicit cognitive and affective processing in PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
defined psychopathy. This will allow the study to also comment on the interplay 
between cognition and affect. Results will conclude by determining the components 
required to provide a comprehensive assessment of psychopathy.   
 
9.6 Data screening 
 
All variables were examined for data entry errors, missing values, and the occurrence of 
multivariate and univariate outliers. Thirty values were identified as missing. Three of 
these were found on the PAPA-2 and 27 on the ACL. A decision was made not to 
exclude or amend the scores of those with missing values on the ACL as this data was 
categorical and estimating values would not be appropriate. The three missing values on 
the PAPA-2 related only to the clinical sample (there was no missing data on the 
PAPA-2 for the student sample). Little’s MCAR indicated that this data was missing at 
random (x
2
 = 109.469, df = 132, p> .05) and it was replaced using Expectation 
Maximisation. No multivariate outliers were identified. In terms of univariate outliers, 
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two values
76
 were found for the clinical sample and made less deviant by modifying 
their overall value to one unit larger than the next most extreme value within the data 
set. Ninety-one cases were put forward for further statistical analysis.  
 
Prior to conducting the following analyses, tests were performed to check that each 
analysis met all necessary assumptions. No violations were found. 
 
A flowchart (Figure 4) has been provided to guide the reader through the results section 
of this Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
76
 One value was identified on variable ACL 1F (Time) and the other on ACL 2C (Time). 
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Figure 5: A flowchart illustrating the contents of the results section for study three. 
Study three: Results 
Preliminary analyses Examining the internal consistency of 
PAPA-2, the PCL:SV and ACL 
Evaluating PAPA-2 
Examining the prevalence of PAPA-2, 
PCL:SV and ACL psychopathy 
Examining the factor structure of  
PAPA-2 
Examining the validity of PAPA-2 
Examining the role of 
explicit and implicit 
cognition in psychopathy 
Examining the relationship between 
implicit and explicit cognition and 
PAPA-2 and PCL:SV psychopathy 
Predicting PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
psychopathy from implicit and explicit 
cognition 
Further exploration of implicit cognitive 
processing in PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
psychopathy 
Examining the role of 
explicit and implicit 
affect in psychopathy 
Determining the components required to provide a comprehensive assessment 
of psychopathy 
Examining the relationship between 
implicit and explicit affect and PAPA-2 
and PCL:SV psychopathy 
Predicting PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
psychopathy from implicit and explicit 
affect 
Further exploration of implicit affective 
processing in PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
psychopathy 
 
Summary of results 
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9.7 Preliminary analyses 
 
This section refers to the internal consistency of the measures adopted and the 
prevalence of psychopathy in the samples studied. To remind readers, the following 
measures were administered: the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment 
– version two (PAPA-2), the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) and 
the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL)
77
.  
  
Internal consistency of the PAPA-2, PCL:SV and ACL 
 
Table 28 presents the internal consistency of the measures administered. It displays 
Cronbach’s alpha for each measure at an overall and subscale level across samples.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
77
 The ACL provides for an overall rating of psychopathy but also examination of implicit and explicit 
affect and cognition.  
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Table 28: Internal consistency of the PAPA-2, PCL:SV and ACL. 
 
 Internal consistency (α) 
 Number 
of items 
Overall 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
Student 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
Clinical 
(n) 
Items negatively 
correlating with the α 
PAPA-2        
Total 44 .81 (91) 16, 22, 26, 28, 36, 37, 40, 
45 
.82 (50) 16, 22, 23, 26, 36, 37, 40, 
45 
.82 (41) 3, 16, 28, 30, 36, 37, 40 
        
PCL:SV        
Total 12 .92 (91) - .77 (50) - .68 (41) - 
F1: Callous, selfish and 
remorseless use of others 
6 .85 (91) - .83 (50) - .62 (41) - 
F2: Chronically unstable 
antisocial lifestyle 
6 .89 (91) - .54 (50) - .64 (41) - 
        
ACL        
Total 37 .93 (88) 4H, 4I .90 (50) 4I .86 (38) 4C, 4E, 4I 
Callousness  5 .84 (88) - .76 (50) - .76 (38) - 
Aggression 5 .70 (90) - .64 (50) 4D .60 (40) 4D 
Manipulativeness 4 46 (90) - .71 (50) - .12 (40) 3H 
Hostility 2 .06 (91) - .03 (50) - .03 (41) - 
Deceitfulness 1 - - - - - - 
Narcissism 2 .64 (90) - .66 (50) - .64 (40) - 
Irresponsibility 1 - - - - - - 
Recklessness 5 .68 (91) 4H .56 (50) - .75 (41) 4H 
Impulsivity 4 .46 (90) 4I .51 (50) - .26 (40) 4I 
Note. When calculating reliability for the ACL, those items addressing the collateral review were not included. A collateral review was not completed for the student sample. Thus, 
in order to calculate alphas for the overall sample, these items were ignored. SPSS was unable to calculate alphas for ‘deceitfulness’ and ‘irresponsibility’, as these subscales were 
underpinned by one item. 
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Acceptable levels of internal consistency were found for PAPA-2 and this was also the 
case when the data was split into student and clinical samples.  
 
The PCL:SV demonstrated an acceptable level of internal consistency across samples. 
When split into factors one (i.e. callous, selfish and remorseless use of others) and two 
(i.e. chronic and unstable antisocial lifestyle), reliability of the PCL:SV decreased and 
this may be due to the number of items underpinning each factor. However, students 
were an exception to this, as reliability was higher for factor one when compared to 
factor two and overall.  
 
The ACL had a high level of reliability overall. When examining the subscales (DSM-
V), internal consistency ranged from .06 to .84 for the overall sample, and from .03 to 
.76 for clinical and student samples. ‘Hostility’ had the lowest level of reliability for all 
and this may reflect the small number of items underpinning this subscale. Internal 
consistency for the ACL subscales was not expected to be high due to this. 
 
Prevalence of psychopathy 
 
This section presents the prevalence across the samples studied. Psychopathy is defined 
via the PAPA-2, PCL:SV and ACL. Table 29 displays the mean psychopathy scores 
overall and for student and clinical samples. Higher scores on each scale indicate higher 
levels of psychopathy. Table 29 also presents skewness and kurtosis values for all three 
psychopathy measures. 
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics for the overall sample, and student and clinical samples. 
 
 Psychopathy scores 
 Overall Clinical Student 
Measure  
Mean 
 
SD (n) 
Skewness/ 
Kurtosis 
 
Mean 
 
SD (n) 
Skewness/ 
Kurtosis 
 
Mean 
 
SD (n) 
Skewness/ 
Kurtosis 
PAPA-2          
Total 108.90 19.57 (90) .33/-.37 112.30 20.84 (40) -.06/-.57 106.18 18.25 (50) .67/.33 
          
PCL:SV          
Total 7.90 7.04 (91) .39/-1.44 14.63 4.22 (41) -.74/-.47 2.38 2.72 (50) 1.70/3.15 
F1: Callous, selfish and 
remorseless use of others 
3.49 3.48 (91) .53/-1.15 6.36 2.64 (41) -.39/-.30 1.14 2.01 (50) 2.39/5.84 
F2: Chronically unstable antisocial 
lifestyle 
4.41 4.06 (91) .48/-1.31 8.27 2.67 (41) -.73/-.24 1.24 1.33 (50) .88/.14 
          
ACL          
Total 24.78 17.49 (88) .57/-.75 38.53 14.12 (38) -.07/-.42 14.34 11.61 (50) 1.73/3.67 
Callousness 4.32  3.86 (88) .90/-.05 6.95 3.78 (38) .40/-.84 2.32 2.48 (50) 1.34/1.08 
Aggression 3.13 2.96 (90) .91/.03 4.88 2.98 (40) .33/-.48 1.74 2.10 (50) 1.70/3.07 
Manipulativeness 1.26 1.67 (90) 1.65/2.91 1.73 1.66 (40) .92/.43 .88 1.59 (50) 2.63/8.14 
Hostility 1.62 1.33 (91) .83/.60 2.02 1.31 (41) .51/-.27 1.28 1.26 (50) 1.28/2.63 
Deceitfulness .36 .71 (91) 2.04/3.71 .78 .88 (41) .92/.09 .02 .14 (50) 7.07/50.0 
Narcissism .92 1.35 (90) 1.79/2.96 .98 1.53 (40) 1.86/2.93 .88 1.21 (50) 1.62/2.54 
Irresponsibility .67 .92 (90) 1.16/.19 1.23 .97 (40) .22/-.96 .22 .58 (50) 3.19/11.33 
Recklessness 1.85 2.11 (91) 1.35/1.09 2.22 2.52 (41) 1.17/.21 1.54 1.69 (50) 1.14/.33 
Impulsivity 2.62 1.99 (90) .62/-.32 3.60 1.96 (40) .40/-.53 1.84 1.67 (50) .87/.07 
Note. As noted, a collateral review was not completed for the student sample. Thus, to allow for comparison between students and patients on the ACL, scores generated from the 
collateral review for patients were not included when calculating mean psychopathy scores. 
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For the overall sample, positive skewness indicated that data on the [total] PAPA-2, 
PCL:SV and ACL clustered towards the left; towards the low values. Kurtosis values 
also indicated a relatively flat distribution. This distribution was expected given that few 
participants should score high on psychopathy. However when examining the samples 
and the ACL components separately, the distribution of the data deviated from what 
was expected and this may relate to the low number of participants belonging to each 
population, and the small number of items underpinning each ACL subscale.  
 
Patients had higher psychopathy scores than students in relation to the PCL:SV (t 
(65.71) = -16.04, p< .001) and ACL (t (86) = -8.81, p< .001), but not the PAPA-2 (t 
(88) = -1.49, p> .05)
78
. 
 
A one-way MANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference between students 
and patients on the combined dependent variables (PCL:SV factor one and two), F(2, 
88) = 152.6, p< .001; Pillai’s Trace79 = .78. When PCL:SV factors one (i.e. callous, 
selfish and remorseless use of others) and two (i.e. chronically unstable antisocial 
lifestyle) were considered separately, using a Bonferonni adjusted alpha level of .025, a 
significant difference between samples was found for factor one (F(1, 89) = 114.7, p< 
.001) and factor two (F(1, 89) = 265.4, p< .001). An inspection of the descriptive 
statistics in Table 30 revealed that the clinical sample had higher PCL:SV factor one 
and factor two scores than the student sample. 
 
A second one-way MANOVA found a significant difference between samples on the 
combined ACL subscales, F(9, 78) = 12.9, p< .001; Pillai’s Trace = .60. When 
examining the ACL subscales separately, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.005, a significant difference between samples was found for ‘callousness’ (F(1, 86) = 
47.9, p< .001), ‘aggression’ (F(1, 86) = 35.1, p< .001), ‘deceitfulness’ (F(1, 86) = 38.3, 
p< .001), ‘irresponsibility’ (F(1, 86) = 34.4, p< .001), and ‘impulsivity (F(1, 86) = 19.4, 
p< .001)’. The clinical sample scored higher on all of these subscales when compared to 
students. There was no significant difference between samples for ‘manipulativeness’, 
‘hostility’, ‘narcissism’, and ‘recklessness’ (for all ns, p> .005). 
                                                        
78
 Sample’ was coded onto one variable (i.e. overall sample). This variable had two levels, ‘clinical’ and 
‘student’. ANOVA requires three or more levels (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and was therefore not 
appropriate. 
79
 In line with the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), Pillai’s Trace was used due to the 
small sample size (n = 91). 
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9.8 Evaluating PAPA-2    
 
This section will focus on evaluating the PAPA-2, examining its structure and validity.  
 
Prediction: 
 
The PAPA will positively associate with existing psychopathy measures (e.g. the 
PCL:SV). 
 
Factor structure of PAPA-2 
 
The PAPA-2 was subjected to a principal component analysis to determine the structure 
of psychopathy in the populations sampled. Due to the low sample size (n = 91), a 
decision was made to examine the participants as one group rather than splitting it by 
sample (i.e. clinical and student). The analysis was exploratory and additional research 
may be required to confirm the extracted factors
80
.  
 
An Oblimin rotation
81
 extracted a three-component solution explaining 20.7%, 9.9% 
and 8.5% of the variance respectively. The three components accounted for 39.1% of 
the variance for the overall sample. An inspection of the scree plot confirmed this 
structure. Ten items loaded onto component one (F1), 11 on component two (F2), and 
six on component three (F3). Seventeen items did not load onto any component, i.e. 
they did not reach a loading of .50 or above as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2013). 
 
The following items did not load onto any component (actual number in PAPA in 
parenthesis):  
 
 I am only interested in myself (1) 
 I do not feel guilty when I cause others to feel pain or hurt (2) 
 I have been described as a cruel person who does not worry about hurting others 
(9) 
                                                        
80
 The author decided not to perform a confirmatory factor analysis at this stage, as PAPA-2 was deemed 
to have too many items for this.   
81
 This rotation was performed, as the extracted components were likely to correlate with each other. 
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 I can allow my feelings to interfere with my decisions (e.g. “cloud my 
judgment”) (10) 
 I am talented at making people feel good about themselves (12) 
 I see a lot of hostility around me (13) 
 When I feel sad I can quickly make myself happy again (16) 
 I am quick to respond in a hostile manner to threats or insults (17) 
 I find it impossible to resist temptation (18) 
 I find it difficult to comfort others when they are upset (20) 
 I would describe myself as someone who is often ‘fearless’ when faced with a 
threat (21) 
 I am not bothered about others (24) 
 The world is a threatening place, you have to ‘watch your back’ (25) 
 I am often bored (29) 
 I am an aggressive person in a number of situations (33) 
 I use illegal drugs, or those that are not prescribed to me, more than most people 
I know (34) 
 I find it difficult to give emotional and personal support to others (35) 
 
Items negatively correlating with the total component loadings were removed and 
Cronbach’s alpha calculated for each factor. One item was removed from component 
one (i.e. item 5) increasing the alpha from .70 to .81. Item 5 was found to also hold 
negative inter-item correlations with the remaining items on this component.  
 
One item was also deleted from component three (i.e. item 30), again increasing the 
alpha from .61 to .82. Negative inter-item correlations between item 30 and the 
remaining items on this component were identified.  
 
No items were removed from component two and this had an alpha of .85. Thus, the 
three-component solution had an acceptable level of internal consistency. 
 
Table 30 displays the items and factor loadings, along with the Cronbach’s alpha for 
each component.  
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Table 30: Items and factor loadings for each component of PAPA-2 (nb. Cronbach's 
alpha for each component is in parenthesis). 
 
Item 
number 
Item Factor loading 
 
Component 1: Dissocial tendencies (α = .81) 
 
19. I often get intro trouble more than others .73 
43. Others would describe be as an intense person who has 
difficulty getting on with others. 
.65 
11. Others would describe me as an irritable person with 
problems controlling my temper. 
.62 
44. As a child I often got into trouble more than others. .57 
7. I often don’t think of the consequences of my actions. .57 
42. I often find people behave aggressively or in a hostile 
manner towards me. 
.57 
6. I often take chances that could be risky to me or others. .56 
39. I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a ‘con artist’ by 
those who know me. 
.52 
41. I can be unpredictable. 
 
.51 
Component 2: Negative views towards others and tendency to objectify (α = .85) 
 
36. If I do something wrong I will feel bad about it [reverse]. .75 
37. If I behave in an aggressive manner I often feel bad about 
it afterwards [reverse]. 
.71 
32. I can find myself viewing others as nothing more than 
‘objects’ or things to be used. 
.64 
4. I will use people to get what I want. .64 
3. I would describe myself as one of the most confident 
people around. 
.64 
38. I often find myself thinking that I am more important than 
others. 
.63 
27. If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly think of a way out. .57 
14. I regularly view others as lazy. .55 
40. I always accept responsibility for what I do [reverse]. .55 
15. I find most people are weak and not worth bothering with. .53 
31. I am able to commit a wide number of behaviours that, if 
caught, would get me into trouble. 
 
.50 
Component 3: Social and emotional difficulties (α = .82) 
 
45. I often feel emotionally close to others [reverse]. .84 
22. I often feel socially close to others [reverse]. .74 
23. I am a creative person who can think of more than one 
way of dealing with problems [reverse]. 
.70 
28. I often experience strong positive emotions, such as 
happiness and joy [reverse]. 
.70 
26. I often feel in touch with other people’s feelings [reverse] .60 
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‘Dissocial tendencies’ (i.e. PAPA-2 F1) positively correlated with ‘negative views 
towards others and a tendency to objectify’ (i.e. PAPA-2 F2) (r = .26, p< .05). Thus, as 
scores on ‘dissocial tendencies’ increased, scores on ‘negative views towards others and 
a tendency to objectify’ also increased. The strength of correlation between these two 
components was weak. ‘Social and emotional difficulties’ (i.e. PAPA-2 F3) did not 
correlate with ‘dissocial tendencies’ (r = .19, p> .05) or ‘negative views towards others 
and a tendency to objectify’ (r = .17, p> .05). 
 
Mean scores were calculated from items that had a loading of .50 or above and 
presented in Table 31. Higher scores indicate higher levels of that particular component. 
 
Table 31: Mean scores for the three components underpinning PAPA-2 (nb. Standard 
deviation in parenthesis). 
 
PAPA-2 subscale Mean (SD) 
F1: Dissocial tendencies 19.95 (6.90) 
F2: Negative views towards others and a 
tendency to objectify 
24.40 (7.53) 
F3: Social and emotional difficulties 12.89 (4.22) 
 
 ‘Negative views towards others and a tendency to objectify’ appeared to be the highest 
scoring PAPA-2 component for the sample as a whole (n = 91). This was followed by 
‘dissocial tendencies’ and then ‘social and emotional difficulties’. 
 
Validity of PAPA-2 
 
To establish concurrent validity, the PAPA-2 will now be correlated with the PCL:SV 
and ACL. Strength and direction of relationships between subscales will also be 
examined. Table 32 displays the correlation coefficients between these variables. 
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Table 32: Bivariate correlations between PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV, and ACL for the 
overall sample. 
 
 PAPA-2 (n) 
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Total 
 
F1: Dissocial 
tendencies 
F2: Negative views 
towards others and a 
tendency to objectify 
F3: Social and 
emotional 
difficulties 
     
PCL:SV total .39*** 
(90) 
.39*** 
(91) 
.07 
(91) 
.26* 
(91) 
F1: Callous, 
selfish and 
remorseless use 
of others 
.44*** 
(90) 
.35**  
(91) 
.16 
(91) 
 
.26* 
(91) 
F2: Chronically 
unstable 
antisocial 
lifestyle 
.30** 
(90) 
.37*** 
(91) 
-.03 
(91) 
.23* 
(91) 
     
ACL total .54*** 
(87) 
.46*** 
(88) 
.28** 
(88) 
.26* 
(88) 
Callousness .50*** 
(87) 
.27* 
(88) 
.37*** 
(88) 
.33** 
(88) 
Aggression .37*** 
(89) 
.36*** 
(90) 
.28** 
(90) 
.06 
(90) 
Manipulativeness .37*** 
(89) 
.19 
(90) 
.35** 
(90) 
.01 
(90) 
Hostility .51*** 
(90) 
.43*** 
(91) 
.37** 
(91) 
.24* 
(91) 
Deceitfulness .18 
(90) 
.19 
(91) 
-.12 
(91) 
.37*** 
(91) 
Narcissism .21*  
(89) 
-.01 
(90) 
.45*** 
(90) 
-.27* 
(90) 
Irresponsibility .42*** 
(89) 
.40*** 
(90) 
.16 
(90) 
.22* 
(90) 
Recklessness .53*** 
(90) 
.56*** 
(91) 
.30** 
(91) 
-.03 
(91) 
Impulsivity .36** 
(89) 
.46*** 
(90) 
.09 
(90) 
.16 
(90) 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
 
PAPA-2 and its subscales positively correlated with total scores on the PCL:SV, and 
scores on factors one (i.e. callous, selfish and remorseless use of others) and two (i.e. 
chronically unstable antisocial lifestyle) of this measure. An exception to this was 
‘negative views towards others and a tendency to objectify’ (i.e. PAPA-2 F2), which did 
not correlate with total PCL:SV, factor one or factor two. However, the correlational 
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analyses revealed that, in general, as scores on PAPA-2 increased, scores on the 
PCL:SV also increased. This demonstrates concurrent validity of the PAPA-2 with an 
existing clinical measure of psychopathy (i.e. the PCL:SV). It is also worth noting that 
correlation coefficients between the variables mentioned here were of weak to moderate 
strength. 
 
PAPA-2 and its subscales positively correlated with total scores on the ACL. All three 
components underpinning PAPA-2 also positively correlated with a number of the ACL 
subscales, thus suggesting that as scores on the PAPA-2 increased, scores on the ACL 
also increased. One exception to this was the relationship between ‘social and emotional 
difficulties’ and ACL ‘narcissism’, where a negative association was found between the 
two. In this instance as scores on ‘narcissism’ increased, scores on ‘social and emotional 
difficulties’ decreased.  Correlation coefficients between the variables discussed here 
were of weak to moderate strength.   
 
As reliability and concurrent validity of PAPA-2 has been established, the study will 
move on and further evaluate PAPA-2 by examining its association with explicit and 
implicit cognitive processing, thus investigating its construct validity. The three 
components found to underpin PAPA-2 (i.e. dissocial tendencies; negative view 
towards others and tendency to objectify; and social and emotional difficulties) will also 
be analysed to investigate how they relate to cognition in psychopathy. 
 
9.9 Examining the role of explicit and implicit cognition in psychopathy  
 
This section commences by exploring the strength of relationships between 
psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV, and implicit and explicit cognition 
on the Affect, Cognitive, Lifestyle Assessment (ACL)
82
. Cognition was split into the 
following characteristics: ‘a lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to exploit and 
dominate’ [explicit]; ‘cognitive impulsivity’ [explicit] ‘making moral judgments’ 
[implicit]; and ‘a tendency for hostile responding’ [implicit]. These variables will be 
entered into the analyses proposed here. 
 
                                                        
82
 To remind readers, the ACL provides for an overall rating of psychopathy but also examination of 
implicit and explicit affect and cognition. 
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A series of standard multiple regression analyses will also be performed to determine 
how much variance explicit and implicit cognition explain in psychopathy measured by 
the PAPA-2 and PCL:SV psychopathy (both overall and at factor level). Analyses will 
be completed across samples.  
 
A number of independent samples t-tests will then be conducted examining determining 
any significant differences between level of psychopathy (high or low) and implicit 
cognitive processing, specifically moral reasoning and a tendency for hostile 
responding.  
 
Predictions: 
 
The PAPA will positively associate with a) higher levels of hostile responding; and 
b) less support for a moral outcome in dilemmas. 
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will be less likely to support a moral 
outcome in dilemmas than individuals with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will display higher levels of hostile 
responding than those with lower levels of psychopathy.  
 
The relationship between explicit and implicit cognition and psychopathy measured by 
PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV 
 
A number of Pearson r bivariate correlations were performed to establish the strength of 
relationships between cognition (both explicit and implicit) and psychopathy as 
measured by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. It is important to note that analyses were 
completed separately to reduce the risk of multicollinearity. Table 33 displays the 
relationship between these variables for PAPA-2 psychopathy. The correlation 
coefficients for PCL:SV psychopathy are also shown in Table 33.  
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Table 33: Bivariate correlations between psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 and the 
PCL:SV and explicit and implicit cognition assessed via the ACL across samples. 
 
 Implicit and explicit cognition (n) 
 
 
 
 
Measure 
A lack of 
guilt/remorse and a 
willingness to 
dominate/exploit 
[explicit] 
 
 
Cognitive 
impulsivity 
[explicit] 
 
Making 
poor moral 
judgments 
[implicit] 
 
A tendency 
for hostile 
responding 
[implicit] 
     
PAPA-2     
Overall .47*** (90) .15 (89) .40*** (90) .25* (90) 
Clinical .43** (40) .20 (39) .45** (40) .24 (40) 
Student .50*** (50) .03 (50) .30* (50) .24 (50) 
F1: Dissocial 
tendencies 
.29** (91) .19 (90) .27* (91) .14 (91) 
F2: Negative 
views for others 
and a tendency 
to objectify 
.40*** (91) .01 (90) .24* (91) .23* (91) 
F3: Social and 
emotional 
difficulties 
.20 (91) .12 (90) .31** (91) .14 (91) 
     
PCL:SV     
Overall .69*** (91) .29** (90) .63*** (91) .13 (91) 
Clinical .53*** (41) .30 (40) .42** (41) .10 (41) 
Student .66*** (50) .17 (50) .36* (50) .19 (50) 
F1: Selfish, 
callous and 
remorseless use 
of others 
.64*** (91) .23* (90) .61*** (91) .17 (91) 
F2: Chronic 
unstable 
antisocial 
lifestyle 
.64*** (91) .31** (90) .56*** (91) .08 (91) 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
‘A lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate’ [explicit] 
displayed moderate positive correlations with PAPA-2 for the overall sample, student 
and clinical samples. This variable also had weak to moderate positive correlations with 
‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to objectify’, 
but not ‘social and emotional difficulties’. Thus, as total PAPA-2 scores and scores on 
‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to objectify’ 
increased, scores on ‘a lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and 
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dominate’ [explicit] also increased. ‘Cognitive impulsivity’ [explicit] did not correlate 
with PAPA-2 psychopathy. 
 
‘Making poor moral judgments’ [implicit] was positively associated with PAPA-2 
psychopathy. This was consistent for both student and clinical samples. This variable 
also positively correlated with all three PAPA-2 factors, though relationships were 
weak. Thus, as scores on this variable increased, so did scores on the PAPA-2. 
 
‘A tendency for hostile responding’ was positively associated with PAPA-2 for the 
overall sample and factor two. Relationships between variables were weak. 
Nevertheless, the correlations identified here indicate that as scores on ‘making poor 
moral judgments’ [implicit] increased, scores on the PAPA-2 also increased. In terms of 
‘a tendency for hostile responding’ [implicit], this was only the case for ‘negative views 
towards others and a tendency to objectify’. 
 
A lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate’ [explicit] 
positively correlated with the PCL:SV across samples and at factor level. Correlations 
were moderate to strong in strength. Thus, as scores on ‘a lack of guilt and remorse and 
a willingness to exploit and dominate’ [explicit] increased, scores on the PCL:SV also 
increased. This was also the case for ‘cognitive impulsivity’ [explicit]. However, this 
variable only demonstrated weak to moderate relationships with PCL:SV for the overall 
sample and factors one (i.e. callous, selfish and remorseless use of others) and two (i.e. 
chronic unstable antisocial lifestyle).  
 
‘A tendency for hostile responding’ [implicit] did not correlate with PCL:SV defined 
psychopathy. ‘Making poor moral judgments’ [implicit] however, had moderate to 
strong relationships with the PCL:SV across samples and at factor level. In this 
instance, as scores on ‘making poor moral judgments increased, scores on PCL:SV also 
increased. 
 
Thus, it appears that the PCL:SV and PAPA-2 are performing equally across explicit 
and implicit cognition defined by the ACL. This section will now explore the role of 
cognitive processing in psychopathy by examining the amount of variance implicit and 
explicit cognition explain in psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. 
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Explicit and implicit cognition as predictors of psychopathy defined by PAPA-2 and the 
PCL:SV 
 
A series of standard multiple regressions were conducted to explore the extent to which 
implicit and explicit cognition predict psychopathy assessed by the PAPA-2 and 
PCL:SV across samples. The subscales underpinning both measures were also 
examined. Analyses were performed separately to decrease the risk of multicollinearity. 
Tables 34 to 37 display the regression coefficients and standard error B for all analyses.  
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Table 34: Predicting psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 across samples from explicit and implicit cognition. 
 
 PAPA-2 
 Overall sample Clinical sample Student sample 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β 
A lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to 
exploit/dominate others [explicit] 
6.97 (91) 2.51 .36** 4.95 (41) 3.76 .25 12.18 (50) 3.87 .47** 
Cognitive impulsivity [explicit] -.36 (90) 2.21 -.02 .39 (40) 3.36 .02 -2.07 (50) 3.15 -.09 
Making poor moral judgments [implicit] 2.33 (91) 2.67 .12 5.53 (41) 4.58 .26 .95 (50) 3.60 .04 
A tendency for hostile responding [implicit] 4.03 (91) 2.39 .16 3.76 (41) 3.49 .16 3.68 (50) 3.45 .14 
** p< .01 
 
Table 35: Predicting the three PAPA-2 subscales from explicit and implicit cognition. 
 
 PAPA-2 
 F1: Dissocial tendencies F2: Negative views towards 
others 
F3: Social and emotional 
difficulties 
Predictor (n) B  SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
A lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to 
exploit/dominate others [explicit] (91) 
1.30 .96 .19 3.35 .99 .45** -.14 .59 -.03 
Cognitive impulsivity [explicit] (90) .78 .85 .10 -.89 .87 -.11 -.02 .52 -.00 
Making poor moral judgments [implicit] (91) .54 1.02 .08 -.54 1.05 -.07 1.35 .63 .32* 
A tendency for hostile responding [implicit] (91) .69 .92 .08 1.77 .94 .19 .39 .56 .07 
** p< .01; * p< .05 
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PAPA-2: Overall sample 
 
The predictors explained 25% (R
2
 = .25, Adjusted R
2
 = .22) of the variance in PAPA-2 
psychopathy for the overall sample (F(4, 84) = 7.1, MSE = 2137.0, p< .001). ‘A lack of 
guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ [explicit] was the 
only positive predictor (t = 2.78, p< .01). Thus, as scores on this variable increased, 
scores on PAPA-2 for the overall sample also increased.  
 
PAPA-2: Clinical and student samples 
 
None of the variables significantly predicted PAPA-2 in the clinical sample (for all, t ≥ 
.12, p> .05). However, for the student sample, the model accounted for 28% (R
2
 = .28, 
Adjusted R
2
 = .21) of the variance in PAPA-2 psychopathy (F(4, 45) = 4.3, MSE = 
1128.2, p< .01). ‘A lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate 
others’ [explicit] positively predicted psychopathy (t = 3.14, p< .01). In this instance, as 
scores on this variable increased, so did scores on PAPA-2 for the students. 
 
PAPA-2 factors: Overall sample 
 
‘Dissocial tendencies’ was not predicted by cognition. ‘Negative view towards others 
and a tendency to objectify’ however, was positively predicted by ‘a lack of guilt and 
remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ [explicit] (t = 3.38, p< .01). 
The model significantly explained 21% (R
2
 = .21, Adjusted R
2 
= .17) of the explained 
variance (F(4, 85) = 5.5, MSE = 260.7, p< .01). As scores on ‘negative views towards 
others and a tendency to objectify’ increased, scores on ‘a lack of guilt and remorse and 
a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ [explicit] also increased. 
 
‘Social and emotional difficulties’ was positively predicted by ‘making poor moral 
judgments’ [implicit] (t = 2.16, p< .05). However, this model was not significant (F(4, 
85) = 2.5, MSE = 41.5, p> .05). 
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Table 36: Predicting psychopathy measured by the PCL:SV across samples from explicit and implicit cognition. 
 
 PCL:SV 
 Overall sample Clinical sample Student sample 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B Β 
A lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to 
exploit/dominate others [explicit] 
3.41 (91) .72 .49*** 1.86 (41) .73 .46* 2.43 (50) .51 .63*** 
Cognitive impulsivity [explicit] .49 (90) .63 .06 .64 (40) .65 .16 .13 (50) .42 .04 
Making poor moral judgments [implicit] 1.88 (91) .77 .27* .23 (41) .89 .05 .12 (50) .47 .03 
A tendency for hostile responding [implicit] -.19 (90) .69 -.02 .10 (41) .68 .02 .15 (50) .45 .04 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
 
Table 37: Predicting the two PCL:SV factors from explicit and implicit cognition. 
 
 PCL:SV 
 F1: Selfish, callous and 
remorseless use of others 
F2: Chronic unstable 
antisocial lifestyle 
Predictor (n) B SE B β B SE B β 
A lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to 
exploit/dominate others [explicit] (91) 
1.44 .38 .42*** 1.97 .44 .49*** 
Cognitive impulsivity [explicit] (90) -.03 .33 -.01 .51 .39 .11 
Making poor moral judgments [implicit] (91) 1.12 .40 .32** .77 .47 .19 
A tendency for hostile responding [implicit] (91) .11 .36 .03 -.30 .42 -.06 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01 
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PCL:SV: Overall sample 
 
Fifty-two percent of variance in psychopathy defined by the PCL:SV was accounted for 
by the predictors (R
2
 = .52, Adjusted R
2 
= .50), F(4, 85) = 23.1, MSE = 573.9, p< .001. 
‘A lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to dominate and exploit others’ [explicit] 
and ‘making poor moral judgments’ [implicit] (for both, t ≥ 2.46, p< .05) positively 
predicted the construct. Thus, as levels of these two predictors increased, so did overall 
levels of PCL:SV. 
 
PCL:SV: Clinical and student samples 
 
For the student sample, PCL:SV psychopathy was positively predicted by ‘a lack of 
remorse and guilt and a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ [explicit] (t = 4.77, 
p< .001). The model accounted for 44% (R
2
 = .44, Adjusted R
2 
= .39) of the variance in 
PCL:SV psychopathy for this sample (F(4, 45) = 8.7, MSE = 39.7, p< .001).  
 
The findings highlighted here were mirrored in the clinical sample, with ‘a lack of guilt 
and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ as the sole [positive] 
predictor (t = 2.56, p< .05). The model explained 31% (R
2
 = .31, Adjusted R
2 
= .23) of 
the variance in PCL:SV (F(4, 35) = 3.9, MSE = 54.0, p< .05).  
 
Thus, for both students and patients, as scores on ‘a lack of guilt and remorse and a 
willingness to exploit and dominate’ [explicit] increased, so did scores on the PCL:SV. 
 
PCL:SV factors: Overall sample  
 
Factor two (i.e. chronic unstable and antisocial lifestyle) was positively predicted by a 
‘lack of remorse and guilt and a willingness to exploit and dominate others’ [explicit] (t 
= 4.44, p< .001). The model accounted for 45% (R
2
 = .45, Adjusted R
2 
= .43) of the 
variance in PCL:SV factor two (F(4, 85) = 17.5, 165.7, p< .001). In terms of factor one 
(i.e. selfish, callous and remorseless use of others), this variable was found to be 
predicted by both ‘a lack of guilt and remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate 
others’ and ‘making poor moral judgments’ (for both, ≥ t = 2.80, p< .01). These two 
predictors accounted for 14% of the total explained variance, which was 47% (R
2
 = .47, 
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Adjusted R
2 
= .44; F(4, 85) = 18.7, MSE = 126.4, p< .001). In this instance, as scores on 
these two predictors increased, scores on PCL:SV factor one also increased. 
 
In terms of predicting psychopathy, it appears that implicit and explicit cognition is 
performing similarly across measures, thus providing further evidence of construct 
validity for PAPA-2. This chapter will now move on to explore implicit cognitive 
processing in psychopathy in more depth. 
 
Further exploration of implicit cognitive processing in psychopathy defined by the 
PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
 
A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine the effect of level 
of psychopathy (i.e. high or low) on implicit cognitive processing. Implicit cognitive 
processing was split into ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘a tendency for hostile responding’.  
 
To remind readers, these analyses will investigate the following predictions:  
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will be less likely to support a moral 
outcome in dilemmas than individuals with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will display higher levels of hostile 
responding than those with lower levels of psychopathy.  
 
Psychopathy and moral reasoning 
 
A median split was conducted on PAPA-2 to separate participants into ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
levels of psychopathy. The median was 107.0 and those scoring above were classified 
into the ‘high’ group and those at or below this value, into the ‘low’ group.  
 
In terms of psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV, participants scoring the 
recommended cut-off and above (i.e. a score of 13; Hart et al. 1995), were categorised 
into the ‘high’ group. Those scoring below this were assigned to the ‘low group’. 
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Descriptive statistics were calculated for each aspect of the moral reasoning test (i.e. 
percentage score, number of reasons and time taken) using the ‘high’ and ‘low’ splits. 
Mean scores for level of PAPA-2 and PCL:SV are displayed in Table 38. 
 
Table 38: Descriptive statistics for each aspect of the moral reasoning test for 
psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV (nb. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis). 
 
  Moral reasoning [implicit] 
Measure Level Total percentage 
(%)
83
  
Number of 
reasons 
Time taken 
(seconds) 
     
PAPA-2 High (n = 44) 142.30 (76.98) 6.52 (2.61) 113.91 (67.93) 
 Low (n = 46) 186.65 (66.62) 8.33 (2.95) 115.89 (56.48) 
     
PCL:SV High (n = 26) 130.27 (72.50) 5.54 (2.69) 93.50 (64.92) 
 Low (n = 65) 180.92 (72.65) 8.23 (2.64) 123.41 (58.52) 
 
Results indicated that individuals with ‘high’ levels of psychopathy defined by the 
PAPA-2 demonstrated less support for a moral outcome in dilemmas (i.e. they assigned 
a lower percentage) than those with ‘low’ levels of psychopathy (t (88) = -2.93, p< .01). 
They also produced fewer reasons supporting their decision (i.e. the percentage that 
they assigned to the scenario) (t (88) = -3.07, p< .01). There was no difference between 
level of psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and time taken on this activity (t (87) = -.15, 
p> .05). 
 
In terms of the PCL:SV, individuals with ‘high’ levels of psychopathy demonstrated 
less support for moral outcome in dilemmas (t (89) = -3.01, p< .01), produced fewer 
reasons supporting their decision (t (89) = -4.38, p< .001), and completed the activity 
faster (t (88) = -2.13, p< .05) than those with ‘low’ levels of the disorder. 
 
Psychopathy and a tendency for hostile responding 
 
Using the ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of psychopathy calculated for the previous analyses, 
descriptive statistics were also computed for hostile and pro-social responding. Data for 
psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and PCL:SV is presented in Table 39.  
                                                        
83
 There were three moral scenarios. Participants assigned a percentage to each (out of 100%). Thus, the 
maximum percentage that could be scored for this activity was 300%. 
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Table 39: Descriptive statistics for implicit hostile and pro-social responding for 
psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV and PAPA-2 (nb. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis). 
 
  A tendency for hostile responding [implicit] 
Measure Level Total hostile Total pro-social 
    
PAPA-2  High (n = 44) 3.84 (1.70) 5.66 (1.99) 
 Low (n = 46) 3.07 (1.90) 6.36 (1.96) 
    
PCL:SV High (n = 26) 3.15 (1.80) 6.15 (2.38) 
 Low (n = 65) 3.54 (1.85) 6.17 (1.87) 
 
There was a significant difference between ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of psychopathy 
defined by PAPA-2 on hostile responding (t (88) = 2.04, p< .05). Individuals with 
higher levels of psychopathy selected more hostile responses than those with ‘low’ 
levels of psychopathy. There was also a significant difference for pro-social responding 
(t (88) = -2.34, p< .05), with those scoring ‘low’ on the PAPA-2 opting for more pro-
social responses than individuals scoring ‘high’ on the measure. 
 
There was no significant difference between ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of psychopathy 
assessed by the PCL:SV for hostile responding (t (89) = -.90, p> .05) or pro-social 
responding (t (37.95) = -.03, p> .05). This Chapter will now move on to explore implicit 
and explicit affective processing in psychopathy.  
 
9.10 Examining the role of explicit and implicit affect in psychopathy defined by 
PAPA-2 and PCL:SV  
 
The strength of relationships between psychopathy (PAPA-2 and PCL:SV) and implicit 
and explicit affect will be examined. Affect was assessed via the ACL and separated 
into the following variables: ‘Deficits in emotion recognition’ [explicit]; 
‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit]; ‘emotional impulsivity’ [explicit]; 
‘anger/irritability’ [explicit]; ‘deficits when identifying emotion’ [implicit]; and ‘deficits 
when evaluating/feeling emotion’ [implicit]. 
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A number of standard multiple regression analyses will also be performed across 
samples to examine the proportion of explained variance in psychopathy defined by 
PAPA-2 and PCL:SV accounted for by explicit and implicit affect. 
 
A number of independent samples t-tests will then be completed investigating whether 
levels of psychopathy (high or low) has an effect on functional deficits in implicit 
affective processing, specifically deficits when identifying and evaluating emotion.  
 
Predictions: 
 
The PAPA will positively associate with a) fewer emotional words identified; and 
b) a lower strength of feeling for own and others’ emotion. 
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will identify less emotional stimuli than 
those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will demonstrate a lower strength of 
feeling for their own and others’ emotion than those with lower levels of 
psychopathy. 
 
The relationship between explicit and implicit affect and psychopathy assessed by 
PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV  
 
A series of Pearson r bivariate correlations were conducted to determine the strength of 
relationships between affect (both explicit and implicit) and psychopathy measured by 
PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. Analyses were completed separately to reduce the possibility 
of multicollinearity. Table 40 displays the relationship between these variables.  
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Table 40: Bivariate correlations between psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV and explicit and implicit affect assessed via the ACL 
across samples. 
 
 Implicit and explicit affect (n) 
 
 
Measure 
Deficits in emotion 
recognition 
[explicit] 
Callousness/lack 
of empathy 
[explicit] 
Emotional 
impulsivity 
[explicit] 
 
Anger/irritability 
[explicit] 
Deficits when 
identifying 
emotion [implicit] 
Deficits when 
evaluating/feeling 
emotion [implicit] 
       
PAPA-2       
Overall .26* (90) .46*** (90) .38*** (90) .47*** (90) .16 (88) .29** (88) 
Clinical .14 (40) .48** (40) .33* (40) .36* (40) -.00 (38) .18 (38) 
Student .33* (50) .45** (50) .37** (50) .52*** (50) .32* (50) .42** (50) 
F1: Dissocial tendencies .26* (91) .25* (91) .45*** (91) .43*** (91) .10 (89) .12 (89) 
F2: Negative views 
towards others and a 
tendency to objectify 
-.02 (91) .33** (91) .17 (91) .29** (91) -.02 (89) .20 (89) 
F3: Social and emotional 
difficulties 
.35** (91) .34** (91) .15 (91) .20 (91) .26* (89) .27* (89) 
       
PCL:SV       
Overall .47*** (91) .75*** (91) .57*** (91) .49*** (91) .33** (89) .59*** (89) 
Clinical  .03 (41) .55*** (41) .43** (41) .39* (41) .05 (39) .22 (39) 
Student .47** (50) .60*** (50) .37** (50) .64*** (50) .37** (50) .40** (50) 
F1: Selfish, callous and 
remorseless use of others 
.37*** (91) .70*** (91) .44*** (91) .44*** (91) .24* (89) .51** (89) 
F2: Chronic unstable 
antisocial lifestyle 
.49*** (91) .70*** (91) .61*** (91) .47*** (91) .37*** (89) .58*** (89) 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
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‘Deficits in emotion recognition’ [explicit] positively correlated with PAPA-2 for 
overall and student sample. It also positively correlated with factor one, ‘dissocial 
tendencies’ and factor three, ‘social and emotional difficulties’. Coeffiecients indicated 
that relationships were of moderate strength. In this instance, as scores on ‘deficits in 
emotion recognition’ [explicit] increased, psychopathy scores on PAPA-2 for the 
samples and subscales highlighted here also increased. 
 
‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] and ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] positively 
correlated with PAPA-2 across sample and at factor level. Relationships were weak to 
moderate strength and indicated that as levels of PAPA-2 scores increased, so did scores 
on ‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] and ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit]. 
 
‘Emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] positively and moderately correlated with PAPA-2 
across sample and with ‘dissocial tendencies’. Thus, as scores on ‘emotional impulsivity 
increased, psychopathy scores on the PAPA-2 for these variables also increased. 
 
Implicit affect also demonstrated positive relationships with PAPA-2. ‘Deficits when 
identifying emotion’ [implicit] and when ‘evaluating/feeling emotion’ [implicit] 
positively correlated with PAPA-2 for students and ‘social and emotional difficulties’. 
Positive correlations were also found between ‘deficits when evaluating/feeling 
emotion’ and PAPA-2 for the overall sample. For all, associations were weak to 
moderate strength and indicated that as PAPA-2 scores increased for the subscales and 
samples outlined here, so did scores on implicit affect. 
 
Moving on to the PCL:SV and its association with affective processing. All variables 
belonging to explicit and implicit affect positively correlated with PCL:SV for overall 
and student samples. They also positively correlated with both PCL:SV subscales. 
Correlations were moderate to strong and suggested that as PCL:SV scores increased 
for the samples and factors mentioned here, explicit and implicit affect also increased.  
 
For the clinical sample, PCL:SV demonstrated positive correlations with explicit affect, 
with the exception of ‘deficits in emotion recognition’ [explicit]. Implicit affect did not 
correlate with PCL:SV psychopathy for this sample. Coefficients indicated that 
correlations were of moderate strength. With the exception of ‘deficits in emotion 
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recognition’ [explicit], as PCL:SV scores increased for patients, explicit affect also 
increased. 
 
The role of explicit and implicit affective processing in psychopathy will now be 
examined. Results for PAPA-2 will be presented first, followed by the PCL:SV. 
 
Explicit and implicit affect as predictors of psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the 
PCL:SV 
 
A series of standard multiple regression analyses were performed to investigate the role 
of implicit and explicit affect in psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. 
Factors underpinning both PAPA-2 and PCL:SV were also included in the analyses. 
Analyses were performed separately to decrease the risk of multicollinearity. Tables 41 
to 44 present the regression coefficients and standard error B for all analyses.  
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Table 41: Predicting psychopathy defined by PAPA-2 across samples from explicit and implicit affect. 
 
 PAPA-2 
 Overall samples Clinical samples Student samples 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β 
Emotion recognition [explicit] .39 (91) 2.26 .02 .63 (41) 3.42 .03 .57 (50) 3.38 .02 
Callousness/lack of empathy [explicit] 3.96 (91) 2.48 .22 7.02 (41) 3.94 .37 5.67 (50) 4.09 .18 
Emotional impulsivity [explicit] 2.14 (91) 1.20 .12 2.82 (41) 3.53 .15 3.50 (50) 2.39 .18 
Anger/irritability [explicit] 5.03 (91) 2.28 .27* 1.36 (41) 4.44 .06 4.89 (50) 2.41 .28* 
Identifying emotion [implicit] .60 (89) 2.52 .03 -1.62 (39) 3.80 -.08 6.67 (50) 3.52 .23 
Evaluating emotion [implicit] .31 (89) 2.52 .02 .64 (39) 3.96 .03 8.32 (50) 3.69 .27* 
* p< .05 
 
Table 42: Predicting the three factors of PAPA-2 from explicit and implicit affect. 
 
 PAPA-2 
 F1: Dissocial tendencies F2: Negative view towards 
others 
F3: Social and emotional 
difficulties 
Predictor (n) B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Emotion recognition [explicit] (91) 1.18 .79 .17 -1.86 .92 -.25* .86 .52 .20 
Callousness/lack of empathy [explicit] (91) -.61 .87 -.10 2.04 1.01 .29* .95 .57 .24 
Emotional impulsivity [explicit] (91) 2.10 .70 .34** -.28 .82 -.04 -.15 .46 -.04 
Anger/irritability [explicit] (91) 1.97 .80 .30* 1.42 .93 .20 -.02 .53 -.01 
Identifying emotion [implicit] (89) .07 .88 .01 -.78 1.03 -.09 .60 .58 .12 
Evaluating emotion [implicit] (89) -.85 .88 -.12 1.14 1.03 .15 -.02 .58 -.01 
** p< .01; * p< .05 
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PAPA-2: Overall sample 
 
The model accounted for 29% (R
2
 = .29, Adjusted R
2
 = .23) of the variance in 
psychopathy measured by PAPA-2 for the overall sample (F(6, 81) = 5.4, MSE = 
1583.6, p< .001). ‘Anger/irritability’ [explicit] was a positive predictor of psychopathy 
(t = 2.21, p< .05). As levels of this predictor increased, so did levels of PAPA-2. 
 
PAPA-2: Clinical and student samples 
 
Psychopathy defined by the PAPA-2 for the clinical sample was not predicted by 
implicit or explicit affect (for all, t ≥ .16, p> .05). In terms of the student sample 
however, the model (F(6, 43) = 6.9, MSE = 1333.2, p< .001) explained 49% of the 
variance in PAPA-2 psychopathy (R
2
 = .49, Adjusted R
2
 = .42). ‘Anger/irritability’ 
[explicit] and ‘deficits when evaluating emotion’ [implicit] (for both, t ≥ 2.03, p< .05) 
positively predicted PAPA-2. Thus, as scores on these two predictors increased for the 
student sample, so did psychopathy scores on PAPA-2.  
 
PAPA-2 factors: Overall sample 
 
The predictors explained 29% (R
2
 = .29, Adjusted R
2
 = .24) of the variance in ‘dissocial 
tendencies’ (F(6, 82) = 5.6, MSE = 201.7, p< .001). ‘Emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] 
and ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] (for both, t ≥ 2.47, p< .05) positively predicted 
‘dissocial tendencies’. In this instance, as scores on ‘emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] 
and ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] increased, scores on ‘dissocial tendencies’ also 
increased. 
 
‘Deficits when recognising emotion’ [explicit] negatively predicted ‘negative views 
towards others and a tendency to objectify’ (t = -2.02, p< .05), where as 
‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] was a positive predictor of this component (t = 
2.01, p< .05). The predictors accounted for 19% (R
2
 = .19, Adjusted R
2
 = .13) of the 
explained variance  (F(6, 82) = 3.1, MSE = 154.4, p< .01). As scores on 
‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] increased, scores on ‘negative views towards 
others and a tendency to objectify’ also increased. This was the opposite for ‘deficits 
when recognising emotion’ [explicit] where decreased levels of this predictor were 
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associated with increased levels of ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify’. 
 
‘Social and emotional difficulties’ was not predicted by implicit or explicit affect (for 
all, t ≥ -.04, p> .05). 
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Table 43: Predicting psychopathy measured by the PCL:SV across samples from explicit and implicit affect. 
 
 PCL:SV 
 Overall sample Clinical sample Student sample 
Predictor B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β B (n) SE B β 
Emotion recognition [explicit] .45 (91) .56 .06 -.52 (41) .63 -.14 .52 (50) .41 .13 
Callousness/lack of empathy [explicit] 3.22 (91) .62 .50*** 1.78 (41) .73 .47* 1.47 (50) .50 .32** 
Emotional impulsivity [explicit] 1.56 (91) .50 .25** .84 (41) .65 .21 .38 (50) .29 .13 
Anger/irritability [explicit] .04 (91) .57 .01 .04 (41) .82 .01 .87 (50) .29 .33** 
Identifying emotion [implicit] .51 (89) .63 .06 -.09 (39) .70 -.02 .95 (50) .43 .22* 
Evaluating emotion [implicit] 1.07 (89) .63 .15 .33 (39) .73 .09 .82 (50) .45 .18 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
 
Table 44: Predicting the two factors of the PCL:SV from explicit and implicit affect. 
 
 PCL:SV 
 F1: Selfish, callous and 
remorseless use of others 
F2: Chronic unstable 
antisocial lifestyle 
Predictor (n) B SE B β B SE B β 
Emotion recognition [explicit] (91) .03 .33 .01 .43 .33 .11 
Callousness/lack of empathy [explicit] (91) 1.79 .36 .56*** 1.43 .36 .38*** 
Emotional impulsivity [explicit] (91) .35 .29 .11 1.21 .29 .33*** 
Anger/irritability [explicit] (91) .07 .33 .02 -.03 .33 -.01 
Identifying emotion [implicit] (89) .02 .37 .01 .50 .37 .11 
Evaluating emotion [implicit] (89) .48 .36 .14 .59 .37 .14 
*** p< .001 
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PCL:SV: Overall sample 
 
Sixty-six percent (R
2
 = .66, Adjusted R
2
 = .63) of variance in psychopathy defined by 
the PCL:SV was explained for by the predictors (F(6, 82) = 26.0, MSE = 476.1, p< 
.001). ‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] and ‘emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] 
positively predicted psychopathy (for both, t ≥ 3.14, p< .01). Thus, as levels of these 
two predictors increased, level of PAPA-2 for the overall sample also increased. 
 
PCL:SV: Clinical and student samples 
 
For the clinical sample, the predictors accounted for 37% (R
2
 = .37, Adjusted R
2
 = .25) 
of the explained variance in PCL:SV psychopathy (F(6, 32) = 3.1, MSE = 41.2, p< .05). 
‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] (t = 2.43, p< .05) was a positive predictor for 
this sample. As scores on ‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] increased, so did 
scores on the PCL:SV. 
 
‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit], ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] and ‘deficits in 
emotion identification’ [implicit] (for all, t ≥ 2.22, p< .05) all positively predicted 
psychopathy in students. The model accounted for 66% (R
2
 = .66, Adjusted R
2
 = .62) of 
the variance in PCL:SV (F(6, 43) = 14.2, MSE = 40.3, p< .001). In this instance, as 
scores on ‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit], ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] and 
‘deficits in emotion identification’ [implicit] increased, scores on PCL:SV also 
increased. 
 
PCL:SV factors: Overall sample 
 
‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] (t = 4.99, p< .001) positively predicted ‘selfish, 
callous and remorseless use of others’. The model explained 52% (R2 = .52, Adjusted 
R
2
 = .49) of variance in PCL:SV factor one (F(6, 82) = 14.9, MSE = 93.0, p< .001). As 
levels of ‘callousness/lack of empathy’ [explicit] increased, levels of ‘selfish, callous 
and remorseless use of others’ also increased. 
 
In terms of PCL:SV factor two (i.e. chronic unstable antisocial lifestyle), the model 
accounted for 64% (R
2
 = .64, Adjusted R
2
 = .61) of the explained variance in 
psychopathy (F(6, 82) = 24.4, MSE = 155.1, p< .001). ‘Callousness/lack of empathy’ 
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and ‘emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] (for both, t ≥ 3.95, p< .001) were positive 
predictors of ‘chronic unstable antisocial lifestyle’. Thus, as scores on these predictors 
increased, scores on ‘chronic unstable antisocial lifestyle’ also increased. 
 
Thus, when predicting psychopathy, it appears that implicit and explicit affect is 
performing differently across measures. This chapter will now move on to explore 
implicit affective processing in psychopathy in more depth. 
 
Further exploration of implicit affective processing in psychopathy measured by the 
PAPA-2 and PCL:SV 
 
A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to identify any significant 
differences between level of psychopathy and implicit affective processing. In the 
following analyses, implicit affective processing was assessed via the two tasks of the 
ACL addressing ‘deficits when identifying emotion’ and ‘deficits when 
evaluating/feeling emotion’. Analyses for PAPA-2 are presented first, followed by 
results for PCL:SV psychopathy. 
 
As a reminder, these analyses will investigate the following predictions:  
 
Those with higher levels of psychopathy will identify less emotional stimuli than 
those with lower levels of psychopathy. 
 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy will demonstrate a lower strength of 
feeling for their own and others’ emotion than those with lower levels of 
psychopathy. 
 
Psychopathy and deficits when identifying emotion 
 
Using the same median split for the PAPA-2 adopted when exploring explicit and 
implicit cognition, those scoring above 107.0 were classified into the ‘high’ 
psychopathy group and those at or below this value, into the ‘low’ group.  
 
Participants scoring 13 or above on the PCL:SV were assigned to the ‘high’ group. 
Those scoring below this were placed in the ‘low group’. 
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Descriptive statistics were calculated for each aspect of the identifying emotion task 
(i.e. number of emotion words correctly identified and time taken) using the ‘high’ and 
‘low’ splits. Mean scores for level of PAPA-2 and PCL:SV are displayed in Table 45. 
 
Table 45: Descriptive statistics for each aspect of the identifying emotions task for 
psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV (nb. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis). 
 
  Deficits when identifying emotion [implicit] 
 
Measure 
 
Level 
Number of emotions 
correctly identified 
Time taken  
(seconds) 
    
PAPA-2 High (n = 42) 18.90 (2.85) 111.57 (50.90) 
 Low (n = 46) 19.37 (2.89) 95.62 (37.04) 
    
PCL:SV High (n = 24) 18.50 (2.89) 103.67 (40.93) 
 Low (n = 65) 19.38 (2.82) 104.42 (47.09) 
 
 
An independent samples t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between 
level of psychopathy assessed by the PAPA-2 and the number of emotion words 
identified (t (86) = -.76, p> .05), and time taken (t (85) = 1.68, p> .05). This was also 
the case for psychopathy defined by the PCL:SV, i.e. emotion words identified (t (87) = 
-1.31, p> .05) and time taken (t (86) = -.07, p> .05).  
 
Psychopathy and deficits when evaluating emotion 
 
Using the ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of psychopathy calculated for the previous analyses, 
descriptive statistics were also determined for all aspects of the evaluating/feeling 
emotion task (i.e. rank order
84, time taken, own feelings and others’ feelings). Data for 
psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and PCL:SV is presented in Table 46.  
 
 
 
                                                        
84
 A high rank order score (out of a maximum 7) is indicative of effective evaluation of the emotional 
scenarios. 
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Table 46: Descriptive statistics for each aspect of the evaluating/feeling emotion task 
for psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV (nb. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis). 
 
  Deficits when evaluating/feeling emotion [implicit] 
 
Measure 
 
Level 
Rank 
order 
Time taken 
(seconds) 
Own 
feelings 
Others’ 
feelings 
      
PAPA-2 High (n = 42) 5.69 (2.01) 231.02 (97.59) 23.00 (7.16) 26.40 (5.82) 
 Low (n = 46) 6.35 (1.48) 236.48 (91.26) 27.61 (4.22) 28.63 (3.76) 
      
PCL:SV High (n = 24) 5.08 (1.91) 243.50 (97.61) 25.20 (6.63) 26.64 (4.94) 
 Low (n = 65) 6.40 (1.58) 236.25 (104.02) 25.54 (6.13) 27.95 (4.94) 
 
Independent samples t-tests revealed that individuals in the ‘high’ psychopathy group 
on the PAPA-2 significantly rated themselves (t (67.15) = -3.67, p< .001) and others (t 
(87) = -2.17, p< .05) as experiencing less emotion than those in the ‘low’ psychopathy 
group. There was no significant difference for rank order (t (74.97) = -1.74, p> .05) or 
time taken (t (86) = -.27, p> .05).  
 
In terms of the PCL:SV, a significant difference between level of psychopathy and rank 
order was found (t (87) = -3.30, p< .01), with individuals in the ‘high’ psychopathy 
category making more errors than those in the ‘low’ category. There was no significant 
difference between levels of psychopathy and the other variables: time taken (t (87) = 
.30, p> .05); own feelings (t (88) = -.23, p> .05); and others’ feelings (t (88) = -1.13, p> 
.05). 
 
The results section will now conclude by determining the components needed to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of psychopathy. 
 
9.11 Determining the components required to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of psychopathy  
 
In order to examine and identify the components required to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of psychopathy, two standard multiple regression analyses will be 
conducted. These will be conducted separately to reduce the risk of multicollinearity. 
The first analysis will examine the different measurement approaches adopted in the 
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ACL, and the second will focus on self-report. Tables 47 and 48 present the regression 
coefficients and standard error B for the two analyses. 
 
Table 47: Predicting psychopathy measured by the PCL:SV from implicit and explicit 
assessment, as well as collateral review and observation. 
 
 PCL:SV 
Predictor B (n) SE B β 
Implicit affect .99 (89) .25 .22*** 
Implicit cognition .38 (91) .30 .08 
Explicit affect .04 (91) .18 .02 
Explicit cognition -.47 (90) .32 -.10 
Explicit lifestyle .22 (90) .07 .32** 
Collateral review .33 (41) .04 .57*** 
Observation .27 (91) .13 .11* 
*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
The predictors accounted for 93% (R
2
 = .93, Adjusted R
2
 = .92) of the explained 
variance psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV (F(7, 31) = 63.0, MSE = 251.4, p< .001). 
Implicit affect, explicit lifestyle, collateral review, and observation (for all, t ≥ 2.07, p< 
.05) all positively predicted psychopathy. Thus, as scores on these four predictors 
increased, psychopathy scores also increased. 
 
Table 48: Predicting psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV from factors underpinning 
the PAPA-2. 
 
 PCL:SV 
Predictor (n) B SE B Β 
F1: Dissocial tendencies (91) .37 .10 .36** 
F2: Negative view towards others and a 
tendency to objectify (91) 
-.06 .09 -.06 
F3: Social and emotional difficulties (91) .33 .17 .20* 
** p< .01; * p< .05 
 
The predictors in the second regression explained 19% (R
2
 = .19, Adjusted R
2
 = .16) of 
the variance in psychopathy defined by the PCL:SV (F(3, 87) = 6.7, MSE = 279.3, p< 
.001). ‘Dissocial tendencies’ and ‘social and emotional difficulties’ positively predicted 
PCL:SV psychopathy (for both, t ≥ 2.02, p< .05). In this instance, as scores on these two 
PAPA-2 factors increased, so did overall scores on PCL:SV psychopathy. 
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9.12 Summary of results 
 
To summarise the main findings outlined here, psychopathy was found to be higher in 
the clinical sample when compared to the student sample. This was significant for the 
PCL:SV and ACL, but not PAPA-2. Nevertheless, PAPA-2 positively correlated with 
the PCL:SV, demonstrating concurrent validity with clinical methods of assessing 
psychopathy. PAPA-2 also positively correlated with the ACL, thus providing further 
evidence of validity. Acceptable levels of internal consistency were found for PAPA-2 
and the PCL-SV. Reliability was good for the ACL overall, but was less acceptable for 
the subscales underpinning this measure.  
 
Three factors were extracted from PAPA-2 for the overall sample. Factor one (F1) 
related to ‘dissocial tendencies’, factor two (F2) to ‘negative views towards others and a 
tendency to objectify’, and factor three (F3) to ‘social and emotional difficulties’.  
 
When determining the components required to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
psychopathy, two multiple regression analyses indicated that implicit affect, explicit 
lifestyle, collateral review, observation and self-report are important when assessing for 
the construct. Explicit and implicit cognition were not significant predictors of 
psychopathy defined by the PCL:SV.  
 
However, correlational analyses revealed explicit and implicit cognition to be positively 
associated with psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. Implicit and explicit 
cognition was also found to have a role in psychopathy, positively predicting the 
construct. Interestingly, implicit and explicit cognition predicted psychopathy in a 
similar manner across measures, thus providing evidence of construct validity for 
PAPA-2.   
 
On further exploration of implicit processing in psychopathy, individuals with higher 
levels of psychopathy defined by the PAPA-2 supported moral scenarios less (i.e. 
assigned a lower percentage) and produced fewer reasons for their argument. Those 
with higher levels of psychopathy also selected more hostile responses than individuals 
with ‘low’ levels of psychopathy. 
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In terms of psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV, individuals with ‘high’ levels of 
psychopathy completed the moral reasoning activity faster, produced fewer reasons and 
agreed less with the moral scenarios than those scoring ‘low’ on the measure. There was 
no significant difference between hostile and pro-social responding and level of 
psychopathy for the PCL:SV. Despite this, the findings here indicate a clear role for 
implicit cognition in psychopathy.  
 
Like implicit and explicit cognition, implicit and explicit affect also correlated and 
predicted PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV across samples. On further exploration of implicit 
affect in psychopathy, individuals scoring ‘low’ on the PAPA-2 rated themselves and 
others as experiencing more emotion than those scoring ‘high’ on the measure. Those 
scoring ‘low’ on the PCL:SV also made fewer errors when ranking emotional scenarios. 
 
The results outlined here will now be discussed in relation to previous findings and 
psychological theory. Limitations of the study will be acknowledged, followed by the 
implications for clinical practice and recommendations for future research. 
 
9.13 Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to further evaluate and refine the Psychopathic Processing and 
Personality Assessment (PAPA-2) using a student and clinical sample. An exploratory 
factor analysis identified psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2 to be underpinned by three 
components; ‘dissocial tendencies’, ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify’, and ‘social and emotional difficulties’. This factor structure was different to 
that identified in the previous study and models proposed by Hare (1991) and Neumann 
et al. (2006).  
 
In the previous study, psychopathy defined by the PAPA was underpinned by ‘dissocial 
tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’. Whilst these two factors were captured 
by the factor analysis in the present study, the component ‘social and emotional 
difficulties’ was a new finding and may relate to the differences in the characteristics of 
the samples studied. For example, study two recruited prisoners and students, whilst the 
present study focused on high secure psychiatric patients and students. Psychopathy 
may therefore present differently in specialised populations, with ‘social and emotional 
difficulties’ being particularly important in those residing in secure psychiatric settings.  
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The lack of replication for the two- (e.g. Hare, 1991) and four- (e.g. Neumann et al. 
2006) factor models may also relate to the sample adopted in the present study. That is, 
the present study used a much broader sample, i.e. students and patients, than that 
employed by Hare (1991) and Neumann et al. (2006), who tended to focus on prisoners.  
 
The differences in factor structure may also stem from the methods used when 
developing the PAPA. The PAPA employed an expert consultation and review of the 
literature to aid its development, which arguably allows for a more holistic assessment 
of psychopathy when compared to existing self-report measures of psychopathy, such as 
the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) and the Self-Report Measure of 
Psychopathy (SRP-III). These two measures were derived from the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) and inherited its flaws (i.e. assessing psychopathy as a 
behavioural entity, ignoring fundamental aspects relating to interpersonal, affective and 
cognitive functioning; Skeem & Cooke, 2010a).  
 
Nevertheless, the three-factor solution derived from PAPA-2 somewhat resembled, but 
was not identical to the three-factor model delineated by Cooke and Michie (2001). 
Cooke and Michie (2001) argued that psychopathy was underpinned by interpersonal, 
affective and lifestyle features. Whilst ‘dissocial tendencies’ was similar to ‘impulsive 
and irresponsible lifestyle’ and ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify’ to ‘arrogant and deceitful interpersonal style’, ‘social and emotional 
difficulties’ was different to ‘deficient affective experience’. That is, ‘deficient affective 
experience’ did not capture the ‘social difficulties’ found to underpin psychopathy 
assessed by PAPA-2. 
 
This again may relate to the sample adopted, with Cooke and Michie (2001) focusing on 
prisoners rather than students or psychiatric patients. Nonetheless, the similarity 
between the two models provides evidence of construct validity for PAPA-2 and aligns 
the new self-report with original conceptualisations of psychopathy (i.e. psychopathy as 
abnormal personality; Cleckley, 1982), placing an emphasis on interpersonal and 
affective functioning rather than criminal behaviour. 
 
Further evidence of [concurrent] validity was found for PAPA-2, with it positively 
correlating with two other measures of psychopathy (i.e. the Psychopathy Checklist: 
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Screening Version, PCL:SV; and the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment, 
ACL). This finding also provided support for the prediction that the PAPA will 
positively associate with existing psychopathy measures (e.g. the PCL:SV). 
 
Some consistency was found for correlations between PAPA-2 and the ACL subscales. 
For example, PAPA-2 ‘dissocial tendencies’ demonstrated positive associations with 
several behavioural subscales of the ACL, including ‘aggression’, ‘hostility’, 
‘irresponsibility’, ‘recklessness’ and ‘impulsivity’. ‘Negative views towards others and 
a tendency to objectify’ however, exhibited stronger positive correlations with the more 
personality-based ACL subscales, including ‘callousness’, ‘manipulativeness’ and 
‘narcissism’.  
 
Thus, it appears that the interpersonal subscale of PAPA-2 (i.e. negative views towards 
others and a tendency to objectify) associated with more personality-based features, and 
the antisocial component (i.e. dissocial tendencies) with behavioural-based features. 
This is consistent with the literature (e.g. Cooke & Michie, 1997; 2001; Blackburn, 
2007a) and provides evidence of convergent validity for the PAPA-2.  
 
However this was not the case for the two subscales belonging to the PCL:SV, with 
factor one (i.e. callous, selfish and remorseless use of others) positively correlating with 
‘dissocial tendencies’, but not ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify’. The interpersonal aspects of psychopathy are represented by personality-
based features (Blackburn, 2007a) and are not expected to associate with a behavioural 
component.   
 
The findings outlined here may be an artifact of the sample composition, in that low 
base rates of psychopathy were found for both students and patients. Further research 
may be required to clarify certain relationships between PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV using 
a sample comprising of higher levels of psychopathy. Nevertheless, as expected, 
PCL:SV factor two (i.e. chronic unstable antisocial lifestyle) positively correlated with 
‘dissocial tendencies’, and not ‘negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify’. 
 
The present study demonstrated evidence for the internal consistency of PAPA-2, the 
PCL:SV and ACL across samples. Acceptable levels of internal consistency were also 
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found for factors underpinning PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV, but not ACL. However, high 
levels of internal consistency were not expected for the ACL subscales due to the low 
number of items underpinning each of these. 
 
There was also evidence of discrimination between samples, with those at higher risk of 
psychopathy (i.e. forensic psychiatric patients, Hare, 1991) exhibiting increased levels 
of the construct on all three measures than the lower risk student sample. This finding is 
consistent with de Vogel and de Ruiter (2005) and Strand and Belfrage (2005), and 
indicates that PAPA-2, the PCL:SV and ACL are able to discriminate effectively across 
samples. Whilst this was statistically true for the PCL:SV and ACL, there was no 
significant difference between sample and prevalence of psychopathy defined by 
PAPA-2.  
 
This finding may relate to problems associated with self-report, with participants, 
particularly those with higher levels of psychopathy, modifying their responses to 
provide a positive impression of themselves (e.g. Snowden et al. 2004). This is not to 
say however that self-report measures are not useful in the assessment of psychopathy, 
it may just be that other methods are also required to prevent deception and detect, in 
full, more subtle aspects of the construct, including cognitive and affective processing 
(e.g. Cleckley, 1982; Hiatt & Newman, 2006). 
 
This suggestion is supported by the finding that clinical observation, interview, 
collateral review, implicit affect and self-report all positively predicted psychopathy 
defined by the PCL:SV. Thus, demonstrating support for the inclusion of these methods 
when providing a comprehensive assessment of the construct. Implicit and explicit 
cognition, and explicit affect did not predict psychopathy. It may be that the ACL did 
not provide a specific enough measure of implicit cognition that was sufficiently 
sensitive to detect this aspect of functioning in psychopathy. However, on closer 
inspection of the data, implicit cognition appeared to predict psychopathy in a more 
localised manner, with a clear role for ‘making poor moral judgments’. The ACL 
therefore does highlight the importance of incorporating more specific aspects of 
implicit cognition in the assessment of psychopathy. 
 
This moves the discussion onto the second aim of the present study, which was to 
explore how implicit and explicit cognitive processing associated with psychopathy 
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defined through expert consensus (i.e. PAPA-2) and clinical measures (i.e. the 
PCL:SV). Analyses revealed that explicit cognition; specifically a ‘lack of guilt/remorse 
and a willingness to dominate/exploit’ positively correlated with, and predicted PAPA-2 
and the PCL:SV across samples. ‘Cognitive impulsivity’ however, only demonstrated 
[weak] positive relationships with the PCL:SV. It therefore appears that a clear role for 
a ‘lack of guilt/remorse and a willingness to dominate/exploit’ was identified and this is 
in keeping with clinical conceptualisations of the construct (e.g. Cleckley, 1982; Hare, 
1991).  
 
The lack of association between psychopathy and ‘cognitive impulsivity’ may relate to 
the ACL’s assessment of this variable. The ACL captures ‘cognitive impulsivity’ 
through one item only and may not provide a sensitive enough measure. Findings could 
therefore be an artifact of this limitation as opposed to a confirmed result.   
  
In terms of implicit cognitive processing, ‘making poor moral judgments’ positively 
correlated with psychopathy defined by PAPA-2 and the PCL:SV. Evidence was 
therefore found for the prediction that the new self-report measure, the PAPA, will 
positively associate with less support for a moral outcome in dilemmas. ‘Making poor 
moral judgments’ also positively predicted the ‘social and emotional difficulties’ 
component of PAPA-2, overall levels of the PCL:SV, and factor one of the PCL:SV 
(i.e. selfish, callous and remorseless use of others).  
 
These results suggest that rather than being a global predictor of psychopathy, ‘making 
poor moral judgments’ appeared to be a specific predictor; predicting components that 
focus on emotional difficulties, a lack of remorse, and callous use of others. This 
finding is consistent with Blair et al. (2005), who made a significant link between 
psychopathic individuals and their inability to consider other’s emotional welfare and 
general well-being when making moral judgments.  
 
Thus, whilst ‘making poor moral judgments’ was assessed as an implicit cognitive 
process in the present study, it also appeared to have a clear role in the affective and 
interpersonal aspects of psychopathy, specifically predicting components capturing 
these. This fits well with the notion that there is interplay between cognition and affect 
in psychopathy (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Glass & Newman, 2009). However, the 
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exact nature of this interplay is yet to be determined and this is one limitation of the 
present study.  
 
On closer inspection of ‘making poor moral judgments’, participants scoring ‘high’ on 
the PAPA-2 demonstrated less support for a moral outcome in dilemmas than those 
scoring ‘low’ on the measure. This was also the case for the PCL:SV. It therefore 
becomes evident that participants with higher levels of psychopathy presented with 
increased deficits in the more traditional element of moral reasoning (i.e. conventional 
reasoning). This is consistent with the findings of Blair (1995), Blair et al. (1995), 
Glenn et al. (2009), Koenigs et al. (2012) and Young et al. (2012), and supports the 
prediction that those with higher levels of psychopathy will be less likely to support a 
moral outcome in dilemmas than individuals with lower levels of psychopathy.  
  
Interestingly, participants scoring ‘high’ on psychopathy also produced fewer [moral] 
reasons supporting their judgment than those with lower scores. This aspect of the 
moral reasoning task is arguably less susceptible to socially desirable responding (i.e. 
due to being less transparent) and therefore provides a more implicit measure than the 
conventional reasoning element. Although deficits in both conventional reasoning and 
moral reasoning were identified in those with higher levels of psychopathy, the latter 
provides further support for the role of implicit processing in the disorder.  
 
The findings outlined here support the application of information processing theories, 
such as the Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998), to account for poor 
moral judgments in psychopathy. Those participants with higher levels of psychopathy 
may have been unable to monitor and regulate their own thoughts and behaviour once a 
dominant response set had been established. In this instance, their ability to engage in 
‘healthy’ conventional and moral reasoning may have been impeded by the goal to 
complete the task in the quickest time possible.  
 
In support of this, analyses indicated that participants scoring ‘high’ on the PCL:SV 
took less time to complete the moral judgment activity than those with ‘low’ scores. 
Although descriptive statistics indicated that this was also the case for PAPA-2, results 
did not reach statistical significance. Nonetheless, these findings indicate that cognition 
in psychopathy, specifically moral reasoning, is conducive to impulsive, ‘automatic’ 
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responding and therefore consistent with more associative systems of processing (e.g. 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Fleischhauer et al. 2013). 
 
Implicit cognitive processing in psychopathy was also examined through a tendency for 
hostile responding. This was found to positively associate with overall levels of PAPA-
2 and factor two of this measure (i.e. negative views towards others and a tendency to 
objectify). Thus, support was found for the prediction that the PAPA will positively 
associate with higher levels of hostile responding. Surprisingly, a tendency for hostile 
responding did not correlate with the PCL:SV, nor did it predict psychopathy across 
measures or sample.  
 
There was also no difference between level (i.e. high or low) of PCL:SV defined 
psychopathy and hostile or pro-social responding. As previously noted, this may relate 
to the small sample size and low base-rate of psychopathy in the present study.  
 
There was a difference however between level of psychopathy as assessed by the 
PAPA-2 and hostile responding, with participants exhibiting higher levels of 
psychopathy selecting more hostile responses than those with ‘low’ levels of the 
disorder. There was also a significant difference between level of PAPA-2 psychopathy 
and pro-social responding. Those scoring ‘low’ on the PAPA-2 opted for more pro-
social responses than participants scoring ‘high’ on the measure. Evidence was 
therefore found for the prediction that individuals with ‘high’ levels of psychopathy will 
display higher levels of hostile responding than those with lower levels of the disorder. 
This prediction was correct for psychopathy assessed by PAPA-2, but not the PCL:SV. 
 
Findings here, specifically those associated with PAPA-2, are supportive of 
Huesmann’s (1998) theory of information processing and extend the application of this 
to psychopathy. Consistent with Vitale et al. (2005), results indicate that psychopathic 
individuals have a tendency to attribute other’s behaviour to hostile intent and therefore 
present with hostile attribution bias. This bias may stem from an inability to effectively 
utilise all information provided, therefore leading to an over-reliance on self-schemas, 
which in the case of the psychopath, often portray the world and others as hostile and 
unpredictable (Cleckley, 1976; Blackburn, 2003). Thus, those with psychopathy are 
likely to respond in a manner that is unrelated to the situation, yet consistent with their 
schemas (Huesmann, 1998), exhibiting a tendency for hostile responding. 
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It therefore becomes increasingly evident that psychopathic individuals have a number 
of cognitive deficits and biases that interfere with their ability to process information 
accurately and respond appropriately. Overall findings support a clear role for implicit 
and explicit cognition in psychopathy, with consistency in cognitive functioning across 
samples. This provides additional evidence of construct validity for PAPA-2 and 
emphasises the importance of incorporating implicit and explicit cognition into 
psychopathy measures. Until recently, cognition has largely been neglected in the 
assessment of the disorder (Blackburn, 2007a). 
 
Affective processing has also received little attention when compared to the behavioural 
features of psychopathy (Flor, 2007). Thus, the present study aimed to investigate how 
implicit and explicit affective processing associated with psychopathy defined through 
expert consensus (i.e. PAPA-2) and clinical measures (i.e. the PCL:SV).  
 
Explicit affect generally demonstrated positive relationships with PAPA-2 and the 
PCL:SV. However there were a number of exceptions to this. For example, when 
examining the clinical sample, deficits in explicit emotion recognition did not 
significantly associate with psychopathy for either measure. This again may relate to the 
number of psychiatric patients recruited. 
 
Furthermore, factor three of PAPA-2; ‘social and emotional difficulties’ demonstrated 
mixed findings with explicit affect, which is surprising given the content of this 
component. ‘Emotional impulsivity’ [explicit] and ‘anger/irritability’ [explicit] did not 
associate with ‘social and emotional difficulties’. However they did correlate with 
‘dissocial tendencies’, which in part may fit with known aspects of psychopathy, such 
as poor behavioural control and impulsivity that are likely to be represented by this 
component (e.g. Hare, 1991). Nevertheless, ‘social and emotional difficulties’ did 
positively correlate with the remaining explicit affective variables, thus providing 
further support for the construct validity of PAPA-2. 
 
Findings for implicit affective processing in psychopathy were also mixed but 
nonetheless, highlight the importance of attending to affective processing when 
investigating psychopathy. Whilst psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV positively 
correlated with ‘deficits when identifying emotion’ and ‘deficits when 
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evaluating/feeling emotion’, PAPA-2 only demonstrated positive associations with the 
latter. No association was found between PAPA-2 and ‘deficits when identifying 
emotion’ for the sample as a whole. However, PAPA-2 correlated with this variable 
when examining the clinical sample separately. Support was therefore found for the 
prediction that the PAPA will positively associate with a lower strength of feeling for 
own and others’ emotion. There was only partial support however for the prediction that 
the PAPA will positively associate with fewer emotional words identified.  
 
Again, it may be that the ACL did not provide a sensitive enough measure of implicit 
affective processing and the results may be an artifact of this. This argument is also 
supported by both implicit affective processing variables failing to predict psychopathy 
across measures. The exception to this is for the student sample, where a clear role for 
implicit affective processing in psychopathy was found. 
 
Deficits in implicit affective processing positively correlated with, and predicted 
psychopathy across measures for students, but not patients. This finding is inconsistent 
with Lorenz and Newman (2002), Long and Titone (2007), and Glass and Newman 
(2009) who all suggested that non-incarcerated psychopaths have similar deficits in 
affect to incarcerated psychopaths.  
 
Additionally, Habel et al. (2002) found strong evidence for impaired emotional-
processing in psychopathy, particularly for those with antisocial personality traits. 
Those with ‘emotional detachment’ (i.e. PCL-R factor one, the core personality traits of 
the construct) were the least impaired in their discrimination ability. Arguably, students 
with ‘high’ levels of psychopathy would fit into the ‘emotional detachment’ rather than 
the ‘antisocial personality’ category given that they are able to avoid contact with the 
Criminal Justice System and reside in the community.  
 
Thus, the findings of the present study were inconsistent with this, but nevertheless do 
suggest that psychopathic individuals in the community (i.e. successful psychopaths) 
also have deficits in affective processing. It may just be that these manifest differently 
to affective deficits found in psychopaths residing in secure settings. Further research is 
therefore required to confirm this using a larger sample and more sensitive measures of 
implicit affective processing. 
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Additional exploration of implicit affective processing in psychopathy revealed that 
individuals categorised into the ‘low’ psychopathy group for the PAPA-2 rated 
themselves and others as experiencing more emotion than those in the ‘high’ group. 
Individuals scoring ‘high’ on the PCL:SV made more errors when ranking emotional 
scenarios, thus suggesting that individuals with psychopathy have impairments when 
evaluating emotion.  
 
It is worth noting that these were the only statistically significant results for the group 
analyses exploring the implicit affective processing tasks. However descriptive 
statistics, though not statistically significant, suggested that individuals with higher 
levels of psychopathy had other impairments in affective processing (i.e. they took 
longer to process emotional information). Thus, with an increased sample size more 
statistically significant results may have been obtained.    
 
Whilst there was no support for the prediction that those with higher levels of 
psychopathy will identify less emotional stimuli than those with lower levels of 
psychopathy, evidence was found for the second prediction; individuals with higher 
levels of psychopathy will demonstrate a lower strength of feeling for their own and 
others’ emotion than those with lower levels of psychopathy.  
 
This finding is consistent with the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957) and 
the Violence Inhibition Mechanism Model (VIM; Blair, 1995), in that those individuals 
with higher levels of psychopathy presented with an affective processing deficit that 
would appear to be conducive to a decreased sensitivity to emotion. Psychopathic 
individuals presented with deficient emotional reactivity that extended to experiencing 
their own emotion and evaluating others’ emotion.  
 
In the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis, Lykken (1957) also argued that individuals with 
psychopathy, specifically primary psychopathy, are characterised by an absence of 
emotional reactivity that relates to an inability to experience anxiety. However, the 
present study did not screen for anxiety in the participants sampled. Future research 
should take this into consideration when exploring implicit affective processing in 
psychopathy so that this theory can be better applied. 
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Beck’s (1987) theory of emotional disorders can also be used to account for the findings 
outlined here. Beck (1987) proposed that biased schemas and past learning history are a 
source of emotional dysfunction. That is, they lead to distorted self-evaluations and 
biased attributions of causality, which impact on an individual’s ability to effectively 
evaluate and react appropriately to emotional information. Thus, those individuals 
scoring high on psychopathy in the present study may have cognitive biases that result 
in an inability to evaluate their own and others’ emotion. Their cognitive biases may 
also influence their ability to evaluate emotional scenarios appropriately. 
 
The application of this theory also highlights the role of cognitive-affective interactions 
in modulating the manifestation of affective processing in psychopathy. Moreover, it 
appears that cognitive schemas, and indeed information processing, have a significant 
influence on emotional experiences in psychopathy, in that they determine how 
affective cues are evaluated, with this being particular apparent for a psychopath’s own 
emotional experience.  
 
9.14 Limitations of the study 
 
As noted, there was a low base rate of psychopathy in the samples studied. Sample size 
was also relatively small (n = 91; 50 students and 41 patients). Although this was 
acceptable for the methods adopted (e.g. interview, collateral review, observation, etc.), 
the study, and indeed analyses, would have benefitted from a larger pool of participants. 
The response rate for students was high (i.e. 96%). However this was not the case for 
the clinical sample, with a response rate of 37% being achieved. The high secure 
psychiatric sample was a challenging population to engage, and this must be considered 
when reviewing the findings of the present study.  
 
The low base rate of psychopathy meant that fewer participants were categorised into 
the ‘high’ group for the PCL:SV and PAPA-2 when examining the effect of level of 
psychopathy on implicit cognitive and affective processing. The disproportionately 
populated groups may have resulted in an underestimation of effect. Future research 
should therefore recruit a larger sample size with a higher base rate of psychopathy to 
allow the data to be split into top and bottom quartiles. This method would provide for 
more meaningful comparisons between levels of psychopathy and implicit cognitive 
and affective processing.  
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The present study also aimed to examine how cognitive and affective processing 
interacts in psychopathy. Whilst cognitive processing demonstrated a clear role in the 
affective component of PAPA-2 (i.e. social and emotional difficulties), the exact nature 
of this interplay was not examined. In light of previous findings, the present study can 
only assume, rather than confirm, that this interplay resulted from a cognitive overload 
experienced by some participants.  
 
Previous research (e.g. Verona et al. 2012; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013) has found 
increased attentional demand and high processing load to create a bottleneck, whereby 
psychopathic individuals have difficulty processing multiple channels of information 
simultaneously. With this in mind, there is reason to suspect that this attention 
bottleneck may be detrimental to affective processing in psychopathy, specifically in 
relation to emotional reactivity (Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013). Further research is 
therefore required to confirm this. 
 
9.15 Concluding comments 
 
Overall the results provide promising evidence for the internal reliability and validity of 
PAPA-2. Similarities between the factors extracted from PAPA-2 and the model 
identified by Cooke and Michie (2001) align the new measure with original 
conceptualisations of psychopathy as ‘abnormal personality’ (e.g. Cleckley, 1982). That 
is, both models place an emphasis on interpersonal and affective functioning. Whilst the 
three-factor solution extracted from PAPA-2 did not attend directly to cognition, a clear 
role for cognitive processing in psychopathy was identified. 
 
Moreover, results were in favour of the notion that psychopathic individuals have a 
number of cognitive deficits and biases that interfere with their ability to process 
information effectively and respond appropriately. Findings provide support for implicit 
and explicit cognition in psychopathy, with consistency in functioning across samples.  
 
Findings also indicate a clear role for both explicit and implicit affective processing in 
psychopathy, with this being particular evident for the student sample. Analyses 
indicated that individuals with psychopathy have deficient emotional reactivity, 
specifically in relation to their experience of emotion. Individuals with higher levels of 
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psychopathy also appeared to make more errors when ranking emotional scenarios, thus 
lending further support for impairments when evaluating emotion. Consistent with 
Beck’s (1987) theory, it appears that cognitive biases may influence emotional 
experiences in psychopathy, in that they determine how emotional information is 
appraised. Whilst this draws on the cognitive-affective interaction, further research is 
required to examine the role of attention in the identification and evaluation of emotion 
in psychopathy.  
 
Thus, it becomes evident that there is a need for implicit and explicit measures of 
cognition and affect to be included in the assessment of psychopathy. Whilst results 
support inclusion at a localised level (i.e. tasks that attend to moral judgments and the 
evaluation of emotion), further research using a larger sample size may indicate the 
need for a more global presence of cognitive and affective processing in measures of 
psychopathy. Results also suggest the need for collateral review, observation and 
interview to reduce the possibility of deception and make the assessment of 
psychopathy via self-report more reliable.  
 
The thesis will now provide a general discussion of the overall theoretical findings of 
the research. It will address the four outcomes proposed in Chapter six (See p. 126) and 
highlight the limitations of the thesis. Implications for clinical practice, including the 
assessment and treatment of those with psychopathy will also be outlined. The general 
discussion will conclude with proposals for future research. 
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Chapter 10. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
10.1 Structure of the Chapter 
 
This Chapter provides a discussion of the overall findings of the thesis. The limitations 
of the research and recommendations for future work will also be discussed, followed 
by a conclusion bringing the thesis to a close.   
 
10.2 Discussion of the overall findings 
 
To maintain focus, this section has been split into four subsections, which include 
‘defining the construct’, ‘evaluating the PAPA and its applicability across samples’, 
‘cognitive processing in psychopathy’, and ‘affective processing in psychopathy’. A 
discussion of the findings will be provided relevant to each subsection. The section 
concludes with a summary of how this thesis provides an original contribution to the 
academic study of psychopathy.  
 
Defining the construct of psychopathy 
 
Experts agreed that psychopathy could be largely understood through interpersonal 
factors, behavioural characteristics, deficits in cognition and affect, and developmental 
factors. They appeared to be influenced by the definition of psychopathy set by the 
Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991) and rated items relating to this 
as most important. This is consistent with Skeem and Cooke (2010a), who noted that 
the theoretical construct and assessment of psychopathy have merged. It would not be 
illogical to propose that experts may have rated familiar items more favorably and this 
would account for the high level of agreement on the PCL-R items.  
 
Experts also rated a number of items addressing cognition and affect as important when 
understanding psychopathy. They rated items capturing affect as more important than 
those associated with cognition. This finding is consistent with early conceptualisations 
of psychopathy that placed more emphasis on affective processing in the disorder (e.g. 
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Cleckley, 1976). However, as expected, item agreement was lower for both cognition 
and affect when compared to interpersonal and behavioural features and would suggest 
that the PCL-R has heavily influenced and hindered research into psychopathy. 
Cognitive processing was poorly captured in experts’ understanding and could indicate 
a lack of familiarity with the research in this area. It may also relate to the 
characteristics of the experts sampled. 
 
A small number of experts took part in the survey, of which over 50% were Forensic 
Psychologists. Forensic Psychologists will have used the PCL-R in their roles, arguably 
leading to biased responding as this measure lacks items that address cognition and 
affect in psychopathy. However, those items capturing cognition and affect that reached 
agreement may be attributed to a small number of experts who were academics and may 
have an increased understanding into the cognitive and affective processes associated 
with psychopathy. 
 
Regarding the expert profile of psychopathy, it was agreed that individuals with 
psychopathy have biased judgments of causality [cognition], possess maladaptive 
cognitive schemas [cognition] and display low levels of fear [affect]. They also have an 
impaired emotional learning [affect], a different internal experience of emotion [affect] 
and are less influenced by emotion [affect].  
 
This profile is consistent with existing research, in that researchers have generally 
identified individuals with psychopathy to present with biased judgments (e.g. Vitale et 
al. 2005), have negative cognitive schemas (e.g. Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012), have 
deficient emotional reactivity (e.g. Lykken, 1957), and experience problems when 
identifying (e.g. Blair et al. 2004; Dawel et al. 2012) and evaluating emotions (e.g. 
Glass & Newman, 2009; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013).  
 
Interestingly, the expert profile of psychopathic cognition and affect also overlaps with 
a number of theories and would indicate that whilst experts have some knowledge of 
cognition and affect that relates to theory, the current assessment of psychopathy is not 
allowing for this to be applied. Beck (1987) and Huesmann (1998) for example, 
recognise that biases in cognitive schema influence information processing and thus 
give rise to attributions of causality that are inconsistent with the situation. These 
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attributions relate to abnormal affective experiences and thus account for the 
psychopath’s ‘abnormal’ internal experience of emotion (Beck, 1987).  
 
The Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957) and Violence Inhibition Mechanism 
Model (VIM; Blair, 1995) also relate to the expert consensus of psychopathy, in that 
they emphasise individuals with psychopathy to have deficient emotional reactivity and 
consequently experience less arousal to emotion. This would account for their inability 
to identify emotion and learn from this, which experts highlighted as crucial aspects of 
affective processing in psychopathy.  
 
It is worth noting that experts in the current study also placed less emphasis on the early 
developmental experiences proposed by VIM and how these associate with cognition 
and affect. Nevertheless, the findings from the Delphi survey were captured by both of 
these theories and therefore allow for a theoretical understanding of the construct that 
extends to the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment (PAPA).  
 
Evaluating the PAPA and its applicability across samples 
 
A two-component solution was extracted from the PAPA in a sample of prisoners and 
students. This solution was underpinned by ‘dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views 
towards others’, closely resembling the two-factor model of the PCL-R. Findings 
therefore point to interpersonal difficulties and antisocial behaviour as core features of 
psychopathy. However, it could be argued that these findings reflect the antisocial 
nature of the forensic sample rather than the true characteristics of psychopathy per se.   
 
‘Dissocial tendencies’ and ‘negative views towards others’ were also found to underpin 
psychopathy in a sample of high secure psychiatric patients and students. However, a 
third component was also identified, which captured ‘social and emotional difficulties’. 
The extraction of this component was a novel finding, as this has not been previously 
identified in research exploring the factor structure of psychopathy (e.g. Hare, 1991; 
Cooke & Michie, 2001; Neumann et al. 2006; Williams et al. 2007; Skeem & Cooke, 
2010a,b). This suggests that research has missed this and it may therefore be incorrect 
to accept that the disorder consists solely of interpersonal and behavioural features (e.g. 
Hare, 1991). There may be other components that are yet to be discovered; components 
that attend to cognitive processing in psychopathy for example.    
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Psychopathy also appears to present differently across samples, with ‘social and 
emotional difficulties’ being important for those detained in secure psychiatric settings. 
This provides compelling evidence for more specific manifestations and etiologies of 
psychopathy that are unique to different populations. Whilst this is consistent with 
psychopathy’s heterogeneous past (e.g. Schneider, 1923, cited in Werlinder, Karpman, 
1955, cited in Skeem et al. 2003; 1978; Arieti, 1963, cited in Hare, 1970), it disagrees 
with more recent conceptualisations of the construct as a homogeneous entity (e.g. 
Harpur et al. 1989; Hare, 1991; Cooke & Michie, 2001). This work therefore supports 
the need for an assessment of psychopathy that is dynamic and sensitive to differences 
in psychopathy across samples. 
 
The PAPA was found to be a valid and reliable assessment of psychopathy. It positively 
correlated with existing psychopathy measures, including the Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson et al. 1995) and the Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised: Screening Version (PCL:SV; Hart et al. 1995). However, it is worth noting 
that the strength of the correlation between the PAPA and PCL:SV was relatively low. 
It may be that the PAPA and PCL:SV are measuring different variants of psychopathy 
and the weak relationship between the two may relate to the focus of each measure. For 
example, whilst the PAPA adopts a more personality-based approach to psychopathy 
assessment, the PCL:SV tends to focus on behaviour. This is a known criticism of the 
PCL:SV as discussed throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, the findings here 
demonstrate concurrent validity of the PAPA with existing psychopathy measures and 
this is important, as it indicates that the self-report is fulfilling its purpose as a new 
measure of psychopathy. 
 
There was also evidence of discrimination between samples on levels of psychopathy, 
with those at higher risk of the disorder (i.e. forensic psychiatric patients and prisoners, 
Hare, 1991) presenting with higher scores on the PAPA. This finding is consistent with 
de Vogel and de Ruiter (2005), Strand and Belfrage (2005), Strachan (1993), Forth et al. 
(1996), and Huss (2009) and indicates that the PAPA is able to discriminate effectively 
across samples. Whilst this held for prisoners and students, there was no significant 
difference between students and psychiatric patients. However when considering means, 
psychiatric patients had higher levels of psychopathy defined by the PAPA than 
students.  
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The lack of discrimination between students and psychiatric patients on the prevalence 
of psychopathy may be due to the low sample size for both populations. It may also 
relate to problems associated with self-report, including impression management. This 
is not to say that self-report measures are not useful in the assessment of psychopathy; it 
may just be that other methods are also required to reduce response bias. This is 
supported by the finding that clinical observation, interview, collateral review and 
implicit affect measured by the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; 
Ireland & Ireland, 2012) all positively predicted psychopathy defined by the PCL:SV. 
Findings therefore support a mixed methods approach when assessing for the disorder. 
This is a new development in the assessment of psychopathy, with the ACL being the 
only measure to offer this. 
 
Cognitive processing in psychopathy 
 
Implicit and explicit cognition was found to be integral aspects of psychopathy across 
samples. In terms of explicit cognition, self-report psychopathy (i.e. psychopathy 
assessed by the PAPA and LSRP) positively correlated with positive and negative 
cognitive schema. Similar relationships were found to those identified by Wilks-Riley 
and Ireland (2012), providing further evidence of construct validity for the PAPA.  
 
Findings were mixed for positive cognitive schema. Whilst increased levels of ‘calm 
controlled’ and ‘caring’ predicted higher levels of self-report psychopathy, increased 
‘happy/sociable’ and ‘easy going’ predicted decreased levels. Thus, not all positive 
schemas are conducive to psychopathy. Nevertheless, these findings broaden the 
description of cognitive schema, as a clear role for positive cognitive schema was found 
for psychopathy.  
 
Cognitive schema, specifically Early Maladaptive Schemas (EMS; Young et al. 2003) 
focus on negative, antisocial characteristics and therefore neglect positive aspects of 
cognition. Interestingly, individuals scoring ‘high’ on psychopathy exhibited more 
positive cognitive schemas than those with ‘low’ levels of the disorder. Whilst this 
indicated that cognitive schemas in psychopathy are not solely maladaptive, it also 
provided support for early conceptualisations of the disorder (e.g. Cleckley, 1982), in 
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that not all psychopathic individuals are involved in criminality and can also be found 
residing in the community, i.e. as successful psychopaths (Stover, 2007).  
 
As expected, negative cognitive schema significantly correlated with, and predicted the 
PAPA and LSRP across samples. This finding is consistent with Blackburn’s (2003) 
Cognitive-Interpersonal Theory of Psychopathy and suggests that psychopaths have a 
distorted belief system stemming from early developmental challenges and unhelpful 
interactions with others. Individuals with psychopathy appear to have an upbringing that 
is characterised by abandonment, distrust and intolerance. It is therefore not 
unreasonable to propose that this experience would foster an extreme interpersonal 
style; a style that minimises the opportunity for these beliefs to be disconfirmed 
(Blackburn, 2003). Thus, it could be argued that negative cognitive schemas relating to 
the disorder may predispose psychopathic individuals to engage in antisocial behaviour, 
as traits that are conducive to this, such as a lack of genuine empathic concern, are 
likely to manifest from such beliefs (e.g. Cleckley, 1982).  
 
Psychopathy in the student sample however, was predicted by more positive cognitive 
schema than negative cognitive schema. This was not the case for the forensic sample, 
with this population having more negative cognitive schema predicting the construct. In 
light of this, it may be that positive cognitive schema in psychopathy act as a protective 
factor, reducing the likelihood of individuals engaging in offending behaviour.  
 
Nevertheless, analyses revealed that both positive and negative cognitive schema 
correlated with psychopathy in a similar manner across samples. This in turn supports 
the view of schemas as fundamental units of personality associated with certain 
developmental experiences consistent across psychopathology (Beck, 1967; Beck et al. 
2004; Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012).  
 
Research has tended to explore cognitive schema in personality disorder (e.g. Reeves & 
Taylor, 2007; Carr & Francis, 2010), neglecting psychopathy. The findings here extend 
the application of cognitive schema to psychopathy and this is a significant contribution 
to understandings of the disorder. It confirms the notion that psychopathy, like 
personality disorder, is underpinned by ‘abnormal personality’ rather than ‘criminal 
behaviour’. 
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Explicit cognition defined by the ACL was also found to correlate with, and predict 
psychopathy defined by the PAPA and the PCL:SV. Interestingly, a ‘lack of 
guilt/remorse and a willingness to dominate and exploit’ positively correlated with, and 
predicted psychopathy across samples, with the exception of psychopathy assessed via 
PAPA-2 in the clinical sample. Explicit cognition in psychopathy may therefore not be 
sample-specific, which is consistent with the findings of Newman et al. (1997), Vitale et 
al. (2007), and Sadeh and Verona (2008). 
 
Nevertheless, this fits well with the findings for implicit cognitive processing in 
psychopathy, specifically in relation to moral reasoning. That is, it could be speculated 
that the impulsive ‘automatic’ responding considered a central feature of psychopathy 
(e.g. Hare, 1991; 2003) may dominate explicit processes, which are conscious and open 
to manipulation (Bluemke et al. 2010). Thus, deficits in implicit processing in 
psychopathy may influence the manifestation of explicit processes and this is evident 
here, in that poor moral reasoning may unconsciously bring about a lack of guilt and 
remorse and a willingness to exploit and dominate.  
 
Regarding implicit cognitive processing, as noted, individuals with higher levels of 
psychopathy were found to exhibit deficits in moral reasoning. They also presented with 
a tendency for hostile responding. This is consistent with the academic literature, in that 
psychopaths have been commonly viewed as immoral (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2013) and are known to respond to situations inappropriately, often in an 
aggressive manner (Vitale et al. 2005).  
 
Rather than being a global predictor of psychopathy, implicit cognition tended to predict 
the disorder at a more specific level. ‘Making poor moral judgments’ for example, 
predicted emotional and interpersonal components of psychopathy but not dissocial 
tendencies. Thus, deficits in moral reasoning appear to play a role in the affective aspect 
of psychopathy and therefore reinforce the idea of interplay between cognition and 
affect in psychopathy (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Glass & Newman, 2009).  
 
Consistent with the findings of Blair (1995), Blair et al. (1995), Glenn et al. (2009), 
Koenigs et al. (2012) and Young et al. (2012), analyses found that individuals with 
higher levels of psychopathy assessed by the PAPA demonstrated less support for a 
moral outcome in dilemmas than those with lower levels of the disorder. Participants 
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with higher levels of psychopathy also produced fewer [moral] reasons when supporting 
their judgment and took less time to do this. Whilst the timing element of the task was 
only significant for the PCL:SV, descriptive statistics for the PAPA were also in support 
of this.  
 
Thus, it appears that psychopathy is associated with increased deficits in conventional 
and moral reasoning. This provides support for the inclusion of implicit testing in the 
assessment of psychopathy, as the moral reasoning task (i.e. generating moral reasons) 
was arguably less susceptible to socially desirable responding and therefore provides for 
a more implicit measure. It also becomes increasingly evident that moral reasoning is 
the core to cognitive difficulties in psychopathy and this has not been captured well in 
the literature; arguably due to an over focus on antisocial behaviour. Psychopaths are 
infamous for their immorality (Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), yet the 
processes underpinning this have largely been neglected in understandings of the 
construct. 
 
These findings nevertheless allow for information processing theories, such as the 
Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998) to be applied to psychopathy. 
Individuals with higher levels of psychopathy may have been unable to regulate and 
monitor their own thoughts and behaviour once a dominant response set had been 
established, which in this instance may have been the timing element of the moral 
reasoning task. It may also mean that when it come to producing their [moral] reasons, 
psychopaths attend to information that is central to an event, ignoring peripheral 
information, which would lead to biased judgments of causality and in turn the wrong 
interpretation of the situation. They are therefore unlikely to form adequate moral 
reasons as a result of this. 
 
The finding that individuals with higher levels of psychopathy completed the moral 
reasoning task faster than those with lower levels of the disorder is consistent with the 
notion that implicit cognition is related to more impulsive, automatic systems of 
processing and therefore relates to the model proposed by Strack and Deutsch (2004). 
This suggests that individuals with higher levels of psychopathy have less control over 
the processes governing their behaviour and consequently, respond with little effort and 
conscious thought. This would account for the poor behavioural control and high levels 
of impulsivity observed in psychopaths (e.g. Cleckley, 1982). 
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Unlike ‘making poor moral judgments’, a tendency for hostile responding did not 
predict psychopathy defined by the PAPA or PCL:SV. However, individuals with 
higher levels of psychopathy defined by the PAPA were found to have more of a 
tendency for hostile responding than those with lower levels of the disorder. This was 
the opposite for pro-social responding. There were no significant findings in relation to 
this for the PCL:SV. 
 
A tendency for hostile responding is supportive of Huesmann’s (1998) theory of 
information processing and extends the application of this theory to the construct of 
psychopathy. Findings confirm that psychopathic individuals have a network of 
cognitive scripts that are conducive to aggressive responding. These scripts may be 
more salient and therefore more accessible for those with the disorder. As cognitive 
scripts are often acquired through observation and enactive learning during childhood 
(Huesmann, 1998), the findings here would also suggest that psychopaths encounter 
early experiences of violence and/or aggression, which is consistent with Frodi et al. 
(2001).  
 
A tendency for hostile responding also lends support for a hostile attribution bias in 
psychopathy (e.g. Vitale et al. 2005), in that psychopathic individuals attribute other’s 
behaviour to hostile intent even when there is no hostility present. Thus, it becomes 
apparent that psychopaths are over reliant on aggressive scripts, with this leading to 
problems associated with biased judgments of causality and inappropriate responding. 
This is arguably maintained through their inability to accurately evaluate the 
environment (Newman, 1998), and monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their 
cognitive scripts.  
 
Thus, the present research supports a clear role for implicit and explicit cognition in 
psychopathy, with consistency across samples. The findings here reinforce the need for 
the inclusion of measures addressing implicit and explicit cognition in the assessment of 
the disorder. Given that cognition has largely been neglected in both the assessment 
(Blackburn, 2007a) and study of psychopathy (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012), the 
findings discussed here have significant implications for advances in these areas. 
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Affective processing in psychopathy 
 
The present research also examined implicit and explicit affective processing in 
psychopathy across samples. Explicit schemas relating to negative affect demonstrated a 
clear role in psychopathy that was shared across prisoners and students. Psychopathy 
was associated with higher levels of negative affect and this fits well with Beck’s 
(1987) Theory of Emotional Disorders.  
 
Beck (1987) argues that cognitive schemas determine how we interpret, experience and 
react to events, circumstances, and indeed others’ emotion. Maladaptive cognitive 
schemas, such as those found to associate with psychopathy, are likely to have a 
negative impact on this process and sustain the high levels of negative affect identified 
here. That is, as others respond in a hostile manner towards the psychopath due to their 
inappropriate responding governed by cognitive biases; the psychopath is likely to form 
an unhelpful impression of the world that promotes negative affect. Whilst this provides 
one explanation of how cognition and affect interact in psychopathy, this requires 
further investigation as Beck’s theory has rarely been applied to the construct. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has identified a clear role for Beck’s theory, with cognitive 
biases determining the expression of emotion in psychopathy.  
 
Explicit affect assessed by the ACL also exhibited positive relationships with 
psychopathy. However, findings for implicit affective processing were mixed. 
Psychopathy assessed by the PCL:SV positively correlated with ‘deficits when 
identifying emotion’ and ‘deficits when evaluating/feeling emotion’. The PAPA only 
demonstrated a positive relationship with the latter. No relationship was found between 
PAPA-2 and ‘deficits when identifying emotion’ for the sample as a whole. However, 
PAPA-2 correlated with this variable when examining the clinical sample separately.  
 
The lack of association between the PAPA and ‘deficits when identifying emotion’ may 
suggest that the ACL does not provide a sensitive enough measure of implicit affective 
processing. Alternatively, it may also imply that individuals with psychopathy do not 
have problems when identifying emotion. Their difficulties may solely relate to 
experiencing emotion. This is the preferred explanation, especially as evidence for this 
has been provided by the group analyses exploring implicit affect in psychopathy. 
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Prior to discussing this, it is worth noting that a clear role was identified for implicit 
affect in the student sample, with deficits in implicit affective processing positively 
correlating with, and predicting psychopathy across measures. This finding was 
surprising and inconsistent with research suggesting that all psychopaths, regardless of 
whether they are incarcerated, should present with similar deficits in affective 
processing (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Long & Titone, 2007; Glass & Newman, 
2009). However, it may just be that the sample size and prevalence of psychopathy was 
not high enough for analyses to detect a relationship between the disorder and implicit 
affect in the high secure psychiatric sample. 
 
Further exploration of implicit affective processing in psychopathy revealed that 
individuals with higher levels of psychopathy defined by the PAPA rated themselves 
and others as experiencing less emotion than those with lower levels of the disorder. 
Those scoring ‘high’ on the PCL:SV also made more errors when ranking emotional 
scenarios, suggesting that psychopaths may have problems when evaluating emotion. 
As these were the only statistically significant results for implicit affect in the group 
analyses, problems experiencing and evaluating emotion may be the core characteristics 
of affective processing in psychopathy.  However this is speculative, as there are other 
aspects of affective processing in psychopathy that this research did not address, e.g. 
empathic dysfunction (e.g. Blair, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, this finding is consistent with both the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis 
(Lykken, 1957) and the Violence Inhibition Mechanism Model (VIM; Blair, 1995), in 
that psychopathy appears to be conducive to a decreased sensitivity to emotion. 
Psychopathic individuals presented with deficient emotional reactivity that extended to 
evaluating emotional situations and when experiencing own and others’ emotion.  
 
Beck’s (1987) theory of emotional disorders can also be applied to explain the findings 
here. As noted, Beck (1987) proposed that biased schemas are a source of emotional 
dysfunction in that they lead to distorted self-evaluations and biased attributions of 
causality, which ultimately impact on an individual’s ability to effectively evaluate and 
react appropriately to emotional information. Results therefore suggest that individuals 
with psychopathy may have cognitive biases that result in an inability to evaluate their 
emotion appropriately. 
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Thus, the application of this theory emphasises the significance of cognitive-affective 
interactions in modulating the manifestation of affective processing in psychopathy. 
Moreover, it appears that cognitive schemas, and indeed information processing 
challenges, play an important role in the emotional experiences of those with 
psychopathy. That is, cognitive biases appear to determine how affective cues are 
evaluated, with this being particular apparent for the psychopath’s own emotional 
experience.  
 
Summary 
 
This discussion highlights that attempts to develop new psychopathy measures have 
been compromised by the dominance of the PCL-R in the field. The emphasis on 
psychopathy as an entity consisting largely of interpersonal and behavioural features 
remains evident in experts’ understanding of the disorder. It is this understanding that 
has been limited by a lack of research into other aspects of psychopathy deemed to be 
important, such as cognitive and affective processing (e.g. Cleckley, 1982). However, it 
is suspected that as more research is being conducted in these areas (e.g. Blair, 2009; 
Ireland & Wilks-Riley, 2012; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013), the expert opinion of 
psychopathy is likely to change. Until then, measure development should take into 
consideration the significant findings of this thesis, as it provides an outline as to what 
should be included in a comprehensive assessment of psychopathy.     
 
In terms of measurement, this thesis offers a new self-report measure of psychopathy, 
the Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment (PAPA), and unlike existing 
psychopathy self-reports (e.g. the LSRP), it has not been derived from the PCL-R and 
inherited its flaws (e.g. Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). The PAPA was developed from an 
expert Delphi survey and literature review, thus allowing for a consensus approach to 
assessment that is sensitive to the core features of psychopathy identified in the 
literature (i.e. cognition and affect). This method has not been previously adopted in the 
development of a psychopathy measure and therefore highlights the originality of the 
present research.  
 
In addition to this, the PAPA was found to perform well across samples, achieving 
acceptable levels of reliability and validity. However, this thesis recognises that self-
report measures are not without their limitations and are open to challenges, such as 
 287 
response bias. It has been proposed nevertheless, that the PAPA should be used 
alongside other measures, such as the ACL, which offer a range of methods to assess for 
psychopathy, including implicit and explicit testing, observation, interview and 
collateral review. This approach has not yet been adopted in the assessment of 
psychopathy and therefore offers a step forward in the measurement and assessment of 
the disorder. It is also worth noting that the PAPA has been aligned with the [proposed] 
changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – version five 
(APA, 2013; DSM-V), allowing for a current assessment. 
 
The present research also provides a novel insight into the factor structure of 
psychopathy that may help when resolving the ongoing debate surrounding the 
components underpinning the disorder. This thesis supports a factor structure that is 
different across populations. A number of researchers (e.g. Hare, 1991, 2003; Cooke & 
Michie, 2001; Neumann et al. 2006) are known to view psychopathy as a homogeneous 
entity, thus attempting to apply the same factor structure to all populations. However, 
the present research indicates that this may not be appropriate and points to the notion 
that psychopathy is sample-specific, with a factor structure unique to each sample.  
 
A specific role for cognitive processing was found for psychopathy, with moral 
reasoning presenting as the core characteristic. This indicates that specific aspects of 
cognition (e.g. moral reasoning) need to be integrated more into theories addressing 
functioning in psychopathy. At present, moral reasoning in psychopathy is explained 
through the Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998), thus attributing deficits 
in moral reasoning solely to attention abnormalities. However, the Response 
Modulation Hypothesis does not attend to moral reasoning per se.  
 
A tendency for hostile responding also provided further support for the application of 
the Response Modulation Hypothesis and indeed, Huesmann’s (1998) theory of 
information processing to psychopathy. In light of these findings, this thesis proposes 
that psychopathy may in fact be a disorder of attention (Blair, 2013) and that all deficits 
associated with the construct may stem from attention abnormalities. Whilst this is 
purely speculative, the psychopath’s inability to attend to all aspects of information 
lends itself to difficulties when monitoring their own behavior leading to inappropriate 
responding.  
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This speculation also extends to affective processing in psychopathy, with attention 
moderating the interaction between cognition and the psychopath’s experience of 
emotion. That is, difficulty when balancing the demands of goal-directed processing and 
secondary processing creates a bias, or cognitive ‘bottle-neck’ (Baskin-Sommers et al. 
2013), where those individuals with psychopathy become less responsive to emotion 
unless it is central to their focus of attention (Blair, 2013). This provides one possible 
explanation for the deficits identified when evaluating emotion. However, psychopathic 
individuals did not appear to have problems when identifying emotion and this may be 
due to affective information being in their primary focus of attention during this 
activity. They are therefore able to focus on the affective information and identify it. 
 
Deficits in information processing stemming from attention abnormalities also give rise 
to maladaptive cognitive schemas that influence how psychopathic individuals evaluate 
emotion. This integrates the role of attention with Beck’s (1987) theory to account for 
the deficient emotional reactivity found in psychopathy. Psychopathy does indeed 
appear to be a disorder of attention, but this is not captured well in psychological theory. 
Whilst the Response Modulation Hypothesis provides an account of attention 
abnormalities in psychopathy, it does not explicitly state how this relates to other 
deficits, such as emotion reactivity, moral reasoning and a tendency for hostile 
responding. Though it is important to note that the latter is captured well in Huesmann’s 
(1998) model of information processing.  
 
A new theory, or a revision of the Response Modulation Hypothesis, is required to 
reflect the findings of this thesis. Arguably, this would make the Dysfunctional Fear 
Hypothesis (Lykken, 1957) and VIM (Blair, 1995) redundant. However, any revisions 
should consider the early socialisation aspect of VIM, as this appears to be crucial in the 
development of maladaptive cognitive schemas, which arguably perpetuate, and 
possibly causes the psychopath’s deficits (e.g. Beck, 1987).      
 
Theory also needs to consider the role of implicit processing. Processing in psychopathy 
manifests at both an impulsive automatic level (i.e. implicit), as well as a controlled 
conscious level (i.e. explicit). This thesis acknowledges that implicit and explicit 
processing co-exist (e.g. Fleischhauer et al. 2013). However, the present research 
proposes that functioning in psychopathy is mainly characterised by less controlled and 
more automatic processing systems; and it is these systems that determine how explicit 
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cognition and affect manifest in the disorder. That is, implicit processing dominates all 
aspects of the psychopath’s presentation, particularly those characteristics that lend 
themselves to impulsive responding. Whilst this is speculative, this thesis is one of the 
first pieces of research to examine cognition and affect in psychopathy at an implicit 
level, thus providing a comparison for future research.  
 
Implicit measures are therefore required in the assessment of psychopathy to capture 
processing at this level. Whilst the PAPA allows for an ‘explicit’ examination of 
cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy; adopting the ACL will also enable 
an investigation into the mechanisms underpinning characteristics of psychopathy 
associated with more automatic responding (e.g. antisocial behaviour). The unique 
findings of this thesis therefore have significant implications for clinical practice. 
 
10.3 Implications for clinical practice 
 
Experts’ understanding of psychopathy appears to be influenced by the PCL-R 
definition. That is, their understanding relates to the interpersonal and behavioural 
features of psychopathy (e.g. Flor, 2007), and not that of cognition and affect. As 
previously noted, cognitive and affective processing are important aspects of 
psychopathy and experts should be aware of this. Those experts who assess and treat 
individuals with psychopathy should receive specialist training that focuses on cognitive 
and affective functioning and how these two processes influence the manifestation of 
psychopathic traits. This will increase practitioner’s awareness of cognition and affect 
in psychopathy and help resolve the ongoing debate as to whether psychopathy is 
personality or behaviour-based. Indeed, this thesis is consistent with early 
conceptualisations of psychopathy as ‘abnormal personality’ rather than ‘criminal 
behaviour’ (e.g. Cleckley, 1982). 
 
Findings are also in favour of a change to the assessment of psychopathy, with an 
emphasis on the inclusion of explicit and implicit cognition and affect. The current 
assessment of psychopathy, the PCL-R, lacks items that attend to these two processes 
(Fowler & Lilienfeld, 2013) and can therefore be criticised for not providing a ‘true’ 
assessment of psychopathy. Researchers (e.g. Cooke et al. 2004) are beginning to 
recognise the importance of including measures of cognition and affect in the 
assessment of psychopathy. However, this has mainly been considered at an explicit 
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level (e.g. the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality; CAPP) and is 
therefore problematic, as explicit measures are limited to what an individual is 
consciously aware of. 
 
The present research supports the inclusion of cognitive and affective processing in 
psychopathy at both an explicit and implicit level. Whilst explicit measures are open to 
impression management and deception (Bluemke et al. 2010), implicit measures avoid 
these biases and are therefore more suited for assessing psychopathy. The inclusion of 
implicit measures will allow for an examination of ‘automatic’ unconscious processing 
that is not captured by explicit measures (Ireland, 2011; Ireland & Adams, in press). 
However this is not to say that explicit measures do not have a place in the assessment 
of psychopathy. 
 
The importance of assessing psychopathic processing at both an explicit and implicit 
level is accounted for by the Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), 
which states that both systems interact with one another to predict certain types of 
behaviour. Thus, the newly developed ACL (Ireland & Ireland, 2012) offers a 
promising approach for assessing psychopathy as it includes explicit and implicit 
measures of cognition and affect, as well as utilising other methods, such as collateral 
review, interview, and observation to capture the disorder. This thesis found support for 
the inclusion of these methods when providing a comprehensive assessment of 
psychopathy.  
 
The development of the PAPA offers an original contribution to the study of 
psychopathy, in that it is the first self-report measure to provide a consensus definition 
of the disorder and attend explicitly to cognition and affect. Whilst the PAPA was found 
to be a valid and reliable measure of psychopathy, it is suspected to encounter difficulty 
when detecting more subtle aspects of psychopathic processing; processing that requires 
assessment at an implicit level. The thesis therefore proposes that the assessment of 
psychopathy should combine the ACL with the PAPA to allow for an holistic 
assessment, one that is sensitive to cognitive and affective processing and provides 
measurement that is in line with the DSM-V criteria for ‘psychopathic personality’. As 
noted, both the PAPA and ACL were developed in accordance to the [proposed] 
changes to DSM. 
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Findings also revealed that cognitive schemas in psychopathy are not purely 
maladaptive and may contain positive, more adaptive aspects. This was a surprising 
finding, as psychopathy has often been defined through negative or antisocial 
personality traits (e.g. Hare, 1991). Nevertheless, the notion that psychopathy is 
associated with positive cognitive schema, and indeed positive characteristics, supports 
evidence for ‘successful psychopathy’ (e.g. Cleckley, 1976; Schneider, 1923, cited in 
Werlinder, 1978) and that the disorder is not always associated with negative and 
antisocial traits.     
 
This has significant implications for clinical practice, specifically in terms of case 
formulation and treatment. The inclusion of positive cognitive schema enables an 
optimistic-based approach to treatment (e.g. Seligman, 2002), which highlights the 
client’s strengths as opposed to weaknesses when tackling core beliefs that influence 
their day-to-day presentation (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012).  
 
Treatment for psychopathy should also consider the localised cognitive and affective 
deficits identified, namely poor moral reasoning, a tendency for hostile responding and 
abnormal emotional reactivity. Therapists may also benefit from considering the 
interaction between cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy, as this may be 
key to tackling the deficits in processing exhibited by many psychopathic individuals. 
 
Thus, by treating the attentional abnormalities thought to be responsible for the 
interplay between cognition and affect (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Glass & 
Newman, 2009), alongside tackling existing maladaptive schemas, individuals with 
psychopathy may be able to attend to, interpret and evaluate a situation correctly 
leading to more appropriate responding. However as Huesmann (1998) suggests, 
cognitive schemas are entrenched and modifying these structures is likely to take 
considerable time and effort. Change is dependent on the client’s motivation and 
readiness (Polaschek, Anstiss & Wilson, 2010). The present research did not examine 
attentional abnormalities in psychopathy and this is to be considered for future research. 
 
10.4 Limitations of the research 
 
Limitations are unavoidable for research of this nature and this section of the discussion 
will attempt to summarise some of the core challenges. For all types of research, 
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recruiting participants on a voluntary basis brings about the possibility of self-selection 
bias (Deitchman, Kennedy & Beckham, 1991). That is, participants with higher social 
conformity (i.e. higher levels of agreeableness) and an investigative personality style 
may be more likely to participate than those with an anti-authoritarian or antisocial and 
enterprising personality (Norton, Booth & Webster, 1976; Porter & Whitcomb, 2005).  
 
Self-selection bias may therefore potentially apply to all samples in this thesis. 
However, the researcher directly approached participants personally, with the exception 
of prisoners in study two and students in study three, and this may have encouraged 
those with an anti-authoritarian or enterprising personality style to engage (Bowling, 
2005). Though it must be noted that at no point were participants coerced or forced to 
take part. Self-selection bias is likely to be a common limitation when researching 
prisoners or forensic psychiatric patients due to the personality traits often associated 
with these individuals (i.e. low levels of agreeableness; Becerra-García, García-León, 
Muera-Martínez & Egan, 2013). 
 
Sample size was also a limitation. Whilst this was acceptable for the methods adopted 
(e.g. detailed interviews), a higher number of participants would allow for greater 
accuracy in the analyses and for more meaningful comparisons to be made between 
students, prisoners and high secure psychiatric patients. This was especially the case for 
the factor analyses. The small sample size meant that these were purely exploratory and 
the components extracted were interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, prisoners and 
high secure psychiatric patients are unique populations and their complex presentation 
means that it is not always possible to engage them in research.   
 
Self-report has been used as a method of data collection throughout this thesis. This 
form of measurement has been associated with impression management and deception 
(Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006), and consequently gives rise to biased responding. Whilst 
this may be the case, other researchers have argued for the utility of self-report in the 
assessment of psychopathy, with Ray et al. (2013) concluding that psychopaths are 
often willing to admit to many of their undesirable traits and behaviours. Although this 
is somewhat dependent on insight and indeed individual differences, the present 
research found self-report (i.e. the PAPA) to be a valid and reliable measure of 
psychopathy.  
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When developing the PAPA, the present research did not subject the measure to test-
retest reliability. Test-retest reliability is often required to examine a measure’s 
consistency over time (Oppenheim, 2000; Segal & Coolidge, 2004). It assumes that the 
construct being measured is stable. Test-retest reliability is thus crucial when evaluating 
a measure of psychopathy, especially as the personality traits underpinning the construct 
appear to be persistent across the lifespan (e.g. Shaw & Porter, 2012). Future work is 
required to determine whether this type of reliability applies to the PAPA. 
 
Furthermore, the validity and reliability of the PAPA was not directly examined in 
women. Although study two recruited a sample of students, of which approximately 
half were women, this sample was not split by sex during data analysis. This decision 
was made to maintain focus, as the author did not obtain access to a female prison 
sample. Whilst the thesis did not aim to examine psychopathy and psychopathic 
processing in women, the author is aware that research has found a sex difference in 
psychopathy (e.g. Forouzan & Cooke, 2005; Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). 
Future research should therefore examine cognitive and affective processing in 
psychopathy in women and at the same time, establish whether the PAPA’s validity and 
reliability extend to this sample.  
 
There are also a number of limitations associated with this thesis’ exploration of 
implicit and explicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy. For example, 
other studies examining the application of psychological theory addressing cognition 
and affect in psychopathy, including the Dysfunctional Fear Hypothesis (Lykken, 
1957), the Response Modulation Hypothesis (Newman, 1998), and the Behavioural 
Inhibition System (BIS; Gray, 1970), separate the disorder into primary and secondary 
subtypes depending on the psychopath’s experience of anxiety. The present research did 
not screen for anxiety in the participants sampled making it difficult to apply these 
theories in full to the results. This is a clear direction for future research.  
 
Investigations of implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy were 
limited to moral reasoning, hostile and pro-social responding, and the identification and 
evaluation of emotion. Research has proposed those individuals with the disorder to 
also exhibit deficits in other aspects of functioning, including instrumental learning (i.e. 
learning to commit specific behavioural responses in order to gain a reward or avoid 
punishment; Blair et al. 2005), language (e.g. Hiatt et al. 2002), empathy (Blair, 2009), 
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and when regulating their own behaviour (e.g. Newman, 1998). Thus, there is scope for 
researchers to extend this thesis and clarify how deficits in other areas of functioning 
apply to the construct; refining the assessment of psychopathy accordingly. 
 
In addition to this, the present research did not explore the role of attention in 
psychopathy. Previous research (e.g. Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Glass & Newman, 
2009; Verona et al. 2012; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013) has found attention to mediate 
the interplay between cognition and affect in psychopathy. An interaction between these 
two processes was found and it could be speculated that this was due to attentional 
abnormalities in psychopathy. Again, further research is warranted to clarify this. 
 
Despite the limitations identified here, results suggest that implicit and explicit 
cognitive and affective processing are integral features of psychopathy and should 
therefore be incorporated into its assessment. Nevertheless, there are clear directions for 
future research and these will be discussed in the ensuing section. 
 
10.5 Directions for future research 
 
It is important to examine whether the consensus definition of psychopathy extends to 
women. Applicability of the current clinical definition of psychopathy (i.e. the PCL-R) 
has been questioned, as women have been found to perform the same as men only when 
psychopathy presents at a severe degree or they have a history of antisocial behaviour 
(Logan & Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). Thus, the current measurement of psychopathy 
may not adequately capture the manifestation of the disorder in women (Logan & 
Weizmann-Henelius, 2012). It would therefore be beneficial to examine whether the 
PAPA, and indeed the ACL, provide a more accurate assessment of psychopathy in this 
population. 
 
Applying the PAPA and ACL to women will also allow for examination into cognitive 
and affective processing and whether this is different to that found in men. Previous 
research has identified psychopathic processing to be similar [though not identical] 
across sex (Verona & Vitale, 2006), with this becoming increasingly evident in more 
severe presentations of psychopathy (e.g. PCL-R score of ≥ 25). However, these studies 
have not examined cognition and affect at an implicit level.  
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A clear role for positive and negative cognitive schema in psychopathy was found for 
prisoners and students. This thesis did not examine whether these cognitive structures 
also occur in psychopathy among psychiatric patients [or women]. Psychiatric patients 
are a unique population, in that their complex presentation and psychopathology would 
be indicative of an abnormal developmental upbringing (Beck, 1967; Beck et al. 2004); 
an upbringing that would arguably give rise to different cognitive schemas to those 
found in other populations.  
 
Future work should examine the role of cognitive schema in psychopathy in other 
populations, including women and psychiatric patients. This work is crucial as there is a 
significant lack of research examining cognitive schema in psychopathy (Wilks-Riley & 
Ireland, 2012). Cognitive schemas form the fundamental units of personality (Beck et 
al. 2004) and are therefore paramount when understanding abnormal personality 
pathology, such as that of psychopathy.  
 
It may also be advantageous to examine the stability of cognitive schemas in 
psychopathy through cross-sectional or longitudinal research. Attending to the 
attachment styles of those with the disorder would allow for any change to be 
monitored. Research could also examine the process of mentalisation (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014), which focuses on an individual’s ability to understand their mental state 
and that of others, and how this applies to overt behaviour. This would help to 
determine the process by which cognitive schemas become maladaptive or adaptive, as 
well as providing a clear understanding of how they associate with personality 
challenges, such as those found in psychopathy (Wilks-Riley & Ireland, 2012). Whilst 
the present research did not investigate the causal effects (if any) of cognitive and 
affective processing on psychopathic personality and behaviour, longitudinal research, 
in combination with experimental methods, could also be used to examine this.  
 
Implicit cognitive and affective processing was explored through tasks addressing moral 
reasoning, behavioural responding (i.e. hostile or pro-social) and emotional reactivity 
(including the identification and evaluation of emotion). Further research could adopt a 
larger sample size and examine the psychopath’s language abilities and 
neuropsychological functioning. This would allow for an understanding into how 
performance in these two areas impacts on functioning in other domains, such as 
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affective processing. It would also enable assessments of psychopathy, such as the 
ACL, to widen their approach when measuring psychopathic cognition.  
 
Deficits have been found in language and neuropsychological functioning for 
psychopathic individuals (e.g. Hiatt et al. 2002; Pham et al. 2003). However, the role of 
attention in these processes, specifically neuropsychological functioning, is yet to be 
understood (Hiatt & Newman, 2006). Previous research has found a clear role for 
attention in the interaction between cognition and affect in psychopathy (e.g. Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002; Glass & Newman, 2009; Baskin-Sommers et al. 2013). Further work is 
thus encouraged to continue to examine this interplay, allowing for the results outlined 
in this thesis to be better applied to attention abnormalities in psychopathy. In light of 
this discussion, the assessment of psychopathy may also benefit from an implicit 
measure of attention that is sensitive enough to detect attention abnormalities. However, 
further research is required to confirm this. 
 
The present research also points to the inclusion of different methods to assess for 
psychopathy. However, this is one of the first studies to test this and additional work is 
required to further refine and develop the ACL, so that it provides a comprehensive 
assessment of psychopathy that is applicable to all samples and can detect individual 
differences. It may also be useful to incorporate the work of Seligman (2002) and 
include more positive, adaptive approaches in the assessment of psychopathy. 
 
10.6 Final conclusion 
 
Arguably, affective and cognitive processing have been neglected from the more recent 
measurements of psychopathy, with a focus instead on interpersonal and behavioural 
aspects (e.g. the PCL-R). Nevertheless, this thesis highlights the importance of these 
two processes in psychopathy, with a specific role for each of these across samples. 
 
Moral reasoning appears to be a core characteristic of cognitive functioning in 
psychopathy. This calls for a review of existing theory addressing cognition in the 
disorder, as moral reasoning has been poorly represented in these. A tendency for 
hostile responding also extends the application of information processing theories to 
psychopathy, with a particular emphasis on the role of attention.  
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Abnormalities in attention could also account for the cognitive-affective interaction in 
psychopathy and may, in part, explain the lack of sensitivity to emotion. Affective 
processing in psychopathy may therefore manifest from cognitive biases that are 
influenced by attentional processes; biases that form during childhood and persist on 
into adulthood as maladaptive cognitive schemas. Adaptive cognitive schemas however, 
serve as a protective factor inhibiting the inappropriate behaviour (e.g. offending) often 
associated with psychopathy. 
 
A clear role for implicit processing in psychopathy was identified. Cognitive and 
affective functioning in psychopathy may therefore be determined by less controlled 
and more automatic processing systems; especially as it has been proposed that implicit 
processing in the disorder determines how explicit cognition and affect manifest. 
Implicit processing may therefore account for aspects of the psychopath’s presentation 
that are characterised by impulsive responding (e.g. antisocial behaviour).  
 
In terms of measurement, the PAPA was found to be a reliable and valid measure of 
psychopathy across samples. It was also sensitive to explicit cognitive and affective 
processing. Factor analysis of this measure revealed that psychopathy may not be a 
homogeneous disorder and instead may be underpinned by components unique to each 
population. 
 
Nevertheless, findings point to the inclusion of a combination of different methods, 
such as observation, collateral review, interview, and implicit testing, when providing a 
comprehensive assessment of psychopathy. Assessing psychopathy using mixed 
methods arguably limits response bias and allows for the more ‘automatic’, unconscious 
processes underpinning the disorder to be examined. 
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Table 49: Psychometric qualities of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)
85
. 
                                                        
85  All values in parentheses, with the exception of cronbach’s alpha and standardised beta, are significant (p< .05) correlation coefficients (r) 
interpreted as follows: > .60: strong positive correlation; < -.60: strong negative correlation; .30 to .59: moderate positive correlation; -.30 to -.59: 
moderate negative correlation; < .30 to 0: weak positive correlation; > -.30 to 0: weak negative correlation. 
Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal 
Consistency 
 
Hare (1991) 
[PCL-R version 1] 
 
n = 1,192 offenders 
& 440 forensic 
psychiatric patients 
 
Exploratory factor analyses yielded two 
correlated factors: Factor one (F1; 
Interpersonal/affective) and Factor two (F2; 
Social deviance) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Male offenders (α = 
.87); Male forensic 
psychiatric patients 
(α = .85) 
Cooke & Michie 
(1997)  
[PCL:SV] 
n = 2,067 offenders 
and forensic 
psychiatric patients 
Identified two correlated but distinct factors: 
F1 (Selfish, callous and remorseless use of 
others) and F2 (Chronically unstable and 
antisocial lifestyle) 
 
Not stated Total PCL-R (α = 
.80) 
Cooke & Michie 
(2001) 
[PCL-R version 1] 
As above The two-factor model previously mentioned 
could not be sustained (CFI = .78, GFI = .86; 
RMSEA = .10). Proposed a three-factor model 
underpinned by deceitful interpersonal style, 
deficient affective experience, and impulsive 
and irresponsible behavioural style (CFI = .97, 
GFI = .94, RMSEA = .07) 
 
Not stated Total PCL-R (α = 
.77) 
Johansson et al. (2002) 
[PCL-R version 1] 
n = 293 offenders Exploratory factor analysis produced three 
factors: an interpersonal factor, an affective 
factor, and a behavioural/ 
Not stated Not stated 
  (Continued) 
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Table 49: Continued. 
 
Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal 
Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
lifestyle factor (GFI = .98, AGFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .06). Confirmatory factor analysis 
showed that this model had a significantly 
closer fit than the original two-factor model 
(GFI = .98, AGFI = .97, RMSEA = .08) 
 
 
 
 
 
Hill et al. (2004) 
[PCL:SV] 
 
n = 149 forensic 
psychiatric patients 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis tested two-, 
three-, and four-factor models. All models 
provided a good fit. The four-factor model 
provided the best overall fit (CFI = .96, RCFI 
= .96, RMSEA = .08). All four-factors 
correlated aggression: F1 (Interpersonal; .43); 
F2 (Affective; .27); F3 (Lifestyle; .29); and F4 
(Antisocial; .53) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Not stated 
Vitacco et al. (2005) 
[PCL:SV] 
n = 840 civil 
psychiatric patients 
Confirmatory factor indicated that the four-
factor model provided a good fit (CFI = .93, 
SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .08). Similar results 
were found for Cooke and Michie’s (2001) 
three-factor model (CFI = .93, SRMR = .05, 
RMSEA = .09). All factors correlated with IQ: 
F1 (-.08); F2 (-.24); F3 (-.34); F4 (-.21) 
Not stated Not stated 
 
Neumann et al. (2006) 
[PCL:SV] 
 
n = 505 offenders  
[adolescents] 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis found all factor 
models, except the two-factor model, to  
 
Not stated 
 
Not stated 
    (Continued) 
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Table 49: Continued. 
 
Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal 
Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
provide a good fit (two-factor: RMSEA =.10, 
SRMR = .08, TLI = .92, CFI = .84; three-
factor:  RMSEA =.07, SRMR = .06, TLI = 
.95, CFI = .91; four-factor:  RMSEA =.07, 
SRMR = .06, TLI = .95, CFI = .84). 
 
Results indicated that the four-factor model 
reflected a central feature of a coherent higher 
order psychopathy factor. This higher order 
factor accounted for variance in F1 
(interpersonal; R
2 
= .44), F2 (affective; R
2 
= 
.86), F3 (lifestyle, R
2 
= .93), and F4 
(antisocial, R
2 
= .62)  
 
 
 
 
 
Sevecke et al. (2009) 
[PCL:SV] 
n = 314 adolescent 
offenders & 193 
students 
 
Confirmatory factor analyses tested the factor 
models. The three-factor model (i.e. 
interpersonal, affective & lifestyle) provided 
an excellent fit in adolescent offenders (CFI = 
.96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .09). The four-
factor model was deemed unacceptable due to 
correlations between lifestyle and antisocial 
factors exceeding 1.0.  This was also the case 
for students.  
 
Not stated 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
for total PCL:SV 
ranged between .83 
and .91 for students, 
and .74 and .87 for 
offenders 
 
  
    (Continued) 
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Table 49: Continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal 
Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
The three-factor model was less validated in 
students (CFI = .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA .07). 
The two-factor model provided an adequate fit 
(CFI = .98, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .07). 
 
For the offender sample, externalising 
behaviours significantly correlated with 
interpersonal (.22) and lifestyle (.20). Number 
of violent offenses also correlated with the 
affective score (.18) in offenders 
 
 
 
For students, F1 
ranged between .75 
and .88, F2, .68 and 
.75, and F3, .62 and 
.73. 
 
Offenders ranged 
between .71 and .76 
for F1, .63 and .71 
for F2, and .61 and 
.63 for F3 
 
Neumann et al. (2013a) 
[PCL-R version two] 
 
n = 1,031 offenders 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated 
excellent fit for the four-factor model (TLI = 
.97, RMSEA = .06). All factor loadings and 
correlations were significant. Low anxiety 
correlated with all four factors (.40 to .60) 
 
Not stated 
  
Total PCL-R (α = 
.92). The four 
factors all exceeded 
alphas of .82 
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Appendix 2. 
PSYCHOMETRIC QUALITIES OF THE SELF-REPORT 
MEASURES OF PSYCHOPATHY 
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Table 50: Psychometric qualities of the self-report measures of psychopathy
86
. 
 
Measure Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal Consistency 
 
LSRP 
 
Levenson et al. (1995) 
 
n = 487, Students 
 
Factor analysis revealed a two-factor 
solution; Primary and Secondary 
psychopathy.  
 
Primary Psychopathy 
Related to disinhibition (.34), boredom 
susceptibility (.39), harm avoidance  
(-.17) and stress reaction (.09)  
 
Secondary Psychopathy  
Related to disinhibition (.16), boredom 
susceptibility (.27), stress reaction (.41) 
and antisocial action (.29) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Primary psychopathy 
(α = .82); Secondary 
psychopathy (α = .63) 
LSRP Lynam et al. (1999) n = 1958, Students Confirmatory factor analysis identified 
two-factors; Primary psychopathy and 
Secondary psychopathy 
 
Primary Psychopathy 
Related to agreeableness (-.41), 
Not stated Primary psychopathy 
(α = .84); Secondary 
psychopathy (α = .68) 
     (Continued) 
                                                        
86  All values in parentheses, with the exception of cronbach’s alpha and standardised beta, are significant (p< .05) correlation coefficients (r) 
interpreted as follows: > .60: strong positive correlation; < -.60: strong negative correlation; .30 to .59: moderate positive correlation; -.30 to -.59: 
moderate negative correlation; < .30 to 0: weak positive correlation; > -.30 to 0: weak negative correlation. 
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conscientiousness (-.20), extraversion (-
.08), alcohol use (.25), illegal drug use 
(lifetime, .25; past year, .24) and serious 
antisocial behaviour (lifetime, .32; past 
year, .28) 
 
Secondary Psychopathy 
Associated with agreeableness (-.42), 
conscientiousness (-.59), neuroticism 
(.37), extraversion (-.15), alcohol use 
(.22), illegal drug use (lifetime, .25; past 
year, .25) and serious criminal 
behaviour (lifetime, .20; past year, .18)  
 
  
LSRP Brinkley et al. (2001) n = 549, Prisoners Confirmatory factor analysis provided 
an adequate fit for the two-factor model 
identified in previous research (e.g. 
Levenson et al. 1995; Lynam et al. 
1999) 
 
Overall LSRP 
Related to violent criminal activity (.24) 
and substance abuse (.18) 
Overall LSRP was 
associated with total 
PCL-R (.35); LSRP 
primary psychopathy 
with PCL-R F1 (.30); 
and LSRP secondary 
psychopathy with 
PCL-R F2 (.36) 
Overall LSRP  
(α = .85);  
Primary psychopathy 
(α = .83); Secondary 
psychopathy (α = .69) 
      
     (Continued) 
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Primary Psychopathy 
Correlated with violent criminal 
activity (.25) 
 
Secondary Psychopathy 
Associated with violent criminal 
activity (.28) and substance abuse (.14) 
 
  
LSRP Sellbom (2011) n = 573, Prisoners; 
n = 482, Students 
Confirmatory factor analysis identified 
the LSRP to be underpinned by a three-
factor model: Egocentricity; Callous; 
and Antisocial 
 
Overall LSRP  
Related to Machiavellian egocentricity 
(.77), narcissism (.26), coldheartedness 
(.26), emotional empathy (-.06), 
antisocial behaviour (.44), carefree 
nonplanfulness (.51), rebellious 
nonconformity (.48), impulsivity (.40), 
disinhibition (.51), alcoholism (.30), 
addiction (.42), anger (.44), fearfulness 
(.29), thrill and adventure seeking (.04) 
and emotional distress (-.32) 
LSRP correlated with 
the PPI (.68) 
Egocentricity (α= .83); 
Callous (α = .61); 
Antisocial (α = .62);  
 
 
 
     (Continued) 
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Egocentricity 
Correlated mainly with egocentricity 
(.71) and narcissism (.35) 
 
Callous 
Related to coldheartedness (.34), 
emotional empathy (-.07) and 
Machiavellian egocentricity (.48) 
 
Antisocial 
Associated with offending (.48), 
carefree nonplanfulness (.55), rebellious 
nonconformity (.41), impulsivity (.40), 
disinhibition (.32), alcoholism (.30), 
addiction (.44) and anger (.52) 
  
      
SRP Hare (1985) n = 274, Prisoners Principal component analysis found the 
SRP to be underpinned by a two factor 
model similar to that identified in the 
PCL (Items underpinning each factor 
were not provided) 
Correlated with the 
PCL (.38) 
Overall SRP (α = .80)  
      
SRP-II Williams & Paulhus 
(2004) 
Study 1; n = 289, 
Students 
Principal component analysis revealed 
two factors. F1 (Manipulative  
Not stated Overall SRP-II (α = 
.84). When reverting 
      
     (Continued) 
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trouble making) included the 
personality and behavioural features of 
the PCL-R. F2 (Emotional stability) 
composed of items relating to low 
anxiety and confidence 
 
Total SRP-II correlated with 
extraversion (.38), agreeableness (-.30), 
conscientiousness (-.15), emotional 
stability (.34), openness (.25), 
perspective taking (-.09), fantasy 
seeking (-.04), empathic concern (.10) 
and personal distress (-.17) 
 
  
back to the original 
subscales of the PCL, 
the SRP-II the alpha for 
the personality factor 
was .56 and .78 for the 
behavioural factor 
  Study 2; n = 356, 
Students 
Total SRP-II correlated with bullying 
(.35), serious crime (.19), drugs (.35), 
minor crime (.34), anti-authority (.20), 
and total delinquency (.47) 
Not stated Not stated 
      
SRP-II Benning et al. (2005) n = 326, Students Exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis found a two-factor solution 
optimal. This consistent with Wallace 
and Paulhus (2004) 
 
SRP-II F1 correlated 
with PPI factor one 
(.50). SRP-II F2 
correlated with PPI 
(.68) 
SRP-II F1 (α = .47); 
SRP-II F2 (α = .77) 
      
     (Continued) 
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SRP-II (F1) 
Correlated with neuroticism (-.52), 
dominance (.39) and conscientiousness 
(.23).  
 
SRP-II (F2) 
Related to dominance (.38) and love (-
.40).  
  
 
 
 
 
SRP-II Williams et al. (2007) Study 1; n = 269, 
Students 
 
Principal component analysis revealed a 
four-factor model: Interpersonal 
manipulation (IPM); Criminal 
tendencies (CT); Erratic lifestyle (ELS); 
and Callous affect (CA). Correlations 
among these were positive and ranged 
between .20 and .33 
 
Not stated Not stated 
  Study 2; n = 274, 
Students 
 
Overall SRP-II 
Associated with extraversion (.05), 
agreeableness (-.46), conscientiousness 
(-.23), neuroticism (-.05) and openness 
(.05) 
 
Correlated with LSRP 
(.53) and PPI (.60) 
 
Alpha reliabilities for 
the four subscales range 
from .67 to .91. Overall 
SRP-II (α = .88) 
 
      
     (Continued) 
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Subscales of SRP-II  
Related to type of misconduct (i.e. 
bullying, drug abuse, driving, 
misconduct, crime, anti-authority and 
overall misconduct). All types of 
misconduct correlated positively with 
the four subscales: CT (range .06 to 
.27); ELS (range .23 to .52); IPM (range 
.13 to .36); and CA (range .01 to .39) 
 
 
 
 
 
SRP-II Lester et al. (2013) n = 1257, Students Factor analyses identified a four-factor 
model: IPM; CT; ELS; and CA 
 
Overall SRP-II  
Correlated with neuroticism (-.10), 
conscientiousness (-.34), extraversion (-
.25), agreeableness (-.66), shame (-.25), 
detachment (.35), guilt (-.42), 
externalization of blame (.29), 
emotional self-awareness (-.24), self-
actualisation (-.28), empathy (-.38), 
interpersonal relationships (-.25), social 
responsibility (-.56) and impulse control 
(-.51) 
Not stated Not stated 
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SRP-III 
 
Paulhus et al (in press) 
 
n range = 300 to 
1500, Students and 
Prisoners 
 
Four factors identified: IPM; CA; ELS; 
and ABS (Antisocial behaviour). 
(Authors provide no further data for 
these factors) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Overall SRP-III (α = 
.81); IPM (α = .81); CA 
(α = .79); ELS (α = 
.74); ASM (α = .82) 
 
SRP-III Mahmut et al. (2011) n = 500, 
Community 
Exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses revealed a four-factor model 
consistent with that of Williams et al. 
(2007) 
 
Overall SRP-III 
Participants scoring high on the SRP-III 
(i.e. higher levels of psychopathy) had 
significantly lower levels of empathy 
compared to those scoring low on the 
measure: t(45) = 4.30, p< .05. SRP-III 
negatively correlated with empathy (-
.52) 
 
Not stated Overall SRP-III (α = 
.86); IPM (α = .72); CA 
(α = .65); ELS  (α = 
.76); CT ( α = .75)  
 
   Those with higher SRP-III scores made 
significantly more poorer decisions on 
the IOWA gambling task than those 
scoring low on the measure: t(40, 82) = 
2.81, p< .001  
 
  
     (Continued) 
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Logistic regression revealed the four-
factor model, when compared to a 
three-factor model, to be better at 
classifying those scoring high and low 
on the SRP-III 
 
 
 
 
 
SRP-III Neal & Sellbom 
(2012) 
n = 602, Students 
 
Factor analysis confirmed a four factor 
structure (e.g. Williams et al. 2007) 
 
IPM 
Predicted a range of characteristics 
including impatient urgency (β = .40), 
honesty (β = .35), alienation (β = .34), 
and blame externalisation (β = .30). 
Also associated with antisocial 
processes (β = .44), thought dysfunction 
(β = .22) and negative emotion (β = .33) 
 
CA 
Predicted a range of externalising 
characteristics (e.g. empathy, β = -.53;  
physical aggression, β = .24; and 
problematic impulsivity, β = -.18), 
callous-unemotional traits (β = .43) and  
 
Not stated Overall SRP-III (α = 
.92); IPM (α = .82); CA 
(α = .78); ELS (α = 
.79); CT (α = .75) 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     (Continued) 
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social avoidance (β = .18) 
 
ELS  
Mainly predicted externalising 
characteristics, including alcohol 
problems (β = .43), irresponsibility (β = 
.46), problematic impulsivity (β = .43), 
and reactive aggression (β = .28) 
 
CT 
Predicted a range of externalising 
characteristics, including alcohol (β = 
.18) and drug (β = .37) problems, 
irresponsibility (β = .35), rebelliousness 
(β = .15), fraud (β = .28) and theft (β = 
.48). Also associated with disconstraint 
(β = .27), behavioural dysfunction (β = 
.33) and proactive aggression (β = .34)  
 
 
 
 
 
SRP-III Watt & Brooks (2012) n = 382, 
Community 
 
IPM 
Predicted empathic concern (β = -.19),  
fantasy (β = .25), perspective taking (β 
= -.16), social desirability (β = -.36), 
Not stated Not stated 
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reactive violent thoughts (β = .24) and 
instrumental violent thoughts (β = .23) 
 
CA 
Predicted empathic concern (β = -.57), 
fantasy (β = -.34), perspective taking (β 
= -.37), personal distress (β = -.18), 
reactive violent thoughts (β = .21) and 
instrumental violent thoughts (β = .23) 
 
ELS 
Predicted empathic concern (β = .18), 
alcohol misuse (β = .33) and social 
desirability (β = -.16) 
 
CT 
Predicted alcohol misuse (β = .17) and 
instrumental violent thoughts (β = .14) 
 
 
 
 
 
PPI Lilienfeld & Andrews 
(1996) 
Study 1; round 1, n 
= 241; round 2, n = 
253; round 3, n = 
610. Students 
 
Factor analyses indicated eight 
subscales: Machiavellian egocentricity; 
Social potency; Coldheartedness; 
Carefree nonplanfulness; Fearlessness; 
Blame externalising; Impulsive 
Not stated PPI total score in all 
samples ranged from 
.90 to .93 (α). 
Cronbach’s alpha for  
the eight subscales 
 
     (Continued) 
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nonconformity; and Stress immunity 
 
 
 
ranged from .70 to .90 
   
Study 2; n = 71, 
Students 
 
 
Total PPI correlated with ASPD (.59), 
narcissistic personality disorder (.35), 
Cleckley’s psychopathy (.60), 
trustworthiness (-.39), accuracy of 
reporting (-.30), drug abuse (.25), major 
depression (.19), positive emotionality 
(.35), negative emotionality (-.50), 
social potency (.29), aggression (.43), 
harm avoidance (-.41), control vs. 
impulsivity (-.38), traditionalism (-.34), 
drinking frequency and intensity (.26) 
 
 
Total PPI correlated 
with the SRP-R (.91) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
PPI Poythress et al. (1998) n = 50, Prisoners 
 
Not stated Total PPI associated 
with the PCL-R (.54) 
 
Not stated 
PPI Benning et al. (2003) n = 353, 
Community 
 
Factor analysis revealed a two-factor 
model: PPI-I (Fearless dominance) and 
PPI-II (Self-centered impulsivity).  
 
All subscales loaded onto the two 
factors with the exception of 
coldheartedness. PPI-I: Impulsive- 
Not stated Total PPI (α = .95); 
Subscales range from 
.82 to .94 
     (Continued) 
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nonconformity; Blame externalization; 
Machiavellian egocentricity; Carefree 
nonplanfulness 
 
PPI-II: Stress immunity; Stress potency; 
Fearlessness 
 
PPI-I 
Correlated with adult antisocial 
behaviour (.15), educational level (.14), 
high school rank (.14), well-being (.39), 
social potency (.49), achievement (.21), 
social closeness (.29), alienation (-.15) 
and harm avoidance (-.31) 
 
PPI-II 
Related to adult antisocial behaviour 
(.27), childhood antisocial behaviour 
(.34), alcohol abuse-dependence (.18), 
age at first drink (.17), educational level 
(-.18), high school class rank (-.24), 
income (-.22), well-being (-.20), 
achievement (-.16), social closeness  
 
 
 
 
 
     (Continued) 
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(-.18), stress reaction (.27), alienation 
(.49), aggression (.42), traditionalism (-
.22) and absorption (.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
PPI Berardino et al. (2005) 
 
n = 105, Prisoners 
 
Total PPI correlated with deceitfulness 
(.49), impulsivity (.24), aggressiveness 
(.33), recklessness (.28), irresponsibility 
(.24), [lack of] remorse (.30), 
depression (-.25), psychopathic deviate 
(.23), masculinity-femininity (.38), 
schizophrenia (.24), hypomania (.52) 
 
Total PPI correlated  
with total PCL-R 
(.58); PPI-I correlated 
with PCL-R F1 (.38); 
and PPI-II correlated 
with PCL-R F2 (.49) 
 
In terms of the PCL-R 
three factor model: 
PPI-I with F1 (.36); 
F2 (.28); and F3 (.19). 
PPI-II with F1 (.22); 
F2 (.30); and F3 (.46). 
Total PPI with F1 
(.40); F2 (.42); and F3 
(.46) 
 
Total PPI (α = .89) 
 
PPI Patrick et al. (2006) 
 
Study 1; n = 96, 
Prisoners 
Total PPI correlated with empathy (-
.45), aggression (.60) and borderline 
personality disorder (.45) 
 
Not stated Not stated 
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Study 2; n = 89, 
Prisoners 
 
 
 
Total PPI 
Related to antisocial features (.67), 
aggression (.68), dominance (.38), 
borderline features (.39), drug problems 
(.29) and suicidal ideation (.33) 
 
PPI-I 
Correlated with dominance (.50), 
anxiety (-.37), anxiety-related disorders 
(-.23), somatic complaints (-.23) and 
alcohol problems (-.22) 
 
PPI-II 
Related to antisocial features (.71), 
aggression (.62), borderline features 
(.54), anxiety (.49), anxiety-related 
disorders (.43), somatic complaints 
(.43), alcohol problems (.28), drug 
problems (.36) and suicidal ideation 
(.40) 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Not stated 
PPI Edens et al. (2008) 
 
n = 131, Prisoners 
 
Any infractions correlated with total 
PPI (.33), PPI-I (.28) and PPI-II (.29). 
Nonaggressive infractions also related  
 
Not stated Not stated 
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to total PPI (.36), PPI-I (.34) and PPI-II 
(.34). Aggressive infractions did not 
correlate with the PPI. 
 
 
 
 
 
PPI 
 
Neumann et al. (2008) 
 
n = 1224, Prisoners 
 
Factor analyses revealed a three-factor 
model: F1, Impulsive nonconformity, 
Blame externalization, Machiavellian 
egocentricity and fearlessness; F2, 
Stress immunity and Stress potency; 
and F3, Coldheartedness and Carefree 
nonplanfulness 
 
 
Not stated 
 
Total PPI (α = .91). 
Cronbach’s alpha for 
the subscales ranged 
from .73 to .87 
 
PPI Claes et al. (2009) 
 
n = 399, 
Psychiatric 
Inpatients 
 
Traditional two-factor model, i.e. PPI-I 
and PPI-II, provided a good fit.  
 
Total PPI correlated with verbal 
aggression (.23), anger (.21), 
dysfunctional impulsiveness (-.40), 
functional impulsiveness (.45), 
authority problems (.19), social 
imperturbability (.26), amorality (.18), 
psychomotor acceleration (.17), 
imperturbability (.18) and ego inflation 
(.13) 
 
Not stated 
 
Eight PPI subscales 
ranged from .76 to .89 
(α). Total PPI (α = .92)  
 
     (Continued) 
 349 
Table 50: Continued. 
Measure Author(s) and Year Sample Construct Validity Concurrent Validity Internal Consistency 
 
PPI-R 
 
Copestake et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
n = 52, Prisoners 
 
 
Not stated 
 
 
Total PPI-R correlated 
with PCL-R (.54) 
 
 
Total PPI-R (α = .93); 
PPI-I (α = .87); PPI-II 
(α=.95); 
Coldheartedness (α = 
.85).  
Cronbach’s alpha for 
the eight subscales 
ranged from .78 to .92 
 
PPI 
 
Marcus et al. (2013) 
 
Meta-analysis; n = 
14517 from 45 
studies 
 
 
PPI-I 
Related to negative emotionality (-.35) 
and constraint (forensic, .23; 
nonforensic, -.14) 
 
PPI-II 
Related to positive emotionality 
(forensic, .10; nonforensic, -.09), 
negative emotionality (.30) and 
constraint (-.44) 
 
 
PPI-I  
Correlated with PCL-
R F1 (.21), PCL-R F2 
(.15), SRP F1 (.53), 
FRP F2 (.40) and 
LSRP primary scale 
(.17)  
 
PPI-II  
Correlated with PCL-
R F1 (.20), PCL-R F2 
(.41), SRP F2 (.67), 
LSRP primary scale 
(.50) and LSRP 
secondary scale (.65) 
 
Not stated 
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EPA 
 
Lynam et al. (2011) 
 
 
Study 1; n = 907, 
Students 
 
 
Joint factor analysis with the NEO 
personality inventory revealed that the 
18 EPA subscales were all captured by 
the Five Factor Model (FFM). Sixteen 
of the 18 subscales had loadings greater 
than .40 on their ‘home’ domains.  
 
 
Not stated 
 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for 
the 18 subscales ranged 
from .63 to .85. 
  Study 2; n = 77, 
Prisoners 
 
 
EPA subscales related to a number of 
externalising behaviours, including 
alcohol use (anger, urgency, distrust, 
manipulation, self-centeredness, 
opposition, arrogance and rashness; 
range .31 to .42), substance use (thrill 
seeking; .37) and antisocial behaviour 
(anger, thrill-seeking, manipulation, 
self-centeredness, opposition, 
callousness; range .32 to .53), and 
disciplinary infractions (anger, 
dominance, manipulation, self-
centeredness, opposition, callousness 
and disobliged; range .29 to .44) 
 
EPA correlated with 
SRP-III (.81), LSRP 
(.78) and PPI-R (.83) 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for 
the 18 subscales ranged 
from .44 to .87. Overall 
EPA (α = .95) 
 
 
EPA Wilson et al. (2011) 
 
n = 116, Students 
 
Total EPA associated with reactive (.28) 
and proactive (.45) aggression,  
 
EPA associated with 
PPI-R (.78), LSRP  
Total EPA (α = .94). 
Cronbach’s alpha for  
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antisocial behaviour (.42), alcohol use 
(.34) and substance use (.26) 
 
 
(.57) and SRP-III (.77) 
 
the 18 subscales ranged 
from .64 to .89 
EPA Few et al. (2013) 
 
Study 1; n = 907, 
Students 
 
Factor analysis reveled a four-factor 
model: Antagonism (F1); Emotional 
stability (F2); Disinhibition (F3); and 
Narcissism (F4). This was replicated in 
study two 
 
Not stated 
 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
ranged from .63 to .88 
 
 
 
  Study 2; n = 787, 
Students 
 
 
Antagonism (F1) 
Related to substance use (.21), 
antisocial behaviour (.33) and gambling 
(.30) 
 
Emotional Stability (F2) 
Associated with gambling (.18) 
 
Disinhibition (F3) 
Related to substance use (.33), 
antisocial behaviour (.34) and gambling 
(.21) 
 
 
Antagonism 
Related to nine out of 
10 self-report 
psychopathy scales, 
with correlations 
ranging from .50 
(SRP-III ELS) to .75 
(SRP-III CA). PPI-R 
FD was the exception 
(-.15) 
 
Emotional Stability 
Related to PPI-R FD 
(.67), PPI-R C (.24),  
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
ranged from .64 to .87  
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Narcissism (F4) 
Associated with substance use (.21), 
antisocial behaviour (.28) and gambling 
(.23)   
 
 
 
LSRP Secondary (-
.29), and PPI-R ScI (-
.15) 
 
Disinhibition  
Associated with all 10 
subscales of self-
report psychopathy. 
Correlations ranged 
from .21 (PPI-R FD) 
to .76 (PPI-R ScI) 
 
Narcissism 
Related to all 10 
subscales, with 
correlations ranging 
from .28 (SRP-III 
ASB) to .62 (PPI-R 
FD) 
 
 
TriPM Patrick (2010) 
 
Study 1; n = 148, 
Prisoners 
 
Not stated All three scales 
correlated with the 
PCL-R: Boldness 
(.20); 
Not stated 
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Meanness (.29); and 
Disinhibition (.32). 
Total TriPM related to 
the PCL-R (.53) 
 
 
  Study 2; n = 94, 
Students 
 
Not stated Total TriPM 
correlated with the 
PPI (.79), SRP-III 
(.76) and the LSRP 
(.44) 
 
Not stated 
TriPM Drislane et al. (2013) 
 
n = 618, Students 
 
Total TriPM associated with social 
potency (.34), harm avoidance (-.34), 
aggression (.47), control (-.43), 
antagonism (.55), lack of trust (.24), 
lack of straightforwardness (.55), lack 
of altruism (.37), lack of compliance 
(.49), lack of modesty (.30), and lack of 
tenderness (.29) 
 
Total TriPM related to 
the PPI (.78), the 
SRP-III (.69) and 
LSRP (.57) 
 
Not stated 
 
TriPM Poy et al. (2013) 
 
n = 349, Students 
 
Boldness  
Predicted by neuroticism (β = -.53), 
extraversion (β = .32), openness (β = 
.26) and agreeableness (β = -.34) 
 
Not stated Boldness (α = .82); 
Meanness (α = .85); 
Disinhibition (α = .84) 
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Meanness  
Predicted by agreeableness (β = -.63) 
 
Disinhibition  
Predicted by neuroticism (β = .30), 
agreeableness (β = -.35) and 
conscientiousness (β = -.30) 
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INFORMATION SHEET: Please retain this sheet for your information 
 
Assessing clinical psychopathy: Using an expert Delphi study to examine the areas 
of importance for a clinical psychopathy measure. 
 
Invitation 
You have been invited to take part in a Delphi study to try and gain a consensus on the 
underlying facets of clinical psychopathy, including the role of cognitive and affective 
processing. Your input will help develop the foundations of for a new measure of 
clinical psychopathy. This research forms the first part of a PhD research degree and has 
been ethically approved by the UCLAN ethics committee.  
 
You have been invited to participate in the Delphi study based on the following 
selection criteria: 1) If a review of the relevant academic literature has identified you as 
having authored more than one good impact publication on the topic of psychopathy, 
and/or 2) if you have been identified as having experience in assessing for clinical 
psychopathy. 
 
What is a Delphi? 
A Delphi technique is nothing more than a survey that a participant completes more 
than once with the ensuing survey accounting for early responses. So for example, you 
will be given a questionnaire to complete and then later, a revised version that has 
accounted for your comments. You will be given around three such questionnaires each 
becoming smaller. 
  
How to take part 
Please read the following information and decide whether you wish to take part. 
Participation is purely voluntary. If you do wish to participate in the Delphi please email 
‘yes’ to the principal researcher’s email address (located at the end of this information 
sheet) by February 26
th
 2011. Alternatively if you decide not to participate please ignore 
this invitation. Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to participate in approximately three Delphi rounds. More or less 
rounds may be required until a consensus of around 80% is achieved. For each round 
you will be emailed a link. This will grant you access to the survey. For each question 
you will either have to rate the item or write a short response. Once you have completed 
the survey you will be required to submit it back to the principal researcher online. It is 
estimated that each round will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Consent and withdrawal 
Emailing ‘yes’ to the principal researcher will indicate that you consent to be included 
in the Delphi study. With regards to withdrawal, you have up to 48 hours after 
submitting your responses to withdraw from the study. To withdraw you must email the 
principal researcher informing him that you wish to withdraw. No reason is required. 
Unfortunately, after 48 hours it will be impossible to withdraw your submitted 
responses, as they will have been merged with the other participants’ data. 
 
Anonymity  
Only the principal researcher will have access to your name and email address. No other 
members of the research team or other experts will know who is on the expert panel. 
Your information will remain anonymous. If the examiners or research supervisors 
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request to see the raw data, the data will be anonymised beforehand. Upon completion 
of the study your email address will be deleted.  
 
Raw data will be securely stored for up to five years following the completion of the 
research. After this period it will be destroyed. Any publication of the data in a 
professional journal or at a conference will report group data only and will not single 
out your individual responses.  
 
Feedback 
As part of your involvement in the Delphi study you will receive a final copy of the 
developed measure. You will also be sent a debrief sheet at the end of the study.  
 
Contact Information 
Principal Researcher:  Michael Lewis, Department of Psychology, Darwin 
Building, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 
2HE, mlewis@uclan.ac.uk  
Director of Studies: Professor Jane L. Ireland, Department of Psychology, 
Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, PR1 2HE, jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk 
Second Supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott, Department of Psychology, 
Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, PR1 2HE, jabbott@uclan.ac.uk 
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Figure 6: Round one. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 6: Continued. 
 368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Round two. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 7: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Round three. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
 
 388 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued. 
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Figure 8: Continued
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DEBRIEF SHEET:  Thank you for participating in the study 
 
Assessing clinical psychopathy: Using an expert Delphi study to examine the areas 
of importance for a clinical psychopathy measure. 
 
Please retain this sheet for your information. 
 
What was the purpose of the research? 
This study primarily aimed to gain an expert consensus on the underlying facets of 
clinical psychopathy, including a consensus on the role of cognitive and affective 
processing. The research aimed to incorporate the areas of importance outlined by you 
and other ‘experts’ into a new measure of clinical psychopathy. The overall purpose of 
the PhD is to develop an implicit and explicit measure; a measure that will assist with 
examining deeper levels of conscious and unconscious processing ability and deficits 
among psychopaths. An expert in clinical psychopathy was defined as someone who has 
either: 1) Authored more than one good impact publication on the topic of psychopathy, 
and/or 2) if you have been identified as having experience in assessing for clinical 
psychopathy. 
 
What questionnaires did I complete? 
You responded to a series of items over 3 rounds. The items all related to the construct 
of clinical psychopathy, i.e. its associated characteristics, structure, processing, etc. In 
each round feedback was given to you allowing you to clarify the information 
developed in the previous round. 
 
Why is this information useful? 
Your input has helped develop the foundations of a new measure of clinical 
psychopathy that will diagnose clinical psychopaths. There is a requirement for a new 
measure as research has identified that existing clinical psychopathy self-report 
measures have failed to converge with one another, which in turn suggests that there is 
an absence of concurrent validity. In addition, the existing self-report measures appear 
to correlate poorly with the core clinical assessment of psychopathy, the Psychopathy 
Checklist – Revised (PCL-R).  
 
Further details 
You will receive a copy of the developed measure. However, may I remind you that the 
research is expected to take three years to complete. If you require any further 
information please contact the principal researcher using the contact details presented 
below, thank you. 
 
Principal Researcher:  Michael Lewis, Department of Psychology, Darwin 
Building, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 
2HE, mlewis@uclan.ac.uk  
Director of Studies: Professor Jane L. Ireland, Department of Psychology, 
Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, PR1 2HE, jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk 
Second Supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott, Department of Psychology, 
Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, PR1 2HE, jabbott@uclan.ac.uk 
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MATERIALS USED IN STUDY TWO 
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 INFORMATION SHEET: PILOT SAMPLE  
 
Assessing clinical psychopathy: Developing and piloting a new self-report measure 
 
I am doing some research as part of my postgraduate research degree at the University 
of Central Lancashire. You are being invited to take part in a pilot study to help improve 
a draft measure of clinical psychopathy. The measure assesses people’s unhelpful 
personality style at one end of the scale, and a caring responsible personality style at the 
other. It does not diagnose psychopathy.  
 
The pilot study is recruiting 20 university students to improve the layout, readability, 
and structure of the measure before testing it in a larger student sample, and a prison 
sample. If you could spare approximately 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire I 
would be extremely grateful, thank you. 
 
You will be asked to complete the new psychopathy questionnaire and then rate its 
readability, layout and structure. You will also be asked to suggest any further 
improvements. Your responses on the psychopathy questionnaire (i.e. PAPA-1) will not 
be analysed, we are simply only interested in your suggestions and opinions. 
 
The questionnaire is anonymous. Please do not write your name on the questionnaire. 
Only the research team will see your answers. Your answers will not be singled out. 
 
If the questionnaire upsets or distresses you in any way, please remember that you do 
not have to fill it in. Please contact the researcher if you have any questions about the 
research. 
 
Please be aware that by completing the questionnaire and returning it back to the 
researcher, you are giving consent to be included in the research.  
 
You also have the right to withdraw. However when you have handed back your 
questionnaire, we will not be able to remove your answers from the study. This is 
because the questionnaire does not have your name on it. 
 
Please answer all questions as honestly as possible and then place the questionnaire in 
the envelope provided. Please return your completed questionnaire to the Student 
information room, DB124, Darwin Building,  
 
 
POST BOX NUMBER: 
          
 
Thank you for taking the time to take part in this research. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland 
Second supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott 
Address: School of Psychology, Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE.  
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Please indicate your gender by ticking the appropriate box: 
 
Male     Female 
 
 
How old are you? Please write your age (in years) in the space provided below: 
 
………………………………………………. 
 
PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE: PAPA-1  
 © Lewis, Ireland & Abbott (2011) 
Please contact Michael Lewis (mick.lewis04@gmail.com) or Professor Jane Ireland 
(jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk) for permission to use this measure/request the most 
recent version. 
 
Instructions 
Below are a series of statements that people use to describe themselves. Please read 
each statement carefully and using the scale provided decide how well each describes 
you.  
 
Very unlike 
me 
Not really like 
me 
Neither agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1. I am only interested in myself.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I do not feel guilty when I cause others  1 2 3 4 5 
to feel pain or hurt. 
 
3. I would describe myself as one of the most 1 2 3 4 5 
confident around. 
 
4. I will use people to get what I want.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I often experience strong negative emotions,  1 2 3 4 5 
such as anger, sadness, and hatred. 
 
6. I often take chances that could be risky to 1 2 3 4 5 
me or others. 
 
7. I often don’t think of the consequences of 1 2 3 4 5 
my actions. 
 
8. As a person, I have always stayed the same. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I have been described as a cruel person who 1 2 3 4 5 
does not worry about hurting others. 
 
10. I can allow my feelings to interfere with my 1 2 3 4 5 
decisions. 
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11. Others would describe me as an irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
person with problems controlling my  
temper. 
 
12. I have a talent at making people feel good  1 2 3 4 5 
about themselves. 
 
13. I see a lot of hostility around me.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. I regularly view others as lazy.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I have a problem with using alcohol.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. I am not that bothered about others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. I am described as a ‘charmer’ by those  1 2 3 4 5 
that know me. 
 
18. I find most people are weak and not worth 1 2 3 4 5 
bothering with. 
 
19. When I feel sad I can quickly make myself 1 2 3 4 5 
happy again. 
 
20. Others complain that I never take the  1 2 3 4 5 
blame for my mistakes. 
 
21. If others can help me, I expect them to do 1 2 3 4 5 
this without me returning the favour. 
 
22. I find it impossible to resist temptation.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. I often get into trouble more than others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. I tend to keep in touch with those close to 1 2 3 4 5 
me. 
 
25. I find it difficult to comfort others when  1 2 3 4 5 
they are upset. 
 
26. I would describe myself as someone who is 1 2 3 4 5 
often ‘fearless’ when faced with a threat.  
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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27. I am a creative person who can think of  1 2 3 4 5 
more than one way of dealing with 
problems. 
 
28. The world is a threatening place, you have  1 2 3 4 5 
to ‘watch your back’. 
 
29. I often feel in touch with other people’s   1 2 3 4 5 
feelings. 
 
30. I am able to talk myself out of situations  1 2 3 4 5 
by not answering questions directly. 
 
31. If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly  1 2 3 4 5 
think of a way out. 
 
32. I often experience strong positive   1 2 3 4 5 
emotion, such as happiness and joy. 
 
33. I am often bored.     1 2 3 4 5 
 
34. I regularly view others as irritating.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
35. I see no problem in living off the State/  1 2 3 4 5 
Government. 
 
36. I enjoy doing things that are exciting  1 2 3 4 5 
or new. 
 
37. I am able to commit a wide number of  1 2 3 4 5 
behaviours that, if caught, would get me  
into trouble. 
 
38. I can often find myself viewing others as  1 2 3 4 5 
nothing more than ‘objects’. 
 
39. I am an aggressive person in a number of 1 2 3 4 5 
situations. 
 
40. I very rarely experience fear.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
41. I tend to think of one solution to a problem 1 2 3 4 5 
and stick to it. 
 
 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 402 
 
 
42. I use illegal drugs more than most people 1 2 3 4 5 
I know. 
 
43. I find it difficult to give emotional and  1 2 3 4 5 
personal support to others.  
 
44. If I do something wrong I will feel bad   1 2 3 4 5 
about it. 
 
45. I often find myself thinking that I am more 1 2 3 4 5 
important than others. 
 
46. I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a 1 2 3 4 5 
‘con artist’ by those who know me. 
 
47. I always accept responsibility for what I do. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
48. I don’t see why others can’t take care  1 2 3 4 5 
of me. 
 
49. I can be unpredictable.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
50. I often find people behave aggressively  1 2 3 4 5 
or in a hostile manner towards me. 
 
51. Others would describe me as a very   1 2 3 4 5 
intense person who has difficulty getting  
on with others. 
 
52. I find it easy to form strong emotional  1 2 3 4 5 
relationships with others. 
 
53. As a child I often got into trouble more  1 2 3 4 5 
than others. 
 
54. I have clear goals for my long-term  1 2 3 4 5  
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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YOUR OPINION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
Overall do you think the questionnaire was easy to read? 
 
Yes   No  
 
Overall do you think the questionnaire was easy to understand? 
 
Yes   No  
 
Did you struggle to understand any of the questions? If so, please state which 
question(s) you struggled in the space provided below: 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….. 
 
Did you find the questionnaire instructions easy to understand? 
 
Yes   No  
 
Do you think the response scale is appropriate for the measure? 
 
Yes   No  
 
Do you think the layout and structure of the questionnaire was clear? 
 
Yes   No  
 
If you answered ‘no’ to any of the above questions, please could you expand on your 
answer and tell us why. Please use the space provided below: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
 
Please use the space below to indicate what you think we can do to improve the 
measure: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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DEBRIEF SHEET: PILOT SAMPLE 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire.  
 
The pilot study simply aimed to improve the readability, layout, and structure of a new 
self-report measure of clinical psychopathy.  
 
You completed the new psychopathy self-report questionnaire and then rated its 
readability, layout, and structure. You were also given the opportunity to suggest any 
further improvements. The new measure cannot diagnose psychopathy; it simply 
assesses people’s unhelpful personality style at one end of the scale, and a caring, 
responsible personality style at the other. May I remind you that your responses on the 
psychopathy questionnaire will not be analysed. The pilot study was only interested in 
your suggestions and opinions on the new questionnaire.  
 
 
If any of these questionnaires have upset or distressed you in any way, you may 
find the following support agencies useful:  
 
The Samaritans: Telephone: 08457 90 90 90; Email: jo@samaritans.org. 
 
UCLAN counseling service: Telephone: 01772 892572, Email: CoRecep@uclan.ac.uk. 
 
 
If you would like a copy of the final report once published, and/or if you have any questions about the 
study please feel free to contact any of the research team. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland 
Second supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott 
 
Address: School of Psychology, Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 405 
INFORMATION SHEET: PRISON SAMPLE 
 
Assessing clinical psychopathy: Developing and piloting a new self-report measure 
 
 
Invitation 
I would like you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would like you to 
understand why this piece of research is being carried out and what you would have to 
do. A member of the research team will go through the information sheet with you and 
answer any questions that you may have. This will take approximately 10 minutes. 
 
Part 1 of this leaflet tells you about the purpose of the research, whilst part 2 gives you 
more information on what you would have to do if you decide to take part. Please feel 
free to ask us anything that you are unsure about. 
 
 
PART 1 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am doing some research as part of my degree at the University of Central Lancashire 
(UCLAN). I am looking at the links between personality, thinking styles, and how you 
feel and react in certain situations. The research looks at people’s unhelpful personality 
style at one end of the scale, and a caring responsible style at the other. Please note that 
this research does not diagnose clinical psychopathy. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part as this piece of research aims to pilot and further 
develop a new self-report measure of clinical psychopathy using both a student and 
prison sample. The research aims to recruit 300 university students and 300 prisoners. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether you wish to take part. The research team will describe 
the purpose of the research to you and go through this information sheet.  
 
 
PART 2 
 
What will happen to me if I take part and what will I have to do? 
It will take you approximately 50 minutes to complete the questionnaires. In total you 
will be involved in the research for approximately one hour: 10 minutes to read this 
information and 50 minutes to fill in the questionnaires. Please note that it may not take 
you the full hour to finish. Please inform the researcher if you need assistance with 
reading or writing. 
 
You will be required to fill in three separate questionnaires. Questionnaire 1 and 2 look 
at some ways that people use to describe themselves, and questionnaire 3 looks at your 
beliefs and thoughts about yourself and others. You will also be asked to write down 
your index offence, and indicate your gender and age. 
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The diagram below gives you a brief overview of exactly what will happen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer all of the questions as honestly as possible and then place the 
questionnaires back in the envelope provided.  
 
Consent  
Please be aware that by completing the questionnaires and handing them back to the 
researcher you are giving consent to be included in the research.  
 
Withdrawal 
You have the right to withdraw from the research up until you hand your questionnaires 
back to the researcher. After this point we will not be able to remove your answers from 
the study as you do not have your name on the questionnaires. We will therefore not 
know which one is yours. Withdrawing from the research will not affect your care or 
treatment whilst in prison. 
 
What are the possible advantages and disadvantages for taking part? 
 Advantages: By completing the questionnaires you will be helping develop a new 
self-report measure of clinical psychopathy. You will also be adding to existing 
knowledge in this area of research. 
 Disadvantages: There are no disadvantages in taking part. It is not expected that 
any of the questionnaires will cause you any distress or upset. If they do distress you 
in anyway, please remember that you do not have to fill them in. You may also want 
to speak to your personal officer. 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher will go through this information sheet with you and 
give you time to ask any questions. 
You will be passed an envelope containing the three questionnaires 
under your cell door. 
The researcher will leave you alone to fill in the questionnaires unless 
you need help answering the questions (if you need help alternative 
arrangements will be made). 
Once you have completed the questionnaires you will need to put them 
back into the envelope provided. The researcher will come round to 
collect the envelope. If you decide not to fill in the questionnaires the 
researcher will still collect them. 
The researcher will then hand you a debrief sheet which will 
summarise the research. You will also be given the opportunity to ask 
any final questions.  
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Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
The questionnaires will remain completely anonymous. Please do not write your name 
or prison number on them. If on the off chance you do write you name or number on 
them your data will be destroyed. However, if you disclose verbally or write anything 
on the questionnaire that is deemed to pose a risk to yourself or another person, or if 
you disclose information about an offence that you have not yet been convicted for, the 
prison will be informed immediately. Any publication of the data will report group data 
only, at no point will your responses be singled out. Completed questionnaires will be 
stored securely in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher's office. Only the research 
team will have access to your answers. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Your data will be statistically analysed and presented in the researcher’s thesis. Results 
may also be presented at conferences and in scientific peer-reviewed journals. At no 
point will your data will be singled out. Only group data will be presented. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If any aspect of this research concerns you please speak to the researcher who will do 
his best to answer your questions. Alternatively, you may want to write to the research 
supervisors whose contact details are stated at the end of this leaflet. If you remain 
unhappy and you wish to make a formal complaint, you can do this by contacting your 
personal officer who will be able to forward you to the correct organisation. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN) is funding the research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by an independent group of people, called a Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by Northern & Yorkshire Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 
If you require any further information please speak to the researcher, or alternatively 
you can write to any one of the research team listed below: 
 
Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland 
Second Supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott 
 
Address: 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN), Preston, Lancashire, 
PR1 2HE. 
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  INFORMATION SHEET: STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
Assessing clinical psychopathy: Developing and piloting a new self-report measure 
 
 
Invitation 
I would like you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would like you to 
understand why this piece of research is being carried out and what you would have to 
do. A member of the research team will go through the information sheet with you and 
answer any questions that you may have. This will take approximately 10 minutes. 
 
Part 1 of this leaflet tells you about the purpose of the research, whilst part 2 gives you 
more information on what you would have to do if you decide to take part. Please feel 
free to ask us anything that you are unsure about. 
 
 
PART 1 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am doing some research as part of my postgraduate research degree at the University 
of Central Lancashire (UCLAN). I am looking at the links between personality, thinking 
styles, and how you feel and react in certain situations. The research looks at people’s 
unhelpful personality style at one end of the scale, and a caring responsible style at the 
other. Please note that this research does not diagnose clinical psychopathy. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part as this piece of research aims to test and further 
develop a new self-report measure of clinical psychopathy using both a student and 
prison sample. The research aims to recruit 300 university students and 300 prisoners. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether you wish to take part. The research team will describe 
the purpose of the research to you and go through this information sheet.  
 
 
PART 2 
 
What will happen to me if I take part and what will I have to do? 
It will take you approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaires. In total you 
will be involved in the research for approximately 40 minutes: 10 minutes to read this 
information and 30 minutes to fill in the questionnaires. Please note that it may not take 
you the full 40 minutes to finish. 
 
You will be required to fill in three separate questionnaires. Questionnaire 1 and 2 look 
at some ways that people use to describe themselves, and questionnaire 3 looks at your 
beliefs and thoughts about yourself and others. You will also be asked to indicate your 
gender and age. 
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The diagram below gives you a brief overview of exactly what will happen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer all of the questions as honestly as possible and then place the 
questionnaires in the envelope provided, thank you. 
 
Consent  
Please be aware that by completing the questionnaires and returning them back to the 
researcher, you are giving consent to be included in the research.  
 
Withdrawal 
You have the right to withdraw from the research up until you return your 
questionnaires back to the researcher. After this point we will not be able to remove 
your answers from the study as you do not have your name on the questionnaires. We 
will therefore not know which one is yours. 
 
What are the possible advantages and disadvantages for taking part? 
 Advantages: By completing the questionnaires you will be helping develop a new 
self-report measure of clinical psychopathy. You will also be adding to existing 
knowledge in this area of research. 
 Disadvantages: There are no disadvantages in taking part. It is not expected that 
any of the questionnaires will cause you any distress or upset. If they do distress you 
in anyway, please remember that you do not have to fill them in. You may also want 
to speak to the student counselling service offered by the University. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
The questionnaires will remain completely anonymous. Please do not write your name 
or student number on them. If on the off chance you do write you name or number on 
them your data will be destroyed. Any publication of the data will report group data 
only, at no point will your responses be singled out. Completed questionnaires will be 
The researcher will go through this information sheet with you and 
give you time to ask any questions. 
You will then be passed an envelope containing the three 
questionnaires and the study debrief. 
You will be able to complete the questionnaires in your own time. If 
you require any assistance you may wish to contact the research team 
using the details provided on this leaflet. 
Once you have completed the questionnaires you will need to read the 
study debrief. 
Please return the questionnaires in the envelope provided to the correct 
post box in the student support room (Darwin Building, DB124). The 
box number is: 
 
…………………………………. 
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stored securely in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher's office. Only the research 
team will have access to your answers. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Your data will be statistically analysed and presented in the researcher’s thesis. Results 
may also be presented at conferences and in scientific peer-reviewed journals. At no 
point will your data will be singled out. Only group data will be presented. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If any aspect of this research concerns you please speak to the researcher who will do 
his best to answer your questions. Alternatively, you may want to write to the research 
supervisors whose contact details are stated at the end of this leaflet. If you remain 
unhappy and you wish to make a formal complaint, you can do this by contacting Dr 
Mike Eslea, Chair of the Psychology ethics committee, School of Psychology, 
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN) is funding the research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by an independent group of people, called a Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by Northern & Yorkshire Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 
If you require any further information please speak to the researcher, or alternatively 
you can write to any one of the research team listed below: 
 
Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland 
Second Supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott 
 
Address: 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN), Preston, Lancashire, 
PR1 2HE. 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask any 
questions.  
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Please indicate your gender by ticking the appropriate box: 
 
Male   Female  
 
How old are you? Please write your age (in years) in the space provided below: 
 
………………………………………………. 
 
Whether you believe yourself to be guilty or not, please state your index offence below, 
i.e. the offence you were convicted of/or are charged with that led to your current time 
in prison? (Prison sample only) 
 
……………………………………………….. 
  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE: PAPA-1 
© Lewis, Ireland & Abbott (2011) 
 
Please contact Michael Lewis (mick.lewis04@gmail.com) or Professor Jane Ireland 
(jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk) for permission to use this measure/request the most recent version. 
 
Instructions 
Below are a series of statements that people use to describe themselves. Please read 
each statement carefully and using the scale provided decide how well each describes 
you.  
 
Scale: 
 
Very unlike 
me 
Not really like 
me 
Neither agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1. I am only interested in myself.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I do not feel guilty when I cause others  1 2 3 4 5 
to feel pain or hurt. 
 
3. I would describe myself as one of the most 1 2 3 4 5 
confident around. 
 
4. I will use people to get what I want.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I often experience strong negative emotions,  1 2 3 4 5 
such as anger, sadness, and hatred. 
 
6. I often take chances that could be risky to 1 2 3 4 5 
me or others. 
 
7. I often don’t think of the consequences of 1 2 3 4 5 
my actions. 
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8. As a person, I have always stayed the same. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I have been described as a cruel person who 1 2 3 4 5 
does not worry about hurting others. 
 
10. I can allow my feelings to interfere with my 1 2 3 4 5 
decisions. 
 
11. Others would describe me as an irritable  1 2 3 4 5 
person with problems controlling my  
temper. 
 
12. I have a talent at making people feel good  1 2 3 4 5 
about themselves. 
 
13. I see a lot of hostility around me.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. I regularly view others as lazy.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I have a problem with using alcohol.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. I am not that bothered about others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. I am described as a ‘charmer’ by those  1 2 3 4 5 
that know me. 
 
18. I find most people are weak and not worth 1 2 3 4 5 
bothering with. 
 
19. When I feel sad I can quickly make myself 1 2 3 4 5 
happy again. 
 
20. Others complain that I never take the  1 2 3 4 5 
blame for my mistakes. 
 
21. If others can help me, I expect them to do 1 2 3 4 5 
this without me returning the favour. 
 
22. I find it impossible to resist temptation.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. I often get into trouble more than others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. I tend to keep in touch with those close to 1 2 3 4 5 
me. 
 
25. I find it difficult to comfort others when  1 2 3 4 5 
they are upset. 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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26. I would describe myself as someone who is 1 2 3 4 5 
often ‘fearless’ when faced with a threat.  
 
27. I am a creative person who can think of  1 2 3 4 5 
more than one way of dealing with 
problems. 
 
28. The world is a threatening place, you have  1 2 3 4 5 
to ‘watch your back’. 
 
29. I often feel in touch with other people’s   1 2 3 4 5 
feelings. 
 
30. I am able to talk myself out of situations  1 2 3 4 5 
by not answering questions directly. 
 
31. If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly  1 2 3 4 5 
think of a way out. 
 
32. I often experience strong positive   1 2 3 4 5 
emotion, such as happiness and joy. 
 
33. I am often bored.     1 2 3 4 5 
 
34. I regularly view others as irritating.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
35. I see no problem in living off the State/  1 2 3 4 5 
Government. 
 
36. I enjoy doing things that are exciting  1 2 3 4 5 
or new. 
 
37. I am able to commit a wide number of  1 2 3 4 5 
behaviours that, if caught, would get me  
into trouble. 
 
38. I can often find myself viewing others as  1 2 3 4 5 
nothing more than ‘objects’. 
 
39. I am an aggressive person in a number of 1 2 3 4 5 
situations. 
 
40. I very rarely experience fear.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
41. I tend to think of one solution to a problem 1 2 3 4 5 
and stick to it. 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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42. I use illegal drugs more than most people 1 2 3 4 5 
I know. 
 
43. I find it difficult to give emotional and  1 2 3 4 5 
personal support to others.  
 
44. If I do something wrong I will feel bad   1 2 3 4 5 
about it. 
 
45. I often find myself thinking that I am more 1 2 3 4 5 
important than others. 
 
46. I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a 1 2 3 4 5 
‘con artist’ by those who know me. 
 
47. I always accept responsibility for what I do. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
48. I don’t see why others can’t take care  1 2 3 4 5 
of me. 
 
49. I can be unpredictable.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
50. I often find people behave aggressively  1 2 3 4 5 
or in a hostile manner towards me. 
 
51. Others would describe me as a very   1 2 3 4 5 
intense person who has difficulty getting  
on with others. 
 
52. I find it easy to form strong emotional  1 2 3 4 5 
relationships with others. 
 
53. As a child I often got into trouble more  1 2 3 4 5 
than others. 
 
54. I have clear goals for my long-term  1 2 3 4 5  
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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QUESTIONNAIRE: LSRP 
 
Instructions 
Listed below are 26 statements that a person might use to describe themselves. Please 
read each statement carefully and decide how well it describes you. When you are not 
sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel, rather than what you think to be 
true. Choose the highest rating from 1 to 4 that best describes you and circle the 
number where: 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 
 
1. Success is based on survival of the fittest;   1 2 3 4 
I am not concerned about the losers. 
 
2. For me, what's right is whatever I can    1 2 3 4 
get away with.   
 
3. In today's world, I feel justified in doing    1 2 3 4 
anything I can get away with to succeed. 
 
4. My main purpose in life is getting as    1 2 3 4 
many goodies as I can.  
  
5. Making a lot of money is my most important goal. 1 2 3 4 
 
6. I let others worry about higher values;    1 2 3 4 
my main concern is with the bottom line. 
 
7. People who are stupid enough to get    1 2 3 4 
ripped off usually deserve it.  
 
8. Looking out for myself is my top priority.  1 2 3 4 
 
9. I tell other people what they want to hear so   1 2 3 4 
that they will do what I want them to do. 
 
10. I would be upset if my success came at someone  1 2 3 4 
else's expense.  
 
11. I often admire a really clever scam.   1 2 3 4 
 
12. I make a point of trying not to hurt others in  1 2 3 4 
 pursuit of my goals. 
 
13. I enjoy manipulating other people's feelings.  1 2 3 4 
 
14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone  1 2 3 4 
else to feel emotional pain. 
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15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, 1 2 3 4 
I wouldn't lie about it. 
 
16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to   1 2 3 4 
others.  
 
17. I find myself in the same kinds of trouble,  1 2 3 4 
time after time.   
 
18. I am often bored.      1 2 3 4 
 
19. I find that I am able to pursue one goal   1 2 3 4 
 for a long time.   
 
20. I don't plan anything very far in advance.  1 2 3 4 
 
21. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.   1 2 3 4
  
22. Most of my problems are due to the fact that  1 2 3 4 
other people just don't understand me. 
 
23. Before I do anything, I carefully consider the  1 2 3 4 
Possible consequences. 
 
24. I have been in a lot of shouting matches   1 2 3 4 
with other people.   
 
25. When I get frustrated, I often "let off steam"   1 2 3 4 
by blowing my top.  
 
26.   Love is overrated.     1 2 3 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 
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QUESTIONNAIRE: SPANA-2 
© Wilks-Riley & Ireland (2012) 
 
Instructions 
This questionnaire looks at beliefs that people can have about themselves and others. 
Please read each statement carefully and answer how you have thought and felt 
recently. Please contact Professor Jane Ireland (jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk) for 
permission to use this measure. You have a choice of answers so please circle how 
much you agree or disagree with each statement using the following scale:  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. I get on well with other people in general 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. The only real feelings I have are anger 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. I am a caring person    1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. I can be trusted    1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I am assertive     1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I am fairly ‘cut off’ from my feelings  1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. I am not cared for    1 2 3 4 5
  
8.  I am fairly outgoing    1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Other people are a pain   1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. When it comes to the ‘crunch’,  1 2 3 4 5 
 I am on my own 
 
11. I am fairly relaxed about things in   1 2 3 4 5 
 general 
 
12. Other people try to advantage of me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I would describe myself as content  1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. As a person I have a lot of positive  1 2 3 4 5 
 things to offer 
 
15. I am an easygoing person   1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. Other people are demanding   1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. I think about things before acting  1 2 3 4 5
  
18. I am suspicious of others   1 2 3 4 5 
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19. I feel in control of my actions   1 2 3 4 5 
 
20. People are not really there for me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. I am a good listener    1 2 3 4 5 
 
22. I am isolated     1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. I work hard at things I want to do  1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. I do not seem to get as upset as others 1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. I don’t trust others easily   1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. I am a good person    1 2 3 4 5 
 
27. I have goals for the future   1 2 3 4 5
  
28. I tend to take things in my stride  1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. I have a ‘laid back’ approach to life  1 2 3 4 5 
 
30. I am useless     1 2 3 4 5 
 
31. I let myself down    1 2 3 4 5 
 
32. Other people are uncaring   1 2 3 4 5 
 
33. I can control my behaviour   1 2 3 4 5 
 
34. Other people are abusive   1 2 3 4 5 
 
35. I am not in touch with my emotions  1 2 3 4 5 
 
36. I am wary of others    1 2 3 4 5 
 
37. Other people are unreliable   1 2 3 4 5 
 
38. I am a good person in general   1 2 3 4 5 
 
39. I am a decent person    1 2 3 4 5 
 
40. Other people don’t value me   1 2 3 4 5 
 
41. Other people are forgiving   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
42. Other people are irritating   1 2 3 4 5 
 
43. I am a worthless person   1 2 3 4 5 
 
44. I can do some things well   1 2 3 4 5 
 
45. I know the kinds of things I want to  1 2 3 4 5 
 achieve in the future  
 
46. Other people are inferior of me  1 2 3 4 5 
 
47. Other people lack responsibility  1 2 3 4 5 
 
48. People think that I am emotionally cold 1 2 3 4 5 
 
49. Other people are hostile   1 2 3 4 5 
 
50. I am a calm person in most situations  1 2 3 4 5
  
51. I hate myself     1 2 3 4 5 
 
52. Other people are confrontational  1 2 3 4 5 
 
53. I try to be understanding with people  1 2 3 4 5 
 
54. Other people are annoying   1 2 3 4 5 
 
55. People tend to abandon me   1 2 3 4 5 
 
56. Other people are selfish and only care 1 2 3 4 5 
 for themselves 
 
57. I am a much nicer person than I used  1 2 3 4 5 
 to be 
 
58. I am a friendly person    1 2 3 4 5 
 
59. Other people cause conflict   1 2 3 4 5 
 
60. I am enthusiastic    1 2 3 4 5 
 
61. Other people are ignorant   1 2 3 4 5 
 
62. I am a happy person in most situations 1 2 3 4 5 
 
63. I am a hardworking person   1 2 3 4 5 
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64. Things have to build up before I get  1 2 3 4 5 
 emotional 
 
65. I am a loyal person    1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
or disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DEBRIEF SHEET: PRISON SAMPLE 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaires.  
 
People in prison and university students were asked to fill in the questionnaires. The 
study used both an old (questionnaire 2) and new questionnaire (questionnaire 1) to look 
at how people describe themselves. Both of these questionnaires looked at where you 
are on a scale that has an antisocial type of personality at one end, and a caring and 
responsible type of personality at the other. The questionnaires looked at some 
behaviour that is linked to psychopathy. They also looked at caring and responsible 
behaviour. These two questionnaires cannot diagnose psychopathy.  
 
The research simply wanted to find out how good the new questionnaire (questionnaire 
1) is by comparing it with the old questionnaire (questionnaire 2). The new 
questionnaire was also compared with questionnaire 3, which looked at your thoughts 
and beliefs about yourself and others.  
 
 
If any of these questionnaires have upset or distressed you in any way, you may 
find the following support agencies useful: Your personal officer; The prison 
health centre; The listener service; or The Samaritans. Please see the wing notice 
board for contact details. If you do not have a personal officer see the wing 
principal officer. 
 
 
If you would like a copy of the final report once published, and/or if you have any questions about the 
study please feel free to write to any of the research team. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
Researcher: Michael Lewis, School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE.  
 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland, School of Psychology, University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE.  
 
Second supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott, School of Psychology, University of 
Central Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE.  
 
Thank you once again for taking the time to take part in this piece of research. 
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DEBRIEF SHEET: STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaires.  
 
People in prison and university students were asked to fill in the questionnaires. The 
study used both an old (questionnaire 2) and new questionnaire (questionnaire 1) to look 
at how people describe themselves. Both of these questionnaires looked at where you 
are on a scale that has an antisocial type of personality at one end, and a caring and 
responsible type of personality at the other. The questionnaires looked at some 
behaviour that is linked to psychopathy. They also looked at caring and responsible 
behaviour. These two questionnaires cannot diagnose psychopathy.  
 
The research simply wanted to find out how good the new questionnaire (questionnaire 
1) is by comparing it with the old questionnaire (questionnaire 2). The new 
questionnaire was also compared with questionnaire 3, which looked at your thoughts 
and beliefs about yourself and others.  
 
 
If any of these questionnaires have upset or distressed you in any way, you may 
find the following support agencies useful:  
 
The Samaritans: Telephone: 08457 90 90 90; Email: jo@samaritans.org. 
 
UCLAN counseling service: Telephone: 01772 892572, Email: CoRecep@uclan.ac.uk. 
 
 
If you would like a copy of the final report once published, and/or if you have any questions about the 
study please feel free to contact any of the research team. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
Researcher: Michael Lewis, School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE. Email: mlewis@uclan.ac.uk. 
 
Supervisor: Professor Jane L. Ireland, School of Psychology, University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE. Email: JLIreland1@uclan.ac.uk.  
 
Second supervisor: Professor Janice Abbott, School of Psychology, University of 
Central Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE. Email: JAbbott@uclan.ac.uk 
 
Thank you once again for taking the time to take part in this piece of research. 
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Appendix 5. 
MATERIALS USED IN STUDY THREE87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
87 Due to copyright regulations, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised: Screening Version (PCL:SV) and 
the Affect, Cognitive and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL) are not included in this appendix. However, an 
overview of both measures has been provided to aid readers’ understanding. 
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POSTER: STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interested in Forensic Psychology? 
Would you like to take part in a PhD psychology research study? 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The research aims to explore the role of functioning in individuals with challenging 
personality traits. At the other end of the scale, the research will also be examining 
functioning in individuals with a caring responsible personality style. The research aims 
to develop a new self-report measure to assist with this. 
 
What will I have to do? 
Participants will participate in a 1.5 hour interview based psychological assessment and 
complete a self-report measure. All assessments will take place across approximately 
two sessions, which will be conducted in the School of Psychology, University of 
Central Lancashire. You will be compensated for the inconvenience of taking part in the 
study. 
 
Please note that the research is entirely anonymous and individual results will not be 
disclosed. Prior to conducting the assessment, you will be provided with a study 
information sheet. 
 
Can I take part? 
You are invited to take part if you are a registered student at University of Central 
Lancashire and you are male. All participants have to be aged 18 years or older. 
If you would like to take part in the research, please contact Michael Lewis 
(Postgraduate Research Student) via email to arrange a suitable time for the research to 
take place: mlewis@uclan.ac.uk.  
 
Thank you! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 425 
 
INFORMATION SHEET: STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
 
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study, which forms part of a PhD degree 
in Psychology. Please read this information sheet carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. If you have any questions, please feel free to speak to the researcher or 
contact the research team on the emails provided at the end of this sheet. Please note 
that you are not eligible to take part in this study if you are already participating in three 
or more research projects. Thank you for taking the time to read the study information. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose of the research is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the role of 
people’s functioning, i.e. their thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, particularly in those with 
challenging personality traits. At the same time, the research aims to explore the role of 
functioning in those individuals who demonstrate a caring, responsible personality style. 
The research also aims to develop a new self-report measure to assist with this 
understanding. 
 
What will the study involve? 
Taking part in the research will involve you participating in a 1.5 hour interview-based 
assessment and completing one self-report questionnaire. As part of the interview 
assessment, you will be asked a series of questions on the following topics: Personal 
interests; employment and lifestyle; intimate relationships; childhood background 
(including education and behaviour); future aspirations; responsibilities; relationships 
with others; and criminal history (if you have one). You may also be asked about your 
beliefs, views, and feelings on particular situations or contexts. This interview will take 
place across approximately two sessions. If you wish you can complete it in one 
session.  
 
Following the interview you will be scored on the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening 
Version (PCL:SV; Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995; see below). You will also be scored on, 
and asked to complete a number of timed tasks on the Affect, Cognitive, and Lifestyle 
assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012; see below). At the end of the interview you 
will then be asked to complete a self-report measure, the Psychopathic Processing and 
Personality Assessment – version two (PAPA-2). 
 
Please note that the assessment is being conducted for research purposes only and it is 
NOT a clinical assessment by any means.  
 
Details of the measures 
 
PCL:SV 
This interview assessment explores if you have personality and behavioural traits 
related to clinical psychopathy. We are just collecting this information for research 
purposes. 
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ACL 
Like the PCL:SV, the ACL also explores whether you have traits that relate to clinical 
psychopathy. As part of this measure, you will be interviewed and asked to complete a 
number of timed tasks. 
 
PAPA-2 
This measure looks at the ways people use to describe themselves. It also examines 
people’s beliefs, views, emotions, and feelings. At one end of the scale the measure 
looks at a challenging personality style, and at the other, a responsible caring 
personality style. You will have to respond to a series of statements by circling the 
appropriate response on a five-point likert type scale ranging from very unlike me (1) to 
very like me (5). There are 45 items in total. 
 
Time scale 
Your involvement in the research will take approximately 1.5 hours in total. The 
assessment will take place across approximately two sessions. You will be given a total 
of £10.00 for your time. This will be paid to you in cash once you have completed the 
research and have been debriefed. You will not receive the money if you only complete 
part of the research. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Your data will be statistically analysed and presented in the researcher’s thesis. Results 
may also be presented at conferences and in scientific peer-reviewed journals. At no 
point will your data will be singled out. Only group data will be presented. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
Taking part in the research will help forward the clinical assessment, management, and 
treatment of those individuals with challenging personality traits. It will also help 
further develop and refine psychological theories that focus on the role of functioning in 
such individuals. 
 
What are the risks? 
It is unlikely that you will experience any distress when taking part in this piece of 
research. However, please be aware that the interview assessment examines several 
sensitive topics, such as relationship history and childhood background. Please consider 
this when deciding whether you wish to take part. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
It is completely your choice whether or not you take part in the study and the 
information provided here is to help you make that decision.  
 
What about my consent? 
You will be asked to sign a consent form to say that you agree to take part in the 
research and are happy with what is being asked of you. You will also receive a copy of 
the consent form.  
 
Withdrawal 
Please note that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving 
a reason. The only time that you can no longer withdraw is when the data collected and 
has been inputted and analysed – you will be anonymous, and it will not be possible to 
identify you. 
 427 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
Everyone who takes part will be given a ‘research number’, which will appear on the 
information collected instead of your name. Only the research team (i.e. the lead 
researcher and the academic supervisors) will know which number matches to which 
name. The lead researcher will keep this list secure on his office computer, which is 
password protected. This list will be destroyed once the research has been completed 
(i.e. the data has been inputted and analysed). You will not be identified in any formal 
write-up of the results; the research is totally anonymous. 
 
Exceptions to anonymity 
Information provided by you during the consent or data collection process may be 
disclosed to the appropriate organisation if it includes anything indicating a threat to 
others or yourself (e.g. if you disclose a crime that you are about to commit, or tell the 
researcher you are about to hurt yourself or another). You are not being asked about this 
but please be mindful of it. 
 
Security of information obtained 
The research team will hold copies of research information. It will be kept secure in a 
locked filing cabinet in the lead researcher’s office at the university. 
 
What if I become upset? 
Although not expected, if you find some elements of the assessment distressing and you 
feel you would like support you may want to contact one of the support agencies listed 
below: 
 
 University Counselling Service (a free professional and confidential counseling 
service offered by UCLAN). Tel: 01772 892572; Email: CoRecep@uclan.ac.uk 
 Samaritans (a confidential free support service). Tel: 08457 90 90 90; Email: 
jo@samaritans.org 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If any aspect of this research concerns you please speak to the researcher who will do 
his best to answer your questions. Alternatively, you may want to write to the research 
supervisors whose contact details are stated at the end of this information sheet. If you 
remain unhappy and you wish to make a formal complaint, you can do this by 
contacting Dr Mike Eslea, Chair of the Psychology ethics committee, School of 
Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE. 
 
Insurance 
The study is covered by insurance provided by the University of Central Lancashire.  
 
Who is funding the research? 
Mersey Care NHS Trust; High Secure Psychiatric Services is funding the research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by an independent group of people, called a Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favorable opinion by Greater Manchester South Research Ethics Committee. 
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Contact details for the lead researcher and academic supervisors 
If you would like more information about this study, please contact the lead researcher 
on the details below. The contact details of the academic supervisors are also listed: 
 Michael Lewis (PhD student; Lead researcher): mlewis@uclan.ac.uk 
 Professor Jane Ireland (Director of studies): JLIreland1@uclan.ac.uk 
 Professor Janice Abbott (Second supervisor): JAbbott@uclan.ac.uk 
 
Address of the research team: 
School of Psychology, Darwin Building, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 
2HE 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask any 
questions. 
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CONSENT FORMS: STUDENT SAMPLE 
 
REC reference: …………….. 
 
Participant identification number for this study: (………………..) 
 
STUDENT COPY 
Title of the Project: Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing 
in psychopathy: Examining student and clinical samples. 
 
Research Team 
Lead Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Academic Supervisors: Professor Jane Ireland & Professor Janice Abbott 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet dated (…) for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand that I do not have to agree immediately, but I can consider the 
information that I have received and ask the researcher to come and see me 
at a later date. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up until my data has been inputted and analysed and 
it is no longer identifiable as my data, without giving any reason. 
 
4. I understand that I will be paid £10.00 for my time in the research. I 
understand that I will only receive this if I complete the research in full, i.e. 
the interview-based assessment and self-report measure. 
 
5. I understand that no personal information obtained during the course of the 
study relating to myself will be disclosed to other students or anybody 
outside of the research team. 
 
6. I understand that all information relating to myself obtained as part of the 
study will remain anonymous to those outside of the research team, and 
that I will not be personally identified in the final report of the study. 
However, I understand that if I report information indicating a threat to 
myself or others, e.g. If I disclose a previously unreported crime or a 
possible future crime, or that I intend to harm myself, then this information 
will be disclosed to the appropriate personnel. 
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7. I understand that this consent form may be seen by responsible individuals 
from the University for the purposes of monitoring research procedures. I 
understand that this is for audit purposes only to ensure that my consent has 
been sought and that the study if being carried out correctly. 
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study carried out by Michael Lewis 
(Doctoral student), University of Central Lancashire and ARC (Ashworth 
Research Centre), and I am satisfied that the purpose and procedures of the 
study have been fully explained to me. 
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
                                
            
Name of Person   Date    Signature  
taking consent. 
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REC reference: ………………….. 
 
Participant identification number for this study: (……………………..) 
 
STUDENT FILE COPY 
Title of the Project: Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing 
in psychopathy: Examining student and clinical samples. 
 
Research Team 
Lead Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Academic Supervisors: Professor Jane Ireland & Professor Janice Abbott 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet dated (…) for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand that I do not have to agree immediately, but I can consider the 
information that I have received and ask the researcher to come and see me 
at a later date. 
   
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up until my data has been inputted and analysed and 
it is no longer identifiable as my data, without giving any reason. 
 
4. I understand that I will be paid £10.00 for my time in the research. I 
understand that I will only receive this if I complete the research in full, i.e. 
the interview-based assessment and self-report measure. 
 
5. I understand that no personal information obtained during the course of the 
study relating to myself will be disclosed to other students or anybody 
outside of the research team. 
 
6. I understand that all information relating to myself obtained as part of the 
study will remain anonymous to those outside of the research team, and 
that I will not be personally identified in the final report of the study. 
However, I understand that if I report information indicating a threat to 
myself or others, e.g. If I disclose a previously unreported crime or a 
possible future crime, or that I intend to harm myself, then this information 
will be disclosed to the appropriate personnel. 
 
7. I understand that this consent form may be seen by responsible individuals 
from the University for the purposes of monitoring research procedures. I 
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understand that this is for audit purposes only to ensure that my consent has 
been sought and that the study if being carried out correctly. 
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study carried out by Michael Lewis 
(Doctoral student), University of Central Lancashire and ARC (Ashworth 
Research Centre), and I am satisfied that the purpose and procedures of the 
study have been fully explained to me.   
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
                                
            
Name of Person   Date    Signature  
taking consent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 433 
LETTER: RESPONSIBLE CLINICIAN 
 
 
Dear (….), 
                                                                                                                           
I am a PhD student currently based at the Ashworth Research Centre (ARC). I am 
conducting a piece of research as part of my PhD degree, which is funded by Mersey 
Care NHS Trust, High Secure Psychiatric Services. The research aims to explore 
cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy across different populations. The 
research has already investigated psychopathic functioning in a student and prison 
population. It is now being extended to include a secure psychiatric sample. In order to 
further our understanding of cognition and affect in psychopathy within different 
populations I would like to sample patients at Ashworth Hospital High Secure Hospital.  
 
The research aims to sample all those patients residing on low and medium dependency 
wards. I will not be including patients on neurocognitive wards and those who are 
deemed not well enough by their Responsible Clinician. 
 
I have enclosed the study information sheet; please take time to read through this as it 
details exactly what the patient will be asked to consent to and complete.  I have also 
enclosed consent forms for you to sign and return should you deem the patient well 
enough to take part and that they are residing on low and medium dependency wards.   
 
Please could you confirm that you are happy for me to approach your patients by 
signing the consent forms attached and returning no later than (….)   
 
If you have any questions about the research or would like to discuss it further please 
contact me on ext. …..  
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
 
 
Michael Lewis 
Doctorate Student and Research Assistant
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INFORMATION SHEET: RESPONSIBLE CLINICIAN 
 
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
Introduction 
You are being asked to be involved in the selection of participants for a piece of 
research, which forms part of a PhD degree in Psychology. Please read this information 
sheet carefully before making a decision on whether you feel that your patients would 
be suitable. If you have any questions, please feel free to speak to the researcher or 
contact the research team on the emails provided at the end of this sheet. Thank you for 
taking the time to read the study information. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The research aims to understand cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy 
across community, clinical, and forensic populations. The work also aims to develop 
and evaluate a new self-report measure to assist with this process. The new measure will 
allow for greater examination of cognitive and affect in psychopathy and in doing so, 
may help further develop theoretical models of psychopathic processing.  
 
The new self-report has already been partially developed and administered across 
students and prisoners to explore explicit cognitive and affective processing in 
psychopathy. To extend the research, the current study aims to explore cognition and 
affect in more detail (i.e. examine implicit as well as explicit processing). This should 
allow a new theory of affective and cognitive processing in psychopathy, to be proposed 
which should account for differences in the samples. A sample of students will also be 
recruited alongside a psychiatric sample, allowing for an understanding of psychopathic 
functioning across a variety of different populations.  
 
What is my role in the research? 
You will be involved in the selection of participants for the research. You will be asked 
to give your expert opinion on whether you feel that your patients are suitable to take 
part in the study. This will take the form of written consent. Please consider the study 
design when deciding whether you deem a patient to be suitable or not.  
 
Patients will not be invited to take part in the research without prior consent from you. 
Following RC consent, patients will receive a copy of the study information, which will 
invite them to take part.  
 
Engagement/Expectations 
As part of the study, both populations will take part in an assessment process that will 
include a self-report approach and a one and a half-hour interview. This will mirror 
approaches like the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R) and therefore allow for 
the results to be compared to other clinical methods of assessing psychopathy.  
 
The interview will follow the structure of the Affect, Cognitive, and Lifestyle 
Assessment. In addition to the data obtained during the interview, a file trawl will also 
be conducted for the patient sample in order to complete the Psychopathy Checklist: 
Screening Version (PCL:SV). Consent will be obtained from the patient to allow the 
access to their health records. All patients will also complete a self-report measure, the 
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Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment, the PAPA-2. Details of the three 
measures can be found below: 
 
Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV; Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995): The 
PCL-SV is a screening assessment of clinical psychopathy.  This represents a pattern of 
interpersonal, affective and behavioural symptoms comprised of two factors: Factor I 
relates to interpersonal style and Factor II to criminal history and lifestyle.   
 
Affect, Cognitive, and Lifestyle Assessment (ACL; Ireland and Ireland, 2012): The ACL 
provides an assessment of general functioning across three broad domains: affect, 
cognitions, and lifestyle. The assessment examines cognition and affect at both an 
explicit and implicit level, and can be scored to determine levels of psychopathy. It is a 
new measure. The ACL assesses functioning via collateral information and an 
interview, which includes some varied tasks, such as case scenarios. It also includes an 
evaluation of presentation during the interview assessment. Scores are generated to 
provide a general functioning profile. 
 
Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment – Version 2 (PAPA-2): This is a 
45 item self-report measure, which looks at an individual’s unhelpful, 
antisocial/psychopathic personality style at one end of the scale, and a caring 
responsible personality style at the other. The measure has also been designed to 
explicitly examine psychopathic processing (both cognitive and affective processing). 
Participants have to indicate the extent to which item applies to them via a five-point 
likert type scale ranging from very unlike me (1) to very like me (5). 
 
The participant information sheet makes the participants aware that the interview-based 
assessment is not a clinical assessment by any means, and they will not receive a 
diagnosis. 
 
Who is conducting the assessment? 
The lead researcher, Michael Lewis, will be conducting the interview-based assessment. 
Please find the contact details for Michael at the end of this sheet. In addition to the lead 
researcher, a member of ward staff will be present during the interview-based 
assessment. A member of ward staff will be present to answer any questions that the 
lead researcher cannot. The member of ward staff will be briefed about the research. 
They will also be informed that they are not allowed to disclose any information that the 
participant provides during the assessment (with the exception of the issues highlighted 
on page 5). The lead researcher is employed by the University of Central Lancashire, 
but supported in their studies by Mersey Care NHS Trust. 
 
Time scale 
It is important to note that the research will not be completed all at once.  It will be 
separated over approximately two sessions.  It is expected that the assessment will take 
approximately one and a half hours to complete, with sessions lasting around 30 - 45 
minutes.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Participants’ data will be statistically analysed and presented in the researcher’s thesis. 
Results may also be presented at conferences and in scientific peer-reviewed journals. 
At no point will individual responses be singled out. Only group data will be presented. 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
Taking part in the research will help forward the clinical assessment, management, and 
treatment of those individuals with challenging personality traits. It will also help 
further develop and refine psychological theories that focus on the role of functioning in 
such individuals. 
 
What are the risks? 
It is unlikely that participants will experience any distress when taking part in this piece 
of research. However, please be aware that the interview assessment examines several 
sensitive topics, such as relationship history and childhood background. Please consider 
this when deciding whether your patients will be suitable for the research. 
 
Participation 
There will be no negative outcomes for patients not wanting to take part and this will be 
made clear to them. Participation will be purely voluntary. Participants will be paid 
£10.00 for their time in the research. This is because the research does not directly 
benefit them and the measures are quite time consuming. The £10.00 will be paid 
directly into the patient’s bank account held by the hospital. Participants will only 
receive the money if they complete the research in full. 
 
Withdrawal 
Please note that participants are free to withdraw from the study at any time and without 
giving a reason. The only time that they can no longer withdraw is when the data 
collected and has been inputted and analysed – all participants will remain anonymous. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
All patients who take part will be given a ‘research number’, which will appear on the 
data that the research team collects instead of their name.  Only the research team will 
know which number matches to which name.  The information collected is purely for 
research purposes only.  Patients will not be identified in any formal write-up of the 
results; the research is totally anonymous. At the same time, participants are reminded 
on their information sheet that their results will not be discussed with their clinical team. 
 
Exceptions to anonymity 
Information provided by patients during the consent or data collection process may be 
disclosed to staff if it includes anything indicating a threat to others e.g. if they report 
information about a previously unreported crime or about a possible or future crime this 
information will be disclosed to staff. Patients will be informed about this. No 
information will be disclosed to other patients.  
 
Security of information obtained 
The research team will store the raw data. It will be kept secure in a locked filing 
cabinet in the ARC. Mersey Care NHS Trust or NHS Ethics may audit the information 
held (e.g. checking that the research team have written consent from everyone who has 
agreed to take part), but this is focused on protecting research participants and checking 
that researchers have completed everything that they have agreed to. 
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What if patients become distressed? 
Although not expected, if patients find some elements of the assessment distressing and 
feel that they would like support, they have been instructed by the study information 
sheet to contact any of the following support agencies: 
 
 Their Internal Care Coordinator (ICC) or a member of ward staff 
 Their ward psychologist 
 Patient advocacy service 
 
Complaints 
If the patients have any complaints throughout the duration of the study they have been 
instructed to speak to the Lead Researcher (Michael Lewis) or Professor Jane Ireland 
(Academic Supervisor). If they do not wish to speak to the researcher the participant 
information sheet instructs them to contact their ICC, RC, and/or patient’s complaints 
department. 
 
Insurance 
The study is covered by insurance provided by the University of Central Lancashire.  
 
Who is funding the research? 
Mersey Care NHS Trust, High Secure Psychiatric Services is funding the research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by the Health Research Authority, National Research 
Ethics Service. The study has been given favorable opinion by Greater Manchester 
South Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Contact details for the lead researcher and academic supervisors 
If you would like more information about this study, please contact the lead researcher 
on the details below. The contact details of the academic supervisors are also listed: 
 
 Michael Lewis (PhD student; Lead researcher) 
Michael.lewis2@merseycare.nhs.uk 
 Professor Jane Ireland (Director of studies) 
Jane.ireland@merseycare.nhs.uk 
 Professor Janice Abbott (Second supervisor) 
JAbbott@uclan.ac.uk 
 
Address of the research team: 
Ashworth Research Centre, Ashworth High Secure Hospital, Mersey Care NHS Trust. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask any 
questions. 
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CONSENT FORM: RESPONSIBLE CLINICIAN 
 
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
Patient Name: … Hospital No:… 
 
Research Title: Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing 
in psychopathy: Examining student and clinical samples 
 
Lead Researcher:   Michael Lewis  
Academic Supervisors:  Professor Jane Ireland 
     Professor Janice Abbott 
 
 
 
I (…) RC to (…) hereby give my approval to the involvement of the above-named 
patient in the research project conducted by Michael Lewis, Doctoral Student, ARC 
(Ashworth Research Centre) and the University of Central Lancashire.  I have received 
a written explanation of the study and I am also satisfied that the participant is capable 
of giving his consent for his involvement in the study. 
 
 
  
Signed.......................................................................  Date........................................ 
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INFORMATION SHEET: PATIENT SAMPLE 
 
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study, which forms part of a PhD degree 
in Psychology. Please read this information sheet carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. If you require assistance with your reading, please speak to a member of ward 
staff who will go through this information sheet with you. Please note that you are not 
eligible to take part in this study if you are already participating in three or more 
research projects. Thank you for taking the time to read the study information. 
 
What do I do if I wish to take part or have any questions? 
If you have any questions or would like to take part in the research please ask a member 
of ward staff to get in contact with the lead researcher who will then visit your ward.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose of the research is to provide a more in-depth understanding of the role of 
people’s functioning, i.e. their thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, particularly in those with 
challenging personality traits. At the same time, the research aims to explore the role of 
functioning in those individuals who demonstrate a caring, responsible personality style. 
The research also aims to develop a new self-report measure to assist with this 
understanding. 
 
What will the study involve? 
Taking part in the research will involve you participating in a 1.5 hour interview-based 
assessment and completing one self-report questionnaire. As part of the interview 
assessment, you will be asked a series of questions on the following topics: Personal 
interests; employment and lifestyle; intimate relationships; childhood background 
(including education and behaviour); future aspirations; responsibilities; relationships 
with others; and criminal history. You may also be asked about your beliefs, views, and 
feelings on particular situations or contexts. This interview will take place across 
approximately two sessions.  
 
Following the interview you will be scored on the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening 
Version (PCL:SV; Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995; see below). You will also be scored on, 
and asked to complete a number of timed tasks on the Affect, Cognitive, and Lifestyle 
assessment (ACL; Ireland & Ireland, 2012; see below). A review of your collateral 
information (i.e. your health records) will be used to help score the PCL:SV and ACL. 
At the end of the interview you will then be asked to complete a self-report measure, the 
Psychopathic Processing and Personality Assessment – version two (PAPA-2). 
 
Please note that the assessment is being conducted for research purposes only and it is 
NOT a clinical assessment by any means. You will not receive a diagnosis from taking 
part in the research. 
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Details of the measures 
 
PCL:SV 
This interview assessment explores if you have personality and behavioural traits 
related to clinical psychopathy. We are just collecting this information for research 
purposes. 
 
ACL 
Like the PCL:SV, the ACL also explores whether you have traits that relate to clinical 
psychopathy. As part of this measure, you will be interviewed and asked to complete a 
number of timed tasks. 
 
PAPA-2 
This measure looks at the ways people use to describe themselves. It also examines 
people’s beliefs, views, emotions, and feelings. At one end of the scale the measure 
looks at a challenging personality style, and at the other, a responsible caring 
personality style. You will have to respond to a series of statements by circling the 
appropriate response on a five-point likert type scale ranging from very unlike me (1) to 
very like me (5). There are 45 items in total. 
 
Time scale 
Your involvement in the research will take approximately 1.5 hours in total. The 
assessment will take place across approximately two sessions (lasting 30 to 45 minutes 
each). You will be given a total of £10.00 for your time. This will be paid directly into 
your personal account held by the hospital once you have completed the research and 
have been debriefed. You will not receive the money if you only complete part of the 
research. 
 
Who will be present during the interview? 
The lead researcher and a member of ward staff will be present during the interview-
based assessment. A member of ward staff will be present to answer any questions that 
the lead researcher cannot. The member of ward staff will be briefed about the research. 
They will also be informed that they are not allowed to disclose any information that 
you provide during the assessment (with the exception of the issues highlighted on page 
4). The lead researcher is employed by the University of Central Lancashire, but 
supported in their studies by Mersey Care NHS Trust. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Your data will be statistically analysed and presented in the researcher’s thesis. Results 
may also be presented at conferences and in scientific peer-reviewed journals. At no 
point will your data will be singled out. Only group data will be presented. Please also 
note that your results will not be discussed with your clinical team. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
Please note that your Responsible Clinician (RC) has been approached to check your 
suitability for the research. It is completely your choice whether or not you take part in 
the study and the information provided here is to help you make that decision.  
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
Taking part in the research will help forward the clinical assessment, management, and 
treatment of those individuals with challenging personality traits. It will also help 
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further develop and refine psychological theories that focus on the role of functioning in 
such individuals. 
 
What are the risks? 
It is unlikely that you will experience any distress when taking part in this piece of 
research. However, please be aware that the interview assessment examines several 
sensitive topics, such as relationship history and childhood background. Please consider 
this when deciding whether you wish to take part. 
 
What about my consent? 
You will be asked to sign a consent form to say that you agree to take part in the 
research and are happy with what is being asked of you. You will also receive a copy of 
the consent form.  
 
Withdrawal 
Please note that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving 
a reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. The only time that you 
can no longer withdraw is when the data collected and has been inputted and analysed – 
you will be anonymous, and it will not be possible to identify you. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
Everyone who takes part will be given a ‘research number’, which will appear on the 
information collected instead of your name. Only the research team (i.e. the lead 
researcher and the academic supervisors) will know which number matches to which 
name. The lead researcher will keep this list secure on his office computer, which is 
password protected. This list will be destroyed once the research has been completed 
(i.e. the data has been inputted and analysed). You will not be identified in any formal 
write-up of the results; the research is totally anonymous. 
 
Exceptions to anonymity 
Information provided by you during the consent or data collection process may be 
disclosed to the appropriate organisation if it includes anything indicating a threat to 
others or yourself (e.g. if you disclose a crime that you are about to commit, or tell the 
researcher you are about to hurt yourself or another). You are not being asked about this 
but please be mindful of it. 
 
Security of information obtained 
The research team will hold copies of research information. It will be kept secure in a 
locked filing cabinet in the lead researcher’s office at the hospital. 
 
What if I become upset? 
Although not expected, if you find some elements of the assessment distressing and you 
feel you would like support you may want to contact one of the support agencies listed 
below: 
 
 Your Internal Care Coordinator (ICC) or a member of ward staff 
 Your ward psychologist 
 Patient advocacy service 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If any aspect of this research concerns you please speak to the researcher who will do 
his best to answer your questions. Alternatively, you may want to write to the research 
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supervisors whose contact details are stated at the end of this information sheet. If you 
remain unhappy and you wish to make a formal complaint, you may like to speak to 
your ICC, RC, or patient complaints department at the hospital who will advise you on 
how to deal with your concerns. 
 
Insurance 
The study is covered by insurance provided by the University of Central Lancashire.  
 
Who is funding the research? 
Mersey Care NHS Trust; High Secure Psychiatric Services is funding the research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by an independent group of people, called a Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favorable opinion by Greater Manchester South Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Contact details for the lead researcher and academic supervisors 
If you would like more information about this study, please contact the lead researcher 
on the details below. The contact details of the academic supervisors are also listed: 
 
 Michael Lewis (PhD student; Lead researcher) 
 Professor Jane Ireland (Director of studies) 
 Professor Janice Abbott (Second supervisor) 
 
Address of the research team: 
Ashworth Research Centre (ARC), Ashworth High Secure Hospital, Mersey Care NHS 
Trust. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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CONSENT FORMS: PATIENT SAMPLE 
 
 
REC reference: ……………………… 
 
Participant identification number for this study: (…………………..) 
 
PATIENT COPY 
Title of the Project: Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing 
in psychopathy: Examining student and clinical samples. 
 
Lead Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Academic Supervisors: Professor Jane Ireland & Professor Janice Abbott 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet dated (………..) for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand that I do not have to agree immediately, but I can consider the 
information that I have received and ask the researcher to come and see me 
at a later date. 
   
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up until my data has been inputted and analysed and 
it is no longer identifiable as my data, without giving any reason, without 
my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
4. I understand that I will be paid £10.00 for my time in the research. I 
understand that this will be paid directly into my personal account held by 
the hospital. I also understand that I will only receive this if I complete the 
research in full, i.e. the interview-based assessment and self-report 
measure. 
 
5. I understand that no personal information obtained during the course of the 
study relating to myself will be disclosed to other patients. 
 
6. I understand that all information relating to myself obtained as part of the 
study will remain anonymous to those outside of the research team, and 
that I will not be personally identified in the final report of the study. 
However, I understand that if I report information indicating a threat to 
myself or others, e.g. If I disclose a previously unreported crime or a 
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possible future crime, or that I intend to harm myself, then this information 
will be disclosed to the appropriate personnel. 
 
7. I understand that this consent form may be seen by responsible individuals 
from Mersey Care NHS Trust for the purposes of monitoring research 
procedures. I understand that this is for audit purposes only to ensure that 
my consent has been sought and that the study if being carried out 
correctly. 
 
8. I give my approval for the research team to access my hospital records for 
research purposes only. 
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study carried out by Michael Lewis 
(Doctoral student), ARC (Ashworth Research Centre) and the University of 
Central Lancashire, and I am satisfied that the purpose and procedures of 
the study have been fully explained to me. 
 
 
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
      
Patient’s Hospital Number                       
            
Name of Person   Date    Signature  
taking consent. 
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REC reference: ………………… 
 
Participant identification number for this study: (………………….) 
 
PATIENT FILE COPY 
Title of the Project: Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing 
in psychopathy: Examining student and clinical samples. 
 
Lead Researcher: Michael Lewis 
Academic Supervisors: Professor Jane Ireland & Professor Janice Abbott 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet dated (………..) for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand that I do not have to agree immediately, but I can consider the 
information that I have received and ask the researcher to come and see me 
at a later date. 
   
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time up until my data has been inputted and analysed and 
it is no longer identifiable as my data, without giving any reason, without 
my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
4. I understand that I will be paid £10.00 for my time in the research. I 
understand that this will be paid directly into my personal account held by 
the hospital. I also understand that I will only receive this if I complete the 
research in full, i.e. the interview-based assessment and self-report 
measure. 
 
5. I understand that no personal information obtained during the course of the 
study relating to myself will be disclosed to other patients. 
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6. I understand that all information relating to myself obtained as part of the 
study will remain anonymous to those outside of the research team, and 
that I will not be personally identified in the final report of the study. 
However, I understand that if I report information indicating a threat to 
myself or others, e.g. If I disclose a previously unreported crime or a 
possible future crime, or that I intend to harm myself, then this information 
will be disclosed to the appropriate personnel. 
 
7. I understand that this consent form may be seen by responsible individuals 
from Mersey Care NHS Trust for the purposes of monitoring research 
procedures. I understand that this is for audit purposes only to ensure that 
my consent has been sought and that the study if being carried out 
correctly. 
 
8. I give my approval for the research team to access my hospital records for 
research purposes only. 
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study carried out by Michael Lewis 
(Doctoral student), ARC (Ashworth Research Centre) and the University of 
Central Lancashire, and I am satisfied that the purpose and procedures of 
the study have been fully explained to me. 
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
      
Patient’s Hospital Number                       
            
Name of Person   Date    Signature  
taking consent. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE: PAPA-2 
© Lewis, Ireland & Abbott (2012) 
 
Please contact Michael Lewis (mick.lewis04@gmail.com) or Professor Jane Ireland 
(jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk) for permission to use this measure/request the most recent version. 
 
Instructions 
Below are a series of statements that people use to describe themselves. Please read 
each statement carefully. Using the scale provided decide how well each statement 
describes how you have generally been throughout your life.  
 
Scale: 
 
Very unlike 
me 
Not really like 
me 
Neither agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1. I am only interested in myself.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I do not feel guilty when I cause others  1 2 3 4 5 
to feel pain or hurt. 
 
3. I would describe myself as one of the most 1 2 3 4 5 
confident people around. 
 
4. I will use people to get what I want.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I often experience strong negative emotions,  1 2 3 4 5 
such as anger, sadness, and hatred. 
 
6. I often take chances that could be risky to 1 2 3 4 5 
me or others. 
 
7. I often don’t think of the consequences of 1 2 3 4 5 
my actions. 
 
8. As a person, I have never changed.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I have been described as a cruel person who 1 2 3 4 5 
does not worry about hurting others. 
 
10. I can allow my feelings to interfere with my 1 2 3 4 5 
Decisions (e.g. “cloud my judgement”). 
 
11. Others would describe me as an irritable  1 2 3 4 5 
person with problems controlling my  
temper. 
 
12. I am talented at making people feel good  1 2 3 4 5 
about themselves. 
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13. I see a lot of hostility around me.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. I regularly view others as lazy.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I find most people are weak and not worth 1 2 3 4 5 
bothering with. 
 
16. When I feel sad I can quickly make myself 1 2 3 4 5 
happy again. 
 
17. I am quick to respond in a hostile manner  1 2 3 4 5 
to threats or insults. 
 
18. I find it impossible to resist temptation.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. I often get into trouble more than others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
20. I find it difficult to comfort others when  1 2 3 4 5 
they are upset. 
 
21. I would describe myself as someone who is 1 2 3 4 5 
often ‘fearless’ when faced with a threat.  
 
22. I often feel socially close to others.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. I am a creative person who can think of  1 2 3 4 5 
more than one way of dealing with 
problems. 
 
24. I am not that bothered about others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. The world is a threatening place, you have  1 2 3 4 5 
to ‘watch your back’. 
 
26. I often feel in touch with other people’s   1 2 3 4 5 
feelings. 
 
27. If I am caught out on a lie I can quickly  1 2 3 4 5 
think of a way out. 
 
28. I often experience strong positive   1 2 3 4 5 
emotions, such as happiness and joy. 
 
29. I am often bored.     1 2 3 4 5 
 
30. I enjoy doing things that are exciting  1 2 3 4 5 
or new. 
 
 
 
 
Very 
unlike me 
 
 
 
 
Not really 
like me 
 
 
 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
 
 
 
 
Somewhat 
like me 
 
 
 
 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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31. I am able to commit a wide number of  1 2 3 4 5 
behaviours that, if caught, would get me  
into trouble. 
 
32. I can often find myself viewing others as  1 2 3 4 5 
nothing more than ‘objects’ or things to 
be used. 
 
33. I am an aggressive person in a number of 1 2 3 4 5 
situations. 
 
34. I use illegal drugs, or those that are not  1 2 3 4 5 
prescribed to me, more than most people 
I know. 
 
35. I find it difficult to give emotional and  1 2 3 4 5 
personal support to others.  
 
36. If I do something wrong I will feel bad   1 2 3 4 5 
about it. 
 
37. If I behave in an aggressive manner I often  1 2 3 4 5 
feel bad about it afterwards. 
 
38. I often find myself thinking that I am more 1 2 3 4 5 
important than others. 
 
39. I have been described as a ‘fraudster’ or a 1 2 3 4 5 
‘con artist’ by those who know me. 
 
40. I always accept responsibility for what I do. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
41. I can be unpredictable.    1 2 3 4 5 
 
42. I often find people behave aggressively  1 2 3 4 5 
or in a hostile manner towards me. 
 
43. Others would describe me as a very   1 2 3 4 5 
intense person who has difficulty getting  
on with others. 
 
44. As a child I often got into trouble more  1 2 3 4 5 
than others. 
 
45. I often feel emotionally close to others.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Very 
unlike me 
Not really 
like me 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
like me 
Very like 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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PCL:SV  
© Hart, Cox & Hare (1995) 
 
The PCL:SV can be obtained from Multi-Health Systems, Psychological Assessments 
and Services, 83 Baker Street, London, W1U 6AG. 
 
Participants rate items such as ‘Superficial’, ‘Grandiose’ and ‘Deceitful’ on a three-
point likert scale, where ‘0’ indicates that the trait is not present, ‘1’ that it maybe 
present, and ‘2’ that  ‘yes’ it is present. Raters also have the option of omitting an item. 
Ratings should be made while reviewing the diagnostic criteria in the PCL-R rating 
booklet. 
 
This is a 12 item measure. 
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Table 51: Content of the ACL. © Ireland & Ireland (2012). 
 
ACL area Theme identified from literature 
 
Implicit, explicit 
or observation 
How assessed Collateral 
item?  
ACL composite 
item  
 
Affective Difficulty in recognising emotions Explicit Interview N 1A (3) 
Affective Callousness/lack of empathy Explicit Interview Y 1B (4) 
Affective Emotional impulsivity  Explicit Interview Y IC (1) 
Affective Anger/irritability Explicit Interview Y 1D (3) 
Affective Problems in identifying emotions Implicit Puzzle plus response time N 1E 
Affective Problems in feeling emotions Implicit Event stories plus response 
time 
N 1F 
Affective Lack of guilt/remorse & willingness to exploit Explicit Interview Y 2A (3) 
Cognitive Cognitive impulsivity  Explicit Interview  Y 2B (1 item) 
Cognitive Difficulties with moral judgements/ reasoning Implicit Moral scenarios plus response 
time and number of reasons 
N 2C  
Cognitive Hostile responding Implicit Conditional reasoning 
scenarios 
Y 2D 
Lifestyle Poor quantity of interpersonal relationships Explicit Interview Y 3A 
     (Continued) 
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Table 51: Continued. 
 
    
ACL area Theme identified from literature 
 
Implicit, explicit 
or observation 
How assessed Collateral 
item?  
ACL composite 
item  
Lifestyle General poor quality of interpersonal 
relationships 
Explicit  Genogram patterns Y 3B 
Lifestyle Poor quality of interpersonal relationships, 
characterised by aggression 
Explicit Genogram patterns Y 3C 
Lifestyle Tendency towards being aggressive Explicit Interview Y 3D (2 items) 
Cognitive Uncaring/callous view towards aggression use Explicit Interview Y 3E (2 items 
Lifestyle Tendency to be cruel or humiliate others Explicit Interview  Y 3F (2 items) 
Cognitive Uncaring/callous view towards use of 
cruelty/humiliation 
Explicit Interview Y 3G (2 items) 
Lifestyle Tendency to manipulate Explicit Interview Y 3H (2 items) 
Cognitive Tendency towards narcissism Explicit Interview Y 3I (2 items) 
Lifestyle Irresponsibility/poor planning Explicit Interview Y 3J (6 items) 
Lifestyle Thrill and adventure seeking Explicit Self-report scale Y 3K (6 items) 
Lifestyle Susceptibility to boredom Explicit Self-report scale Y 3N (6 items) 
Lifestyle Criminal tendency Explicit Interview Y 3P (2 items) 
     (Continued) 
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Table 51: Continued. 
 
    
ACL area Theme identified from literature 
 
Implicit, explicit 
or observation 
How assessed Collateral 
item?  
ACL composite 
item  
Lifestyle Inability to learn from punishment Explicit Interview N 3Q (1 item) 
Interpersonal Paucity of emotional content Implicit Observational - 4A 
Interpersonal Superficial content/style Implicit Observational - 4B 
Interpersonal Controlling style Implicit Observational - 4C 
Interpersonal Aggressive/hostile style Implicit Observational - 4D 
Interpersonal Manipulative style Implicit Observational - 4E 
Interpersonal Less than honest style Implicit Observational and collateral Y 4F 
Interpersonal Self-important style Implicit Observational - 4G 
Interpersonal Susceptibility to boredom Implicit Observational - 4H 
Interpersonal Impulsive style Implicit Observational - 4I 
 
For further details on the ACL, please contact Professor Jane Ireland (jlireland1@uclan.ac.uk). Please note that this measure is copyrighted. 
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DEBRIEF SHEET: STUDENT SAMPLE 
  
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for participating in the research. If you 
have any questions relating to the research, please do not hesitate to contact the lead 
researcher on the contact details located at the bottom of this form. 
 
What did I complete? 
The study recruited a sample of university students as well as patients at a High Secure 
Psychiatric Hospital to examine their thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and feelings, on a 
scale that has a psychopathic personality style at one end, and a caring responsible 
personality style at the other. At the same time, the research was conducted to further 
develop and refine a new self-report measure, the Psychopathic processing and 
personality assessment – version two (PAPA-2).   
 
You took part in an interview-based assessment. As part of this, the Affect, Cognitive, 
and Lifestyle (ACL) assessment was completed. This measure provided a profile of 
your functioning, i.e. it looked at your personality as well as your thoughts, beliefs, 
feelings, and emotions, at a conscious (explicit) and unconscious (implicit) level. A 
second measure, the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) was also 
scored using your responses during the interview. Finally, you also completed the 
PAPA-2. This self-report questionnaire examined how people generally describe 
themselves. It also looked at where you are on a scale that has antisocial personality 
traits at one end, and caring responsible traits at the other. Like the other two measures, 
this questionnaire also examined your beliefs and thoughts, and your feelings and 
emotions. 
 
Please note, the assessment was conducted for research purposes only and it is NOT a 
clinical assessment by any means. 
 
Support 
If the research has upset or distressed you in any way, you may find the following 
support agencies useful: 
 
 University Counselling Service (a free professional and confidential counselling 
service offered by UCLAN) 
Tel: 01772 892572; Email: CoRecep@uclan.ac.uk 
 Samaritans (a confidential free support service) 
Tel: 08457 90 90 90; Email: jo@samaritans.org 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints regarding the research you may first want to contact the lead 
researcher. Alternatively you may want to speak to the academic supervisor, Professor 
Jane Ireland, on the contact details listed at the bottom of this form. If you would like to 
contact somebody independent from the research, you may like to contact the Dean of 
the School of Psychology. 
 
Results 
A summary of the results will be available in due course. Should you wish to receive a 
copy, please make the lead researcher aware as soon as possible.  
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Payment 
You will now receive the £10.00 payment for your time and effort. 
 
Thank you once again for taking part in the research. 
 
Research team: Contact details 
 
Michael Lewis (Lead researcher): mlewis@uclan.ac.uk 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE 
 
Professor Jane Ireland (Director of Studies): JLIreland1@uclan.ac.uk 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE 
 
Professor Janice Abbott (Academic supervisor): JAbbott@uclan.ac.uk 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, PR1 2HE 
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DEBRIEF SHEET: PATIENT SAMPLE  
 
Exploring explicit and implicit cognitive and affective processing in psychopathy: 
Examining student and clinical samples 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for participating in the research. If you 
have any questions relating to the research, please do not hesitate to contact the lead 
researcher on the contact details located at the bottom of this form. 
 
What did I complete? 
The study recruited a sample of university students as well as patients at a High Secure 
Psychiatric Hospital to examine their thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and emotions on a scale 
that has a psychopathic personality style at one end, and a caring responsible personality 
style at the other. At the same time, the research was conducted to further develop and 
refine a new self-report measure, the Psychopathic processing and personality 
assessment – version two (PAPA-2).   
 
You took part in an interview-based assessment. As part of this, the Affect, Cognitive, 
and Lifestyle (ACL) assessment was completed. This measure provided a profile of 
your functioning, i.e. it looked at your personality as well as your thoughts, beliefs, 
feelings, and emotions, at a conscious (explicit) and unconscious (implicit) level. A 
second measure, the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version (PCL:SV) was also 
scored using your responses during the interview. If you provided consent for your 
health records to be examined, they were also used to score these two measures. Finally, 
you also completed the PAPA-2. This self-report questionnaire examined how people 
generally describe themselves. It also looked at where you are on a scale that has 
antisocial personality traits at one end, and caring responsible traits at the other. Like 
the other two measures, this questionnaire also examined your beliefs, thoughts, 
feelings, and emotions. 
 
Please note, the assessment was conducted for research purposes only and it is NOT a 
clinical assessment by any means. 
 
Support 
If the research has upset or distressed you in any way, you may find the following 
support agencies useful: 
 
 Spiritual care 
 Advocacy service 
 Psychology 
 Befriender scheme 
 Your ICC nurse 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints regarding the research you can ask a member of staff to first 
contact the lead researcher. Alternatively you may want to speak to the academic 
supervisor, Professor Jane Ireland, on the details at the bottom of this form. If you 
would like to contact somebody independent from the research, you may like to contact 
the patient’s complaints department who will advise you on how to deal with your 
concerns. 
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Results 
A summary of the results will be available in due course. Should you wish to receive a 
copy please make the lead researcher aware as soon as possible.  
 
Payment 
The £10.00 payment for your time and effort will now be paid directly into your 
personal bank account held by the hospital. 
 
Thank you once again for taking part in the research. 
 
Research team: Contact details 
 
Michael Lewis (Lead researcher) 
Ashworth Research Centre (ARC), Ashworth Hospital 
 
Professor Jane Ireland (Lead academic supervisor) 
Ashworth Research Centre (ARC), Ashworth Hospital 
 
Professor Janice Abbott (Academic supervisor) 
School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
